There is a tendency among those who identify themselves as subjectivists on the issue of defining criminal intent to dismiss or minimize the role of actual non-trivial harm in the determination of criminal liability and punishment. That is to say, they are those who argue that an individual’s subjective intent is a sufficient indication of potential dangerousness and culpability to justify punishment. In this essay, the author presents a view, based on Adam Smith’s recognition of the “irregularity of the sentiments,” that actual physical harm matters; that it reflects the negative component of the two great motivators, pleasure and pain; and that it can release the worst sort of emotional reactivity: retribution. The infliction of a non-trivial first order harm can invoke a deeply felt aesthetic reaction which, in turn, reflects our natural (and cognitively “irregular”) human sentiments. Trying to dispense with harm as a feature in our understanding of criminality seems prima facie absurd. Awareness of the sentiment, as Smith understood, helps temper the worst parts of our nature: that which hopes to crush the people and ideas we find threatening. Ironically, the existence of and need for harm as a necessary condition of criminality heightens our awareness of the limitations of reason in dealing with victims of crime. We are not simply cognitive creatures.

Recent writers concerned with general theories of law have taken little notice of the new information communication technologies (ICTs). This situation ought to change. General theories of law ought to take into account the potential of the new ICTs to enable significant changes in the relations between legal authorities and legal subjects. This paper takes legal positivism as a stalking horse for examination of the way the new ICTs may affect presumptions regarding citizens’ and officials’ knowledge, attitudes, and allegiance to law. The positivist account of legal normativity, key to its general account of law, is significantly threatened by the prospect that e-consultation and e-petitioning may breach presumed differences between officials and citizens in life under law. This argument brings various consequences for the positivist view of normativity and legal system, all inclining toward the conclusion that the positivist view may lose its basis in social fact and so present an unrealistic account of law.

This article examines the work of Martin Loughlin, a prominent public lawyer who works in the leftwing tradition of political and legal theory, often associated with the London School of Economics and Political Science. It argues that tensions in Loughlin’s work exemplify certain trends within the left, the result of the left having lost faith in its positive political programme, one which was supposed to be delivered by Parliament. What remains once this faith is lost is a traditional hostility to liberalism and judicial review in combination with a sense that the realm of politics-the political-is valuable. This combination explains the turn taken by certain leftwing theorists to Carl Schmitt’s authoritarian understanding of politics and to a kind of romanticism about tradition. Given the risks inherent in this turn, would be better for the left both to return to its roots in a positive programme. This move would require the left to engage properly in the contemporary debate about the normativity of law.

Can rights constitutionalism operate as a social democratic restraint on private power? How should we assess this? Following renewed interest in social democratic legal theory, some propose developing more egalitarian forms of rights constitutionalism as a counterweight to overweening private power in the global economy. Such strategies follow a normative methodology, associated with liberal accounts of legality which emphasize the autonomy of law as an external means of social change. This can be contrasted with traditional social democratic accounts of law as an artifact produced through and in political struggle. This shift of focus to normative argument is at the expense of contextual diagnosis, which remains valuable in questioning whether constitutional strategies can restrain private power in the name of substantive equality. Rights constitutionalism, reflecting its classical liberal roots, continues to protect private power in important ways.; Two strategies, based in innovations in North American and European constitutionalism respectively, have been proposed to overcome this default. First, the Application to State Institutions (ASI) model seeks to extend the reach of constitutional application to include private actors, and; second the Application to Law (LAW) model seeks to extend the scope of rights by requiring all law to conform to constitutional guarantees, including equality. A sociologically grounded analysis of the comparative jurisprudence shows these models retain key elements of the classical liberal framework, such as the state-civil society distinction, and which have in practice militated against any significant democratization of private power.

One question looms large in the early history of Soviet legal theory and practice: how and why did EvgenyPashukanis emerge as the pre-eminent Soviet jurist from 1924 to 1930, come under only minor criticism from 1930 to 1936 and then be denounced and executed in 1937 as a ‘Trotskyite saboteur’? Of course, Pashukanis was not alone. Virtually every leading figure associated with the October 1917 Russian Revolution and the early years of the Soviet Union fell victim to Stalin’s purges by 1937 (from Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin to thousands of less-known socialists). Yet, there are some particularly revealing aspects in the case of Pashukanis that have not been probed adequately by most Western or Soviet writers. His rise to leadership of Soviet legal work in 1924, with the publication of his The General Theory of Law and Marxism, coincided with Stalin’s initial victory over the Left Opposition and the enunciation of Stalin’s program of seeking to build ‘socialism in one country’. Pashukanis’ unexpected emergence from obscurity appears to be related to the fact that he publicly lined up against the Left Opposition as early as 1925. Pashukanis’ central theme in his General Theory, somewhat simplistically referred to as a ‘commodity-exchange’ theory of law, was related to the limited restoration of commercial property and market relations under the 1921 shift to the New Economic Policy. The dangers inherent in this temporary retreat became entrenched in Stalin’s bureaucratic elite after 1924. As discussed in this article, Pashukanis’ approach, which regarded commodity exchange as the essence of legal relations, to some extent reconciled Marxist theory with the official revival of economic relations based on private ownership and market forces.

In the first part of the article it is argued that a debt, which is generally taken to be a standard example of a Hohfeldian right-duty relation, is properly understood as a power-liability relation, although a separate right-duty relation can arise in respect of it. This understanding provides a solution to a problem devised by MacCormick and discussed in the jurisprudence literature concerning a right to a payment from the estate of a deceased person. The main part of the article is concerned with the restitutionary claim to recover money or property invalidly transferred, and it is argued that this claim is also a Hohfeldian power, not a right correlated with a duty to return the money or property. The recipient’s liability to the exercise of the power is to be distinguished from his or her duty to return or to preserve the money or property invalidly transferred. This analysis provides a solution to the controversy in the literature over the strict liability and fault-based approaches to restitutionary claims, and it explains and supports the traditional understanding of the equitable proprietary claim and the claim for knowing receipt. The discussion leads to some consideration of the harm principle and duties of positive action.

In this paper I want to address, against the background of the ECtHR’s recent attempt to resolve the clash between property rights and the right to freedom of expression in its decision in Appleby v. UK, two questions, both of which I take to be related to the overarching theme of “social democracy”. First, there is the problem of the influence of “higher law”-of human rights norms and constitutional norms-on private law norms; second, the question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalizing” private law, in other words, the question of the “judicial cognizability” of constitutional norms within private law.

If there is one doctrine distinctively associated with legal positivism, it is the separability of law and morality. Both in opposition to classical natural-law thinkers and in response to more recent theorists such as Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller, positivists have endeavored to impugn any number of ostensibly necessary connections between the legal domain and the moral domain. Such is the prevailing view of legal positivism among people familiar with jurisprudence. During the past couple of decades, however, that prevailing view has come into question among some estimable legal positivists. In particular, Joseph Raz and his followers have queried the importance and the very tenability of an insistence on the separability of law and morality. The present article maintains that the traditional view of legal positivism is correct and that the recent skepticism about it on the part of some positivists is unfounded. When the notion of the disjoinability of law and morality is understood properly as a large array of theses, it proves to be resistant to the challenges that have been mounted against it.

The fundamental political concern of liberalism has been to secure equal liberties for all citizens. There has, however, been no agreement among liberals on the extent to which this project depends, both normatively and practically, on the democratization of society. Socialism, on the other hand, has been fundamentally concerned with the realization of emancipated forms of life. But socialists too have disagreed with one another on the extent to which political structures of democratic self-government are central to the revolutionary task of emancipation. Social democracy, as a tradition, has involved the attempt to show how these core political projects of the modern era, liberalism and socialism, are mutually interdependent. The most appropriate emancipatory project for late modern, increasingly complex societies, from a social-democratic perspective is to create and maintain a social structure that can deliver equal and effective liberties for all citizens. This achievement is to be best understood in republican terms, as the realization of a democratic form of life in which free and equal citizens engage one another in the collective task of autonomous self-governance. Jürgen Habermas has been one of the most significant intellectual contributors to the development of the idea of social democracy as an emancipatory project. Over several decades from the early 1960s to the present, Habermas has set about recasting critical social theory in terms of a theory of communicative action. The main legal and political implications of this critical perspective are outlined in his discourse theory of democracy Habermas considers the realization of rights through the democratic self-organization of legal communities to be the normative core of emancipatory politics in the modern era.

Contemporary “flexible capitalism” requires novel forms of legal regulation. In this vein, Joshua Cohen, Michael Dorf, Archon Fung, and Charles Sabel have developed a provocative set of proposals for a new mode of regulatory law, what they describe as “democratic experimentalism” or, alternately, “directly deliberative polyarchy.” Their proposal are criticized: they not only fail to take traditional liberal democratic rule of law virtues seriously enough, but it remains unclear whether they can effectively tame and humanize capitalism. Instead, some evidence suggests that their proposals simply amount to a normatively problematic synchronization of the legal system with contemporary high-speed capitalism.

It is a basic intuition about the law that organs of adjudication ought to justify their decisions by recourse to the appropriate applicable norms. Nevertheless, a sound reconstruction of the applicability of legal norms has been largely ignored in contemporary legal theory. Different connections between applicable norms and cases are explored in this paper, and a distinction is suggested between internal and external applicability. A legal norm is internally applicable to the cases regulated by its scope of validity (i.e. by its terms the norm fits the facts of the case), and is externally applicable when it has to be used in a certain case as a justification of an institutional decision (i.e. the presiding judge has a legal duty to apply it to the case). A usual claim holds that all and only valid norms which, by their terms, apply to the case at hand must be applied in determining the outcome of the case. However, we try to demonstrate that a valid legal norm that exists as a member in a legal system may be internally applicable to a case and yet not be externally applicable to it. It also may occur that judges sometimes have the legal duty to apply norms that are not part of their own legal system. Consequently, the relations between internal and external applicability and between external applicability and validity deserve a careful examination. In these pages we hold that, though validity plus internal applicability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the duty to apply a legal norm, there is a complex conceptual link between external applicability and the systematic reconstruction of the law.

e-government is a fast-developing phenomenon in many countries world-wide. Information and communication technology (ICT) has the potential to transform government generally and re-invigorate democracy in particular. This article considers the role of ICT in increasing democratic engagement both in relation to traditional aggregative forms of democracy and as regards more radical, participatory democracy. Within traditional democracy the potential of ICT moves beyond simply e-voting and has particular application in the various consultations processes that are increasingly of significance within ideas of "modernised government". The particular value that ICT can bring is of importance for more participatory versions of democracy too.; A model of consultation, drawn from mediation, is outlined and the application of ICT to such methods of decision-making is considered. Finally a range of best practice examples is given to illustrate how a technology of democracy requires putting information technology in service of democracy rather than the other way around.

I argue that institutions charged with giving justice must understand responsibility in terms of norms governing what people are entitled to expect of each other. On this conception, the sort of responsibility that is of interest to private law or distributive justice is not a relation between a person and the consequence, but rather a relation between persons with respect to consequences. As a result, nonrelational facts about a person’s actions and the circumstances in which she performs them will never settle the questions of responsibility that matter to institutions charged with giving justice. I show the significance of this way of thinking about responsibility by contrasting it with prominent conceptions of responsibility which suppose that its moral significance derives from the ways in which an individual person acts in the world. I demonstrate its power by focussing on cases in which responsibility is widely agreed to run out in ways that non-relational conceptions of responsibility cannot explain.

This paper seeks to counter a currently popular account of criminal defences which holds that both excuses and justifications are characterised by the fact that the conduct of the actor is consistent with the standards to be expected of good citizens in the role inhabited by the actor. Its object is to restore due prominence to the role played by human frailty in core defences. The position will be advanced that a significant reason for this loss of prominence is that insufficient attention has been paid to the filtering role played by crisis. For both excuses and justifications crisis marks the moral limits within which a workable system of norm enforcement can be achieved. In each case it ensures defences are socially validated, although the nature of the validation differs according to the nature of the defence. With defences of reasonable reaction crisis helps mark the parameters of reasonableness and ensures respect for the rule of law. Crisis may also deprive individuals of their susceptibility to conform their behaviour to rules. Its major constitutive role in this regard is to ensure that this susceptibility is rooted in the characteristics of human beings generally rather the specific characteristics of the actor. In this way it gives moral focus to the way excuses may intrude simply because the state cannot reasonably demand any better, at the same time providing a mechanism for distinguishing true excuses from exemptions or defences of impaired capacity.

Max Weber grappled with the rise of social democracy, the welfare state, or the Sozialstaat, most explicitly in the “sociology of law” sections of his posthumously published Economy and Society. Through a close reading of Weber’s text, this essay argues that the historical and analytic categories Weber deployed in his investigation of the Sozialstaat, its rise and its legal dimensions, were inadequate for an appropriate understanding of the phenomena and for the attempt to offer progressive prescriptions for their further development. Instead, by relying on a faulty historical logic, Weber obscured many realities of the Sozialstaat, and unwittingly laid the groundwork for the neo-conservative critique of the welfare state on both sides of the Atlantic. The essay concludes with some reflections on similar, “Weberian,” theoretical moves observable in literatures dealing with the most recent large-scale transformation of law and the state: the rise of the European Union.

In recent years democracy has become a prominent topic in the development of international law and relations. The trend in the international system in pursuit of international legal requirements of democracy is perhaps most evident in Europe with significant support coming from the regional organisations of Europe. The EU is part of this development having established treaty-based provisions making democracy a requirement for current and potential members. At the same time the economic integration project of the EU places a range of demands upon states which directly impact the type of democracy they may be striving for. Significantly, the EU’s requirements will influence the extent to which social democratic practices may be pursued. Examining the type of democracy the EU is promoting among its current and potential members will be useful for understanding the meaning and content of the type of democracy international law is working towards and also for the future of social democratic practices in Europe.

The article is a Critical Notice of C. Edwin Baker’s Media, Markets, and Democracy (Cambridge UP: 2002).