1. See, for example, Chien, Chang, “Behind the so–called ‘energy crisis,’” Peking Review, No. 11 (15 March 1974), pp. 5–7;Google Scholar and Chiu Pei–chiang, “’ Energy crisis’ and scramble for energy resources,” ibid. No. 39 (28 September 1973), pp. 12–14. Perhaps the best quote is from another article by Chien, Chang in Hung–ch'i (Red Flag), No. 2 (1974): “ There is a hrase in the novel ‘ Dream of the Red Chamber’ that runs like this: ‘ Gloomy like a dying lamp’ which suitably depicts the capitalist world's confusion and darkness and the gloomy outlook …,” quoted in British Broadcasting Corporation, Survey of World Broadcasts: The Far East (FE)/4524 (12 February 1974), p. A/1.Google Scholar

2. Past developments are described and analysed in detail in, amongst other studies: Yuan–li Wu with Ling, H. C., Economic Development and the Use of Energy esources in Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1963); Crossfield and Sons, The Chinese Coal Industry (Warrington, 1961–62);Google ScholarIkonnikov, A. B., “The capacity of China's coal industry,” Current Scene, No. 4 (April 1973), pp. 1–9;Google ScholarMeyerhoff, A. A., “Developments in Mainland China, 1949–1968,” Bulletin of American Association of Petroleum Geologists (BAAPG), No. 8 (August 1970), pp. 1567–580;Google ScholarKambara, T., “The petroleum industry in China,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 60 (1974), pp. 699–719;CrossRefGoogle ScholarAshton, J., “Development of electric energy resources in Communist China” in An Economic Profile of Mainland China (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 297–316;Google Scholar and Carin, R., Power Industry in Communist China (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969).Google Scholar

3. One should, of course, always be aware of the fact that fragmentary dis– closures fed to the world by the New China News Agency (NCNA) or irregular bits of information brought out by expert delegations, politicians and newsmen, are all too frequently of a dubious quality – and virtually impossible to verify. Consequently, to offer sensible statistics for China is a difficult, frustrating and rather risky task, especially in an international context, where one may be com– paring weak estimates with precise figures available for many open societies.

4. The last credible figures for resources before the publication of statistics ceased in 1960 were 1,500 billion metric tons for coal and two billion metric tons for crude oil; see Wu and Ling, Economic Development, pp. 35 and 177.

5. Reserve are economically recoverable material in identified deposits; resources include, in ddition to reserves, deposits not yet discovered as well as identified deposits that cannot be immediately recovered. For details, see McKelvey, V. E., “Mineral resource stimates and public policy,” American Scientist, No. 1 (January–February 1972), pp. 32–40.Google Scholar

6. Continental (early Cretaceous) Ta–ch'ing, discovered in 1959 and producing since 1961, in the Sung–liao Plain (Heilungkiang); continental and marine Sheng–li (Mesozoic), discovered in 1962 and producing since 1964, in the North China Plain (Shantung); and continental and marine (Mesozoic) Ta–kang, discovered in 1964 and producing since 1967, on the shore of Po Hai near Tientsin (Hopei).

For details of the first two fields see A. A. Meyerhoff, “ Developments in Mainland China” for Ta–kang field, see “Newly built Takang oilfield,” Peking Review, No. 21 (24 May 1974), pp. 15–17; and NCNA in English, FE/4602 (17 May 1974), p. C2/1, FE/Weekly Economic Report (W) 809 (15 January 1975), p. A/19.

7. Estimates of the total U.S. oil in place have grown from 1.37 billion metric tons in 1910 to 13.7 in 1950 and to 27.4–41.1 billion metric tons today; see T. H. McCulloh, “ Oil and gas,” in Brobst, D. A. and Pratt, W. P. (eds.), United States Mineral Resources (Washington, D.C.), pp. 489–91.Google Scholar Chinese officials claimed to an American visitor in 1973 that their evaluation of the country's oil resources makes the P.R.C. the world's third richest oil region, after the Middle East and North America; see Strauss, P., “China's new claim,” Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), No. 19 (14 May 1973), p. 41.Google Scholar

8. Good quality bituminous coal has typically between 6,800 and 7,200 kilo–calories perkilogram (kcal./kg.), while crude oils have between 9,100 and 10,500 kcal./kg. and natural gas about 11,600 kcal./kg.

9. This effort was initiated in the early 1950s through Soviet, Czech, East German, Polish and Hungarian assistance (with oil refining and prospecting, coal mining, electricity generating and transmission equipment), interrupted and weakened by the Sino–Soviet split, reoriented towards the west and Japan in the early 1960s and once again interrupted by the Cultural Revolution.

10. Water, instead of gas, cooling is becoming essential for the growth of large generators, but many western manufacturers see the need to go to liquid cooling of the rotor only in the range of 1,300 to 1,500 megawatts; see Papamarcos, J., “Large turbine–generators: straining at the leash,” Power Engineering, No. 9 (September 1972), pp. 28–33.Google Scholar

11. NCNA in English, FE/W795 (2 October 1974), p. A/13, FE/W888 (8 January 1975), p. A/7.

12. China is thus the seventh country in the world (after Italy, New Zealand, the U.S.A., Mexico, the U.S.S.R. and Japan) to generate electricity with geo–thermal steam. For the latest on geothermal energy, see Scott, W. E., Swiss, M. and Jeffs, E., “Rising fuel costs give boost to geothermal energy,” Energy Inter– national, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 16–20.Google Scholar

13. “Geo–thermal power station,” Peking Review, No. 20 (17 May 1974), p. 31.Google Scholar

14. The set was produced in Harbin Electric Machinery Plant and has been in operation since summer 1973: NCNA in English, Survey of People's Republic of China Press (SPRCP), No. 40 (1974), p. 76.Google ScholarPubMed

15. NCNA in Chinese, translated in FE/W761 (6 February 1974), p. A/13.

16. “Taching No. 61,” launched on 24 April 1974. Previously the largest Chinese–made tankers were in the 10,000– to 15,000–ton category; see NCNA in English, FE/W776 (22 May 1974), p. A/13. Another 24,000–ton tanker (“ Taching No. 62,” 178 metres long and 25 metres wide) was launched in Dairen's Hung–ch'I shipyard on 19 March 1975; see NCNA in English, FE/W822 (16 April 1975), p. A/17.

17. NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 39 (1974), p. 76; Shanghai city service, FE/W842 (3 September 1975). Chin–shan pier, constructed in an area where differences between the high and low tides are as much as 7.5 metres, can handle fully loaded 10,000–ton tankers.

18. “China's first floating drilling vessel,” Peking Review, No. 2 (10 January 1975), p. 5; Kantan is an interesting case of “do–it–yourself” technology: the deck of the vessel, built by a Shanghai shipyard, was fashioned by piecing together and reshaping decks of two old cargo ships; see NCNA in English, FE/W810 (22 January 1975), p. A/15.Google Scholar

19. “China's largest gas tank,” Peking Review, No. 47 (22 November 1974), p. 23.Google Scholar

20. Six new oil–pipe plant were built in what seems to be an incredibly short time: the ground was broken on 25 September 1970, and the plant were com– pleted three months later. The line required a total of more than 200,000 tons of steel (with an estimated diameter of 60 centimetres); see “Building oil industry through self–reliance,” Peking Review, No. 2 (10 January 1975), pp. 13–16; NCNA in English, FE/W810 (22 January 1975), p. A/16; and H. R. Connell, “ China's petroleum industry – an enigma,” BAAPG, No. 10 (October 1974), pp. 2157–172.Google Scholar

21. Molecular sieves were introduced commercially in the west in 1954. The removal of normal paraffines from distillates in the refinery enhances the value of the oil distillates as raw materials for fuels and lubricants. Hydrofining is the term first introduced by Exxon, and now used for different forms of hydro–desulphurization (i.e. the removal of sulphur from distillates in the form of hydrogen sulphide); see Hobson, G. D.et al. (eds.), Modern Petroleum Technology (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp. 363, 397, 416 and 703.Google Scholar

22. NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 41 (1974), p. 33.

23. NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 50 (1974), p. 26.

24. A 100–megawatt coal fuelled generating unit at Kao–ch'ing power station on the western fringe of Peking is now controlled by electronic computer; see FE/4823 (6 February 1975), p. i. This practice is standard in western power plant.

25. Shanghai Steam Turbine Works trial–produced a 6,000 kilowatt turbine in 1974; see Shanghai city service, FE/W799 (30 October 1974), p. A/20. Gas turbines are expected to cover 10% of worldwide generation by 1980. The world's highest rated turbine today is the Westinghouse model W1101 – 99,200 kilowatts – built by the Belgium subsidiary, ACEC; see “Gas turbine power packages,” Energy International, No. 4 (April 1974), pp. 39–46.Google Scholar

26. The 1975 construction box score of Hydrocarbon Processing, No. 2 (February 1975), Section 2, pp. 36–37,. lists 55 different projects. The largest single installation ever purchased by the P.R.C. is a $300 million multi–plant petro– chemical complex scheduled for completion in 1977 in Shen–yang. The contract was signed with a French consortium, Speichem/Technip, in September 1973 and the complex will produce, amongst other things, 65,000 tons of gasoline, 74,600 tons of ethylene and 87,000 tons of polyester resins annually; see ibid. p. 37. Shanghai General Petrochemical Works, another large project consisting of both imported and Chinese–made installations, has been under construction since January 1974. The 660–hectare enterprise will produce mainly ethylene and various synthetic fibres: NCNA in English, FE/W843 (10 September 1975), pp. A/10–11; “Building a new project at high speed,” Peking Review, No. 41 (10 October 1975), pp. 11–13.Google Scholar

27. Including a Mitsubishi–built offshore oil drilling rig ($22.6 million), eight oil rig support vessels from Denmark ($20 million), land drilling rigs from Romania (30 annually), $10 million worth of oilfield equipment from the U.S.A., a 46,000–ton Swedish–built oil tanker and five tankers over 50,000 tons from Norway (the biggest, a 74,000–ton ship renamed Tai Hu is the largest vessel in the Chinese fleet); negotiations for 80,000–100,000–ton second–hand Japanese tankers were also reported; see Lewis, C., “The independence seekers,” FEER, No. 9 (28 February 1975), pp. 25–26.Google Scholar

28. Turbogenerators were imported from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, hydroturbines from Sweden, gas turbines (5 X 20 megawatts) from England, thermal power plant from Italy (two worth $79 million), Japan (two worth $72 million) and France (one worth $41 million); see “China's foreign trade, 1973–74,” Current Scene, No. 12 (December 1974), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

29. Production increases for the first six months of 1974 were: Ta–ch'ing 24.7%, Ta–kang 22.5%, Sheng–li 12.2%. Percentages for the whole year were 22% at Ta–ch'ing, 24.7% at Ta–kang and 16% at Sheng–li; see NCNA in English, in SPRCP, Nos. 34 and 52 (1974), pp. 15 and 105 respectively. The only reported increases for the first six months of 1975 were Ta–ch'ing 14.9% and Yü–men 7%; see NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 5897 (18 July 1975), p. 224.

30. Kambara (“ The petroleum industry,” p. 710) suggests the following outputs (all in million metric tons): Ta–ch'ing 20, Sheng–li 5, Ko–la–mai and Yü–men 8, Ta–kang 1, shale oil 3. Koide, Y., “China's crude oil production,” Pacific Com– munity, No. 3 (April 1974), p. 466, estimates as follows: Ta–ch'ing about 20, Sheng–li 12, Ko–la–mai arid Yümen 12, Ta–kang over 1, shale oil 4.9 (all figures refer to 1973 production)Google Scholar

31. Construction of the main line running through Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liao– ning and Hopei started in late winter 1970 and was finished on 1 October 1973 (the parallel Ta–ch'ing – T'ieh–ling line was finished on 1 October 1974). The main route crosses 260 rivers, 40 railway lines and 200 roads. The digging of the trench was done without machinery by gathering labourers along the route: tens of thousands of local peasants, workers and soldiers finished the task in less than half a month. There are 19 pumping stations 70 kilometres apart, and a parallel high–voltage electricity line along the route; see “Building oil industry through self–reliance “; and NCNA in English, FE/W809 (15 January 1975), p. A/20. A 355–kilometre extension was built from Ch'in–huang–tao to Peking's Tung–fang– hung refinery between May 1974 and June 1975: “Chinhuangtao–Peking oil pipe– line completed,” Peking Review, No. 29 (18 July 1975), pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

32. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W786 (31 July 1974), p. A/6.

33. There was another brief mention five months later (in “ Building oil industry through self–reliance,” p. 16), which stated that the Design Institute of Ta–kang oilfields was given the task of building a 1,700–kilometre pipeline to a synthetic ammonia factory in February 1974. It is hard to imagine that the line could have been finished within 10 months.

34. While the 1974 crude oil output is claimed to be more than six times that of 1965, refinery capacity is said to have grown less than four times (NCNA in English, FE/W808) (8 January 1975), pp. A/7–8. Even after subtracting exports to Japan, North Vietnam and North Korea, these figures translate into a surplus of at least 15 million metric tons in 1974 alone. Total U.S. crude oil stocks were 36.73 million metric tons at the beginning of 1975 (The Oil & Gas Journal, No. 6 (10 February 1975), p. 2), which makes it difficult to believe that the Chinese could be stockpiling crude oil of the same order of magnitude as the world's largest oil consumer.

35. The field accounts for 30% of the total crude oil output; see NCNA in English, Current Scene, No. 9 (September 1974), p. 20.Google Scholar

36. Both Sheng–li and Ta–kang extend offshore, and further major discoveries in shallow Po Hai waters (18–41 metres) are likely.

37. Or, in the case of the San–men project, a lengthy reconstruction. The dam was completed in September 1960 but quickly incapacitated by the annual influx of 1,600 million tons of sand. Silting extended rapidly upstream to the Wei Ho, endangering Sian. Reconstruction started in 1964, and involved cutting of two discharging tunnels, changing half of the feedwater pipes into discharges, opening water outlets at the bottom of the dam, and installing low–head, abrasion– resistant turbines; see “Reconstructing the big Sanmen Gorge dam,” Peking Review, No. 5 (31 January 1975), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

38. To erect the 697–metre long and 42–metre high concrete dam across the Ching–tung Gorge two coffer dams were built with 250,000 cubic metres of wheat stalks, straw and earth. Tang–chiang–kou's 2.5–kilometre–long dam was constructed without any advanced machinery by about 100,000 labourers from Hunan and Hupeh; see “Big dam across the Yellow River,” Peking Review, No. 39 (27 September 1974), pp. 7–9; and NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 10 (1974), pp. 106–108.Google Scholar

39. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W751 (21 November 1973), p. A/11.

40. The latest available figures (1973–75) are: Yangtze Valley 20,000; Kwang– tung 10,600; Szechwan 7,500; Hunan 5,200; Yunnan 5,000; Fukien 4,600; Kwei– chow 4,290; Kwangsi 4,000; Chekiang 3,900; Liaoning 278; and Chinghai 146; see NCNA dispatches and provincial broadcasts, FE/W739 (29 August 1973), p. A/12, FE/W743 (26 September 1973), p. A/5, FE/W747 (24 October 1973), p. A/10, FE/W756 (2 January 1974), p. A/14, FE/W784 (17 July 1974), p. A/4, FE/W799 (30 October 1974), pp. A/9–10, and FE/W812 (5 February 1975), p. A/5; NCNA in English, FE/W845 (24 September 1975), pp. A/20–21.

41. E.g. in Chekiang county about three quarters of the 117 stations were built by funds raised by communes and production brigades; in Kwangsi more than 80% of turbines and generators were made locally; see NCNA in English, FE/W710 (7 February 1973), p. A/8, FE/W784 (17 July 1974), p. A/4.

42. It is interesting to note that the total capacity of these stations (most likely somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 megawatts), built and maintained by millions of people, is about equal to (or just slightly larger than) the single largest steam turbogenerator operating in the U.S.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority's 1,380–megawatt unit in Cumberland power plant).

43. There is no integrated, nationwide power grid in the P.R.C. and the prospects for its establishment are rather remote.

44. NCNA in English, FE/W747 (24 October 1973), pp. A/8–10, and FE/W762 (13 February 1974), p. A/11.

45. R. W. Patterson, “The stretch–out in power plant schedules,” Power Engineering, No. 9 (September 1971), pp. 40–43.

46. “Race against time,” Peking Review, No. 7 (16 January 1973), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

47. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W760 (30 January 1974), p. A/9.

48. “ Total energy system ” is a western engineering term. For details see Diamant, R. M. E., Total Energy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

49. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W720 (18 April 1973), p. A/8.

50. NCNA in English, FE/4660 (25 July 1974), p. C/l.

51. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W708 (24 January 1973), p. A/8.

52. The “ native pits campaign ” was one of the outstanding features of the ill–fated Great Leap Forward, when more than 10 million people opened up some 110,000 “mines ” at the height of an unprecedented crash development in 1958; see A. B. Ikonnikov, “ The capacity of China's coal industry,” p. 5.

53. NCNA in English, FE/W803 (27 November 1974), p. A/15.

54. Yunnan and Kweichow provincial broadcasts, FE/W810 (22 January 1975), p. A/13.

55. NCNA in English, FE/W810 (22 January 1975), p. A/12.

56. Shansi is the biggest coal producing area in the P.R.C., accounting for one–sixth of the total output. Two thirds of the coal mined in the province is shipped to other provinces and municipalities; see NCNA in English, FE/W810 (22 January 1975), p. A/12; NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 5894 (15 July 1975), pp. 84–85.

57. NCNA in Chinese, FE/W786 (31 July 1974), p. A/4.

58. For a brief review of environmental, technological and political difficulties facing Chinese energetics, see Smil, V., “Energy in the PRC,” Current Scene, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 1–16.Google Scholar

59. Although the south is now less dependent on the north for coal than in the past, mass campaigns to locate and develop small coal deposits are still considered necessary (e.g. in Chekiang nearly 10,000 people searched mountainous areas for coal outcrops in 1974); see Chekiang provincial broadcast, FE/W808 (8 January 1975), p. A/7. The army is also used to open large, more efficient mines; see NCNA in Chinese, FE/W755 (19 December 1973), p. A/12.

60. A fact well attested by a recent campaign – centred on Szechwan and spreading to other rural areas – to produce and use “ marsh gas,” that is biogas (composed of about two thirds of methane and one third of carbon dioxide) liberated from methanogenic fermentation of human and animal wastes, leaves, grasses and crop residues in sealed digesters. There were more than 460,000 containers in operation in China by mid–1975, most of them (410,000) in Szechwan; see NCNA in Chinese, FE/W834 (9 July 1975), p. A/13; “Popularizing the use of marsh gas in rural areas,” Peking Review, No. 30 (25 July 1975), p. 15. Chinese claims about operating biogas digesters successfully in the very cold climate of northern provinces must be judged rather sceptically as the fermentation requires high steady temperatures whose maintenance can, in cold climates, consume more energy than is released in biogas by methanogenic bacteria (A. B. Sparling, Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Manitoba, personal com– munication).Google Scholar

61. Due to growing concern about air pollution, increasingly strict regulations against burning high sulphur fuels have been introduced in most industrialized countries, and low sulphur oils are internationally in high demand. While Persian Gulf crudes have typically about l.7–2.8% of sulphur, Ta–ch'ing crude has only 0.11%; see H. R. Connell, “ China's petroleum industry,” p. 2172.

62. Developments during those less than four months in early 1973 were rather intriguing: a four–member team of oil executives flew to Peking on 7 January 1973, and the basic agreement was reached before Japan's Minister for Inter– national Trade and Industry, Yasuhiro Nakasone, visited Peking (17–21 January). Nakasone proposed further oil purchases to Chou and repeated the offer of joint offshore exploration. Yet Chou told a group of Liberal Democratic Party members of the Diet on 20 January that China's oil output at the moment was still too low for export. Throughout February the Japanese negotiating team had to grapple with the price–level. Negotiations were eventually suspended, only to be resumed briefly afterwards, and the deal was signed in April; see Kyodo in English, FE/W707 (17 January 1973), p. A/16; K. Nakamura, “China: political deal,” FEER, No. 4 (29 January 1973), p. 33; “ Peking puts oil on the market,” Current Scene, No. 6 (June 1973), p. 16.

63. R. Koven, “ U.S. firms, China weigh oil deals,” The Washington Post, 21 May 1973, pp. Al and A24.

64. “ Japan eyes oil fields in China,” The Journal of Commerce, 7 June 1973, p. 10.

65. “ Drilling pushed in China's Pohai Gulf.” Once again, a somewhat puzzling move, because in the late summer of 1973 the Chinese–built pipeline was almost finished (see footnote 31).

66. A new Energy Division was set up in the Japan–China Economic Association in December 1973, and the hopes for four million metric tons of crude in 1974 were growing; see Kyodo in English, FE/4487 (31 December 1973), p. C/2.

67. Kyodo in English, FE/4493 (7 January 1974), p. C/l. Better statistics now available show a steadier growth (see Table 5, pp. 62–63).

68. Kyodo in English, FE/4516 (2 February 1974), p. C/l.

69. Kyodo in English, FE/4538 (28 February 1974), p. C/2.

70. International Oil Trading Co. (Kokusai Sekiyu K.K.) contracted for 3.3 million metric tons and Japan–China Oil Import Council for 1.6; see Kyodo in English, FE/W807 (1 January 1975), p. A/20.

71. By the end of 1974 Japanese storages were filled to capacity due to reduced demand and Indonesian Minas oil of equal quality was imported at $12.60 per barrel compared with the average of $13.50 for the Chinese oil; see Kyodo in English, FE/W809 (15 January 1975), p. A/28.

72. Kyodo in English, FE/W818 (19 March 1975), p. A/14. During the first half of 1975 Japanese crude oil imports from China increased 2.2 times in com– parison with 1974, reaching $285 million and accounting for 42.8% of the total Japanese imports from the P.R.C.; see Kyodo in English, FE/W839 (13 August 1975), p. A/26.

73. T. H. McCulloh, “ Oil and gas,” p. 481.

74. Chang Chien, “ Behind the so–called ‘ energy crisis,’ ” pp. 5 and 7.

75. The first developments are already on the horizon: Bridgestone Tyre Co., Bridgestone Liquefied Gas Co. and Ishikawajima–Harima Heavy Industries Co. sent a high–level delegation to China to give advice on the technology of producing, storing and shipping liquefied natural gas. Japanese experts suggested modestly a 150,000 ton/year plant for a start, and were told by the Chinese that they needed a plant “scores of times as big as that”; see Kyodo in English, FE/W813 (12 February 1975), p. A/24. The P.R.C. could be expected to ship the liquefied gas in exchange for Japanese technology before the end of this decade.

76. The total value of contracts for whole plant imports reached $1,246 million; see “China's foreign trade,”Current Scene, No. 12 (December 1974), P.14.Google ScholarPubMed

77. These commodities accounted for 50, 52 and 56% of the P.R.C.'s imports in 1971, 1972 and 1973 respectively; see ibid. p. 11.

78. Foodstuffs, textile fibres, oilseeds and crude animal materials accounted for 43, 41 and 44% of the P.R.C.'s exports in 1971, 1972 and 1973 respectively; see ibid. p. 10.

79. At the beginning of 1975 Japan was firmly committed to the following projects: a pulp and wood–chip plant (U.S. $45 million); a port on the Far Eastern coast ($62 million); hydrocarbon exploration offshore Sakhalin ($100 million); extraction of South Yakut coal ($450 million) and development of Siberian timber ($550 million) – i.e. to the total of less than $1,300 million. The Tyumen oil deal alone would cost at least $3,200 million; see K. Nakamura, “ A rethink in Japan,” FEER, No. 5 (31 January 1975), pp. 62–63.

80. The other considerations were Japan's hesitation to commit such a vast sum in times of economic uncertainty, questions about the economy of the scaled–down project after the Russians reduced their proposal from 40 to 25 million metric tons per year, and problems with U.S. financial participation; see D. Murarka, “ Growth pace curbed,” FEER, No. 5 (31 January 1975), p. 62.

81. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies each side has at least 45 divisions along the border; see Strategic Survey 1973 (London: IISS, 1974), p. 67.Google Scholar

82. The protocol on the development of South Yakut coal was signed on 30 April 1974; see Kyodo in English, FE/4588 (1 May 1974), p. C/2.

83. Voice of the People of Thailand, FE/4493 (7 January 1974), p. C/l; N. Ludlow, “ US companies and China's oil development,” The New York Times, 3 March 1974r p. 2; and Bangkok broadcast, FE/4671 (7 August 1974), p. C/2.

84. Kyodo in English, FE/W713 (22 February 1973), p. A/13, FE/4557 (22 March 1974), pp. C/l–2, FE/4660 (1 August 1974), p. C/l; Auldridge, “Mainland China striving to boost crude exports,” p. 27. The posted price of Saudi crude was $2,591 on 1 January 1973 and $11,651 on 1 January 1974.

85. Kyodo in English, FE/4683 (21 August 1974), p. C/l.

86. For details see Smil, V., “Communist China's oil exports: a critical evaluation,” Issues & Studies, No. 3 (March 1975), pp. 71–78.Google Scholar

87. Li–cheng, Chung, “China's general principle for developing the national economy,” Peking Review, No. 33 (17 August 1973), p. 6.Google Scholar The aim was reaffirmed and put on a clearer timescale by En–lai, Chou in his report at the Fourth National People's Congress: “We can certainly build China into a powerful modern socialist country in another 20 years and more before the end of the century,” Peking Review, No. 4 (24 January 1975), p. 25.Google Scholar

88. En–lai, Chou, “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC,” Peking Review, Nos. 35–36 (7 September 1973), p. 25.Google Scholar

89. Needless to say, a comparison with all countries of the world looks very different. In per capita energy consumption China ranks somewhere between 89th and 100th place on the list of 175 countries and territories for which energy statistics are available; see United Nations Organization (UNO), World Energy Supplies, Statistical Papers, Section J, No. 17, pp. 6–29.

90. However, China's individual consumption ranking within the Far East is rather inconspicuous (all the following figures are in kilograms of coal equivalent per capita in 1972): Japan 3,251; Brunei 2,834; North Korea 2,161; Taiwan 1,200; Hong Kong 1,034; Mongolia 963; Singapore 885; South Korea 827; Sarawak 530; Western Malaysia 496; P.R.C. 398; see UNO, World Energy Supplies, No. 17, pp. 6–29 (the UNO estimate for the P.R.C. is 567; my own calculation for the P.R.C. is based on output figures in Table 5 and the UNO mid–year population estimate of 800–721 million people).

91. Cheng, Chu–yuan, “Economic fluctuations in the PRC: 1949–1972,” Current Scene, No. 7 (July 1974), pp. 1–16.Google Scholar

92. This fact is explained to a large degree by the very low level of Thailand's energy consumption at the beginning of the postwar economic expansion: 20 kilograms of coal equivalent fuel against 80 in China in the early 1950s.

93. Energy requirements of one kilogram of agricultural supports equal (in kilograms of crude oil) two kilograms for nitrogen fertilizers, 2.3 for machinery and 2.6 for pesticides. For details on fossil fuel subsidies to agriculture, see Pimentel, D.et al., “Food production and energy crisis,” Science, No. 4111 (2 November 1973), pp. 443–49.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

94. Chou En–lai, “ Report to the Tenth National Congress,” p. 21.

95. A Eckstein, “Economic growth and change in China: a twenty–year perspective,” CQ, No. 54 (1973), p. 241.

96. L. Goodstadt, “ Peking: shifting emphasis to higher yields,” FEER, No. 2 (10 January 1975), p. 40.

97. NCNA in English, SPRCP, No. 1 (1975), p. 68; FE/W795 (20 October 1974), p. A/7; “Sharp rise in output of farm machinery,” Peking Review, No. 6 (7 February 1975), p. 23; Jung, Hsin, “An effective way to speed up chemical fertilizer production,” Peking Review, No. 32 (8 August 1975), pp. 16–18; NCNA in English, FE/W819 (26 March 1975), p. A/2.Google Scholar

98. C. Djerassi, “Some observations on current fertility control in China,” CQ, No. 57 (1974), pp. 40–62.

99. Chinese expert delegations have shown interest in nuclear power plant when touring Japan, Pakistan, Canada and several European countries. While construction of a small plant is technologically feasible immediately, any significant contribution of nuclear energy (say, at least 10% of the total) is economically and technologically impossible in China within the next two decades. Interestingly enough, the Chinese have recently joined a growing number of western and Soviet establishments pursuing the difficult – but potentially extremely rewarding – task of developing controlled thermonuclear generation.

The NCNA announced the completion and successful testing of a small device for toroidal discharge in a high–density quasi–steady magnetic field (NCNA in English, FE/4822 (5 February 1975), p. i). The Tokamak–type device (first developed by the Kurchatov Institute of Physics in the U.S.S.R.) was designed and built in less than two years by the Institute of Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Peking. Controlled thermonuclear reaction (fusion) might become a commercial source of electricity around the year 2000; see Smil, V., “Energy and the environment: scenarios for 1985 and 2000,” The Futurist, No. 1 (February 1974), pp. 4–13.Google Scholar

100. The impact of new generating methods will be limited for some time to come even in the most advanced countries; see Smil, V., “Energy policy faces limited choices,” Energy International, No. 3 (March 1974), pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

101. R. M. Field, “ China's industrial development,” p. 63, gives the 1970 indus– trial production index (1952 = 100) at 388–499 (average 419), while energy pro– duction for the same period was 505 (my own calculation based on data in Table 5).