¹ In Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Mahlum v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., No. CV93-05941 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 1995), cited according to Caplan, 135 n. 79.

² United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998); 42 U.S.C. 9607(a): “… (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of (…) shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government (…) not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.”

³ Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC), OJ(EC) [1985] L 210/29-33; on the implementation and the respective provisions in the Member States see Hoffman, and Hill-Aming, , Guide to Product Liability in Europe (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer 1994).Google Scholar

⁴ Fundamental are the following: Serick, , Rechtsform und Realität juristischer Personen [Legal Form and Reality of Legal Entities] (Berlin: de Gruyter 1955, 2nd unchanged edition – Tübingen: Mohr 1980)Google Scholar; Reinhardt, , “Gedanken zum Identitätsproblem bei Einmanngesellschaften” [Thoughts about Problems of Identity in One-Man Companies], in: FS Lehmann (Berlin: de Gruyter 1956) 576–593Google Scholar; Müller-Freienfels, , “Zur Lehre vom sogenannten ‘Durchgriff’ bei juristischen Personen im Privatrecht” [On the so-called “Piercing of the Corporate Veil”], 156 AcP [Archiv für die civilistische Praxis] (1957) 522–543Google Scholar; Drobnig, , Haftungsdurchgriff bei Kapitalgesellschaften [Disregarding Limited Liability in Corporations] (Frankfurt a.M.: Metzner 1959)Google Scholar; Rehbinder, , Konzernauβenrecht und allgemeines Privatrecht [External Group Law and General Private Law] (Frankfurt a.M.: Metzner 1969)Google Scholar; Schanze, , Einmanngesellschaft und Durchgriffshaftung als Konzeptualisierungsprobleme gesellschafts-rechtlicher Zurechnung [One-Man Companies and Piercing the Corporate Veil as Conceptual Problems of Corporate Identity] (Frankfurt a.M.: Metzner 1975)Google Scholar; Rehbinder, , “Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Durchgriff im Gesellschaftsrecht”, [10 Years of Legal Practice concerning the Piercing of the Corporate Veil], in: FS Fischer (Berlin: de Gruyter 1979) 579–603Google Scholar; Wiedemann, , Gesellschaftsrecht, Band I: Grundlagen [Company Law, Vol. I, Fundamentals] (München: Beck 1980) 221–234Google Scholar; Wiedemann, , Die Unternehmensgruppe im Privatrecht [The Group of Enterprises in Private Law] (Tübingen: Mohr 1988) 18–22, 30Google Scholar; Wilhelm, , Rechtsform und Haftung bei der juristischen Person [Legal Form and Liability in the Legal Entity] (Köln: Heymann 1981)Google Scholar; Lehmann, , “Das Privileg der beschränkten Haftung und der Durchgriff im Gesellschafts – und Konzernrecht”, [The Privilege of Limited Liability, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Corporate Law and the Law of Company Groups], ZGR (1986) 345–370Google Scholar. Lately critical for methodical reasons: Ehricke, , “Zur Begründbarkeit der Durchgriffshaftung in der GmbH, insbesondere aus methodischer Sicht” [On the Admissibility of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the GmbH, in particular from a methodical Point of View], 199 AcP (1999) 257–304Google Scholar. As to the status quo of the discussion: Brändel in Großkomm. AktG § 1 Rdnrn. 91-139; Lutter, and Hommelhoff, , GmbHG (Köln: O. Schmidt 2000) § 13 n.. 5-13Google Scholar; Schmidt, K., Gesellschaftsrecht³ [Corporate Law] (Köln: Heymann 1997) 241–252Google Scholar. In US literature, see lately Singhof, , “Equity Holders' Liability for Limited Liability Companies' Unrecoverable Debts – Reflections on Piercing the Corporate Veil under German Law”, 22 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. (1999) 143–174.Google Scholar

⁵ For example: Bundesgerichtshof (BGH, Federal Supreme Court): BGHZ 54, 222; BGH NJW (1979) 2104; BGH LM (Lindmaier-Möhring) Nr. 124 zu § 276; Bundessozialgericht (BSG, Federal Social Court) NJW (1984) 2117.

⁶ Thus, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG, Federal Constitutional Court) BVerfGE 18,224, 235; BGHZ 54, 222, 224; equally similar BGHZ 20, 4, 11; BGHZ 61, 380, 383f.; BGHZ 68, 312, 314f.; BGHZ 78, 318, 333. Latest rejection of disregarding limited liability in BSG ZIP (1996) 1134; Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG, Federal Labor Court) BAG ZIP (1999) 24; BAG ZIP (1999) 878.

⁷ BGHZ 95, 330 (Autokran); BGHZ 107, 7 (Tiefbau); BGHZ 115, 187 (Video); deviating therefrom BGHZ 122, 123 (TBB).

⁸ As to the interdependence between the provision of liability and corporate as well as group law in Germany: Brüggemeier, , “Unternehmenshaftung für ‘Umweltschäden’ im deutschen Recht und nach EG-Recht” [Liability of Enterprises for “Environmental Damages” under German and EC Law, in: FS Jahr (Tübingen: Mohr 1993) 223–250Google Scholar; Fleischer, and Empt, , “Gesellschaftsrecht-liche Durchgriffs- und Konzernhaftung und öffentlich-rechtliche Altlastenverantwortlichkeit” [Piercing the Corporate Veil Corporate and Group Law and the Responsibility for Hazarduous Waste under Public Law]: ZIP (2000) 905–914Google Scholar; Hommelhoff, , “Produkthaftung im Konzern” [Product Liability in the Law of Groups], ZIP (1990) 761–771Google Scholar; Oehler, , “Produzentenhaftung im Konzern – Deliktsrecht und Haftungsbeschränkung” [Manufacturer's Liability in the Law of Groups – Tort Law and Limited Liability], ZIP (1990) 1445–1455Google Scholar; Schmidt, K., “Haftungsrisiken fur Umweltschutz und technische Sicherheit im gegliederten Unternehmen – Gesellschafts- und konzernrechtliche Betrachtungen” [Liability Risk for Environmental Damage and Security in Structured Companies], in: 9. Trierer Kolloquium zum Umwelt- und Technikrecht vom 19. bis 21. September 1993, Umweltschutz und technische Sicherheit im Unternehmen [Environmental Protection and Technical Safety in Enterprises], edited by Breuer, /Kloepfer, /Marburger, /Schröder, M. (Heidelberg: v. Decker 1994) 69–92Google Scholar; Westermann, , “Umwelthaftung im Konzern” [Environmental Liability in the Group], 155 ZHR (1991) 223–246Google Scholar; on the basis of the interdependence between public law and organizational requirements: Schneider, U. H., “Die Überlagerung des Konzernrechts durch öffentlich-rechtliche Strukturnormen und Organisationspflichten – Vorüberlegungen zu ‘Compliance im Konzern’” [The Overlapping between Public Law and Organizational Requirements – Preliminary Thoughts on “Group Compliance”], ZGR (1996) 225–246Google Scholar; Equally to the relation between corporate and public law Spindler, , “Der Betreiberbegriff im Umweltrecht: Gesellschafts- und zivilrechtliche Einflüsse” [The Notion of Operator in Environmental Law: Influences of Corporate and Civil Law], in: FS Feldhaus (Heidelberg: Müller 1999) 25–48Google Scholar; Monography: Ossenbühl, I., Umweltgefährdungshaftung im Konzern [Strict Environmental Liability within a Group of Companies] (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1999)Google Scholar. For an Overview see Hucke, and Schröder, , “Umwelthaftung von Konzernen” [Environmental Liability of Groups], DB (1998) 2205–2210.Google Scholar

⁹ Thompson, , Cornell L. Rev. 76 (1991) 1036–1074Google Scholar; for updates see Thompson, , “Piercing the Veil within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors”, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. (1999) 379–396.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Fundamental to the opposition of management and the shareholder's position, Berle, and Means, , The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan 1933).Google Scholar

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¹⁸ Easterbrook and Fischel in their fundamental work “The Economic Structure of Corporate Law” (1991) 8Google Scholar, equally refer to the connection between the contractual foundations of a corporation and the mechanisms of competition in Adam, Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London 1776).Google Scholar

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³⁰ Posner, , “The rights of creditors of affiliated corporations”, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1976) 499–526CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This effect equates with an insurance against losses for the benefit of the shareholders.

³¹ Hansmann, and Kraakman, , “Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts”, 100 Yale L.J. (1991) 1879–1934CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Presser, , “Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics”, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. (1992) 148–179 (166-172)Google Scholar; Stone, , “The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct”, 90 Yale L. J. (1980) 1–77 (70).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³³ Similarly already Hackney, and Benson, , “Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital”, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. (1982) 837–901 (872f.).Google Scholar

³⁴ Fletcher, § 41, 602-724; Rands. For a consideration of more recent types of companies in US corporate law see Matheson, and Eby, , “The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to codify the Test for Waiving Owners' Limited-Liability Protection”, 75 Wash. L. Rev. (2000) 147–193Google Scholar; German literature: Meier, , Grenzüberschreitender Durchgriff in der Unternehmensgruppe nach US-amerikanischem Recht [Cross-Border Piercing of the Corporate Veil within the Group of Companies under US law] (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang 2000) 372–427Google Scholar; Merkt, , US-amerikanisches Gesellschaftsrecht [US Corporate Law] (Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft 1991) 216–232Google Scholar; Drobnig, Haftungsdurchgriff bei Kapitalgesellschaften, supra n. 4; Nacke, , Die Durchgriffshaftung in der U.S. amerikanischen Corporation [Piercing the Corporate Veil in the U.S.] (München: VVF 1988).Google Scholar

³⁵ Sic. Judge Cardozo in one of the earliest decisions on Piercing the Corporate Veil: Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 60 (N.Y. 1926).

³⁶ Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., ibid., 61.

³⁷ Wormser, , “Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity”, 12 Colum. L. Rev. (1912) 496–518.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³⁹ Powell, ibid., 8-34, 54-81; on these factors in detail see Fletcher, § 41.30-41.60, 661-706.

⁴⁰ Precedent in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 287 N.Y.S. 62, 72-76 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936).

⁴¹ A classic decision is Minifie v. Rowley, 202 P. 673, 676 (Cal. 1921); for German literature on the Californian practice: Nacke, supra n. 34, 159-209.

⁴² See for example Easterbrook and Fischel 54f.; with a view to the limited liability types of companies in US corporate law see Matheson and Eby, supra n. 34, 149-151.

⁴³ On the legal practice in detail see Alting; Thompson, , 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1991) 1036–1074Google Scholar; for the recent German literature see Meier, supra n. 34, 372-427; Merkt, supra n. 34, 216-226.

⁴⁴ On the applicability of direct liability in a group of companies see Blumberg, , The Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Law (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company 1987) 105–136Google Scholar; Thompson, , 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1991) 1036–1074 (1048, 1056f.)Google Scholar; on the liability of a close corporation see Easterbrook and Fischel 55f.; for the German literature on the legal practice of the close corporation see already Immenga, , Die personalistische Kapitalgesellschaft [The Close Corporation] (Bad Homburg: Athenäum 1970) 352–355.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ On the element of control see Alting 200; Blumberg, , “The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities”, 28 Conn. L. Rev. (1996) 295–346 (331f.)Google Scholar; Fletcher, § 41.35, 691-695; Rands 433-443.

⁴⁶ In detail hereto see Alting 201-206; Fletcher, § 41.55, 703-705; Thompson, , 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1991) 1036–1074 (1048, 1064-1067).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ With a view to particular settings: Alting 211-213; Fletcher, § 41.50, 700-703.

⁴⁸ In this sense also Drobnig, supra n. 4, 27f.; Nacke, supra n. 34, 94f.

⁴⁹ On the connection between the disregard of formal requirements and the deceipt of contracutal creditors see Thompson, , 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1991) 1036–1074 (1067f.).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Alting 204-206; Thompson, , 76 Cornell L. Rev. (1991) 1036–1074 (1059, 1064, 1071).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Adams, supra n. 19, 56-58.

⁵² Hansmann and Kraakman, supra n. 31; Presser, supra n. 31, 166-172; Stone, supra n. 31, 70-74; Schwartz, , “Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship”, 14 J. Leg. Stud. (1985) 689–736CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the German literature on the proposal by Hansmann, and Kraakman, : Vagts, , “Wohin mit der beschänkten Haftung der Aktionäre? Neue Strömungen im amerikanischen Gesellschaftsrecht” [Limited Shareholder Liability: Quo Vadis? Recent Tendencies in US Corporate Law), ZGR (1994) 227–236 (231-235).Google Scholar

⁵³ United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 692f. (5th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).

⁵⁴ See under 2.3 above.

⁵⁵ Generally on the unlimited liability of the heading company in a group see Blumberg, supra n. 44, 263-294; 63 Am Jur 2d (1996) Products Liability § 115. For the German literature: Meier, supra n. 34, 460-471.

⁵⁶ On these theories and as to their significance for modern product liability see in detail Giliberti, , “Emerging Trends for Products Liability: Market Share Liability, its History and Future”, 15 Touro L. Rev. (1999) 719–733Google Scholar; for the German literature on US product liability: Kästle, , Die Haftung für toxische Massenschäden im US-amerikanischen Produkt- und Umwelthaftungsrecht [Liability for Toxic Mass Damage in US Environmental and Product Liability Law] (München: VVF 1993) 56–107, 129–209.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711 (1972); Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).

⁵⁸ Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980). See also the practice regarding the liability of the licensor for defective products manufactured by the licensee: Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979); fundamental hereto is Goldstein, , “Products Liability and the Trademark Owner – ‘When a Trademark Is a Warranty’”, 32 Bus. Law. (1977) 957–973Google Scholar; Hanak, , “The Quality Assurance Funktion of Trademarks”, 43 Fordham L. Rev. (1974) 363–378Google Scholar; recently hereto see Franklyn, , “The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third Restatement of Torts”, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (1999) 671–729.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Blumberg, supra n. 55, 105-136, 264-294; Blumberg, supra n. 45; Blumberg, , “The Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate Successorship in United States Law”, 10 Fla. J. Int'l L. (1996) 365–418Google Scholar; for the German litereature hereto see Blumberg, , “Amerikanisches Konzernrecht” [US Law of Company Groups], ZGR (1991) 327–372.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Califfv. Coca Cola Co., 326 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Moffett v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 652 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (in the inverse case, the liability of a subsidiary for its parent company was denied); American Eagles Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 48 F.3d 142 (5th Cir. 1995).

⁶¹ 691 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1985).

⁶² Electric Power Board v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn. 1985).

⁶³ Electric Power Board v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp. (supra) 527.

⁶⁴ In this sense the results of Ross v. Coleman Co., 761 P.2d 1169, 1184 (Idaho 1988), aff'd, 804 P.2d 325 (Idaho 1991), a decision commented upon in Rands 444f.; NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 775 (Ga. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds) sub. nom. Nelson v. G.M. City, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 569 (Ga. App. 1997); Yoder v. Honeywell, 104 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S.Ct. 55 (1997), a decision commented upon in Dulin, , “Corporate Law: Disregarding the Corporate Entity”, 75 Denv. L. Rev. (1998) 763–777 (766-768).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Ross v. Coleman Co. (supra); Yoder v. Honeywell (supra) 1222.

⁶⁶ NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson (supra n. 66).

⁶⁷ See hereto 3.2 above.

⁶⁸ On the impact of product liability on a corporation's capital market access, see already Roe, supra n. 32, 26, 51-55.

⁶⁹ On the financial standing of the subsidiary see Electric Power Board v. St. Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., supra n. 62, 525f.

⁷⁰ For background information see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, supra n. 1, 1457; as well as Caplan 122-127; Posin, , “Silicone Breast Implant Litigation and My Father-in-Law: A Neo-Coasean Analysis”, 70 Tul. L. Rev. (1996) 2565–2582 (2567-2572)Google Scholar; Snyder, , “Silicone Breast Implants: Can Emerging Medical, Legal, and Scientific Concepts be Reconciled?”, 18 J. Legal Med. (1997) 133–220CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Weisman, , “Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle”, 23 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1993) 973–1000 (973f., 976-981).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Snyder, ibid., 136.

⁷² Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 1991 WL 328048 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 9,1991), aff'd 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995).

⁷³ In re Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-20512,1995 WL 495978, *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 1995).

⁷⁴ 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); on the ensuing automatic stay see King, (ed.), Collier on Bankruptcy, 15th ed., loose-leaf (New York: Bender 1996-)Google Scholar

⁷⁵ For example: In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 632 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 642 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); In re Connecticut Breast Implant Litigation, 1994 WL 668032 (Conn. Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1994); In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation, 880 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Minn. 1995), aff'd, 113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir. 1997) (the subject matter dealt with joint implants); on the last-mentioned decision see Davis, , “Eighth Circuit Denies Jaw Implant Recipients' Relief from Dow Chemical”, 9 Loyola Consumer L. Rep. (1997) 335–338.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993), vacated in part, confirmed in part, 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995).

⁷⁷ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), ibid., 1134.

⁷⁸ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), supra n. 76, 1137.

⁷⁹ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), supra n. 76, 1136,1138.

⁸⁰ See also under 4.1.1 above.

⁸¹ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), supra n. 76, 1140f.; In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, supra n. 75; In re Connecticut Breast Implant Litigation, supra n. 75; In re TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation (supra n. 75); on the latter decision see Davis, supra n. 75, 335-338.

⁸² In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation (MDL 926), supra n. 76, 1140.

⁸³ Hereto with additional citations see recently Thompson, , “Piercing the Veil within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors”, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. (1999) 379–396.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 887 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Ala. 1995); on this decision see DeMott, , “The Mechanisms of Control”, 13 Conn. J. Int'l L. (1999) 233–255 (242f.).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, ibid., 1452f.

⁸⁶ In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, supra n. 84, 1453f.

⁸⁷ In particular the following decisions were celebrated as victories for consumer protection: Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998); regarding this decision Kohlmeier, , “Malpractice & Negligence: Negligent Undertaking Liability for Silicone Testing – Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum”, 25 Am. J.L. & Med. (1999) 179–181Google Scholar; Caplan 136-138; Meister v. MEC, No. 9226660 (D.D.C. Jan. 4,1999) (cited in accordance with Hellwege, , “Plaintiffs Score Victories in Breast Implant Cases”, Trial 35-Mar [1999] 16Google Scholar); on this decision and its legal foundation see also Rosencrantz.

⁸⁸ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965): “One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to a third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.”

⁸⁹ This principle was formulated for the first time in Glanzer v. Shepard (135 N.E. 275, 276 [N.Y. 1922]).

⁹⁰ Rick v. RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39,46f. (E.D. Mich. 1981) (denied claim of an employee against the parent company of the group); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806f. (Minn. 1979) (denied claim against a city due to insufficient fire/police inspections at a school); for the German literature hereto: Meier, supra n. 34,495f.

⁹¹ Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87, 132-142 (Maupin, J., Shearing, J., dissenting).

⁹² Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87, 113-121.

⁹³ Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87, 119-121.

⁹⁴ Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87, 132-142.

⁹⁵ In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, supra n. 75,956; critical of this decision is Rosencrantz 1091f.

⁹⁶ Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum (supra n. 87) 119.

⁹⁷ See hereto 4.1.1 above.

⁹⁸ Coffee, , “Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action”, 95 Colum. L. Rev. (1995) 1343–1465 (1404-1410)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Caplan, 138f.; from a practitioner's point of view critical Barrios, , “The Long and Winding Road for Spitzfaden, Louisiana's breast implant class action: Ad Astra per Aspera”, 74 Tul. L. Rev. (2000) 1941 (1958-2003)Google Scholar; with a positive view of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with mass tort liability Resnick, , “Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability”, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2000) 2045–2093CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the German literature on the implications of US product liability claims on insolvency law: Whitlo, , “USA: Die Wirkung der Konkurseröffnung auf anhÄngige Produkthaftungsklagen” [The Impact of Commencing Bankruptcy Proceedings on Product Liability Claims], PHI (Produkthaftpflicht internat.) (1996) 58–61Google Scholar. Generally hereto see Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy (1992); Youdelman, , Note, “Strategic Bankruptcies: Class Actions, Classification and the Dalkon Shield Cases”, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. (1986) 817–853Google Scholar; on the strategic inclusion of the parent company in the reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11 see Cole, , “A Calculus without Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party Non-Debtor ‘Discharge’”, 84 Iowa L. Rev. (1999) 753–800.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ On this aspect see already Baetge, and Eichholtz, , “Die Class Action in den USA”, in: Die Biindelung gleichgerichteter Interessen im Prozeβ [The US Class Action, in: The Bundelling of parallel Interests], Basedow, / Hopt, / Kötz, / Baetge, (ed.) (1999) 287–361 (297)Google Scholar; Kästle, supra n. 56, 228-240.

¹⁰⁰ On the fact that the reorganization under Chapter 11 does not require insolvency see King, supra n. 74, §301.11.

¹⁰¹ See in detail on the procedural situation Coffee, supra n. 98, 1404-1410.

¹⁰² On the scope of the blocking effect of Chapter 11 under 11 U.S.C., § 362 see King, supra n. 74, § 362.

¹⁰³ Mestmäcker, , Organisationen in spontanen Ordnungen [Organizations in Spontaneous Order] (Freiburg im Breisgau: Haufe 1992) 33–36.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See hereto under 4.1.1 above as well as Roe, supra n. 32,26, 51-55.

¹⁰⁵ As examples of the broad criticism of Chapter 11 see Bradley, and Rosenzweig, , “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11”, 101 Yale L.J. (1992) 1043–1095CrossRefGoogle Scholar; LoPucki, , “The Debtor in Full Control – Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Parts 1 & 2”, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. (1983) 99–126, 247–273Google Scholar; in favor of general litigation in insolvency law to increase efficiency: Schwartz, , “A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy”, 107 Yale L.J. (1998) 1807–1851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁶ In German literature as of 1997: Ochsenfeld; for a comparative study of the new German Federal Law on Soil Protection, see Fleischer and Empt, supra n. 8, 912-914.

¹⁰⁷ Note, “Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Clean up and Damages”, 99 Harv. L. Rev. (1986) 986–1003 (987f.)Google Scholar; for an introduction to the problem see Silecchia 124-137.

¹⁰⁸ 42 U.S.C. § 9611; on the Superfund legislation see Aronovsky, and Fuller, , “Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases under CERCLA”, 24 U.S.F. L. Rev. University of San Francisco Law Review (1990) 421–469 (422-429)Google Scholar; Guzzano, , Note, “United States v. Bestfoods: Decree on Parent Corporation Liability for Illegal Discharges Made by Subsidiaries under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act”, 23 Nova L. Rev. (1999) 927–964 (932-938)Google Scholar; for the German literature hereto: Baker, Roeben, “US-amerikanisches Umwelthaftungsrecht”, in: Umweltschutz durch Internationales Haftungsrecht [U.S. Law of Environmental Liability, in: Environmental Protection by International Tort Law], Umweltbundesamt, / Wolfram, / Langenfeld, (ed.) (Berlin: Schmidt 1999) 271–352 (291-320)Google Scholar; Ochsenfeld 31-34.

¹⁰⁹ For the wording of 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) see supra n. 2; on this provision see Silecchia 126-128; Ochsenfeld 34-43.

¹¹⁰ Hopkins, , “United States v. Bestfoods: The U.S. Supreme Court Sets New Limits on the Direct Liability of Parent Corporations for Polluting Acts of Subsidiaries”, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (1999) 10545Google Scholar; Silecchia 138-159; detailed overview in Ochsenfeld 45-80.

¹¹¹ See for example United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3rd Cir. 1993); Jacksonville Electric Authorty v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993).

¹¹² For example: United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).

¹¹³ For example: Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991); United States v. Cordova Chemical, 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub. nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).

¹¹⁴ In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Habor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).

¹¹⁵ In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Habor Proceedings (supra) 33; Note, “Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law”, 95 Harv. L. Rev. (1982) 853–871Google Scholar; Ochsenfeld 120-123.

¹¹⁶ 512 U.S. 79 (1994); in the same direction also the evaluation of the respective 10th Circuit practice in Miller, and Mangone, , “Parent Corporation Liability under CERCLA After United States v. Bestfoods”, 28 Colo. Law. (05 1999) 85–88 (87 Fn. 46).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998); from the vast literature on this decision we will limit ourselves to the following works: Guzzano, , Note, “United States v. Bestfoods: Decree on Parent Corporation Liability for Dlegal Discharges Made by Subsidiaries under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act”, 23 Nova L. Rev. (1999) 927–964Google Scholar; Lester, , “Supreme Court Defines Derivative Liability, Direct Liability, and Operator under CERCLA”, 7 S.C. Envtl. L.J. (1998) 285–291Google Scholar; Miller and Mangone, supra n. 116, 85-88; Silecchia.

¹¹⁸ See also the decisions of the previous instance: CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (direct liability of the parent company under CERCLA Sect. 107), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, U.S. Cordova Chemical Co. of Michigan, 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995) (liability admitted by piercing the corporate veil), vacated sub. nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).

¹¹⁹ United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1884-1886 (1998).

¹²⁰ United States v. Bestfoods, ibid., 1885f.

¹³¹ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119,1887f.

¹²² United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1889.

¹²³ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1888.

¹²⁴ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1889; on the limitation of the parent company to the status of an investor as a criterion to uphold the latter's limited liability see already Thompson, supra n. 87.

¹²⁵ United States v. Dell'Aquilla, 150 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1998).

¹²⁶ Browning-Ferries Indus. of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1999 WL 988974 (7th Cir., Nov. 1,1999); on this decision see Miller and Mangone, supra n. 116, 86.

¹²⁷ 42 F. Supp.2d 736 (W.D. Mich. 1999).

¹²⁸ Ibid., 747f.

¹²⁹ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1889.

¹³⁰ Datron, Inc. v. CRA Holdings, Inc., supra n. 127, 741-745.

¹³¹ Datron, Inc. v. CRA Holdings, Inc., supra n. 127, 746-748.

¹³² United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1889f.

¹³³ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1889f.

¹³⁴ United States v. Bestfoods, supra n. 119, 1883.

¹³⁵ Fundamental in this respect is Winter, , “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation”, 6 J. Leg. Stud. (1977) 251–292CrossRefGoogle Scholar; under the same assumption concerning the control capacity of the capital market, see Romano, , The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington, DC: AEI Press 1993)Google Scholar; dissenting: Cary, , “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware”, 83 Yale L.J. (1974) 663–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar; skeptical with regard to Canadian corporate law recently Cumming, and MacIntosh, , “The role of interjurisdictional competition in shaping Canadian corporate law”, 20 Int'L Rev. L & Econ. (2000) 141–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³⁶ As an example hereto see the debate on the various methods of applying Section 324A Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Samaritan Doctrine”) to product liability in state law Rosenkrantz 1090-1094.

¹³⁷ Romano, supra n. 135; on the transfer of the concept to investor protection see Romano, , “Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation”, in: Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, Hopt, / Kanda, / Roe, / Wymeersch, / Prigge, (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998) 143–217Google Scholar; for the German literature hereto see Dreher, , “Wettbewerb oder Vereinheitlichung der Rechtsordnungen in Europa?” [Competition or a Unified Legal System in Europe?], JZ (1999) 105–112Google Scholar; Kieninger, , “Niederlassungsfreiheit als Rechtswahlfreiheit” [Liberty of Establishment as the Freedom of the Choice of Law], ZGR (1999) 724–749 (747-749)Google Scholar; Kübler, , “Rechtsbildung durch Gesetzgebungswettbewerb? Überlegungen zur Angleichung und Entwicklung des Gesellschaftsrechts in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft” [Legislation by Competing Legal Systems? Thoughts on the Harmonization and Development of Corporate Law in the EC], 77 KritV (1994) 79–89Google Scholar; Merkt, , “Das Europäische Gesellschaftsrecht und die Idee des ‘Wettbewerbs der Gesetzgeber’” [European Community Law and the Idea of a Competition of Legislators], 59 RabelsZ (1995) 545–568Google Scholar; Müller, , Systemwettbewerb, Harmonisierung und Wettbewerbsverzerrung [Competition of Legal Systems, Harmonization and Distortions of Competition] (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000)Google Scholar; Schön, , “Mindestharmonisierung im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht” [Minimal Harmonization in European Community Law], 160 ZHR (1996) 221–249 (232-238).Google Scholar

¹³⁸ 512 U.S. 79 (1994); on the future of “federal common law” see Lund, , “The Decline of Federal Common Law”, 76 B.U.L. Rev. (Boston University Law Review) (1996) 895–1017Google Scholar; Markworth, , Note, “Survival of the Federal Common Law D'Oench Doctrine?” 1 N.C. Banking Inst. (North Carolina Banking Institute) (1997) 436–466Google Scholar; Shumadine, , Note, “Striking a Balance: Statutory Displacement of Established Federal Common Law and the D'Oench Doctrine in Murphy v. F.D.I.C. and Motorcity of Jacksonville Ltd. v. Southeast Bank”, 51 Me. L. Rev. (Maine Law Review) (1999) 129–168Google Scholar; Sisk, and Anderson, , “The Sun Sets on Federal Common Law: Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA after O'Melveny & Myers”, 16 Va. Envtl. L.J. (1997) 505–575.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ ECJ decision of 9.3.1999, Case C-212/97, [1999] ECR I-1459 (1479); on the perspective of competing legal systems in this decision see Freitag, , “Der Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht” [Competing Laws in International Company Law], EuZW (1999) 267–270 (269)Google Scholar; Kieninger, supra n. 137, 747-749; Merkt, , “Das Centros-Urteil des Euro-päischen Gerichtshofs – Konsequenzen für den nationalen Gesetzgeber”, in: Gesellschaftsrecht in der Diskussion 1999 [The Centros-Decision of the ECJ – Consequences for the National Legislator, in: Corporate Law in the 1999 Debate], edited by the Gesellschaftsrechtliche Vereinigung (VGR) (Köln: Schmidt 2000) 111–150 (120f.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ For example Ulmer, , “Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Geschäftstätigkeit inländischer Zweigniederlassungen von Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem Auslandssitz” [Protection Mechanisms against the Dangers of Acts Carried out by the Domestic Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations with a fictitious foreign Domicile], JZ (1999) 662–665 (664f.)Google Scholar. See also Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH [International Company Law in view of the Centros Decision of the ECJ], IPRax (1999) 323-331 (English translation published in 1 EBOR (2000) 125ff.); in the same direction concerning other fields of Private International Law see already Basedow, , “Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis” [Private International Law Implications of the Production Freedoms on the European Market: Favor Offerentis], 59 RabelsZ (1995) 1–55.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ From the vast literature favoring the abolition of the domicile theories in accordance with Centros: Behrens, , “Die Anerkennung von Gesellschaften nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH” [The Recognition of Companies after the Centros-Decision], EuZ (1999) 78–83Google Scholar; Kieninger, supra n. 137, 745; Meilicke, , “Anmerkung” [Annotation], DB (1999) 627 (628)Google Scholar; Neye, , “Kurzkommentar”, EWiR (1999) 259 (260)Google Scholar; Roth, G., “Gründungstheorie: 1st der Damm gebrochen?” [Theory of Incorporation: Has the dyke been broken?], ZIP (1999) 861 (867)Google Scholar; Sedemund, and Hausmann, , “BB-Kommentar” [BB Commentary], BB (1999) 810 (811)Google Scholar; Zimmer, , “Mysterium ‘Centros’” [The Mystery of Centros], 164 ZHR (2000) 23 (36f.)Google Scholar; more reserved Borges, , “Die Sitztheorie in der Centros Entscheidung, Vermeintliche Probleme und unvermeidliche Änderungen” [Theory of Domicile in the Centros Decision, Imaginary Problems and Inevitable Changes], RIW (2000) 167–178Google Scholar; in favor of the theory of domicile Ebke, , “Das Schicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH” [The Fate of the Theory of Domicile after the Centres Decision of the ECJ], JZ (1999) 656 (660)Google Scholar; Kindler, , “Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften?” [Freedom of Establishment for Fictitious Foreign Companies?], NJW (1999) 1993 (1996-1999)Google Scholar; Sonnenberger, and Großerichter, , “Konfliktlinien zwischen internationalem Gesellschaftsrecht und Niederlassungsfreiheit” [Conflict Lines between International Company Law and Freedom of Establishment], RIW (1999) 721 (725f.)Google Scholar; recently the German Supreme Court asked the ECJ for a Preliminary Ruling on the Compatibility of the Theory of Domicile with the EC Treaty: BGH 30.3.2000 – VII ZR 370/98, DStR (2000) 1064; hereto see Altmeppen, , “Parteifähigkeit, Sitztheorie und ‘Centres’” [Capacity to be a Party in Legal Proceedings, Theory of Domicile and “Centres”], DStR (2000), 1061–1063Google Scholar; Behrens, , “Reaktionen mitgliedstaatlicher Gerichte auf das Centros-Urteil des EuGH” [Reactions of member state courts to Centres], IPRax (2000) 384 (387-388)Google Scholar (English translation published in 1 EBOR (2000/3) (forthcoming); Forsthoff, , “Rechts- und Parteifähigkeit ausländischer Gesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland? – Die Sitztheorie vor dem EuGH” [Foreign Companies with a German Place of Management: Their Ability to act as a Party and to have Legal Rights and Duties? Theory of Domicile before the ECJ], DB (2000) 1109–1114Google Scholar; Kindler, , “Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht am Scheideweg” [International Company Law at the Crossroads], RIW (2000) 649.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87,142 (Maupin, J., Shearing, J. dissenting).

¹⁴³ Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, supra n. 87, 118; rejecting such an extension of diligence obligations in accordance with the “good Samaritan” doctrine: Artiglio v. Corning, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 479, 485 (1998).

¹⁴⁴ Caplan 146.

¹⁴⁵ Gallanter, , “Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote”, 55 Md. L. Rev. (1996) 1093–1160 (1145-1149)Google Scholar; Litan, , “The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities”, in: Tort Law and the Public Interest, Schuck, (ed.) (New York: Norton 1991) 127–150Google Scholar; skeptical on the incentives of product liability regulations: Huber, P., Liability, The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (New York: Basic Books 1988)Google Scholar; in detail on the negative implications of the availability of breast implants: Scott, , “Liability Concerns About Implanted Material May Hurt Device Availability”, reproduced in: Economic Analysis of Tort and Products Liability Law, Wahl, (ed.), (New York:Garland 1998) 294.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Further studies with the same outcome: Report, “Tort Law in New York Today”, 71-Apr. N.Y. St. B.J. (1999) 8–30.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Viscusi, and Moore, , “Rationalizing the Relationship between Product Liablity and Innovation”, in: Tort Law and the Public Interest, Schuck, (ed.) (1991) 105–126Google Scholar; Viscusi, and Moore, , “An Industrial Profile of the Links between Product Liability and Innovation”, in; The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and Innovation, Huber, and Litan, (eds.) (Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. 1991) 81–119Google Scholar; Mackay, , “Liability, Safety, and Innovation in the Automotive Industry”, in: The Liability Maze; The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and InnovationGoogle Scholar, ibid., 191–223; Lasagna, , “The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development”, in: The Liability Maze; The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and InnovationGoogle Scholar, ibid., 334–359; see also US Senate, Report No. 105-32 of 19.06.1997 concerning Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, Bill S. 648, 1997 WL 346260.

¹⁴⁸ See also the reflections on the Greenbook The Civil Law Liability for Defective Products of the European Commission (COM (99) 396 of 28.07.1999) with a view to an eventual general aggravation of product liability law; see also Giliker, , “Recent Developments in Product Liability”, Bus. L. Rev. (March 2000) 54, 55–56Google Scholar; “Kritik an Verschärfung des Produkthaftungsrechts” [Critical Review of the Aggravation of the Law of Product Liability], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1.2.2000, p. 28.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Hereto recently the European Commission (ed.), Whitebook on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66, 9 February 2000Google Scholar; in German law see the newly enacted “Bundes-Bodenschutzgesetz” [Statute on the Protection of Lands] and particularly ist § 4 para. 3 on environmental liability for reasons of company law (hereto Fleischer and Empt, supra n. 8).

¹⁵⁰ European Commission, ibid., 21.

¹⁵¹ Schmidt, K., “Zum Stand des Konzernhaftungsrechts bei der GmbH” [On the Status Quo of Group Law regarding the GmbH], ZIP (1991) 1325, 1329Google Scholar; K. Schmidt, supra n. 4, 247.

¹⁵² BGHZ 122, 123, 131; on this decision see Drygala, , “Verhaltenshaftung im faktischen GmbH-Konzern” [Behavior Control in the GmbH Group], GmbHR (1993), 317–329Google Scholar; Hommelhoff, , “Die qualifizierte faktische Unternehmensverbindung: ihre Tatbestandsmerkmale nach dem TBB-Urteil und deren rechtsdogmatisches Fundament” [The Qualified Factual Group of Enterprises: Its Elements after the TBB Decision and the doctrinal fundamentals], ZGR (1994) 395–421Google Scholar; Kleindiek, , “Kurskorrektur im GmbH-Konzernrecht” [Amendments in the Law of GmbH Groups], DZWir (1993) 177–182Google Scholar; Schmidt, K., “‘Konzernhaftung’ nach dem TBB-Urteil – Versuch einer Orientierung” [“Group Liability” after the TBB decision: The Attempt at Orientation], ZIP (1993) 549–554Google Scholar; Westermann, H.P., “Das TBB-Urteil – ein Neuansatz bei der Haftung wegen qualifizierter faktischer Konzernierung?” [The TBB decision – A New Start in the Liability for Qualified Factual Groups?], ZIP (1993) 554–558.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ BGHZ 122,123,131f.; BGH NJW (1996) 1283, 1284; BAG NJW (1994) 3244, 3246.

¹⁵⁴ Lutter and Hommelhoff, supra n. 4, Anh § 13 Rdnr. 27; in favor of additional criteria to be required for a duty to coverage: Schneider, U. H., “Recht des konzernweiten Cash-Managements”, in: Handbuch der Konzernfinanzierung [The Law of Group Cash Management, in: Handbook of Group Financing], Lutter, / Scheffler, / Schneider, (eds.) (Köln: O. Schmidt 1998) n. 25.70-25.76.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Altmeppen, , “Die systematische Einordnung der Rechtsprechung zum qualifiziert faktischen Konzern nach ‘TBB’” [The Systematic Classification of Legal Practice on the Qualified Factual Group after “TTB”], DB (1994) 1912–1917 (1916)Google Scholar; Drygala, supra n. 152, 325f.; opposite view Hommelhoff, supra n. 152, 410.

¹⁵⁶ Hommelhoff, supra n. 152, 408-412.

¹⁵⁷ On the fundamental differences between the German and the US capital market see Black, and Gilson, , “Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets”, 47 J. Fin. Econ. (1998) 243–277 (244)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on the Swiss capital market and the difficulties in providing empirical evidence of market efficiency see Theurillat, , Der Schweizer Aktienmarkt; Eine empirische Untersuchung im Lichte der neueren Effizienzmarkt-Diskussion [The Swiss Capital Market; An Empirical Study in the Light of the Recent Debate on Market Efficiency] (Heidelberg: Physica-Verl. 1996).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ On the empirical connection between the development of the capital market of a State and creditor protection rules see La, Porta/ Lopez-de-Silanes, / Shleifer, / Vishny, , “Legal Determinants of External Finance”, 52 J. Fin. (1997) 1131–1150Google Scholar; Pistor, , “Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies”, 1 EBOR (2000) 59–108.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ See hereto 3.2 above.

¹⁶⁰ See hereto 4.1 above.