The Ionian war was more complex than any previous war in which Greeks had fought one another. Various factors contributed to its complexity. One of them was the uneasy partnership between Peloponnesians and Persians, which seldom functioned to the complete satisfaction of the former and was at times almost in abeyance. Other factors were the oligarchical revolution at Athens, which nearly plunged the Athenians into civil war, and the chameleon-like behaviour of Alcibiades, who within a brief period lent his services first to Sparta, then to Persia, and finally to Athens, though at all times serving primarily his own interests. Yet another factor was the multiplicity of Greek states directly or indirectly involved in the war. In addition to those of the Greek homeland and of Italy and Sicily which supplied contingents to the Peloponnesian expeditionary forces in Asia, all the members of the Delian Confederacy included at any time in the Ionian, Hellespontine, and Carian districts, numbering more than 150, must have been affected to some extent by the war, though only a fraction of them played an active part in it. The aim of this paper is to consider the attitude of Asiatic Greek cities towards the war and the extent of their involvement in it.
page 9 note 1 Thucydides uses (8.11.3) but only in a local sense denoting ‘the war in Ionia’’ and not distinguishing it from other wars. The less appropriate ‘Decelean war’’ soon established itself as the conventional term, presumably representing the viewpoint of contemporaries resident in Athens, cf. Isocr 86; Hell. Ox. 7.3, 19.2 (Bartoletti); Dem. 18.96.
page 9 note 2 Meiggs R., The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1972), pp.538-61.
page 9 note 3 It will be convenient, for the sake of brevity, to use the term ‘Ionian’’ occasionall to cover all or most Asiatic Greek cities. Th minor inaccuracy has respectable precedent cf. Hdt. 5.37.2; 9.106.2; Thuc. 8.86.4. The modern term ‘East Greek’’ is not altogether appropriate here.
page 9 note 4 See, e.g., Meyer E., GdA 4 (Stuttgart, 1901), 563–4 and 633, for conclusions based on such assumptions. Large fleets could certainly anchor in the harbours of insignificant cities without considering whether they were welcome or not. It should not be assumed that Loryma was well disposed towards Athens because an Athenian fleet called there (Thuc. 8.43.1), or that Icarus was in revolt because Mindarus sheltered there from a storm (99). Fleets of both sides were at Syme within a few days (41.4–43.1). In 427 Alcidas had called at various places on the islands and the Asiatic mainland which were certainly not in revolt, and although his supporters claimed that he was welcome, his fleet caused great alarm (3.29.2–33.2). The cities at which he called were mostly small, but they included Ephesus.
page 10 note 1 There are significantly few references to garrisons established by either side, especially in the opening stages of the war. In 412 Chalcideus left a makeshift garrison at Chios (17.1), which was later reinforced by mercenaries led by Pedaritus (28.5; 32.2). In 410 the Spartans sent Clearchus to Byzantium (Xen . Hell. 1.1.35, 3.15; Diod. 13.66.5) and Hippocrates to Chalcedon (Xen. Hell. 1.3.5; Diod. 13.66.2; Plut. Alcib. 29.6–30.1) as harmosts, each supported by a body of troops. The Athenians garrisoned Sestos (62.3) and Mytilene (100.3) in 411 and later Methymna (Xen. Hell. 1.6.13; Diod. 13.76.5) and a num- ber of cities on the Hellespont and Propontis: Lampsacus (Diod. 13.66.1, 104.8), Chrysopolis (ibid. 64.2), Selymbria (ibid. 66.4; Plut. Alcib. 30), Byzantium, and Chalcedon (Xen. Hell. 2.2.1). The Athenians appear to have had greater resources of man- power at their disposal in the last years of the war, presumably because they were recovering from the Sicilian disaster.
page 10 note 2 de Romilly J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Eng. trans., Oxford, 1963), pp.84–6, p.315 with n.2, pp.376–8, and BICS 13 (1966), 1–12.
page 10 note 3 For the Ionian war the most important passage is 8.2.2. In later statements feelings about independence are considered in relation to feelings about forms of govern- ment: the desire for independence was not to be curbed by the establishment of oligarchy either at Athens (48.5, the view of Phrynichus but evidently approved by Thucydides) or in the cities themselves (64.5).
page 10 note 4 Croix G.E.M. de Ste., Historia 3 (1954), 1–41, especially 6-9 on Ionia, cf. his Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London, 1972), pp.34–43. Bockisch G., Helikon 8 (1968), 139–60, and Hegyi D. in Hellenische Poleis (ed. Welskopf E. C., Berlin, 1974), 2.1018–27 (which contains some errors) seem to me to overestimate the influence of conflicts between rival political factions.
page 11 note 1 Neutrality is not, strictly speaking, an appropriate term in the prevailing circum- stances: cities which had not revolted were under an obligation to aid the Athenians, while cities which had revolted were under an obligation to aid the Peloponnesians. In practice, however, it was soon found that there was little to be gained by using local levies of most Ionian cities except in home defence (seebelow, p.34).
page 11 note 2 Hereafter references where the name of the author is not stated are to Thucydides and those without a book- number are to the eighth book.
page 11 note 3 Cf. Adcock F. E., Thucydides and his History (Cambridge, 1963), pp.83–9; de Romilly , op cit. (above, p.10 n.2), pp.53–4; my Individuals in Thucydides (Cambridge, 1968), pp.257–9.
page 11 note 4 As Weil R., Thucydide Livre VIII (Budé, 1972)Notice, xv, aptly comments, ‘beaucoup des fairs auxquels s'attache le scruple de l'historien sont apparemment le pain quotidien de la guerre.’’
page 12 note 1 Bean G. E., Aegean Turkey (London, 1966), p. 140.
page 13 note 1 The troops from Clazomenae and Erythrae may well have left Teos before completing the destruction of the landward wall largely because they distrusted Tissaphernes and were reluctant that a Greek city should be at the mercy of the Persians.
page 13 note 2 Cf. Ferguson W. S., CAH 5 (1927), 316; ATL 1 (1939), 423; Hatzfeld J., Aicibiade (Paris, 1940), p.307. The only extant record of military action at Teos during the remaining years of the war, which will be considered below, might be thought to support the view that the Athenians recovered the city in 412, but the passage in which Thucydides defines the agreement with Diomedon is unequivo- cal. Action taken by the Peloponnesians in 406 does not imply that Teos was then under Athenian control or had meanwhile given wholehearted assistance to Athens.
page 13 note 3 Busolt G., Gr. Gescb. 3.2 (Gotha, 1904), 1427, interprets this phrase correctly, cf. Steup , n. ad loc, who, however, follows Goodhart, n. ad loc, in defining the status of Teos as neutrality. As noted above (p.11 n.l), this term is inappropriate.
page 13 note 4 In the preceding sentences of Diodorus (ibid. 3–4) the surrender of Delphinium, the Athenian fort on Chios, to die Spartans is recorded. For this reason some scholars have accepted an emendation of Xen. Hell. 1.5.15 by Schneider involving the substitution of Teos for Eion as the name of a place seized by the Spartans, who in the same sentence are stated to have taken Delphinium. This emendation is attractive, though by no means certain. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that, because Xenophon assigns these Spartan successes to the nauarchia of Lysander, Diodorus is mistaken in attributing them to Callicratidas. Xenophon does not credit them to Lysander personally but to the Spartans, and he uses the phrase Lotze D., Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg (Abbandl. sachs. Akad. 57, 1964), p.25 n.5, rightly points out that here as elsewhere Xenophon is anticipating later events. The account of Diodorus should be accepted: it includes detail which is not in his conventionally rhetorical manner and seems to be authentic.
page 14 note 1 Cf. Hdt. 1.143.2–3;4.142;6.11–12; also the views expressed by various Thucydidean speakers, 1.124.1; 5.9.1; 6.77.1; 7.5.4.
page 14 note 2 Cf. Cook J. M., The Greeks in Ionia and the East (London, 1962), p.90: ‘Teos slumbered in its hollow, taking life as it came and unwilling ever to struggle: the Teians opened their gates to all assailants’’. Anacreon, the most celebrated Teian, expressly condemns the prevalence of martial themes at banquets (fr. 96, Diehl) and seems, unlike some earlier poets, to have felt distaste for war itself, cf. Bowra C. M., Greek Lyric Poetry 1 (Oxford, 1961), pp.270–1, 303–4.
page 15 note 1 This passage has been commonly misunderstood. The correct explanation was given long ago by Classen, n. ad loc. Astyochus demands that the Clazomenians generally should come over the Peloponnesian side, not merely the atticizers. The latter are to move to Daphnous in order that they can be kept under surveillance.
page 15 note 2 A fragmentary text in Hell. Ox. 3.1 (Bartoletti) may refer to this episode. Unfortunately fragments of an Atheni: decree of 407 confirming an agreemem made by Athenian generals with Clazomenians settled at Daphnous doe not throw any light upon the situation Meiggs R. and Lewis D. M., GH1 (Oxford 1969), No. 88.
page 16 note 1 About forty years earlier political unrest at Erythrae, probably amounting to a revolt, had led to Athenian intervention and the expulsion of a faction intriguing with Persia; see Meiggs , op. cit. (above, p. 10 n.2), pp.112–15. Resentment maytill have smouldered.
page 16 note 2 Soon afterwards Astyochus was summoned from Erythrae by the Chian government to confer about measures to foil a conspiracy to betray Chios to the Athenians (24.6), and later he attacked Pteleon without success (31.2).
page 17 note 1 See below, p.27 n.3.
page 17 note 2 If the arguments of Baker J. M., Rev. Suisse de numism. 49 (1970), 25–46, are accepted, Teos established monetary links with Phocaea and perhaps with Ephesus early in the Ionian war. As shown by the present investigation, the relations between each of these cities and the major belligerents differed very widely.
page 17 note 3 Meiggs R., Harv. Stud. 67 (1963), 20–1; Barron J. P. in Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson (Oxford, 1968), p.87.
page 17 note 4 See below, pp.22–3.
page 17 note 5 See my Individuals (above, p.13 n.3), pp.292–7.
page 17 note 6 Bean G. E. and Cook J. M., BSA 52 (1957), 119–26, maintain that Astypalaea, capital city in the fifth century, was situated near the western extremity of the island, while Meropis was on the site of the later capital facing the mainland across the straits; that in the Ionian war the Athenians held Meropis, whereas the rest of the island favoured the Peloponnesians (ibid. 121 and 125). Meiggs , Ham. Stud. 67, p.35 n.88, is critical of this theory on the ground that it is not easily reconcilable with evidence about Cos during the Pentecontaetia It is also difficult to believe that, even in the peculiar conditions of the Ionian war to which the present investigation draws attention, an island with an area of little more than 100 square miles can have been for years divided into a large zone controlled by the Peloponnesians and a lesser zone controlled by the Athenians. No one reading the narrative of Thucydides on the attack by the fleet of Astyochus, which contains a considerable amount of circumstantial detail (the Coans flee to the mountains and the attackers make plundering raids into the countryside, 41.2) would suspect that most of the island was already under Peloponnesian control.
page 18 note 1 That Halicarnassus (cf. 42.2) granted valuable and consistent support to Athens is suggested by an official expression of gratitude issued early in 409 (IG l 2.110a).
page 18 note 2 Plut. Alcib. 27.2 evidendy refers to the same expedition. On the reference to Cnidus in that passage see below, p. 38.
page 18 note 3 Nease A. S., Phoenix 3 (1949), 107–9, collects evidence about arcbontes in the Athenian empire: some had the support of a garrison, but others evidently had not. Brunt P. A. in Ancient Society and Institutions (Oxford, 1966), p.84, points out that shortage of manpower normally caused the Athenians to with- draw garrisons as soon as possible and to maintain their authority by other means.
page 19 note 1 Hicks E. L. in Paton W. R. and Hicks , Inscriptions of Cos (Oxford, 1891), p.xxv, suggests that Cos had revolted when Athenian prospects seemed hopeless shortly before the victory at Cynossema and that Alcibiades first plundered the Coans (Diodorus) and then fortified then- city (Thucydides) before leaving a garrison (an unwarranted assumption from Thucydides: see above). This explanation is accepted by Modona A. Neppi, L'isola di Coo (Rhodes, 1933), p.36; but the versions of Thucydides and Diodorus are not so easily reconcilable.
page 19 note 2 Cf. Hatzfeld , Alcibiade, p.314 n.l.
page 19 note 3 The chronology of this period is uncertain, but there is every reason to date the visit of Lysander to Cos before the plundering raid by Alcibiades, cf. Beloch K. J., Gr. Gesch. 2.2 (Strasbourg, 1916), 273–4.
page 19 note 4 Cf. Lotze , op. cit., p.14. Xenophon mentions that crews from Siceliot ships distinguished themselves at Ephesus in 409 in the defeat of the Athenian force led by Thrasyllus (Hell. 1. 2.1–11), but he does not refer to the presence of any Peloponnesians. A mutilated passage in a new fragment of Hell. Ox. suggests that some Spartans were present, but they were probably very few cf. Koenen L., Stud. Pap. 15 (1976), 58–9.
page 19 note 5 Plut. Alcib. 35.4–5, see below, p.21 n.2.
page 20 note 1 Thibron was sentenced to banishment by the Spartans when their allies brought this charge against him (Xen. Hell. 3.1.8). When the expeditionary forces sent out by the Athenians came to be composed increasingly of mercenaries, the plundering of allies became more prevalent (cf. Isocr. 8.46 and 134; Don. 4.24 and 13.6).
page 20 note 2 See above, p. 15.
page 20 note 3 Shortly afterwards the Peloponnesian fleet under Mindarus on its hasty voyage from Ionia to the Hellespont coasted along the territory of Cyme, apparently without making a landfall (101.2).
page 20 note 4 Barber G. L., The Historian Epborus (Cambridge, 1935), 86; Sanctis G. De, Studi di storia della storiografia greca (Florence, 1951), p.170.Busolt , Gr. Gescb. 3.2, p. 15 75 n.l, though expressing some uneasiness about the episode, concludes that Alcibiades may well have attacked the Cymaeans but that Ephorus has falsely represented them as loyal to Athens; cf. Meyer , GdA 4, p.634. On the chronology Busolt and Meyer convincingly maintain that the attack by Alcibiades should be linked with his visit to Phocaea when he left his main fleet in charge of Antiochus and that Ephorus has falsely dated it after the battle of Notium.
page 21 note 1 Accame S., Rend. Line. 14 (1938), 387–8, believes that Ephorus found in his source a reference to an attack on Cyme by Alcibiades but, influenced by local patriotism, exaggerated its importance. Hatzfeld , Alcibiade, p.313 n.2, accepts the authenticity of the episode on the not entirely cogent grounds that Ephorus must have known the truth about the history of his native town. See also HoSek R., Kyme 1 (ed. Bouzek J., Prague, 1974), 192, who has no doubts.
page 21 note 2 Plutarch (Alcib. 35.4–5) states that he had often to sail off on fund-raising expeditions, whereas the close collaboration between Lysander and Cyrus secured gen- erous pay for the Peloponnesians. Bloedow E. F., Alcibiades Re-examined (Historia, Einzelschrift 21, 1973), pp.74–6, who does not cite this passage, refers in a footnote (n.442) to the effect of the payments made to the Peloponnesians, but he apparently fails to appreciate the gravity of the handicap imposed thereby upon Alcibiades, whose leadership he disparages here as elsewhere to an unjustifiable degree.
page 21 note 3 According to Nepos (Alcib. 7.1–2) Alcibiades was accused of having made little effort to capture Cyme because he had accepted Persian bribes. Since his association with the Persians had long since ended (cf. Xen. Hell. 1.1.9–10 for his arrest by Tissaphernes), this charge is doubtless a calumny by his enemies seeking to discredit him. It does, however, suggest that the Persians may have had designs on Cyme at this time. Justin 5.5.2–3 is characteristically vague and muddled in dealing with the general situation at this time.
page 21 note 4 This compound verb (which means ‘sail across’’ ibid. 1.1.15; 1.5.14) is unsuitable for a voyage from Notium to Phocaea, as a glance at a map will show. It is entirely appropriate to a crossing of the Gulf of Smyrna from Clazomenae, to which, according to Diodorus (13.71.1), Alcibiades had sailed in haste from Notium to deal with raids by exiles (see above, p.15). Xenophon has perhaps shortened his narrative by cutting out this intermediate stage.
page 22 note 1 Plutarch in the Lysander (5.1), evidently following Xenophon, states that Alcibiades sailed directly to Phocaea, but in the Alcibiades (35.5) that he went to Caria to raise money. In the latter passage Plutarch, though doubtless accurately attributing financial need as a motive (see above), has evidently mis- dated an earlier mission to Caria to which Xenophon refers (Hell. 1.4.8).
page 22 note 2 Meyer Gda 4, p.634, cf. Busolt , Gr. Gesch. 3.2, p.1575 n.l.
page 22 note 3 Cf. Hude (Teubner) and Hatzfeld (Budé). has also been suggested.
page 22 note 4 Underhill, n. ad loc, rightly rejects them. The manuscripts without exception read .
page 22 note 5 Meiggs , Athenian Empire, pp.436–7, justifiably favours 430, when an Athenian force sent to collect money in Caria and Lycia was defeated and its commander killed (2.89).
page 22 note 6 ATL 2 (1949), A9.98 (where its assessment is seen to have been enormously increased, perhaps as an indemnity).
page 22 note 7 See above, p.17.
page 23 note 1 According to Meyer , GdA 4, p.566, Caunus, like Cnidus (35.1), was in the hands of Tissaphernes; he cites no evidence for this statement, which may be merely an inference from 57.1 (on which see below). Other scholars ignore the status of Caunus.
page 23 note 2 Delebecque E., Thucydide Livre VIII (Aix-en-Provence, 1967), pp.107 (on 88) and 125 (on 108.1) doubts whether Alcibiades ever reached Caunus and Phaselis.lt is true that the former passage is inconclusive on this point, but 108.1 is unequivocal. (The paper by the same author in Annates de la Faculty de Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence, 43, is not accessible to me.) On the other hand, Alcibiades evidently did not choose to go as far as Aspendus.
page 24 note 1 I have discussed the relations between Athens and Amorges in Phoenix 31 (1977), 319–29.
page 24 note 2 See below, pp.37–9.
page 24 note 3 If the emendation of Diod. 13.104.7 is accepted, a fragmentary Athenian decree, IG 2 2.3, which provides evidence of friendly relations between Athens and Iasus, may well belong to this period of renewed alliance and is not necessarily to be dated before 412, as Lewis D. M., BSA 49 (1954), 33, concludes.
page 25 note 1 Cf. Lotze , op. cit., p.82 n.3.
page 25 note 2 Lotze , op. cit., p.30 n.3; Meiggs , Athenian Empire, pp.577–8.
page 25 note 3 Beloch , Gr. Gesch. 2.2.246.
page 25 note 4 Kahrstedt U., Forschungen (Berlin, 1910), p.176 n.17, is responsible for the emendation, which has been widely accepted, cf. Andrewes A., JHS 73 (1953), 7 n.21; Croix de Ste., Historia 3 (1954), 7 n.9; Meiggs , Athenian Empire, p.578.Schaefer H., RE 18.4 (1949), 2085, who rejects the emendation, does not adequately account for the intervention of Tissaphernes at Thasos.
page 25 note 5 See above, p. 15.
page 25 note 6 According to Croix De Ste., op. cit., pp.8–9, the case of Iasus provides a notable example of loyalty to Athens and supports his argument that allied cities had no enthusiasm for liberation. This interpretation cannot be disproved, since the evidence is so inadequate, but it seems far more probable, as suggested above, that the citizens were disposed to favour Athens because they con- sidered themselves to have been harshly treated by Persians and Spartans alike.
page 26 note 1 It is less grandiose than the figure of 500, which included contributions from the western Greeks, announced at the beginning of the Archidamian war (2.7.2).
page 26 note 2 As will be seen from the next section, Sparta did not require these cities to contribute large numbers of land troops; this is more surprising because service on land demanded considerably less training.
page 26 note 3 See below, p.34.
page 26 note 4 See below, p. 3 7.
page 26 note 5 Cf. Busolt , Gr. Cesch. 3.2. 1555.
page 27 note 1 Not even the total number of ships is precisely known, though he had 200 shortly after his victory (Xen. Hell. 2.2.5).
page 27 note 2 Meiggs and Lewis , op. cit., No. 95, cf. Bousquet J., BCH 90 (1966), 428–40.
page 27 note 3 A lacuna precedes the words (who are then named), Conjectural attempts to fill the lacuna name Erythrae as the city to which Astycrates belonged, since Mimas is a mountain in Erythraean territory, cf. Hitzig and Bliimner, n. ad loc; Pomtow H., RE Suppl. 4 (1924), 1210. This restoration is not wholly convincing. There seems to be no reason why in the context Erythrae should need to be meticulously located (Epidaurus, ibid. 10, does need to be located because of possible confusion with Epidaurus Limera). The only other moderately well-known Erythrae (Paus. 6.21.11, ) was situated on the northern side of Cithaeron many miles from the sea. Nor, if it were thought necessary to locate Erythrae, would it be natural to do so by reference to Mimas, which was not at all famous. Normally, when there is any risk of confusion, this Erythrae is identified as being in Ionia (cf. Paus. 6.15.6; 9.27.8). It is more likely that Astycrates belonged to some insignificant town which needed to be located as ‘beyond Mimas’’ or ‘over against Mimas’’ and which, as the context implies, had links with Chios (itself Paus. 7.4.1). Astycrates may even have been in command of Chian ships. Textual difficulties could well have arisen because the name of the town, like many in this area, was not widely known.
page 27 note 4 These cities are, with very few exceptions, identical with those ordered to build ships when the Ionian war had not yet begun (3.2). Eretria and Chalcis (the latter omitted in error by Pausanias, cf. Bousquet , op. cit., pp.438–40) had revolted in 411.
page 28 note 1 Diodorus (13.97.1) in a vague and inaccurate passage refers to ‘islands’’ as a source from which ships were obtained.
page 28 note 2 The shortage of trained troops, which was yet another source of weakness, will be discussed in the next section.
page 28 note 3 Meiggs , Athenian Empire, pp.150–1; Schuller W., Herrschaft der Atbener im ersten attiscben Seebund (Berlin, 1974), pp.12–13.
page 28 note 4 31.3 (Clazomenae); 35.3 (Cnidus); 41.2 (Cos); 44.2 (Camirus); 50.5–51.1 (Samos);62.2 (Lampsacus); 107.1 (Cyzicus). For a general statement from the Archidamian war, 3.33.2. There is hardly any evidence that rebel cities tried to protect themselves by building fortifications, but cf. 100.5, 103.2 (Eresus) and Xen. Hell. 1.1.26 (Antandrus). Most references to fortifications are to those built by the Athenians for the protection of cities under their control: 51.1–2 (Samos); 108.2 (Cos); Xen. Hell. 1.1.22, Diod. 13.64.2 (Chrysopolis); Xen. Hell. 1.2.15, Diod. 13.66.1 (Lampsacus).
page 28 note 5 For striking examples of occasions when such information was lacking see 33.2 (Corycus) and 42.1–3 (Syme).
page 29 note 1 The effects of bad weather upon ships at sea is mentioned frequently, cf. 31.3; 32.1; 34; 42.1; 80.3; 99; also the notorious sequel to the battle of Arginusae, Xen. Hell. 1.6.35, Diod. 13.100.2–3.
page 29 note 2 See above, p.9 n.4.
page 29 note 3 See above, p.10 n.l.
page 29 note 4 See above, pp. 13–14, 19, 20–1.
page 29 note 5 Evidence on the quality of the rival fleets suggests that the Peloponnesians were somewhat more effective than the Athenians when receiving adequate payment from the Persians but tended to become inferior when the subsidy was withheld or drastically reduced, cf. 36.1; 46.4; 48.4; 80.1; 87.4; 106.2; Xen. Hell. 1.6.29–31.
page 30 note 1 See above, p. 10.
page 30 note 2 During the negotiations at Sparta before the war began there was rivalry between the delegations from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes about the area in Asia to which the Spartans should first send (6.2). Although the latter term may be used of naval forces, here it undoubtedly denotes land troops.
page 30 note 3 See Karhstedt U., Gr. Staatsrecbt (Göttingen, 1922), pp.318–19, on the personnel on the Spartan navy.
page 31 note 1 Ehrenberg V., RE 19 (1937), 26, notes the inferiority of the troops under the command of Pedaritus.
page 31 note 2 The rest of this force consisted of Megarians, Boeotians, and (cf. Diod. 13.66.5) mercenaries.
page 32 note 1 The Athenians were victorious on land and were preparing to invest the city when a powerful fleet arrived from the Peloponnese, and Phrynichus persuaded his colleagues to withdraw and not to fight a decisive battle at sea (25.5–27.6).
page 32 note 2 Andrewes A., JHS 73 (1953), 2–5. See also Diod. 13.64.2–4; 66.3–4.
page 32 note 3 When Alcibiades attacked Cyme without success, he had to send to Mytilene for reinforcements (see above, p.20), which suggests that his own troops were insufficient in numbers.
page 32 note 4 In the Tbesmopboriazusae (produced probably in 411) Aristophanes seems to suggest that the performance of the army was at the time more creditable than that of the navy (833–9, cf. 804 on the defeat of Charminus off Syme).
page 33 note 1 According to Diodorus, Thibron had 2,000 Asiatic Greeks.under his command (14.36.2) and Agesilaus 4,000 (14.79.2): Because the Spartans were no longer in alliance with Tissaphernes but were fighting against him, the prospect of independence for Asiatic Greeks was clearly much brighter despite the risk of decarchies imposed by Sparta. Thus they were far more willing to supply contingents, though Xenophon suggests that they had little choice (Hell. 3.1.5).
page 33 note 2 See above, p. 15.
page 33 note 3 Exceptions are: at Mycale in 411, when infantry from Miletus and neighbour- ing cities encamped there in support of the Peloponnesian fleet (79.4) but were not in action (see below, p.37 n.3); at Ephesus in 409, when some of the allies supporting the Ephesians were presumably Ionians (Xen. Hell. 1.2.6–8, cf. ibid. 2 for some Milesians at Pygela); at Lampsacus in 405, when Lysander assembled troops from Abydos and elsewhere (ibid. 2.1.18). Among the benefits which the Peloponnesians expected to derive from the revolt of Rhodes was the support of its powerful infantry (44.1), but there is no evidence that Rhodian troops served on the mainland. Internal strife (Diod. 13.38.5) may have proved an obstacle.
page 33 note 4 See above, p. 16, on Erythrae. The allies mentioned in 40.3 who supported the Chian appeal to Astyochus to take action for the relief of Chios were certainly those from Greece and Sicily and not Ionians.
page 34 note 1 Even for the Sicilian expedition the only Asiatic Greek troops conscripted were from Miletus, Samos, Tenedos, and Rhodes (7.57.4–6), the Rhodians being slingers (6.43).
page 34 note 2 See above, p.28.
page 34 note 3 Astyochus supplied rebels at Eresus with arms (23.4), but there is no mention of similar action elsewhere.
page 34 note 4 28.2(Iasus); Xen. Hell. 1.2.10 (Ephesus), cf. ibid. 1.1.26 (Antandrus).
page 34 note 5 It is noteworthy that, although Cyrus was in Asia Minor when he was organizing his expedition against his brother, none of the Cyreans whose provenance is known was an Asiatic Greek, apart from one Chian and one Samian, cf. Parke H. W., Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933), p.28.
page 34 note 6 Most of the troops recruited by Thibron nearly three years earlier we're presumably still serving under Dercyllidas.
page 34 note 7 At Cnidus in 394 the Spartan admiral was deserted by his Asiatic Greek allies, who fled to land (Xen. Hell. 4.3.12; Diod. 14.83.7).
page 35 note 1 They may also have become less determined to resist the Athenians at all costs when they learned that rebel cities forced to submit were not being subjected to the savage reprisals which had been imposed on Scione. For the relative generosity of the Athenians, which was doubtless politic in the circumstances cf. Meiggs , Athenian Empire, pp.367–8.
page 35 note 2 The problem is fully discussed by Lateiner D., TAPA 106 (1976), 267–90.
page 35 note 3 There is no means of determining what proportion of the force assembled by him for the defence of Ephesus in 409 consisted of his own troops (Xen. Hell. 1.2.6–8).
page 35 note 4 See above, p.24.
page 36 note 1 He was an Egyptian (Diod. 14.19.6), who later served under Cyrus against Tissaphernes (Xen. Anab. 1.4.2).
page 36 note 2 See below, pp.38–9.
page 36 note 3 Iasus (29.1); Cnidus (109); Miletus (84.4–5; 109); Aritandrus (108.4–5). Ephesus was under his control (109; Plut. Lys. 3.3) but does not seem to have been garrisoned.
page 36 note 4 See below, p.42 with references.
page 36 note 5 A striking illustration of this dependence on Persian subsidies is provided by the desperate situation of troops under Eteonicus at Chios towards the end of the war: in order to feed and clothe themselves they first worked as farm labourers and then conspired to plunder their Chian allies (Xen. Hell. 2.1.1).
page 36 note 6 Cf. De Sanctis , op. cit., p.89.
page 36 note 7 De Sanctis , op. cit., pp.84–93; Woodhead A. G., Thucydides and the Nature of Power (Harvard, 1970), pp.138–9. A further argument in favour of this interpretation is that at the meeting between the Spartans and Tissaphernes at Cnidus Lichas, if his protest is accurately reproduced by Thucydides, criticized both these two documents, especially the first (43.3–4): if they had been formally ratified treaties, the second would have superseded the first, which would accordingly have become null and void before Lichas expressed his views.
page 36 note 8 This heading refers to the sons of Phamaces, who included Pharnabazus, but he is kept in the background, perhaps deliberately. He was, in theory at least, subordinate to Tissaphernes, who was (5.4).
page 36 note 9 De Sanctis , op. cit., pp.90, 93, expresses some doubt whether it actually came into operation.
page 37 note 1 For a fourth-century condemnation of Spartan duplicity in the Ionian war for having at the same time promised to liberate the Asiatic Greeks and agreed to hand them over to Persia see Isocr. 12.103, cf. 4.122.
page 37 note 2 Meyer C., Die Urkunden im Gescbichtswerk des Tbukydides 2 (Munich, 1970), pp.87–8, draws attention to the connection between the clause relating to Persian control of Asia (58.2) and the expulsion of Persian garrisons.
page 37 note 3 Cf. 79.1–5 for an episode which must have annoyed the Milesians. Their troops were ordered to Mycale to support what was to have been a decisive action against the Athenians at Samos, but the Peloponnesian leaders changed their minds on learning that their fleet no longer enjoyed a substantial superiority in numbers.
page 37 note 4 Parke H. W., JHS 50 (1930), 47–9, convincingly maintains that the Spartans had handed over control of Miletus to Tissaphernes under the terms of the treaty. He cites as evidence (a) that Philippus, who was appointed harmost at Miletus in 412 (28.5), no longer held that appointment in 411 (87.6; 99) and (b) the remark by Lichas (84.5) mentioned above.
page 38 note 1 Xen . Anab. 1.1.6–8 shows that Tissaphernes was still hated at Miletus a decade later, as indeed elsewhere (see below, p.40 n.3).
page 38 note 2 In 424 Antandms had been betrayed to Lesbian exiles, who planned to establish their headquarters there (4.S2.3), but it was soon recovered by the Athenians (4.75.1) and its name has been preserved in the assessment of 421 (ATL A10.15). Presumably it revolted in 412 and was afterwards garrisoned by the Persians. Its coinage was on the Persian standard; see Robinson E. S. G., Hesperia, Suppl. 8 (1949), 332.
page 38 note 3 Meiggs , Athenian Empire, p.356, believes that the hoplites sent from Abydos were Antandrians who had been serving with the Peloponnesian forces there, but Thucydides certainly implies that they were Peloponnesians. He would hardly have stated that the Antandrians ‘introduced hoplites into their city’’ (108.4) if these hoplites had been local men returning home. The feelings attributed to Tissaphernes ‘when he learned of this action also on the part of the Peloponnesians’’ (109) are more easily understood if the hoplites who helped to expel his garrison were Peloponnesians. Such is evidently the view of Diodorus, whose account of this episode (13.42.4) seems to depend ultimately upon that of Thucydides.
page 39 note 1 Plutarch refers in different contexts to this hatred of Greeks: Alcib. 24.6; Artax. 23.1; Ages. 10.5; cf. Lys. 4.2.
page 39 note 2 See above, p.13 n.l.
page 39 note 3 The slighting tone of this refusal is perhaps attributable to Alcibiades and not to Tissaphernes. As Fritz K. von, Griechische Geschichtsscbreibung la (Berlin, 1967), 763, suggests, it suited the plans of Alcibiades to make Tissaphernes unpopular with the Peloponnesians and rebel cities alike because he hoped eventually to bring him over to the Athenian side.
page 39 note 4 Murray O., Historia 15 (1966), 148, 151.
page 40 note 1 Cavaignac E., Population et capital (Strasbourg, 1923), pp.35–6; the weakness of his comparison lies in his arbitrary esti– mate of the proportion paid by Greeks in the total sum stated by Herodotus (3.90.1) to have been raised by Persia from a taxation district which included other races; cf. Beloch , Gr. Gesch. 2.1.63 n.l and Murray , op. cit., p.149. If, as is maintained by Murray, op. cit., pp.146-7, some cities at various times paid tribute both to Persia and to Athens, in these cases the burden would naturally be lightened by revolt from Athens.
page 40 note 2 As stated above, pp.24–5, Iasus should probably be included among the cities cities which took action against him. For lesser indignities see above, pp.12–13 (his treatment of Teos).
page 40 note 3 The unpopularity of Tissaphernes in Ionia was remarkably persistent, as is illustrated by the events after the death of Darius in 404. When Cyrus was sent down again to Asia Minor and his feud with Tissaphernes led to open war between them, all the Ionian cities deserted Tissaphernes and joined Cyrus, apart from Miletus, which wished to do likewise but was restrained by force (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6–7, cf. 9.9). The exaction of tribute by Cyrus does appear to have damaged his popularity (ibid. 1.1.8).
page 40 note 4 Flaceliere R. and Chambry E., Plutarque, Vies 6 (Budé, 1971), p.163 with n.l.
page 41 note 1 There is also evidence of hostility between Tissaphernes and Lysander. When in 405 the latter instigated the overthrow of the democracy at Miletus, democratic refugees were given a home and financial aid by Tissaphernes (Diod. 13.104.5–6, where there is, as elsewhere, confusion between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; Plut. Lys. 8.1–3).
page 42 note 1 See above, pp.26–7. He courted the favour of extreme oligarchs in the cities. As most of these men were doubtless prosperous, this policy had the effect of producing contributions towards the prosecution of the war (Diod. 13.70.4), but according to Plutarch (Lys. 5.5–6; 13.5) its principal aim was much less commendable, namely to pave the way for the establishment of decarchies under his own control and thus to boost his personal authority. See above, p. 39, for the refusal of Tissaphernes to make such payments.
page 42 note 2 Cf. Xen. Hell. 1.2.16 and Plut. Alcib. 29.4 (Abydos); Xen. Hell. 1.1.26, 3.5 and Plut. Alcib. 30.1 (Chalcedon).
page 42 note 3 Amit M., Ant. Class. 42 (1973), 437–57, has discussed this agreement.
page 42 note 4 It may be that Pharnabazus treated Greeks more sympathetically because, being the son of the previous satrap Pharnaces, he had been in frequent contact with them from boyhood.
page 42 note 5 Byzantium: Xen. Hell. 1.3.14–21; Diod. 13.66.4–67.7; Plut. Alcib. 31.3–6. Selymbria: Diod. 13.66.4, , but Hatzfeld , Alcibiade, p.283 with n.l, is probably right in accepting the account of Plutarch , Alcib. 30.3–10, which credits Alcibiades with conspicuous gallantry in an assault resulting in the surrender of the city.
page 44 note 1 I greatly regret that the valuable work by Lewis D.M., Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977), was not accessible to me until this paper was completed.
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