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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2022
A functional universalistic approach to human dignity in legal argumentation – a theory which applies three variables to define the functions of dignity: content width, argumentative power, and applicability before courts – relative individual right, objective value and source of human rights as legitimate basic functions – the problematic nature of hybrid functions created by blending the basic functions – a set of principles to avoid hybrid functions and minimise the problems caused by them – qualitative analysis of several examples of judgments by supreme, constitutional and international courts to support the theory
This article was financially supported by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic, Project NPO No. LX22NPO5101 ‘Systemic Risk Institute’, and by Charles University, Project SVV No. 260 495/2020. I would like to thank Marek Antoš, David Lacko, Jan Komárek, and Koen Lemmens for their brilliant comments and recommendations, which enhanced the level of this article significantly.
1 R. Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’, 88 Harvard Law Review (1974) p. 1057; N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press 1994) p. 100-128.
2 For a deeper insight into cross-cultural research, see J.W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications (Cambridge University Press 2002).
3 E.g. N. Rao, ‘On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law’, 14 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007) p. 201; D. Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part I’, 4 Public Law (1999) p. 682; C. O’Mahony, ‘There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity’, 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2012) p. 551; C. Byk, ‘Is Human Dignity a Useless Concept? Legal Perspectives’, in M. Düwell et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 362; M. Bagaric and J. Allen, ‘The Vacuous Concept of Dignity’, 5 Journal of Human Rights (2006) p. 257; S. Riley, Human Dignity and Law: Legal and Philosophical Investigations (Routledge 2018) p. 26-27.
4 From the broad literature on the topic, I highlight at least C. McCrudden (ed.), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press 2013); Düwell et al. (eds.), supra n. 3; Riley, supra n. 3; and A. Barak, Human Dignity. The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (Cambridge University Press 2015).
5 cf L.M. Henry, ‘The Jurisprudence of Dignity’, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2011) p. 169; N. Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’, 86 Notre Dame Law Review (2011) p. 183; A. Di Stasi, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept.’Dialogue’ Between European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU)?’, in P. Pinto de Albuquerque and K. Wojtyczek (eds.), Judicial Power in a Globalized World (Springer 2019) p. 115; C. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, 19 European Journal of International Law (2008) p. 655.
6 BVerfG 15 February 2006, 1 BvR 357/05, Luftsicherheitsgesetz.
7 ECtHR 28 July 1999, No. 25803/94, Selmouni v France; ECtHR 29 April 2002, No. 2346/02, Pretty v United Kingdom; ECtHR 1 June 2010, No. 22978/05, Gäfgen v Germany. Interestingly, The Supreme Court of Israel attributes dignity in this context not only to humans but also to animals (IsrSC 22 June 1997, LCA 1648/96, Let the Animals Live v Hamat Gader Spa Village Inc).
8 Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9 State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); BverfG 25 February 1975, 1 BvF 1/74, Schwangerschaftsabbruch I.
10 Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
11 ECJ 12 October 2007, Case T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission; ECtHR 6 February 2001, No. 41205/98, Tammer v Estonia.
12 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); BVerfG 11 October 1978, 1 BvR 16/72, Transsexuelle I.
13 Goldberg v Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 SCR (2) 516.
14 BVerwG 15 December 1981, 1 C 232.79, Sittenwidrigkeit von Peep-Shows; Conseil d’État (Assemblée) 27 October 1995, No. 136727 and 143578, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge et Ville d’Aix-en-Provence v Ville d’Aix-en-Provence.
15 e.g. D. Shultziner, ‘Human Dignity – Functions and Meanings’, 3 Global Jurist Topics (2004) p. 1; Rao, supra n. 5; J.B. Heath, ‘Human Dignity at Trial: Hard Cases and Broad Concepts in International Criminal Law’, 44 George Washington International Law Review (2012) p. 317; Barak, supra n. 4, p. 157; McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 680-681; D. Shultziner and G.E. Carmi, ‘Human Dignity in National Constitutions: Functions, Promises and Dangers’, 62 The American Journal of Comparative Law (2014) p. 461.
16 I admit that the terms strong, medium, and weak can be somewhat counterintuitive and that it would be slightly more natural to speak of the broad, medium, and narrow content width or direct, indirect, and no applicability before the courts in this context. I believe, however, that the benefits of using a single scale outweigh counterintuitiveness because it enables simpler quantitative assessment of the studied judicial decisions and their reasoning and consequently allows the theory presented in this article to be empirically falsified in the future.
17 For empirical evidence supporting the theoretical framework based on the three functions of human dignity, see F. Horák, Human Dignity. Critical Reflection of its Status and Functions in Constitutional Law (Leges 2019).
18 McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 657.
19 Roman law, for example, protected the dignitas from defamation through two sets of provisions: injuria and libellus famosus: V.V. Veeder, ‘The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation. I’, 3 Columbia Law Review (1903) p. 546 at p. 563-564.
20 S. Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A Human Dignitas? Remnants of the Ancient Legal Concept in Contemporary Dignity Jurisprudence’, 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2011) p. 32 at p. 53.
21 By relative (as opposed to absolute), I mean that human dignity in this function can be proportionally balanced with other individual rights and consequently limited.
22 cf D Statman, ‘Humiliation, Dignity and Self-respect’, 13 Philosophical Psychology (2000) p. 523.
23 cf D. Weisstub, ‘Honor, Dignity and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values’, in D. Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law International 2002) p. 263; J. Waldron, ‘Dignity and Rank’, 48 European Journal of Sociology (2007) p. 201.
24 A. Hughes, Human Dignity and Fundamental Rights in South Africa and Ireland (Pretoria University Press 2014) p. 39. See also J.Q. Whitman, ‘On Nazi “Honour” and the New European “Dignity”’, in C. Joerges and N.S. Ghaleigh (eds.), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Hart Publishing 2003) p. 243; Hennette-Vauchez, supra n. 20.
25 Czech Constitutional Court 15 March 2005, I. ÚS 367/03.
26 Art. 10 Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
27 Ibid., Art. 17.
28 M.T. Cicero, On Duties (Cambridge University Press 1991) p. 41.
29 T. Aquinas, The Summa Theologicae (Aquinas Institute 2012) part I, questions 72-76; part III, question 4; cf M. Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Harvard University Press 2012) p. 16-17.
30 G. Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (Cambridge University Press 2012) p. 117.
31 See A.W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press 1999).
32 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition (Cambridge University Press 2011) p. 97-113.
33 E.g. R. Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification. A Reflexive Approach’, in C. Corradetti (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights: Some Contemporary Views (Springer 2012) p. 81.
34 cf Constitution of Kosovo, Art. 23, which states: ‘Human dignity is inviolable and is the basis of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
35 R. v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30, p. 166.
36 BVerfG 8 November 2006, 2 BvR 578/02, Strafrestaussetzung, para. 68.
37 BVerfG 3 March 2004, 1 BvR 2378/98, Großer Lauschangriff, para. 115.
38 cf H. Dreier, ‘Human Dignity in German Law’, in Düwell et al. (eds.), supra n. 3, p. 375 at p. 375-377.
39 ECtHR 17 July 2014, Nos. 32541/08 and 43441/08, Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia, para. 118.
40 Barak, supra n. 4, p. 156-159.
41 C. Enders, ‘A Right to have Rights – The German Constitutional Concept of Human Dignity’, 3 NUJS Law Review (2010) p. 253.
42 The solution of the conflict between dignity ‘daughter rights’ suggested by Barak (supra n. 4, p. 164-169) cannot be used in this situation, as Barak assumes dignity itself to be violable and therefore possibly limited by the rules of proportionality (i.e. not absolute). Barak’s understanding of dignity as a mother right (from a functional perspective) is a combination of dignity as a source of human rights and as an objective value, since he: (a) understands dignity as a purpose to be fulfilled by daughter rights (ibid., p. 160); and (b) assumes the existence of ‘independent freestanding rights’ (ibid., p. 162), consequently admitting that dignity is not necessarily a source of all human rights.
43 M. Mahlmann, Elemente Einer Ethischen Grundrechtstheorie [Elements of an Ethical Theory of Fundamental Rights] (Nomos 2008) p. 167.
44 See M. McManus, Making Human Dignity Central to International Human Rights Law: A Critical Legal Argument (University of Wales Press 2019).
45 McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 660-661.
46 See Art. 6, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789; McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 660.
47 cf M.W. Spicer, ‘Value Conflict and Legal Reasoning in Public Administration’, 31 Administrative Theory and Praxis (2009) p. 537.
48 Human dignity as an objective value therefore also plays a significant role (alongside other objective values) in the proportionality and limitation of conflicting individual rights (and possibly public interest) in individual cases: Barak, supra n. 4, p. 112-113.
49 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development (2004) 6 SA 505 (CC).
50 Ibid., para. 41.
51 Ibid., para. 44.
52 Ibid., para. 52.
53 In other words, even if none of the rights at stake were (by themselves) able to outweigh the individual rights they collide with, the fact that more of them suffer interference enables the objective value (achieved through these rights) to be applied as a legal argument and thus potentially change the outcome of the balancing exercise.
54 Human dignity as an objective value, therefore, plays a significant role as a tool whereby the individual rights associated with it are interpreted: Barak, supra n. 4, p. 110-112.
55 See G. Lohmann, ‘Human Dignity and Socialism’, in Düwell et al. (eds.), supra n. 3, p. 126.
56 This point of view can be found in the work of Rawls: see N. Eyal, ‘Respect for Persons’, in J. Mandle and D.A. Reidy (eds.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon (Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 723. See also H. Dreier, ‘Human Dignity in German Law’, in Düwell et al. (eds.), supra n. 3, p. 375 at p. 383.
57 For another possible ‘typology’ of the content of human dignity as an objective value, see Barak, supra n. 4, p. 124-132.
58 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts. 2-5, which link dignity as a value with the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.
59 For problems arising from clashes between the ideological conceptions of human dignity as a value, see J. Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 4-6.
60 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (2000) 11 BCLR 1169 (CC), para. 23.
61 Ibid., para. 44.
62 For more examples, see McCrudden, supra n. 5, p. 693-694.
63 However, human dignity as the source of human rights can be used only as an interpretative framework for legal argumentation. Therefore, it is not applicable as a legal argument itself before the courts, a consequence which follows from its only weak characteristic feature (see the explanation above).
64 Ibid., p. 698.
65 See H. Botha, ‘Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective’, 20 Stellenbosch Law Review (2009) p. 171 at p. 217-220.
66 R.G. Brown, Axioms (Lulu Press 2007) p. 103.
67 R. Alexy, ‘Human Dignity and Proportionality Analysis’, 16 Espaço Jurídico Journal of Law (2016) p. 83.
68 Brown, supra n. 66, p. 103; M. Madej and F. Horák, ‘Axioms in Legal Argumentation: A Double-edged Sword in the Hands of Law-applying Institutions’, 5 Jurisprudence (2018) p. 29.
69 cf BVerfG 11 March 2003, 1 BvR 426/02, Schockwerbung II, para. 26.
70 State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, supra n. 9, para. 111.
71 Ibid., para. 144.
72 BVerfG, supra n. 6.
73 Basic Law of Germany, Art. 1 sec. 1.
74 For a review, see H. Dreier, ‘Human Dignity in German Law’, in Düwell et al. (eds.), supra n. 3, p. 375.
75 BVerfG, supra n. 6, para. 121.
76 Ibid., para. 119.
77 Ibid., para. 124.
78 Ibid., para. 124.
79 ECtHR 24 July 2014, No. 28761/11, Al Nashiri v Poland.
80 Preamble, Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
81 ECtHR 29 April 2002, No. 2346/02, Pretty v United Kingdom.
82 ECtHR, supra n. 79, para. 538.
83 ECtHR, supra n. 81, para. 52. This association appears to be natural since Art. 3 of the Convention explicitly prohibits ‘degrading’ treatment or punishment (i.e. treatment or punishment which could humiliate someone or lower one’s dignity). At least this notion of Art. 3 is close to the content of human dignity as a relative individual right. The other notions (i.e. prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment) mean something completely different and can be associated with human dignity only as an objective value or a source of human rights.
84 Ibid., paras. 65, 67.
85 ECtHR, supra n. 79, para. 507.
86 cf ECtHR, 1 June 2010, No. 22978/05, Gäfgen v Germany, para. 87. For a review, see Di Stasi, supra n. 5, p. 120-123.
87 ECtHR, supra n. 79, paras. 538-539.
88 The only supportive argument for the unconstitutionality of the concerned provision of the Act is that until the final moment, we should not predict the terrorists’ success in their intent and should therefore give the passengers and crew of the aircraft a chance to take the situation back under their control (BVerfG, supra n. 6, paras. 125-129).
89 See BVerfG 31 January 1973, 2 BvR 454/71, Tonband, para. 32.
90 Rao, supra n. 3, p. 208.
91 Barak (supra n. 4, p. 112-113) suggests a similar solution by solving the issue with the rules of proportionality at the sub-constitutional level. However, the core of the solution should be in avoiding the approach of overusing (and consequently misusing) the term of human dignity in the described hybrid manner rather than in transferring the issue to the sub-constitutional level.
92 Horák, supra n. 17, p. 93-98.
93 See IsrSC 14 August 2001, LCA 4740/00, Amar v Yoseph, where the Court needed to resolve the conflict between dignity as reputation and dignity as freedom of expression. For a review, see D. Kretzmer, ‘Human Dignity in Israeli Jurisprudence’, in Kretzmer and Klein, supra n. 23, p. 161.
94 See BVerfG 28 May 1993, 2 BvF 2/90, Schwangerschaftsabbruch II, where the Court claimed that dignity protects both the right to life of an unborn child (ibid., paras. 145-147) and the right to protection, respect, and free development of personality of the pregnant woman (ibid., para. 153).
95 See Indiana v Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), where dignity as protection from the humiliation of a defendant who lacked the mental capacity to conduct their defence without the assistance of counsel (ibid., the majority opinion) clashed with dignity as a person’s individual choice underlying the right to self-representation (ibid., the dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia).
96 Czech Constitutional Court 20 December 2016, Pl. ÚS 3/14.
97 Ibid., para. 63.
98 Ibid., para. 71.
99 Ibid., para. 110.
100 Ibid., the dissenting opinion, para. 40.
101 F. Horák and D. Lacko. ‘Triangulation of Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualizations Related to the Rule of Law’ [online pre-print], SocArXiv (27 September 2021) ⟨https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/z73pn⟩, visited 20 June 2022.
102 D. Shultziner, ‘Human Dignity in Judicial Decisions: Principles of Application and the Rule of Law’, 25 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law (2016) p. 435 at p. 448-449.
103 cf Rao, supra n. 5, p. 270; Shultziner and Carmi, supra n. 15, p. 480-483.
104 Constitution of Sweden, Art. 2.
105 Constitution of San Marino, Art. 4.
106 Constitution of Slovakia, Art. 19.
107 Ibid., Art. 36.
108 Ibid., Art. 12.
109 Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Art. 1.
110 Ibid., Art. 10.
111 Basic Law of Germany, Art. 1.
112 The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Art. 54, adopted 20 August 1949.
113 Constitution of South Africa, Arts. 1, 7, 36, 39.
114 Ibid., Art. 10.
115 Ibid., Art. 10.
116 Ibid., Art. 35.
117 Ibid., Arts. 165, 181, 196.
