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Analyzing the Wrongfulness of Lying: A Defence of Pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2017

ARIANNA FALBO
ARIANNA FALBO*
Affiliation:
Brown University
*
*<afalbo@sfu.ca>
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Abstract

Extant accounts, both old and new, of the wrongfulness of lying are all inadequate. The common problem with each consists in its unitary structure. Such analyses presuppose that all lies are wrongful in the same way, for the same unifying reason. This assumption, however, does not do justice to the phenomena of lying. This is because lying can be morally objectionable in diverse ways. Thus, I argue for a dialectical shift towards a pluralist approach to the wrongfulness of lying. We should not force unity upon the moral structure of lying when there is actually diversity.

Les explications de ce pourquoi mentir est mal sont toutes inadéquates. Leur problème commun se situe dans leur structure unitaire. Ces analyses présupposent que tous les mensonges sont mauvais pour la même raison unificatrice. Cette supposition ne rend cependant pas justice au phénomène du mensonge, et ce, parce qu’on peut s’objecter à l’acte de mentir de différentes façons. Ainsi je suggère qu’il faut un changement dialectique en direction d’un traitement pluraliste de ce qui est mauvais dans le mensonge. Il ne faut pas forcer une unité sur la structure morale du mensonge lorsqu’il y a en fait pluralité.

Keywords

normative ethicspluralismlyingbald-faced lieswrongfulness of lying
Type
Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 Essay Prize Winners
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 431 - 454
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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