^{Page 75 note 1} Busolt, , Gr. Gesch. iii. 2. 901–2Google Scholar; Meyer, , G. d. A. iv. 297–9Google Scholar; Adcock, , C.A.H. v. 195–6Google Scholar; Miltner, , R.E. xix. 781Google Scholar. Beloch, Even, who leads the attack on Periclean strategy (Gr. Gesch. ii. 1. 300Google Scholar with n. 1, cf. his earlier Att. Politik, 22–4), agrees that he was right in refusing to fight a pitched battle in Attica.

^{Page 75 note 2} Grundy, , Thucydides, 354–5Google Scholar; Beloch, loc. cit.; Henderson, , Great War between Athens and Sparta, 62Google Scholar (‘These naval parades round the Peloponnese were extraordinarily futile’); Sanctis, De, Sloria dei Greci, ii. 268Google Scholar.

^{Page 75 note 3} De Sanctis, loc. cit., apparently ignores this passage when he writes of ‘piccoli sbarchi sulle coste del Peloponneso’.

^{Page 75 note 4} Throughout this paper all references where the author is unspecified are to Thucydides.

^{Page 76 note 1} A secondary object of the Locrian operations may have been to safeguard communications with the Thessalians, whose cavalry gave exsome support to the Athenians in the first year of the war (2. 22). The interest shown by both sides in this area is illustrated by the Spartan foundation of Heraclea in 426.

^{Page 76 note 2} Grundy, , op. cit. 317–18Google Scholar, though it seems unlikely that Thucydides was so incurious about matters which he leaves unexplained.

^{Page 76 note 3} He only once claims to be aware of the undisclosed motives of Pericles (2. 22. 1).

^{Page 76 note 4} Plutarch (Per. 35. 3) concludes—apparently from the narrative of Thucydides—that the operations of 430 were abortive, though he exsome presses very different views on those of 431 (Ibid. 34. 4). Thucydides treats the expeditions of Nicias, about which he is likely to have been well informed through having served at least once as his colleague, in much the same way as those of Pericles (Westlake, , C.Q. xxxv (1941), 59–60)Google Scholar.

^{Page 76 note 5} 2. 65. 7, ⋯συχάξοντ άς τε και τ⋯ναυτικ⋯νθεραπεύοντας, cf. 2. 13. 2.

^{page 77 note 1} The same point is made in a brief and inaccurate note by Frontinus, (Strat. 1. 3. 9)Google Scholar.

^{page 77 note 2} In 2. 57. 1 Thucydides quotes a report, in which he does not seem to have had much confidence, that the withdrawal was hastened by the plague.

^{page 77 note 3} The earlier statement of Diodorus in 42. 7–8 may possibly be a doublet of 45. 3, the latter being a false inference from a sentence in Thucy dides stating that, when the expedition of 430 returned from Prasiae, the Peloponnesians had already left Attica (2. 56. 6). It is strange that Diodorus, when describing the occupation of Pylos, does not mention the fact that it induced Agis to withdraw his army from Attica (12. 61. 1; cf. Thuc. 4. 6).

^{page 77 note 4} Busolt, , op. cit. iii. 2. 899–901 with 892 n. 6Google Scholar; Beloch, loc. cit.; Kromayer in Kromayer and Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegfuhrung, 152–3; Miltner, loc. cit.

^{page 77 note 5} Gomme, , Essays in Greek History and Literature, 190–203Google Scholar.

^{page 77 note 6} 2. 69. 1 (Corinthian Gulf–though the squadron under Phormio was not sent to Naureturned pactus until the winter of 430–429); 2. 93. 4 (Nisaea).

^{page 77 note 7} 2.7.3 does not refer to blockade, as Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus were too far from Laconia to serve as bases for blockading the whole Peloponnese. On the other hand, they would be most useful to Athenian fleets making seaborne raids against points west of Cape Taenarum, as is shown by the operations of 431.

^{page 78 note 1} Grundy, , op. cit. 358Google Scholar, interprets this passage rather differently, inferring from the construction of additional ships that a blockade had been attempted before (i.e. after 425, when bases had been occupied), but had failed because the fleet was too small. It is difficult to believe that, even when they held Pylos and Cythera, the Athenians aimed at an effective blockade of the Peloponnese, but this difference of interpretation is immaterial so far as the operations of Pericles are concerned.

^{page 78 note 2} The case of Sollium does not affect the present inquiry, as it lay outside the Peloponnese; but it was handed over to the Acarnanians after the Corinthians had been expelled and was not occupied by Athenian troops. The object of the operations at Sollium and Astacus is clear: it was to damage Corinthian interests in the north-west and to gratify the Corcyraeans, who contributed to the allied fleet in this year.

^{page 78 note 3} Gomme, , Historical Commentary on Tkucydides, 462Google Scholar (n. on 1.144.1), considers that Pericles would not have disapproved of operations such as those at Pylos and Cythera, but the fact remains that he did not attempt to occupy Peloponnesian bases, though his raids afforded at least two excellent opportunities.

^{page 79 note 1} Beloch, , op. cit. ii. 1. 300, n. 1, and 330Google Scholar; Henderson, , op. cit. 63Google Scholar. It is not by any means certain that the occupation of the island would have been easy; in 424 the end of resistance was hastened by secret negotiations which Nicias had conducted in advance with a disaffected party (4. 54. 3), and the Spartans may have withdrawn their governor and garrison, fearing a recurrence of the disaster on Sphacteria (Busolt, , op. cit. III, 2, 1126, n.4)Google Scholar.

^{page 79 note 2} The first reaction of the Spartan government to the occupation of Pylos was that it could be recovered with ease (4. 5.1).

^{page 79 note 3} One of the aims of the raid on Methone may have been to test the reactions of the Messenians. In the absence of modem methods of communication the establishment of contact with an underground movement must have been extremely difficult. Pericles can hardly have anticipated how useful and how loyal the Messenians from Naupactus would prove.

^{page 79 note 4} When Thucydides states that before the occupation of Pylos the Spartans were ⋯μαθєῖς ⋯ν τῷ πρìν χρόνῳ ληστєίας καì το⋯; τοɩούτοʋ πολέμοʋ (4. 41. 3), he implies a distinction between the damage inflicted by seaborne raids, which the Spartans had experienced, and the almost continuous petty privateering conducted from fortified posts, of which they had had no experience hitherto.

^{page 79 note 5} Grundy, , op. cit. 331Google Scholar, inclines to this view, though without much conviction (Plut., cf.Per. 34. 3)Google Scholar.

^{page 80 note 1} Distinguished from attempted conquest, 5. 23. 1–2 and 47. 3–4 (documents of the peace terms and the alliance between Athens and Sparta); from privateering, above p. 79, n. 4. Gomme, , op. cit. 10–24Google Scholar, in an interesting summary of conditions of warfare does not refer to seaborne raids. This omission arises from his dichotomy between land warfare and naval warfare, which are surely inseparable in this period. As both sides refused to fight a decisive battle where they were weak, the Athenians on land and the Peloponnesians at sea, most operations undertaken by the Athenians and some undertaken by the Peloponnesians were amphibious.

^{page 80 note 2} A typical example is that of Alcidas, who in 427 refused to fight a second engagement off Corcyra, much to the disgust of Brasidas, and salved his conscience by plundering the promontory of Leucimme (3. 79. 3).

^{page 80 note 3} The potential destructiveness of such pillaging is illustrated by the suggestion made in the Republic (5.470a–47ic) that Greeks should refrain from ravaging the land and burning the houses of other Greeks and should content themselves with carrying off the crops.

^{page 80 note 4} The expeditions of 431 and 430 both sailed towards the end of June, when Peloponnesian corn would already be cut and could be more easily destroyed than while it was still growing. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, had to adopt the more laborious method of destroying standing crops in Attica, as the Athenians, if given time to gather their harvest, could have removed the bulk of it to safety behind the Long Walls.

^{page 81 note 1} Beloch, , op. cit. II. 1.300Google Scholar; De Sanctis, loc. cit.

^{page 81 note 2} It is perhaps the misinterpretation of this passage by some unknown historian that leads Justin (3. 7. 5–6) and Polyaenus (1. 36. 1) to declare that the Athenians actually inflicted greater damage than the Peloponnesians (cf. the more cautious statement of , Plut.Per. 34. 3–4)Google Scholar. The same tradition, exaggerating the effect of the Athenian raids, may have misled Diodorus (see above, pp. 76–7). Contemporary public opinion, represented by Aristoph, . Peace 625–7Google Scholar, envisaged the sufferings of Peloponnesian farmers from Athenian raids as severe (Ehrenberg, , People of Aristophanes, 68)Google Scholar.

^{page 81 note 3} Gomme, , op. cit. 26Google Scholar, mentions this point as one on which Thucydides supplies no information. The only hint is 3.15, where he states that the allies of Sparta resented the proposal to make an additional invasion in 428, because they were busy with their autumn harvest.

^{page 81 note 4} Tod, , C.A.H. v. 14Google Scholar; Michell, , Economics of Ancient Greece, 49Google Scholar.

^{page 81 note 5} Adcock, , C.A.H. v. 200Google Scholar. Thucydides mentions the narrow failure to take Epidaurus almost casually in the midst of a catalogue of plunderings (2. 56. 4), and perhaps concrete results were not expected to develop so soon.

^{page 82 note 1} Meritt, and Davidson, A.J.P. Ivi (1935),65–71Google Scholar , interpreting I.G. i². 87. In 412 the devastation of rich agricultural land at Chios nearly caused a revolution led by a faction wishing to come to terms with Athens (8.24.2–5,38.2–3), but here too ⋯πɩτєɩΧɩσμός was used.

^{page 82 note 2} The technique of such raids is admirably summarized by the ‘Old Oligarch’ (, Ps.-Xen.Ath. Resp. 2. 4)Google Scholar.

^{page 83 note 1} The home army, i.e. a third of the total hoplite strength, must have amounted to at least 1,500 men, excluding light-armed troops (Beloch, , op. cit. III. I. 281–2)Google Scholar.

^{page 83 note 2} De Sanctis, loc. cit. Records of some payments made for the expedition of 431 are preserved in I.G. i². 296,11. 30–40.

^{page 83 note 3} Adcock, , Canib. Hist. Journ. i (1925), 319–22Google Scholar, who gives reasons for believing that 3. 17 has been misplaced and should be inserted after 2. 56.

^{page 83 note 4} Ferguson, , Treasurers of Athena, 166–7Google Scholar, lays emphasis on the remarkable feat of accumulating a large reserve and of later recreating a considerable part of it.

^{page 83 note 5} Thucydides' treatment of finance is unsatisfactory to modem scholars (Gomme, op. cit. 26)Google Scholar, and the amount of information which can be extracted from inscriptions by the labours of epigraphists is insufficient to make good this deficiency. It is strange that there has been so much discussion on the adequacy of Pericles' financial provision for the war when his offensive plans have tended to be underrated and were certainly modest in comparison with those of the Pentecontaetia and of the period after his death. The report of Thucydides in 2. 13, which has no parallel elsewhere, is doubtless responsible. There is every reason to believe that Pericles, who had not scrupled to use the funds of the Confederacy for his building programme, would have been prepared to press the allies for heavier tribute if he had thought that a decisive advantage in war could have been gained thereby.