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Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Samuel Kahn
Samuel Kahn*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46202, USA
*
Email: kahnsa@iupui.edu
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Abstract

In Harry Frankfurt’s seminal “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he advances an argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: if an agent is responsible for performing some action, then she is able to do otherwise. However, almost all of the Frankfurt cases in this literature involve impermissible actions. In this article, I argue that the failure to consider other deontic categories exposes a deep problem, one that threatens either to upend much current moral theorizing or to upend the relevance of Frankfurt cases.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans son célèbre texte intitulé « Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility », Harry Frankfurt avance un argument contre le principe des possibilités alternatives : si un agent est responsable de l'exécution d'une action, alors il a pu faire autrement. Cependant, presque tous les cas de Frankfurt dans cette littérature impliquent des actions inadmissibles. Dans cet article, je soutiens que le fait de ne pas prendre en compte d’autres catégories déontiques expose un problème profond, qui menace soit de bouleverser une grande partie des théories morales actuelles, soit de bouleverser la pertinence des cas de Frankfurt.

Keywords

Frankfurt casesmere permissibilityprinciple of alternate possibilities (PAP)compatibilismsupercompatibilism
Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 62 , Issue 3 , December 2023 , pp. 539 - 552
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association/Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie

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