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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2021
Courts do many good things. Judges carefully consider individual claims and arguments,1 and contrast them against the law in light of evidence. Their decisions are argued for, are public, and can be contested in form and content in different hierarchical stages. Additionally, and among other things, these practices are said to contribute to the will-formation of the public sphere and improve the quality of the legislative process.2
I wish to thank Jeff King, Johan Olsthoorn, Eric Boot, Ugur Aytac, Chiara Valentini, Richard Bellamy, Sebastian Lewis, and Dimitrios Kyritsis for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. I was kindly invited to present the argument in events at UCL-Laws (Public Law Discussion Group), the University of Reading Law School, Universidad de Cuyo (seminario “legitimidad democrática”), and the Magios running seminar organised by Sebastian Reyes Molina.
1. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985) at 32.
2. Jürgen Habermas, “Lecture One: How is Legitimacy Possible on the Basis of Legality” translated by Kenneth Baynes (Law and Morality, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered at Harvard University, 1 and 2 October 1986) at 248; Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, “The Role of Courts in Improving the Legislative Process” (2015) 3:3 The Theory and Practice of Legislation 295.
3. Dworkin, supra note 1 at 70; Alon Harel, “Why Legislatures Owe Deference to the Courts: A Commentary on Dimitrios Kyritsis’ Where Our Protection Lies: Separation of Powers and Constitutional Review” (2019) 38 Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law 7.
4. Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 33-34; Jeremy Waldron, “Do Judges Reason Morally?” in G Huscroft, ed, Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 38; Jeremy Waldron, “Judges as Moral Reasoners” (2009) 7:1 Intl J of Constitutional Law 2.
5. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, “Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions: Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice” in W Sadurski, ed, Constitutional Justice: East and West (Kluwer, 2002) 21 at 22. See also Stephen Macedo, “Introduction” in S Macedo, ed, Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) 3 at 6. Some examples of scholars arguing along these lines are John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) at 231-40; Christopher L Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard University Press, 2001) at 3, 5; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, 1996) at 279-80; Conrado Mendes, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2013).
6. Donald Bello Hutt, “Measuring popular and judicial deliberation: A critical comparison” (2018) 16:4 Intl J of Constitutional Law 1121; Donald Bello Hutt, “Constitutional Interpretation and Institutional Perspectives: A Deliberative Proposal” (2018) 31:2 Can JL & Jur 235[“Constitutional Interpretation”].
7. I partially confront this argument in section 4.1. For a different take also setting aside discussions of electoral representation in favour of discussing “other important aspect[s] of representation,” see Margit Cohn, A Theory of the Executive Branch: Tension and Legality (Oxford University Press, 2021).
8. For a brief discussion of this possibility, concluding that this type of representation “proves decidedly limited,” see Richard Bellamy & Cristina E Parau, “Introduction: Democracy, Courts and the Dilemmas of Representation” (2013) 49:3 Representation 255 at 261.
9. Richard Bellamy briefly analyses some arguments made in this article, but his discussion leaves significant room for further development. Additionally, my argument here grants fewer representative credentials to courts than Bellamy, who affirms that because judges operate in a democratic environment “they can sometimes be categorized under gyroscopic and anticipatory representation.” For the reasons I give in this paper, I am less inclined to buy into this narrative. See Richard Bellamy, “The Democratic Qualities of Courts: A Critical Analysis of Three Arguments” (2013) 49:3 Representation 333 at 343-44.
10. Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92:2 Harvard Law Review 353 at 354; Adam Tomkins, “The Role of Courts in the Political Constitution” (2010) 60:1 UTLJ 1 at 4; Cass R Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretation and Institutions” (2003) 101:4 Mich L Rev 885; Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Cass R Sunstein, “There is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is” (2015) 30:2 Const Commentary 193.
11. Albert Weale, Democracy (Macmillan, 1999) at 87 [emphasis added].
12. Others make similar points. Mattias Kumm, for example, also argues for judicial representation, but his argument is generally covered by Alexy’s. The difference, which I take as ancillary to my analysis, is that Alexy focuses on ideal argumentation, while Kumm focuses on interpretive methodologies. See Matthias Kumm, “On the Representativeness of Constitutional Courts: How to Strengthen the Legitimacy of Rights Adjudicating Courts Without Undermining Their Independence” in C Landfried, ed, Judicial Power: How Constitutional Courts Affect Political Transformations (Cambridge University Press, 2019) at 281-291. One could also argue that there is a claim for judicial representation in Habermas’ contention that the judiciary contributes to the will-formation of the public sphere. But this is an indirect claim for representation inasmuch as it follows Ely’s procedural account that limits the contribution of the judiciary to clearing the paths for representative law-making that takes places outside the courtroom. See Habermas, supra note 5 at 267-96. Having said that, here I nonetheless offer some indirect critical remarks about adopting Elyan approaches to warrant the idea of judicial representation. For other scholars discussing these problems along similar lines, see for example, Eisgruber, supra note 5 at 110; Horacio Spector, “Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy” (2003) 22:3 Law & Phil 285; Dimitrios Kyritsis, “Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review” (2006) 26:4 Oxford J Leg Stud 733; Dimitrios Kyritsis, Where Our Protection Lies: Separation of Powers and Judicial Review (Oxford University Press, 2017) at ch 4, 6; Dimitrios Kyritsis, “Justifying Constitutional Review in the Legitimacy Register” (2020) 42 Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law [Kyritsis, “Justifying Constitutional Review”]. For an alternative but partially overlapping overview, see Pierre Brunet, Para un análisis del discurso jurídico, translated by Adriana María Cely (Univ Externado de Colombia, 2019) at 263-95.
13. Or it may be described from other theoretical backgrounds, for example, from aesthetics. See, for example, Frank Ankersmit, Political Representation (Stanford University Press, 2002).
14. For the reasons I offer in section 3, I use the term ‘will’ as comprising wills in sensu strictu, preferences, and interests.
15. Robert Alexy, “On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison” (2003) 16:4 Ratio Juris 433 at 443-48.
16. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002).
17. Robert Alexy, “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation” (2005) 3:4 Intl J of Constitutional Law 572 at 578.
18. Ibid .
19. Ibid .
20. Ibid at 579.
21. Ibid at 578.
22. Ibid at 580.
23. Ibid at 580.
24. Pierre Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity (Princeton University Press, 2011) at 123.
25. Ibid at 130.
26. Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
27. Rosanvallon, supra note 24 at 132.
28. Ibid at 140.
29. Ibid at 140.
30. Ibid at 141.
31. Ibid at 141.
32. Ibid at 145.
33. Ibid at 143.
34. Philip Pettit, “Representation, Responsive and Indicative” (2010) 17:3 Constellations 426 at 428.
35. Ibid at 429.
36. Ibid at 430.
37. Ibid at 433.
38. Andrew Rehfeld, “On Representing” (2018) 26:2 J of Political Phil 216 at 219 [Rehfeld, “On Representing”]. See also, Andrew Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy” (2009) 103:2 Amer Political Science Rev 214 at 216 [Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought”]; Suzanne Dovi, “Political Representation” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2018 Edition (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018). See also, Monica Brito Vieira & David Runciman, Representation (Polity, 2008) at 4.
39. I elaborate on my own view in Donald Bello Hutt, “Political Representation as Interpretation: A Contribution to Deliberative Constitutionalism” (2021) 33:4 Ratio Juris 351; Donald Bello Hutt, “Political Representation as a Regulative Ideal: a Comment on the Democratic Objection to Constitutional Review” (2019) 38 Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law 39.
40. Rehfeld, “On Representing”, supra note 38 at 217.
41. Ibid .
42. Ibid .
43. Ibid .
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid .
46. Constructivist theories currently being the most influential. See, for example, Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press, 2006); Michael Saward, The Representative Claim (Oxford University Press, 2010). Yet, they are not the only ones accepting this independence in judgement. See, for example, Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 90.
47. Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought”, supra note 38 at 215.
48. Jane Mansbridge, “Clarifying the Concept of Representation” (2011) 105:3 Amer Political Science Rev 621 at 622.
49. Brito-Vieira & Runciman, supra note 38 at 79 [emphasis added].
50. Ibid at 79. An argument that counts against theories of representation that completely sever the actions of the representative from the preferences of the represented, for example, Saward’s. See Saward, supra note 46. An example of these criticisms is found in Lisa Dish, “The Constructivist Turn in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End?” (2015) 22:4 Constellations 487.
51. It is quite telling of the difficulties in calling courts representative institutions that Brito and Runciman hesitate in accounting for literal trusteeship as representation “because literal trusteeship is a property relation upheld by specialized courts of law.” See Brito-Vieira & Runciman, supra note 38 at 79.
52. Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought”, supra note 38 at 214.
53. Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press, 1967) at 144.
54. Ibid ; Bellamy & Parau, supra note 8 at 256.
55. Dieter Grimm, “What Exactly is Political About Constitutional Adjudication” in Christine Ladfried, ed, Judicial Power: How Constitutional Courts Affect Political Transformations (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 307 at 308-09.
56. R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5 [Miller 1]; R (Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland, [2019] UKSC 41 [Miller 2].
57. Miller 1, supra note 56 at para 3 [emphasis added].
58. Miller 2, supra note 56 at para 1 [emphasis added].
59. Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought”, supra note 38 at 218.
60. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Rand McNally, 1967) at 155; David Shapiro, “Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism” (1988) 74:3 Va L Rev 519 at 556-57; Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2009).
61. This coincidence is not really that clear-cut, as judges sometimes decide on the basis of their political affiliation, sometimes on the basis of principle, sometimes attitudinally, etc., but I will assume it is ex arguendo. See Lee Epstein & Andrew D Martin, “Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Probably Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why)” (2011) 13:2 U Pa J Const L 263; Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The Coxford Lecture” (2011) 24:2 Can JL & Jur 305.
62. I take the expression from Kyritsis, “Justifying Constitutional Review”, supra note 12 at 3.
63. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 56-57.
64. Mattias Kumm, “The Problem of Judicial Review” in Matthias Klatt, ed, Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, 2012) 201 at 207 [emphasis added].
65. Ibid .
66. Ibid.
67. Bellamy & Parau, supra note 8 at 261.
68. As they often do. See JGA Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana Press, 1997).
69. Kathleen Doherty & Ryan Pevnick, “Are There Procedural Objections to Judicial Review?” (2014) 76:1 The Journal of Politics 86.
70. I here use a simplified description of the Spanish regulation as an example.
71. Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Banks (MIT Press, 1991); Rosa M Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 34-72.
72. See Kathleen McNamara, “Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation” (2002) 25:1 West European Politics 47.
73. Pitkin, supra note 53 at 52.
74. Although the independence and lack of accountability of Central Banks have increased considerably in the past decades. See Jens van’t Klooster & Clément Fontan, “The Myth of Market Neutrality: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases” (2020) 25:6 New Political Economy 865.
75. Lastra, supra note 71 at 76.
76. On the concept of interpretation, see Bello Hutt, “Constitutional Interpretation”, supra note 6 and the references included there.
77. HLA Hart, “American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream” in Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983) 123.
78. Ekins, supra note 46 at 121, 152.
79. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 336; Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) at 43; John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 60.
80. Samuel Beckett, Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, & The Unnamable (Grove/Atlantic, 2009) at 230.
81. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v Casey, 505 US 833 at 865 (1992) [emphasis added].
82. Seldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (John Hopkins University Press, 1989) at 9.
83. Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 148.
84. Pettit, supra note 34 at 433.
85. Harold Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint” (1969) 12:1 JL & Econ 1 at 1.
86. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (Harvard University Press, 2006) at 17; Jeff King, supra note 10 at 157; Daniel Oliver-Lalana, “Legislative Deliberation and Judicial Review: Between Respect and Disrespect for Elected Lawmakers” in Daniel Oliver-Lalana, ed, Conceptions and Misconceptions of Legislation (Springer, 2019) 207.
87. See for example, Ivan Hunter, “Vistos: se confirma la sentencia apelada” ¿Existe el deber de motivar las sentencias en segunda instancia? (Corte de Apelaciones de Valdivia)” (2007) XX:2 Revista de Derecho 239.
88. Antonin Scalia, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws” in Amy Gutman, ed, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, 1997) 3 at 23.
89. John H Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, 1980).
90. I thank Jeff King for bringing this discussion to my attention.
91. As suggested by Judith S Koffler, “Constitutional Catarrh: Democracy and Distrust, by John Hart Ely” (1981) 1:2 Pace L Rev 403; Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 1988); Roberto Gargarella, La justicia frente al gobierno (Ariel, 1996) at 154-57.
92. My thanks to Stuart Lakin and Dimitrios Kyritsis for recommending that I address this point.
93. Thomas Colby & Peter Smith, “Living Originalism” (2009) 59:2 Duke LJ 239.
94. Ekins, supra note 46 at 245.
95. Ibid .
96. Harel, supra note 3 at para 25 [emphasis added].
97. As I argue in Donald Bello Hutt, “Against Judicial Supremacy in Constitutional Interpretation” (2017) 31 Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory & Philosophy of Law 7.
