Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-29T21:40:45.496Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Entities for Analyzing Legal Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Richard E. Robinson
Richard E. Robinson
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

One speaks of a person having a duty to do something and also of a person having a duty to another person to do something. It seems natural to treat the first as a case of a two-termed relation and the second as a case of a three-termed relation. However, the problem is what to take as the second term of a case of the two-termed relation and the third term of a case of the three-termed relation. For a long time act, instances of which would seem natural contenders, has been a suspect concept; its deficiency being integrally connected with the lack of a specification of how to individuate acts. This paper urges a particular solution to what sort of entity could serve as that which a person has a duty to do. Although discussion will be limited to the legal relations of duty, right, and so on, the problem is similar for the basic moral relations of duty, right, and so on, and the same solution avails for that problem. Before providing the solution to what sort of thing it is that people have a duty, right, etc. to do, it is important to set out what conditions an adequate solution must satisfy.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , December 1983 , pp. 621 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

[1]Anderson, Alan Ross, “The Logic of Hohfeldian Propositions”, Logique et Analyse 13 (1970), 231–242, reprinted in University of Pittsburgh Law Review 33 (1971), 29–38.Google Scholar
[2]Anderson, Alan Ross, and Belnap, Nuel D. Jr, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).Google Scholar
[3]Feinberg, Joel, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).Google Scholar
[4]Fitch, Frederic B., “A Revision of Hohfeld's Theory of Legal Concepts”, Logique et Analyse 10 (1967), 269–276.Google Scholar
[5]Hohfeld, Wesley, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923).Google Scholar
[6]Kripke, Saul, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic ”, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963), 83–94.Google Scholar
[7]Lyons, David, “The Correlativity of Rights and Duties”, Nous 4 (1970), 45–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[8]Montague, Richard, “On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities”, The Monist 53 (1960), 153–194, reprinted in [9], 148–187.Google Scholar
[9]Montague, Richard, Formal Philosophy, ed. Thomason, Richmond H. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).Google Scholar
[10]Robinson, R. E., Coval, S. C., and Smith, J. C., “The Logic of Rights”, University of Toronto Law Journal 33 (1983), 267–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[11]Ross, Alf, Directives and Norms (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).Google Scholar
[12]Smith, J. C., “Liberties and Choice”, The American Journal of Jurisprudence 19 (1974), 87–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[13]Williams, Glanville, “The Concept of Legal Liberty”, Summers, in Robert, ed., Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 121–145.Google Scholar