1 All quotations from Kathryn Morgan are taken from her paper, ‘Women and Moral Madness.’

2 Mill, John StuartUtilitarianism (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 2nd Revised Edition 1957), 30-1Google Scholar

3 Baier, AnnettePostures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1985).Google Scholar See especially ‘Doing without Moral Theory?’ and ‘Poisoning the Wells.’ See also her two most recently published articles on the subject: ‘What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?’ Nous 19, 1 (March 1985), 53-63 and ‘Trust and Antitrust,’ Ethics 96 (1986), 231-60.

4 Gilligan, CarolIn a Different Voice: Psychological Theories and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1982)Google Scholar

5 Caring, Nel Noddings (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press 1984);Google ScholarHeld, VirginiaRights and Goods: Justifying Social Action (New York: The Free Press 1984).Google Scholar Sara Ruddick’s papers are listed below.

6 Broughton, John ‘Women’s Rationality and Men’s Virtues,’ Social Research 50, 3 (Autumn, 1983), 626Google Scholar

7 Houston, Barbara ‘Gilligan and the Politics of a Distinctive Women’s Morality,’ in Code, LorraineMullett, Sheila and Overall, Christine eds., Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Methods and Morals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press forthcoming)Google Scholar

8 Kohlberg, Lawrence’s most fully considered response to Gilligan’s work appears in Kohlberg, L.Levine, C. and Hewar, A.Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and Response to Critics (New York: Karger 1983),Google Scholar especially ch. 3. Kohlberg here accepts the view most clearly expressed by Gertrude Nunner-Winkler that it is more appropriate to see the care orientation as Gilligan describes it as part of women’s ego development, part of women’s personal development. See Kohlberg, above citation, 22-7 and 141. See also Nunner-Winkler, Gertrude ‘Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an Ethic of Care and Responsibility Versus and Ethic of Rights and Justice’ in Kartines, William and Gerwitz, Jacob eds., Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1984), 358.Google Scholar John Broughton also makes this same criticism.

9 Rich, Adrienne ‘The Conditions for Work: The Common World of Women,’ in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence (New York: W. W. Norton 1977), 206Google Scholar

10 Ibid., 205

11 Ruddick, Sara ‘Maternal Thinking,’ and ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace,’ both in Treblicot, Joyce ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1984), 213-63Google Scholar

12 Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction,’ 240Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 240

14 Ibid., 237; see also ’Maternal Thinking,’ 225.

15 Ibid., 239

16 Ibid., 244

17 This phrase is quoted in Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets and Silence, 203. See Arendt, HannahThe Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago 1958), 55.Google Scholar

18 Arendt, 55

19 Ibid.

20 Ringelheim, Joan ‘Women and the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research,’ Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 10, 4 (1985), 741-61CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Ibid., 742

22 Ibid., 743

23 Ibid., 746

24 Ibid., 747

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 253

27 Although I cannot find the source of this direct quotation, it is very close to that first offered by Brooke, in ‘Retreat to Cultural Feminism’ in Feminist Revolution: Redstockings of the Women’s Liberation Movement (New York: Random House 1975), 79.Google Scholar Brooke says, ‘Cultural feminism is the belief that women will be freed via an alternate women’s culture.’ The definition I offer is taken from Brooke and an early version of Ringelheim’s paper which was read at the American Philosophical Association Meetings, New York, December 1984. The reader is urged to consult Ringelheim’s discussion of cultural feminism which draws out political features of this position and its links with Liberalism much more fully than I can discuss in this paper.

28 Ringelheim, 756

29 Ibid., 757

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 758

32 Ibid., 759

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 760

35 Card, Claudia ‘Virtues and Moral Luck,’ Working Series I, No. 4, November 1985,Google Scholar Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Law School. This question, as I state it, is not a direct quotation from Card’s paper. She says, ‘Or, is she [Gilligan] picking up on something in women’s voices genuinely analogous to what Nietzsche heard, or thought he heard, in Christianity — something he identified as a “slave morality”?’ (6)

36 Ibid., 23

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 24

40 Ibid.

41 Ruddick, ‘Preservative Love and Military Destruction,’ 243Google Scholar

42 Ibid., 243

43 Allen, JeffnerLesbian Philosophy: Explorations (Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies 1986), 35Google Scholar

44 Ibid., 35

45 Ibid., 36

46 Ibid., 36-7

47 Ibid., 36

48 These statistics are taken from Morgan, Robin ed., Sisterhood is Global (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday 1984).Google Scholar The Canadian information occurs in an article by Greta Hoffman Nemiroff and the United States statistics occur in an article by Rayna Green. The statistics on rape and battery are generally conservative given the difficulty in estimating unreported incidents. The statistic for women killed by an abusive partner in the State of Massachussets is from the Massachussets Department of Public Health and is reported in an article entitled ’Critics Fault Police Unit in Hub Murder,’ The Boston Globe (June 29, 1987), 1.

49 Baier, Annette ‘What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?’ Nous 19, 1 (1985), 62CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50 Houston, Barbara ‘Prolegomena to Future Caring’ paper delivered to the Association for Moral Education, Toronto, November 1985.Google Scholar

51 Ibid. See also Grimshaw, JeanPhilosophy and Feminist Thinking (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1986),Google Scholar especially ch. 7 and 8. Virginia Held also recognizes some limitations to the mother-child relation as the paradigmatic moral relation; nevertheless, she thinks it worthwhile to hold that criticism in abeyance long enough to fully explore the mother-child relation as a paradigmatic relation. She develops some insightful reflections on this moral relationship in a paper delivered to the University of Cincinnati Philosophy Colloquium, Feminist Moral, Social and Legal Theory, University of Cincinnati, November 22, 1986.

52 Many feminist writers show a sensitivity to this point. See Houston, ‘Prolegomena to Future Caring’; Ringelheim, Joan; Card, Claudia; and Rich, AdrienneOn lies, Secrets, and Silence (New York: W. W. Norton 1979) and Blood, Bread and Poetry (New York: W. W. Norton 1986).Google Scholar

53 One of the best discussions of this point is found in Blum, LarryNomiak, MarciaHousman, Judy and Scheman, Naomi ‘Altruism and Women’s Oppression,’ in Gould, Carol and Wartofsky, Marv eds., Women and Philosophy (New York: Putnam’s 1976).Google Scholar

54 Shogun, Debra ‘What Is “Feminist Ethics”?’ paper presented to the Canadian Women’s Studies Learned Society Meeting, at Winnipeg, Manitoba (June 6, 1986), 1.Google Scholar

55 Walker, James ‘In A Different Voice: Cryptoseparatist Analysis of Female Moral Development,’ in Social Research 50, 3 (1983), 690.Google Scholar

56 Walker himself thinks the problem follows from holding only the first two claims but I have argued elsewhere that he is mistaken in this and that the dilemma arises only if we hold all three claims conjointly. The monistic claim is one Walker assumes in his argumentation and fails to make it clear as a premise of his argument. For a detailed discussion of Walker’s criticisms of Gilligan, see Barbara Houston, ‘Gilligan and the Politics of A Distinctive Women’s Morality.’ To my knowledge, no feminist moral theorist holds the conjunction of all three claims; no theorist holds the female essentialist claim though some appear to hold to the moral essentialist claim (e.g., Gilligan and Noddings) and some the monistic claim (e.g., Noddings).

57 The phrase is Kathryn Morgan’s.

58 Card, 22

59 Ibid.

60 The notion of the focus centering on women’s moral agency is taken from Deborah Shogun.

61 This question has been raised by a number of feminist writers. The question and the general point made here is clearly articulated in Harding, SandraThe Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986), 26.Google Scholar

62 Frye, MarilynThe Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press 1983), 9Google Scholar

63 Ibid.

64 While I am certain that this is Persall’s suggestion, I cannot locate the appropriate reference.

65 Richards, Janet RadcliffeThe Skeptical Feminist (Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980), 8Google Scholar

66 Debra Shogun, 2

67 Grimshaw, 225

68 This is certainly a defensible interpretation of some feminist political perspectives. Others, such as Adrienne Rich, would want to claim that the question ‘What is good for women’ has ‘an expanding, not a constricting potential’ to teach us about all oppressions. She makes these remarks specifically about ‘What is good for the Jews’ in ‘If Not with Others, How?’ in Blood, Bread and Poetry, 209, but all her writings attempt to draw out the expanding potential of the question, ‘What is good for women?’ Another interesting question that arises but which I cannot go into here is whether oppressed groups need to adopt a morality that puts their group first in order to gain their liberation and full moral agency and whether a morality which fails to do this will be self-defeating for that group? For a discussion of a similar question considered from a Marxist point of view, see Fisk, MiltonEthics and Society: A Marxist Interpretation of Value (New York: New York University Press 1980).Google Scholar See especially the last chapter, ‘Revolutionary Ethics.’

69 This phrase is adapted from Sandra Harding’s phrase, ‘science as usual’ in The Science Question in Feminism.

70 Marilyn, The Politics of Reality, 9

71 Ibid.