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The Unrealities of Time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2014

University of Rennes 1


Is time flowing? A-theorists say ‘yes’, B-theorists say ‘no’. But both take time to be real, which means that B-theorists accept that time is real, even if lacking a property usually ascribed to it. In this paper, I ask what the different properties usually ascribed to time there are in order to draw the list of different possible kinds of realism and anti-realism about time. As we will see, there are three main kinds of anti-realism. I will argue that if time is defined as the universe's fourth dimension, there is no way time could be unreal.

Le temps s’écoule-t-il? Les théoriciens A répondent positivement, les théoriciens B négativement. Les deux camps s’accordent cependant sur la réalité du temps. Cela signifie que les théoriciens B acceptent la réalité du temps en dépit du rejet d’une propriété qui lui est communément attribuée. Dans cet article, je veux examiner les différentes propriétés qui sont généralement attribuées au temps afin de faire la liste des différents types de réalisme et d’anti-réalisme. Nous le verrons, il existe trois types d’anti-réalisme. Je soutiendrai que si l’on définit le temps comme la quatrième dimension de l’univers, l’irréalité du temps est exclue.

Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2015 

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