Balancing Procreative Autonomy and Parental Responsibility
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 March 2011
In Rationality and the Genetic Challenge: Making People Better? Matti Häyry provides a clear and informed discussion and analysis of a number of competing answers to the above questions. Häyry describes three main perspectives on the morality of prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD), the “restrictive,” “moderate,” and “permissive” views, and his analysis illuminates that these views can be distinguished in terms of their different “rationalities”—their respective understanding of what counts as a reasonable choice for parents to make in light of PGD.
- Special Section: Methodology in Philosophical Bioethics
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011
3. In what follows we use the terms “embryo” and “future child” interchangeably and understand that there can both single parents and couples.
5. Savulescu, J.Procreative beneficence: Why we should select the best children. Bioethics 2001;15:413–26CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Savulescu, J.In defense of procreative beneficence. Journal of Medical Ethics 2007;33:284–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Savulescu, J, Kahane, G.The moral obligation to create children with the best chance of the best life. Bioethics 2009;23:274–90.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
10. There are additional reasons for objection to PB that have been raised elsewhere, for example, Stoller, S.Why we are not required to select the best children: A response to Savulescu. Bioethics 2008;22:364–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bennett, R.The fallacy of the principle of procreative beneficence. Bioethics 2009;23:265–73.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
16. Häyry raises a third objection against the social view concerning the distribution of scarce resources. Though Häyry’s justice concern is an important one, we are not sure that it is an argument against the social view per say. It may be an argument against selecting for disabled children, however, regardless of the social nature of the disabilities.
18. According to Savulescu and Kahane, social prejudice should be excluded from conditions that influence the well-being afforded by a specific trait. Where Savulescu and Kahane appear to assume that social prejudice will not be a significant factor in most diseases and defects, proponents of the social view would disagree. See note 5, Savulescu, Kahane 2009:286–9.