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Incompatibilism proved

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Alexander R. Pruss
Alexander R. Pruss*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, Texas76798, USA
*
*Email: Alexander_Pruss@baylor.edu
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Abstract

The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements. We shall show that on an appropriate definition of “never have had, have or will have any choice”, a version of the beta principle is a theorem given one plausible axiom for counterfactuals (weakening). Instead of being about transfer principles, the debate should be over whether the distant past and laws are up to us.

Keywords

free willdeterminismindeterminismtransfer principlefreedomcompatibilismincompatibilismcounterfactuals
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 430 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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