¹ For the four statements by the Minister for Ext. Aff., Mr. Mitchell Sharp, in the House of Commons on Jan. 24 and 26, March 27 and May 29, 1973, see H. C. Deb. (Can.), 1973, Vol. 117, respectively at 595–96, 680, 2630–31 and 4194–95.

² Text of the Agreement and the attached Protocols in Documents on Vietnam Agreement 32–79, Dept. of State, News Release (Washington), Jan. 24, 1973.

³ Supra note 1, at 39–31 and 3629. In answer to a question by Mr. David Lewis, Leader of the New Democratic Party, Mr. Sharp stated in the House of Commons that “one of the conditions we consider absolutely essential is that there should be some international body, other than the contending parties, to which the peace–keeping force would report. This is an essential condition of our participation”: Ibid., 326–27.

⁴ Ibid., 30. The personnel for each delegation to the ICCS as agreed upon between the parties to the Paris Agreement consisted of about 290 men, the number for the entire commission totalling 1,160. The first group of Canadian civilian and military officers left Montreal on Jan. 27 and arrived in Saigon two days later. See Canada Weekly (Ottawa) Vol. 1, No. 5, Feb. 7, 1973 and New York Times, Jan. 28, 1973.

⁵ Art. 9 of the Paris Agreement provides that the participants at the International Conference should include the People’s Republic of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the four countries represented on the ICCS, and the four parties signatory to the agreement. For Text of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, see Dept. of State, Press Release, No. 55, March 5, 1973. Mr. Sharp in his report to the House of Commons on the conference on March 5, 1973, also stated that “what finally emerged was the most that could be obtained” and that under the arrangement “the reports and views of the International Commission will at least be transmitted outside the closed circuit of the belligerents to the Conference participants”: supra note 1, at 1865–66.

⁶ For an explanation of the purpose of the journey and the decision to extend the period of Canadian participation, see supra note I, at 2629–31.

⁷ Charges of violations of the Paris Agreement were documented in two separate notes circulated by Washington and Hanoi on April 24, 1973, and addressed to the parties signatory to the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam. The North Vietnamese document accused the United States forces of having failed to take away their armaments and dismantle their military bases (Arts. 5 & 6); of having delayed the mine-clearing operations thus prolonging the blockade of North Vietnamese waters; and of having undertaken aerial bombing of Laos and Cambodia despite Art. 8 of the Agreement. It also charged that thousands of American military personnel had remained, being disguised as civilian advisors. Text in New York Times, April 85) 1973. In tne American note verbale were enumerated Hanoi’s violations of the agreement including the following: clandestine shipment of a vast quantity of military equipment to South Vietnam including 400 tanks and armoured vehicles, 300 artillery pieces, 7,000 military trucks, etc., as well as installation of missiles in Khe Sanh (Arts. 7 & 20); movement of military personnel, no less than 30,000, across the demilitarized zone or through Laos and Cambodia into the South; launching attacks on hamlets and villages in various parts of South Vietnam (Arts. 2 & 3); and opening up new supply routes and expanding their areas of control especially in Quang Ngai Province (Art. 5). Text in Dept. of State, Press Release, No. 117, April 24, 1973.

⁸ For the decision extending Canada’s participation until the end of July 1973, see supra note 1, at 4194–95.

⁹ Text of Mr. Sharp’s statement and proposals in the opening session of the International Conference, ibid., 1921–23. The United Kingdom was reportedly–inclined to turn over the supervisory role to the United Nations. It was also reported that the Canadian proposal on linking the UN with the ICCS was generally supported by the USA but opposed by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong who insisted that the continuing responsibility for the ceasefire must rest with the belligerents. New York Times, Jan. 30 and Feb. 27, 1973.

¹⁰ Text of Mr. Sharp’s proposal, supra note 1, at 1865–66.

¹¹ See Foreign Policy for Canadians: United Nations 16 (1970 Dept. of Ext. Aff., Ottawa).

¹² Dept. of State, Press Release No. 27, Feb. 8, 1973.

¹³ Address of President Nixon on radio and television, Jan. 23, 1973, and transcript of Henry Kissinger’s press conference, Jan 24, 1973, supra note 2, at 1–31.

¹⁴ Text of Joint Communiqué and transcript of Dr. Kissinger’s press conference on results of the Paris Talk, New York Times, June 14, 1973.

¹⁵ Text of the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, Dept. of State, Press Release No. 55, March 5, 1973.

¹⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷ For the text of the statement by the Canadian Minister for Ext. Aff. in plenary session of the Conference on March 1, 1973, see supra note 1, at 1924. For Mr. Sharp’s further elaboration on Canada on the ICCS: Difficulty and Dilemma in his address to the Empire Club, Toronto on March 28, 1973) see Statements and Speeches, Dept. of Ext. Aff., No. 73/8.

¹⁸ See Arts. 29, 34, and 36 of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, July 20, 1954 and Art. 18 of the Paris Agreement. For the latter, see supra note 2, at 40–42.

¹⁹ See Art. 35 of the Geneva Agreement and Arts. 4 and 6 of the Protocol on the ICCS attached to the Paris Agreement. For the latter, see supra note 2, at 69–71.

²⁰ Ibid., 41.

²¹ The Geneva Agreement provides in Art. 43 that “if the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in Article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference” and that “the International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.” The Paris Agreement, however, provides in Art. 3(b) of the attached Protocol on the ICCS that in the event of inability to reach unanimity in the International Commission, the different views of the members should be forwarded to the two South Vietnamese Parties “but these shall not be considered as reports of the Commission.” The Act of the International Conference on Vietnam subsequently extended the submission of such different views as might exist to all twelve participants of the conference and to the Secretary–General of the UN.

²² In a statement in a commission meeting requesting an investigation of this case, Ambassador Michel Gauvin indicated that “Despite the appeal of the Canadian Delegation and by another delegation, two delegates refused to agree to an investigation on the ground that no adequate evidence existed to justify an investigation. Once again, therefore, the Commission failed to take the mandatory action required of it.” Text in Statements and Speeches, Dept. of Ext. Aff., No. 73/7.

²³ White Paper entitled Viet-Nam: Canada’s Approach to Participation in the International Commission of Control and Supervùion, October 35, 1972— March 27, 1973, Dept. of Ext. Aff. (May 1973), at 44–46.

²⁴ Supra note 1, at 2632.

²⁵ Art. 1 of the ICCS Protocol merely provided that “the International Commission shall, when necessary, cooperate with the Joint Military Commissions in deterring and detecting violations” of the provisions in Art. 18 of the Agreement. Supra note 2, at 67.

²⁶ Helicopter incidents were described in a confidential report of the Canadian delegation to the ICCS, supra note 23, at 48–50. Mr. Sharp’s report to Parliament on the killing of a member of the Canadian delegation, supra note 1, at 3072–74. The April 7 incident aroused considerable indignant reaction in a House of Commons debate. Thus, Mr. Claude Wagner (Prog. Cons.) pointed out that “There were accidents in Cyprus, there were accidents in the Middle East, and in the Congo. Nevertheless there was a basic assumption of safety under international auspices throughout those assignments.… It is surely this basic assumption that we must demand from the combatants if we are to continue to maintain our commitment.” Mr. David Lewis, Leader of the NDP, even urged that “we should now decide to withdraw before June 30, since the ICCS has not been given an opportunity to do its job. It was even refused the right and opportunity to investigate the crash itself”: supra note 1, at 3074–75.

²⁷ Supra note 23, at 50.

²⁸ For reports and questions relating to this case in House of Commons debates, see supra note 1, at 5198, 5227–28, 5289, 5291–92, 5324, 5404, and 5627–28.

²⁹ On the eve of his departure from Saigon, , Ambassador Gauvin reportedly expressed the view that “the key to peace in Vietnam is in the hands of Moscow and Peking who are both interested in bettering their relations with the United States”: New York Times, July 20, 1973.Google Scholar

³⁰ Art. 12 of the Paris Agreement was a most significant provision regarding the political future of South Vietnam, providing for the establishment of a “National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord” consisting of three equal segments to organize and to decide, on the basis of the unanimity rule, the holding of “free and democratic general elections” in future. Text in supra note 2, at 36.

³¹ Ambassador Gauvin, Michel, An Ambassador’s View of the ICCS Limits, in International Perspectives, 16–17 (Dept. of Ext. Aff., May-June 1973).Google Scholar

³² In assessing the role of Canada in the ICCS, Mr. Sharp indicated in a speech to the Empire Club in Toronto on March 22, 1973, that “the views of all the leaders with whom I spoke were to the effect that Canada should continue to serve on the Commission.… I have also received similar views from the governments of the United States, Britain, Indonesia and China.” He added that the South Vietnamese believed that “the important thing was to bring all points of view into the open.” Text in Statements and Speeches, Dept. of Ext. Aff., No. 73/8. In contrast, the PRG/Viet Cong in a statement issued on Aug. 3, 1973, charged that “From the day when it assumed its mission in the ICCS until before its withdrawal, Canada has not acted in conformity with its role as a member of the ICCS. All through this period, it has shown an unobjective and very partial stand and attitude … vis-à–vis the Provisional Revolutionary Government”: text in New York Times, Aug. 4, 1973.

³³ Supra note 1, at 4197.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ After the completion of this note in August 1973, the Canadian government accepted in October the invitation of the Secretary–General of the United Nations to participate in a new UNEF for the Middle East. As announced by Mr. Sharp in the House of Commons on October 30 and November 9, Canada’s role was to be confined to the provision of “logistic components of the force including, in particular, air support, transport, communications, ordnance, and related logistic facilities.” Supra note 1, at 7343 and 7692–93.