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2. In H.C. Kuan's apt phrase, elections in Hong Kong are “without political clout.” See Hsin-chi, Kuan, “Election without political clout,” in Hsin-chi, Kuan, Siu-kai, Lau, Kin-sheun, Louie and Ka-ying, Wong (eds.), Power Transition and The Legislative Elections in Hong Kong SAR (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999).Google Scholar

3. The text of the Basic Law appears in Chan, Ming K. and Clark, David J. (eds.), The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” under Chinese Sovereignty? (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).Google Scholar

4. China's agreement to allow the legislature elected under British colonial auspices in 1995 to finish its four-year term beyond the 1997 retrocession date comprised the essence of the “through train” concept, designed to ensure basic institutional continuity across the 1997 divide.

5. The following analysis is based on Clark, David J., “The Basic Law: one document, two systems,”Google Scholar in Chan, and Clark, , The Hong Kong Basic Law, pp. 36–59Google Scholar; Tang, James T. H., “Executive-legislative relations in Hong Kong,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 08 1998, pp. 6–9Google Scholar; and Pang-kwong, Li, “Executive and legislature: institutional design, electoral dynamics and the management of conflicts in the Hong Kong transition,” in Pang-kwong, Li (ed.), Political Order and Political Transition in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 53–78.Google Scholar

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8. Amendments to the Basic Law could be proposed by a two-thirds majority vote of LegCo; however, before a proposed amendment could be referred to the NPC for final debate and decision, prior approval by both the chief executive and two-thirds of Hong Kong's NPC delegation was required.

9. The origins and early development of LegCo are examined in Tsang, Steve (ed.), A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

10. Note Deng Xiaoping's blunt rejection of direct elections, quoted in the epigram at the head of this article. On Britain's reluctance to antagonize Beijing in the late 1980s, see Roberti, Mark, The Fall of Hong Kong: China's Triumph and Britain's Betrayal (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), ch. 17 et passimGoogle Scholar; also Shiu-hing, Lo, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), ch. 2.Google Scholar

11. When martial law was imposed in Beijing in May 1989, one million Hong Kong people – almost 20% of the population – took to the streets to protest against the Chinese government's actions.

12. The controversy over Patten's electoral reforms is examined in Dimbleby, Jonathan, The Last Governor: Chris Patten and the Handover of Hong Kong (London: Little, Brown, 1997), chs. 13–17.Google Scholar

13. District boards constituted the bottom layer of Hong Kong's three-tiered governmental structure. They were responsible primarily for providing local recreational, cultural and public health services. The intermediate layer of government was made up of Urban and Regional Councils. The evolving structure of local government in Hong Kong is examined in Miners, Norman, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (5th ed.) (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

14. For details and analysis, see Shiu-hing, Lo, The Politics of Democratization, ch. 4.Google Scholar

15. Shortly after the 1984 promulgation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong colonial government issued a white paper promising gradually to introduce democratic reforms during the run-up to 1997 – beginning with limited elections in 1985 to fill several newly-created functional constituency seats on the Legislative Council, to be followed by the introduction of “a very small number” of directly elected LegCo seats in 1988. Under intense pressure from China, however, Britain ultimately reneged on this pledge, drawing the ire of many Hong Kong people, including Szeto and Lee. See Roberti, , The Fall of Hong Kong, pp. 118–120.Google Scholar

16. Ibid. chs. 17–19

17. In preparation for the dissolution of LegCo, a Provisional Legislative Council had been set up at China's initiative late in 1996, its members chosen by the same 400-person selection committee entrusted to pick the SAR's first chief executive.

18. The resolution was defeated by a vote of 23 to 22. See Ching, Frank, “China-Hong Kong relations,” in Cheng, Joseph Y. S. (ed.), The Other Hong Kong Report 1997 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997), p. 33.Google Scholar

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20. See Suzanne Pepper's article in this volume.

21. Changes in the 1998 electoral rules and procedures are examined in Pepper, Suzanne, “Hong Kong's first elections under Chinese rule: democracy across the 1997 divide,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 04 1998, pp. 9–12.Google Scholar

22. See Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954)Google Scholar; and Katz, Richard, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

23. For an analysis of the process by which proportional representation was introduced into the 1998 LegCo elections, see Siu-kai, Lau, “The making of the electoral system for the 1998 Legislative Council elections,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

24. Election results are taken from Shiu-hing, Lo, “The 1998 Legislative Council election in Hong Kong,” paper presented at the conference on The Hong Kong Transition: One Year Later, UCLA, 6 06 1998Google Scholar. For analysis of the effects of the new proportional representation system on the outcome of the 1998 elections, see Ngok, Ma, “Party competition pattern under the new electoral system,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

25. I am indebted to Suzanne Pepper and Ming K. Chan for calling my attention to such patterns of strategic co-operation among pro-democratic parties.

26. Data in this section are drawn from the website of the Hong Kong Government Information Office, http://www.info.gov.hk/election/524-e.htm (25 May 1998).

27. See Shiu-hing, Lo, “The 1998 Legislative Council election,” p. 5.Google Scholar

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29. Democratic Party chairman Martin Lee thus claimed that “a very clear signal has been given by Hong Kong people to our leaders… that Hong Kong people want and deserve democracy.” In a similar vein, one Hong Kong public opinion analyst stated: “What this means is that people have overwhelmingly rejected the notion of an appointed legislature… They've come out in massive numbers in favor of direct elections.” Michael DeGolyer, cited in The Washington Post, 25 05 1998.Google Scholar

30. Hong Kong Standard, 27 05 1998.Google Scholar

31. See Shiu-hing, Lo, “The 1998 Legislative Council election,” p. 12Google Scholar; and Weng, Byron, “Impact of the first LegCo elections,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 06 1998.Google Scholar

32. Data from surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project, as reported in DeGolyer, Michael, “Public opinion and participation in the 1998 LegCo elections: pre/post colonial comparisons,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

33. On China's self-restraint in the immediate post-handover period, see Baum, Richard, “Enter the dragon: China's courtship of Hong Kong, 1982–1999,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4 (12 1999).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. See Chung, Robert Ting-yiu, “Voter participation: explaining the record turnout rate,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

35. Ibid. An even higher percentage – 87.7% – indicated that the fulfilment of civic responsibility had been an “important factor” in their decision to vote, while a desire to demonstrate support for democracy had been important to 78% of voters in this same survey. See “Voters driven by freedom, democracy,” Hong Kong Standard, 19 06 1998.Google Scholar

36. See Shiu-hing, Sonny Lo, “Hong Kong's changing public opinion,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 02 1998.Google Scholar

37. See Wong, Timothy Ka-ying, “Issue voting in the 1998 Legislative Council election,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

38. Ibid.

39. On the government's handling of the bird flu crisis, see Lian, Yi-zheng (Joseph), “Tung's Hong Kong in distress,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 01 1998.Google Scholar

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41. Party identification among all voters rose from 25% in 1995 to 70% in 1998. Among Democratic Party voters the increase was even greater, rising to 86% in 1998. See Sun, Milan Tung-wen, “Hong Kong party identification re-examined: retrospective or prospective voting,”Google Scholar in Kuan, et al. , Power Transition and The Legislative Elections.Google Scholar

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. The ADPL's defeat at the polls was widely attributed to party chairman Frederick Fung's controversial 1996 decision to participate in the provisional LegCo, a decision that split the organization's rank-and-file and alienated Hong Kong's other pro-democratic parties and groups.

44. Ibid.

45. For an examination of the political significance of the emerging, mass-based pro-welfare constituency in Hong Kong, see Zweig, David, “Eye on the ball: the politics of welfare in Hong Kong,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 11 1997.Google Scholar

46. The shifting fault lines of partisan cleavage that underlay such a realignment were first noted by a handful of observers before the 1997 handover. See, for example, Pepper, Suzanne, “China and Hong Kong: the political economy of reunification,” in Hudson, Christopher (ed.), The China Handbook (Chicago & London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997), p. 46.Google Scholar

47. Hong Kong Government poll, cited in Ching, Frank, “Political and social impact of the Asian financial crisis on Hong Kong,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 12 1997.Google Scholar

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49. “Democrats call parties to economic meeting,” Hong Kong Standard, 29 05 1998.Google Scholar

50. In a poll taken in June 1998, only 46% of respondents expressed satisfaction with Tung's performance as chief executive. See DeGolyer, , “Public opinion and participation in the 1998 LegCo elections.”Google Scholar

51. “Government action too little too late,” Hong Kong Standard, 30 05 1998Google Scholar. One local commentator likened Tung's modest relief measures to “painting [a picture of] a pancake to ease hunger.” See “$2b offer for small businesses described as ‘useless’,” South China Morning Post, 23 06 1998.Google Scholar

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54. “Politicians better than civil servants,” South China Morning Post, 17 09 1998.Google Scholar

55. “Hong Kong land freeze draws ire,” Wall Street Journal, 25 06 1998.Google Scholar

56. On the airport fiasco and its effects see Weng, , “Weathering a growing discontent,” pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

57. In December 1998, all 13 Democratic Party members of LegCo staged a walkout over the government's proposal to increase the number of appointed and ex officio seats on reconstituted district boards. Shortly thereafter, The Frontier's Emily Lau claimed that the government's plan constituted a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Hong Kong Standard, 17 12 1998, and 12 February 1999.Google Scholar

58. “Don't abuse power to dump Tung, legislators warned,” Hong Kong Standard, 8 08 1998.Google Scholar

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61. The allegations were denied by Suen, who nevertheless continued to antagonize the democrats by claiming that only 5% of Hong Kong people had expressed support for accelerated democratization in the May LegCo elections. See South China Morning Post, 12 01 1999.Google Scholar

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65. “Tung ‘sorry’ as LegCo blames Chan,” Hong Kong Standard, 28 01 1999.Google Scholar

66. DAB legislators attributed the sharp rise in local unemployment to the importation of Chinese workers by mainland-based “red chip” firms operating in Hong Kong. See “Unions brace for feared 6pc jobless figure,” Hong Kong Standard, 20 02 1999.Google Scholar

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72. See “Democrats at the crossroads,” South China Morning Post, 30 12 1998.Google Scholar

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75. “Democrats decide to play by the rules,” South China Morning Post, 12 01 1999.Google Scholar

76. According to Lee, Martin, “Mr Tung was not the least bit swayed by our conversation.”Google ScholarIbid.

77. “Democrats doubt full show of strength for elections,” Hong Kong Standard, 6 01 1999.Google Scholar

78. “Government still out of favour says poll,” Hong Kong Standard, 2 02 1999.Google Scholar

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80. Definition suggested by Larry Diamond and Ramon H. Myers in the original project memorandum.

81. One partial exception to the rule of organizational autonomy is the DAB, which has reportedly maintained close links with the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the Chinese Communist Party.

82. See Weng, Byron, “The first year of the HKSAR: changes in the political institutions,” CSIS Hong Kong Update, 1998 07 pp. 1–4.Google Scholar

83. A rather different conclusion has been reached by H.C. Kuan and Lau Siu-kai in their study of recent trends in Hong Kong's political culture. Focusing on the effects of “intermediation environments” such as primary social networks, secondary associations and the mass media on the political awareness and mobilization of Hong Kong people, Kuan and Lau found that a majority of SAR residents surveyed in 1999 were only weakly, if at all, embedded in (or affected by) these politicizing environments, thus raising doubts about claims of increased citizen activism. Their findings tend to reinforce earlier (pre-Tiananmen) observations concerning the political apathy of Hong Kong people and thus carry negative implications for the success of the democratic transition in Hong Kong. See Hsin-chi, Kuan and Siu-kai, Lau, “Intermediation environments and election in Hong Kong,” Democratization (spring 2000).Google Scholar