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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    JANZEN, GREG 2011. IN DEFENSE OF THE WHAT-IT-IS-LIKENESS OF EXPERIENCE. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 49, Issue. 3, p. 271.

    Gennaro, Rocco J. 2008. Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 139, Issue. 1, p. 39.


Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character

  • Greg Janzen (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 April 2009

This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth of direct arguments for them in the scholarly literature and the relationship between them has so far gone underrecognized. This article attempts to remedy this lack, advancing the claim that if all conscious states have phenomenal character, then all state consciousness involves self-consciousness.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie
  • ISSN: 0012-2173
  • EISSN: 1759-0949
  • URL: /core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie
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