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The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2012

Frank Costigliola
Frank Costigliola
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of History, University of Rhode Island
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Abstract

The foreign economic policy of the United States in the aftermath of World War I was not isolationist, but selectively interventionist. With a group of very able American businessmen-diplomats in the lead, the nation pressured the French to accept the Dawes Plan, which, it was hoped, would solve the reparations problem, encourage healthy economic recovery and growth (which would embrace large sales of American capital goods to Germany), and ensure peaceful contentment in two nations that were more bitter enemies than ever. But, Professor Costigliola shows, a plan to rebuild Germany that was half private business and half foreign policy, and that was manipulated to both ends, could not succeed in the marketplace, where it had to live or die.

Type
Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , Winter 1976 , pp. 477 - 502
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1976

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References

1 The seminal essay is Williams, William A., “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920's,” Science and Society, XVII (Winter, 1954).Google Scholar Williams' thesis has been amplified and modified by Smith, Robert F., “American Foreign Relations 1920–42,” in Bernstein, Barton J., Towards a New Past (New York, 1968), 232–262Google Scholar; Parrini, Carl P., Heir to Empire (Pittsburgh, 1969)Google Scholar; Van Meter, Robert, “The United States and European Recovery 1918–23” (doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971)Google Scholar; Link, Werner, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921–1932 (Düsseldorf, 1970)Google Scholar; Leffler, Melvyn P., “The Struggle for Stability: American Policy toward France, 1921–33” (doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1972)Google Scholar; Hogan, Michael T., “The United States and the Problem of International Economic Control: The Private Structure of Cooperation in American Foreign Policy, 1918–28” (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1974).Google Scholar

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4 Although exports to Europe as a percentage of total American exports declined from 66 per cent in 1919 to 44 per cent in 1929, that continent remained a sizable customer. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C., 1960), 550.Google Scholar As Hoover well knew, the depressed agriculture industry depended on Europe for 75 per cent of its export sales. Hoover Press Release, October 19, 1923, COF Hoover Papers.

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14 Houghton's account of conversation with Rathenau in letter to Castle, July 6, 1922; see also Houghton Diary, June 8, 1922, Houghton Papers.

15 Houghton's account of conversation with Rathenau and Stinnes, Houghton Diary June 23, 1922, Houghton Papers. For Stinnes' memorandum of this conversation, see Ringer, Fritz K., The German Inflation of 1923 (New York, 1969), 90–92.Google Scholar After touring Germany, Castle concurred with this analysis. Extract from Castle Diary, November 18, 1922, copy in Houghton Papers.

16 Houghton Diary, September 22, 1923. See also Houghton Diary, October 15, 1923; December 7, 1923; Houghton to Hughes, October 7, 1923, Houghton Papers.

17 Houghton recounted Stinnes' remarks in a letter to Hughes, October 7, 1923, Houghton Papers.

18 Houghton Diary, September 23, 1923, Houghton Papers.

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20 Houghton to Hughes, October 7, 1923, Houghton Papers.

21 Houghton to Castle, December 3, 1923, Houghton Papers. Castle agreed. Castle to Houghton, November 2, 1923, ibid. In terms of his own social background, Houghton felt far more comfortable with the German Right than Left. Luncheon at von Seeck's home demonstrated that although they were “the most reactionary lot in Germany,” the men around the general were “far pleasanter to meet than most of the newer people.” Houghton Diary, March 11, 1923, Houghton Papers.

22 Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, 1975), 355–420Google Scholar; Jones, Kenneth Paul, “Stresemann and the Diplomacy of the Ruhr Crisis” (doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970)Google Scholar; Saunders, Donald Bishop, “Stresemann vs. Poincare: The Conduct of Germany's Western Policy During Stresemann's Chancellorship, August-November 1923” (doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1975).Google Scholar

23 Houghton to Hughes, March 6, 1923, Houghton Papers.

24 Memorandum by Hughes of conversation with British Ambassador Geddes, January 25, 1923, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1923 (Washington, 1938), II, 52–55Google Scholar; Hughes to Henry P. Fletcher, August 17, 1923, ibid., 66–68; Hughes to Myron T. Herrick and Roland Boyden, October 17, 1922, FRUS 1922 (Washington, 1938), II, 169–170; Hughes to Houghton, November 17, 1923, Houghton Papers; Memorandum by Castle of conversation with Hughes and Herrick, August 1, 1922, ibid., Castle to Houghton, March 17, 1923, ibid. For a general study of Hughes'diplomacy, see Woodard, Nelson Eugene, “Post-War Reconstruction and International Order: A Study of the Diplomacy of Charles Evans Hughes” (doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970).Google Scholar

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26 Henry L. Stimson to Owen D. Young, April 8, 1929, File No. 462.00R296/2773, General Records of the Department of State, RG59 (National Archives).

27 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 148–150.

28 Speech by Hughes, Charles Evans, FRUS 1922 (Washington, 1938), II, 202.Google Scholar On Hughes' private negotiations see Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 150–165. For Borah's criticism, see Memorandum by W. McClure, “Senator Borah's Proposal for an International Conference Made During the 4th Session of the 67th Congress,” January 8, 1927, File No. 550.M1/44, General Records of the Department of State.

29 Castle to Houghton, March 17, 1923, Houghton Papers.

30 Hoover Press Release, October 19, 1923, COF Hoover Papers; unsigned, undated (but probably July 1923) memorandum, File No. 046. Ruhr general 1923, Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, RG151 (National Archives).

31 Houghton to Castle, February 12, 1923; Castle to Houghton, March 17, 1923, ibid., Roland Boyden to Hallowell, February 16, 1923, Owen D. Young Papers (Van Hornesville, N. Y.).

32 Link, Werner, “Die Ruhrbesetzung und die wirtschaftpolitischen Interessen der USA,” Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte, XVII (October, 1969), 379–381.Google Scholar

33 Castle Diary, November 2, 1923, quoted in Gescher, Dieter Bruno, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und die Reparationen 1920–24 (Bonn, 1956), 199–200.Google Scholar

34 During the course of 1923, the franc dropped 40 per cent on the foreign exchange markets. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics (Washington, 1943), 670–671Google Scholar; Dulles, The French Franc, 170–172; Wolfe, Martin, The French Franc Between the Wars (New York, 1951), 33–35.Google Scholar

35 Dawes, Charles G., A Journal of Reparations (London, 1939), February 4, 1924, 74.Google Scholar

36 Memorandum by Stuart M. Crocker of December 27, 1923 trip to Washington with Young, undated, Young Papers.

37 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 218–222.

38 Houghton to Hughes, January 8, 1924, Houghton Papers.

39 Houghton's paraphrase of Young's remarks, Houghton Diary, January 11, 1924, Houghton Papers.

40 Paraphrase of Young's remarks, Dawes, Rufus C., The Dawes Plan in the Making (Indianapolis, 1925), 34.Google Scholar

41 Houghton's paraphrase of Young's remarks, Houghton Diary, January 11, 1924, Houghton Papers. In ensuing months the Committee, largely under Young's direction, fleshed out the Plan. Germany would pay an ascending scale of annuities that would, by 1928–1929, reach the “standard” level of 2.5 billion gold marks ($625,000,000). A “prosperity clause” required the payment of even higher sums as Germany's production rose. A gold value clause provided for adjusting the nominal amount of payments in the event of a drastic change in the purchasing power of gold. In keeping with the American drive to roll back the spread of state enterprise, the plan denationalized the German railroads and recommended the establishment of a private railroad company in which private interests, the German Government, and a foreign director would share control. An American Agent General for Reparations would oversee the reparations machinery and the German economy. Visiting Germany eighteen months later, Governor Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Rank of New York commented that “the extensive character of these controls in Germany is really unbelievable.” Memorandum by Benjamin Strong, “Germany's Attitude toward Supervision,” July 22, 1925, Benjamin Strong Papers (Federal Reserve Rank of New York, N. Y. C.).

42 Representative accounts are Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1969), 661–664Google Scholar and Bemis, Samuel Flagg, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1965), 720.Google Scholar In any case, it is a gross oversimplification to say that American loans went directly to pay reparations. The money lent to Germany was used to finance consumption and investment within Germany, including substantial imports from the U. S. or from America's customers. Only in the sense of providing foreign exchange were the loans connected directly with reparations.

43 Speech by Owen D. Young, June 25, 1925, Young Papers; Crocker interview with Jean Parmentier, May 15, 1925, ibid.; Alan Goldsmith to Christian A. Herter, February 4, 1924, Leonard P. Ayres Papers (Library of Congress, Washington); Walter S. Tower to Henry M. Robinson, March 26, 1924, Young Papers; Basil Miles, “Memorandum for the Members of the Committee on Economic Restoration,” November 7, 1924, ibid.; Henry M. Robinson, “American Banking and World Rehabilitation,” June 25, 1925, ibid.

44 Memorandum by Young of trip to Berlin, February 3, 1924, Young Papers.

45 Houghton to Castle, April 6, 1924, Houghton Papers. See also Goldsmith to Herter, February 4, 1924, Leonard P. Ayres Papers.

46 Strong to Pierre Jay, April 23, 1924, Benjamin Strong Papers.

47 Houghton's paraphrase of Young's comments, Houghton Diary, February 4, 1924, Houghton Papers.

48 Crocker interview with Rufus C. Dawes, May 13, 1925, Young Papers.

49 E. L. Dulles, The French Franc, 174–176.

50 C. G. Dawes, Journal of Reparations, March 11, 1924, 160.

51 Houghton to Dwight, April 26, 1924, Houghton Papers.

52 Memorandum by Young of trip to Berlin, February 3, 1924, Young Papers.

53 The other Federal Reserve Banks soon followed. Banking and Monetary Statistics, 440.

54 Boyden, Roland W., “The Dawes Report,” Foreign Affairs, II (June, 1924), 590.Google Scholar

55 Fred I. Kent to Houghton, April 11, 1924, Houghton Papers; National City Bank of New York, Economic Conditions, Government Finance, United States Securities (June, 1924), 87.

56 Dawes, A Journal of Reparations, February 22, 1924, 117–119.

57 Young to Gerard Swope, March 19, 1924, Young Papers.

58 J. P. Morgan and Company to Young, March 26, 1924, Young Papers.

59 J. P. Morgan and Company in New York to Morgan, Harjes and Co. in Paris, transmitted to Young, April 19, 1924, Young Papers; Morgan and Company to Young, March 1, April 2, April 3, April 5, 1924, ibid.

60 Houghton Diary, March 29, 1924, Houghton Papers.

61 Houghton Diary, March 30, 1924, Houghton Papers.

62 Houghton Diary, August 20, 1924, Houghton Papers.

63 Houghton Diary, August 31, 1924, Houghton Papers.

64 At the London Conference, Kellogg, James A. Logan, and Owen D. Young (joined intermittently by Hughes, Mellon, and Houghton) assumed an influential position as mediators. The French and Belgians were reluctant to loosen their grip on Germany. Opposing them were the British, the Germans, and Thomas W. Lamont, spokesman for the House of Morgan. The latter group insisted on immediate evacuation of the Ruhr and French renunciation of the right to march in again. After a direct appeal by Kellogg to Lamont, the banker, followed by the English and Germans, agreed to a compromise solution. The best archival source for the London Conference are files 176/14–177/4 of the Thomas W. Lamont Papers (Baker Library, Harvard Business School). See also Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 296–306; Clarke, Central Bank Cooperation, 52–55, 68; Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Struggle for Stability: American Policy toward France, 1921–1933,” 115–119.

65 Under the new arrangement, the Reparations Commission could declare Germany in default only with the unanimous consent of its members, including the new American “Citizen Member,” who, though officially independent of his government, enjoyed full voting rights. If the Reparation Commission could not reach a unanimous decision, the issue went to the Dawes Plan Arbitration Committee dominated by its American chairman. In effect, the real power over reparations shifted from the Reparations Commission to the Dawes Plan machinery headed by the American Agent General, whom Strong dubbed the “King” of the Plan. Strong to Jay, April 23, 1924, Strong Papers; Owen D. Young to James H. Perkins, January 6, 1925, Young Papers; T. N. Perkins to Young, October 2, 1924, ibid.

66 James A. Logan to Hughes, June 25, 1924, FRUS 1924, II, 135; Logan to Young, June 27, 1924, Young Papers; Logan to Hoover, September 5, 1924, COF Hoover Papers; Dawes, A Journal of Reparations, 232–233; O. Wiedfeldt to German Foreign Office, July 8, 1924, Microfilm Role No. T120/1490 (Captured German Records, National Archives, Washington ).

67 Morrow to Hughes, September 18, 1924, quoted in Morrow to Morgan and Lamont, September 20, 1924, File No. 177/13 Lamont Papers.

68 Hughes to Morrow, September 19, 1924, quoted in Morrow to Morgan and Lamont, September 20, 1924, File No. 177/13 Lamont Papers.

69 Morrow to Morgan and Lamont, September 22, 1924, File No. 177/13 Lamont Papers.

70 S. Parker Gilbert of J. P. Morgan and Co. to Cordell Hull, June 15, 1934, File No. 182/2 Lamont Papers.

71 Calvin Coolidge Speech, April 22, 1924, FRUS 1924, II, 14–15.

72 An outspoken anti-labor conservative, banker, and ax-wielding Budget Director in 1921–22, Dawes fitted in with Coolidge's campaign, which was based on support for business and economy in government. Furthermore, Dawes promised to win votes from disgruntled farmers, who had thrashed the Republicans in 1922. As journalist Mark Sullivan remarked, Dawes was “the author of the plan for the increase of the European market for farm products by the stabilization of Europe,” Literary Digest, LXXXI (June 28, 1924), 6.

73 Kent to Houghton, April 11, 1924, Houghton Papers; Houghton Diary, April 26, 1924, ibid., Kent, “America and the Dawes Plan,” National Foreign Trade Council, Official Report of the 1924 Convention (New York, 1924), 373–386.Google Scholar

74 Literary Digest, LXXXI (April 19, 1924), 5–8; (April 26, 1924), 10–12; (May 17, 1924), 11–12, 20–21; (June 28, 1924), 5–8; Literary Digest, LXXXII August 9, 1924), 5–7; (August 30, 1924), 5–8; (September 13, 1924), 10–12; (September 27, 1924), 12–13; Literary Digest, LXXXIII October 25, 1924), 16.

75 Banking and Monetary Statistics, 440.

76 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXIX (October 18, 1924), 1771.

77 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, CXIX (October 18, 1924), 1771; Consul Maynard B. Barnes to Kellogg, December 19, 1925, File No. 862, 51/2165, General Records of the Department of State.

78 Gardner, Lloyd C., LaFeber, Walter F., McCormick, Thomas J., Creation of the American Empire (Chicago, 1973), 361.Google Scholar

79 Houghton Diary, November 26, 1924, Houghton Papers.

80 Houghton Diary, December 4, 1924, Houghton Papers.

81 Owen D. Young speech to businessmen of New York, December 11, 1924, Young Papers.

82 Arthur N. Young speech, “The Department of State and Foreign Loans,” August 24, 1924, copy in Owen D. Young Papers.

83 Memorandum by Arthur N. Young, “German Loans,” August 7, 1925, File No. 862.51/2045, General Records of the Department of State.

84 Mellon to Kellogg, November 3, 1925, File No. 862.51/2104, General Records of the Department of State.

85 Memorandum by Grosvenor Jones (prepared at request of Julius Klein), rough draft, no date (but internal evidence suggests mid-1925), COF Hoover Papers.

86 Hoover to Henry M. Robinson, October 23, 1925, CPF Hoover Papers.

87 Owen D. Young speech at Stone and Webster dinner, June 25, 1925, Young Papers.

88 Strong to Pierre Jay, April 23, 1?24, Strong Papers.

89 Literary Digest, LXXXV (May 16, 1925), 5. On Locarno see Jacobson, Jon, Locarno Diplomacy Germany and the West 1925–29 (Princeton, 1972), 3–67Google Scholar; Stambrook, F. G., “‘Das Kind’ — Lord D'Abernon and the Origins of the Locarno Pact,” Central European History, I (1968).Google Scholar

90 Houghton's speech to Pilgrim Society, London, May 4, 1925, Houghton Papers. The British and Germans greeted Houghton's pronouncement warmly, while the French reaction was far cooler. Austen Chamberlain to Esme Howard, April 27, 1925, F.O. 371/10639, PRO (repeating Champerlain's conversation with Houghton); A. von Maltzan to Houghton, May 13, 1925, Houghton Papers; Stresemann to Houghton, June 2, 1925, ibid.; Literary Digest, LXXXV (May 16, 1925), 5. The British applied similar financial pressure on the Germans. Chamberlain to Winston S. Churchill, June 29, 1925, T172/1469 (Treasury Records, Public Records Office, London).

91 Maynard B. Barnes to Kellogg, December 19, 1925, File No. 863.51/2165, General Records of the Department of State.

92 Coolidge Speech at Cambridge, July 3, 1925, in New York Times (July 4, 1925), 4.

93 Strong to Pierre Jay, August 31, 1925, Strong Papers; Strong's memorandum of discussion at Reichsbank luncheon, July 11, 1925, ibid.; Strong's memorandum of conversation with Schacht, November 14, 1925, ibid.

94 Chamberlain to Esme Howard (regarding conversation with Houghton), April 27, 1925, F.O. 371/10639, PRO.

95 During the period 1923–1929, American private investors lent Germany $1.3 billion. See Kuczynski, Robert R., Banker's Profits from German Loans (Washington, 1932), 140–141.Google Scholar In addition, there was a sizable amount of direct investment as General Electric, General Motors, Ford, and other corporate giants moved into Germany.

96 Strong to Pierre Jay, July 21, 1927, Strong Papers. Houghton shared this fear. See Houghton to Castle, August 25, 1927, Houghton Papers.

97 See Leffler, Melvyn, “The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921–1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation,” Journal of American History, LIX (December, 1972), 585–601CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moulton, Harold G. and Pasvolsky, Leo, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington, 1932).Google Scholar

98 Fleisig, Heywood, “Long Term Capital Flows and the Great Depressios” (doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1969)Google Scholar; Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression (Berkeley, 1973)Google Scholar; Costigliola, , “The Politics of Financial Stabilization: American Reconstruction Policy in Europe, 1924–30,” (doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1973).Google Scholar

99 An integral part of the new reparations plan was the creation of an international bank to administer reparation payments and promote world financial stability. See Costigliola, , “The Other Side of Isolationism: The Establishment of the First World Bank,” The Journal of American History, LIX (December, 1972), 602–620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

100 Eyck, Erich, A History of the Weimar Republic (2 vols. Cambridge, Mass., 1963), II, 278–298.Google Scholar

101 Robert Olds to Dulles, June 11, 1929, Dulles Papers. After studying the scheme, Dulles agreed “that Article 248 is certainly pushed far enough into the background that it need give us no practical concern.” Dulles to Olds, June 27, 1929, ibid. This is what Strong had intended when he helped to lay the groundwork for the conference. See Strong to George Harrison, July 20, 1928, c261.1 Banca d'Italia, Files of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

102 On expectations from the Young Plan, see Gilbert to Pierre Jay, September 26, 1928 copy in George L. Harrison Papers (Columbia University Library); Memorandum by S. P. Gilbert of conversation with Stresemann, November 13, 1928, copy in Young Papers: Hans Luther to Henry L. Stimson, March 25, 1931, File No. 862.51/3016, General Records of the Department of State. Foreign lending resumed in the first six months of 1930 and then dwindled to nearly nothing. United States Commerce Department, Survey of Current Business, Annual Supplement: 1931 (Washington, 1931), 223.Google Scholar

103 Bennett, Edward W., Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 1931 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).Google Scholar

104 Frederic M. Sackett to Henry L. Stimson, January 21, 1931, File No. 862.51/2991, General Records of the Department of State; Lochner, L. P., Herbert Hoover and Germany (New York, 1960), 115Google Scholar; Myers, William Starr, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover 1929–1933 (New York, 1940), 174–178Google Scholar; Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 113–165; Smiley, Ralph, “The Lausanne Conference, 1932: The Diplomacy of the End of Reparations” (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1971).Google Scholar

105 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, 523–541; Burke, Bernard Vincent, “American Diplomats and Hitler's Rise to Power, 1930–33: The Mission of Ambassador Sackett,” (doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1966).Google Scholar