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Slow Growth of Labour Productivity in Chinese Industry, 1952–81

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Robert Michael Field
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Extract

Since the death of Mao Zedong in the autumn of 1976, Beijing's economic advisers have been trying to explain what went wrong with the Chinese economy during the past 25 years and, in particular, why the growth of productivity has been so slow. Their findings are pieced together in the series shown in Tables 1 and 2. These Figures demonstrate the impact of the Leap Forward (1958–60), the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), and the final struggle against the “gang of four“ (1976).

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 96 , December 1983 , pp. 641 - 664
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1983

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References

1. The Chinese define the Cultural Revolution as 1966–76, but the worst disruptions were in the first few years.

2. One exception may be the productivity index in State Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years (Beijing, 1960), p. 110Google Scholar; The index number for 1957 (with 1952 = 100) is 152, which is virtually the same as the 152·1 shown in Table 1, and the coverage is stated to be “workers and other employees in industrial enterprises at county level and above,” which may be the same as the coverage assumed in this section.

3. No figure from the 1950s for workers and employees at co-operative enterprises in 1957 is available, but employment could have grown to 427,000 (7,907,000–7,480,000), as it had already reached 366,000 by year-end 1955. See Emerson, John Philip, Nonagricultural Employment in Mainland China: 1949–1958, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 21, US Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (1965), p. 134Google Scholar;

4. Emerson, John Philip, Nonagricultural Employment in Mainland China: 1949–1958, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 21, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (1965), p. 143Google Scholar;

5. United Nations Statistical Office.

6. Muqiao, Xue et al. (eds.), Zhongguo jingji nianjian (1981) (AnnualEconomic Report of China (1981)) (Beijing, 1981), pp. IV–59 and VI–14Google Scholar. The reported gross value of output in 1952 was deflated by the price index in Table A2.

7. Zehou, Zhang and Yuguang, Chen, “The relationship between population structure and economic development in China,” Zhongguo shehui kexue, No. 4 (1981), p. 34Google Scholar;

8. The Chinese revalued the fixed assets of state-operated enterprises in 1951–52 to eliminate the effect of inflation during and after the Second World War, but probably have not revalued them since then.

9. Derived from 1952 output in 1952 prices, 1981 output in 1980 prices and the 1981 output index (1952 = 100). See Table A4 and State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongfi nianjian, 1981 (Chinese Statistical Almanac, 1981) (Hong Kong, 1982), pp. 207 and 209Google Scholar.

10. Just as an output index in current prices can be factored into a Paasche price index and a Lespeyres output index (or vice versa), a productivity or capital-output index can be factored into a direct index with base year or given year weights and an index of change due to structural change with given year or base year branch of industry productivity or capitallabour ratios. The productivity analysis above uses base year (1981) labour weights and given year branch of industry productivity, whereas the capital-output analysis here uses given year output weights and base year (1981) branch of industry capital-output ratios.

11. Earnings include wages, overtime, bonuses and subsidies. See State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1981 (Chinese Statistical Almanac, 1981) (Hong Kong, 1982), p. 508Google Scholar.

12. Muqiao, Xue et al. (eds.), Zhongguo jingji nianjian (1981) (Annual Economic Report of China (1981)) (Beijing, 1981), p. VI–25Google Scholar. The sample from which data on urban participation are drawn has changed over time. In particular, the figure for 1979 includes workers and employees at collective enterprises.

13. Table A4 (Appendix).

14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8 September 1982, p. K8.

15. Hongqi, No. 5 (1982).

16. FBIS, 29 July 1982, p. K16.

17. Guangzhao, Yue, “Several questions on increasing employment and raising labour productivity,” Renmin ribao, 23 11 1981Google Scholar;

18. Unit labour costs are low, but total labour costs high.

19. For an excellent treatment of unemployment, see Emerson, John Philip, “Urban school-leavers and unemployment in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 93 (03 1983), pp. 1–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar;