1 Goldman, Alvin “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,” in Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed., ed. Kornblith, Hilary (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 293Google Scholar; reprinted from Goldman, AlvinLiaisons (Cambridge: Bradford, 1992).Google Scholar

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3 Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, 427-73.

4 Quine, W. V. “On the Nature of Moral Values,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981)Google Scholar. See sec. 3 below.

5 Mackie, J. L.Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977).Google Scholar

6 Ruse, MichaelTaking Darwin Seriously (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).Google Scholar

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9 Jaegwon Kim, “What Is ‘Naturalized Epistemology'?” in Kornblith, Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed. See also Kornblith's introduction.

10 Stroud, Barry “The Significance of Naturalized Epistemology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 6, The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ed. French, P.A.Uehling, T.E. and Wettstein, H.K. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).Google Scholar

11 W. V. Quine, “Things and Their Place in Theories,” in Theories and Things, 22.

12 W. V. Quine, “Natural Kinds,” in Naturalizing Epistemology, 65-6, reprinted from Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.

13 For a version of this objection, see Stich, Stephen “Evolution and Rationality,” in Tlie Fragmentation of Reason (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).Google Scholar

14 Here we rely on a leading account of biological functions due originally to Larry Wright. See, for example, Kitcher, Philip “Function and Design,” in The Philosophy of Biology, ed. Ruse, M. and Hull, D. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

15 This line of reply is taken in Kornblith, Hilary “Our Native Inferential Tendencies,” in Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).Google Scholar

16 For example, an evolutionary account of moral action, feelings, and discourse without any commitment to the existence of moral knowledge is given in Gibbard, AllanWise Owices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

17 “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, 16, 18–9, 24-5, 29-30.Google Scholar

18 Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 1.

19 Quine, “Reply to White,” in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, ed. L.E. Hahn and P.A. Schilpp (Lasalle, III.: Open Court, 1986).

20 As a holist, Quine thinks individual non-observational beliefs have empirical content and warrant only in conjunction with other beliefs.

21 Quine, “On the Nature of Moral Values,” 65. Quine's point, though hardly his conclusion, is oddly reminiscent of one of Kant's critical remarks concerning happiness as a moral end. Cf. “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, 70.

22 See especially Veyne, PaulWriting History: Essay on Epistemology, trans. Moore-Rinvolucri, Mina (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, but also even Behan, C.McCullough's much more optimisticThe Truth of History (London: Routledge, 1998).Google Scholar

23 “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Kornblith, Naturalizing Epistemology, 2d ed., 20.

24 “Reply to Stroud,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 6, Vie Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 474.Google Scholar

25 The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 9–10, 19-20, 43-5, and “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 19, Philosophical Naturalism, ed. French, P.A.Uehling, T.E. and Wettstein, H.K. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1994)Google Scholar. Somewhat analogously, before appealing to circularity/regress considerations to defend the a priori character of moral principles in section II of the “Groundwork,” Kant famously argues in section I that an action has moral worth only if done from duty, from a recognition of the requirements of morality. He explains in the Preface that “in the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, it must be done for the sake of the law. without this, that conformity is only very contingent and precarious, since a ground that is not moral will indeed now and then produce actions in conformity with the law, but it will also often produce actions contrary to the law” (45).

26 Goldman, A.Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 393-4Google Scholar, and approving reference to Cleve, van “Reliability, Induction, and Justification,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 9, Causation and Causal Theories, ed. French, P.A.Uehling, T.E. and Wettstein, H.K. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

27 Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 66 “Psychology and Philosophical Analysis,” in Liaisons, 143; and “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 19, Philosophical Naturalism, 306.

28 The issue might seem different with accounts of evaluative concepts and standards whose acceptability depends on a wide reflective equilibrium of evaluative standards, intuitive or paradigmatic cases of actual empirical knowledge and good reasoning, pragmatic concerns with the point of evaluative concepts, and background theories and beliefs about the human situation and its possibilities, epistemic or moral. However this doesn't make the acceptability of the account straightforwardly empirical. First, there is the non-evidential dimension of what we want in an evaluative concept, which may lead us to consider the implications of an account for hypothetical cases so as to decide whether it is one we can accept. Second, what may matter more for a relevant background theory is widespread acceptance, not empirical warrant, especially if part of the point of having evaluative concepts is to facilitate human interaction and so be interpersonally acceptable. Thirdly, even if such intuitions are themselves instances of empirical knowledge, these paradigmatic cases of empirical knowledge that epistemolo-gists may reflect on hardly exhausts the full range of empirical evidence and empirically warranted judgment. The connections between reflective equilibrium and naturalistic epistemology need careful exploration.

29 BonJour, L.The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 43–5Google Scholar, and A. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 63.

30 Goldman, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology” and “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.” Also “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” Ethics 103 (1993): 337–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 Goldman, “Psychology and Philosophical Analysis,” 150-1.

32 “The Neural Representation of the Social World,” in Mind and Morals, ed. May, Friedman and Clark, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 101.Google Scholar

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34 New Essays on the Human Understanding, ed. Bennett, and Remnant, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 50–1Google Scholar, also 475

35 Heidgerken, LorettaTeaching in Schools of Nursing: Principles and Methods (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1946), 8, 35.Google Scholar

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