1 In fact, it fell to a referee to discover that detachment did not hold in this treatment of the classical truth-functions. Anderson and Belnap did not begin their enterprise with the classical heresy, “DS cannot be true!”, but rather with the aim of presenting a good “axiomatization of the classical two-valued propositional calculus … “(301).

2 I gather that it is safely assumed that a logic isn't classical unless its values are just the classical truth-values. But what are they—truth and falsity? If so, a standard Boolean algebra of propositions with values of 1 and 0 fails to qualify. But this is plainly absurd; so something else is meant by “classical values”. But what?

3 As the reviewer came to learn from Routley's “The Semantics of First-Degree Entailments”, typescript, Monash University (1968), pp. 23–24; subsequently published in Mathematische Annalen 96 (1972) 58-84. Dr. Haack herself makes much the same point when she asserts that excluded middle holds that” ‘p V∼ p’ is a theorem” (66). But this is hardly a principle of truth (i.e., a principle of truth theory), even if the principle is true.

4 E.g. “Bivalence does not hold”.

5 “The Limitations of Generative Grammar”.

6 It surprises me that Dr. Haack later shows herself willing to give T up, in order to solve quite ordinary problems having to do with non-denoting singular terms and empty domains (145).

7 Although does not hold for certain formalized systems of inference, nothing in Dr. Haack's discussion of Aristotle's argument shows that this is one such.

8 This is rough; for somewhat greater caution, see Woods, “Semantic Kinds”, Philosophia 3 (1973) 117-151.