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Minimum Harmonisation and Fundamental Rights: A Test-Case for the Identification of the Scope of EU Law in Situations Involving National Discretion?: ECJ (Grand Chamber) 19 November 2019, Joined Cases C-609/17 and C-610/17, TSN
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2020
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- © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Constitutional Law Review
Footnotes
I would like to thank Professor Dr. Van Cleynenbreugel for his comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this draft. All errors remain, of course, my own.
References
1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time.
2 ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para. 21.
3 See e.g. K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 8(3) EuConst (2012) p. 375; M. Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law”’, 52 CML Rev (2015) p. 1201; X. Groussot et al., ‘The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication’, Eric Stein Working Paper N°1/2011; A. Torres Pérez, ‘The Federalizing Force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 15(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2017) p. 1080; D. Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’, 50 CML Rev (2015) p. 1267.
4 It also derives from Art. 153(2)(b) TFEU, according to which EU secondary legislation adopted to protect the workers’ health and safety can only constitute ‘minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the member states’.
5 Åkerberg Fransson, supra n. 2, para. 21.
6 ECJ 19 November 2019, Joined cases C-609/17 and 610/17, TSN, paras. 33-34.
7 Ibid., paras. 35-36.
8 Ibid., Opinion of AG Bot, para. 88.
9 Ibid., paras. 91-92.
10 Ibid., paras. 94-96.
11 TSN, supra n. 6, para. 50.
12 Ibid., para. 46.
13 Ibid., para. 47.
14 Ibid., paras. 48-49.
15 Ibid., para. 53.
16 V. Trstenjak and E. Beysen, ‘The Growing Overlap of Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the CJEU’, 38(3) E.L. Rev (2013) p. 306; G. De Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 26(2) E.L. Rev (2001) p. 127.
17 Åkerberg Fransson, supra n. 2, para. 21.
18 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 1568.
19 Lenaerts, supra n. 3, p. 378-380; L.S. Rossi, ‘“Same Legal Value as the Treaties”? Rank, Primacy and Direct Effects of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 18(4) German Law Journal (2017) p. 778.
20 E. Muir, ‘The Fundamental Rights Implications of EU Legislation: Some Constitutional Challenges’, 51 CML Rev (2014) p. 31.
21 Dougan, supra n. 3, p. 1210-1217; ECJ 30 April 2014, Case C-390/12, Pfleger and Others, paras. 31-36.
22 Pfleger and Others, ibid., paras. 31-36. F.G. Jacobs, ‘Wachauf and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in EC Law’, in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50 th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) p. 137.
23 Pfleger and Others, supra n. 22; Opinion of AG Sharpston, para. 45.
24 F. Fontanelli and A. Arena, ‘The Harmonization Potential of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, 20 European Journal of Law Reform (2018) p. 66.
25 S.Weatherill, The Internal Market as a Legal Concept (Oxford University Press 2017) p. 43. See also G. Davies, ‘The Competence to Create an Internal Market: Conceptual Diversity and Unbalanced Interests’, in S. Garben and I. Govaere (eds.), The Division of Competence between the EU and the Member States - Reflections on the Past, the Present and the Future (Hart Publishing 2017) p. 74.
26 J.H.H. Weiler and N.J.S. Lockhart, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously”: The European Court of Justice and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’, 32 CML Rev (1995) p. 73.
27 T. Van Danwitz and K. Paraschas, ‘A Fresh Start for the Charter: Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 35 Fordham International Law Journal (2012) p. 1406.
28 D. Chalmers and A. Arnull, The Oxford Handbook of European Union law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 393.
29 ECJ 24 September 2019, Case C-467/19 PPU, Spetsializirana prokuratura (Présomption d’innocence), para. 41.
30 Dougan, supra n. 3, p. 1235-1237.
31 ECJ 6 March 2014, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, para. 25.
32 E. Spaventa, ‘Should We “Harmonize” Fundamental Rights in the EU? Some Reflections About Minimum Standards and Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU Composite Constitutional System’, 55 CML Rev (2018) p. 1007.
33 See e.g. ECJ 17 December 1998, Case C-2/97, Borsana; ECJ 14 April 2005, Case C-6/03, Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe; ECJ 18 July 2013, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and Others; ECJ 25 March 2004, Case C-71/02, Karner.
34 See e.g. F. De Cecco, ‘Room to Move? Minimum Harmonization and Fundamental Rights’, 43(1) CML Rev (2006) p. 9; M. Bartl and C. Leone, ‘Minimum Harmonisation and Article 16 of the CFREU: Difficult Times Ahead for Social Legislation?’, in H. Collins (ed.), European Contract Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2017) p. 113; N. Boeger, ‘Minimum Harmonisation, Free Movement and Proportionality’, in P. Syrpis (ed.), The Judiciary, The Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012) p. 62; M. Bartl and C. Leone, ‘Minimum Harmonisation after Alemo-Herron: The Janus Face of EU Fundamental Rights Review’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 140; J.H. Jans, ’Minimum Harmonisation and the Role of the Principle of Proportionality’, in M. Führ et al. (eds.), Umweltrecht und Umweltwissenschaft. Festschrift für Eckard Rehbinder (ESV 2007) p. 705; S. Weatherill, ‘Beyond Pre-emption? Shared Competence and Constitutional Change in the European Community’, in D. O’Keefe and P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Wiley 1994) p. 13.
35 Alemo-Herron and Others, supra n. 33.
36 Council Directive 2001/23 of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertaking, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses.
37 Alemo-Herron and Others, supra n. 33, para. 34.
38 Bartl and Leone (2017), supra n. 34, p. 116-120.
39 ECJ 10 July 2014, Case C-19813, Julian Hernandez e.a.
40 Ibid., para. 45.
41 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (Codified version).
42 Julian Hernandez e.a., supra n. 39, paras. 38-43.
43 Ibid., para. 44.
44 Art. 153(1) TFEU.
45 Art. 153(2)(b) TFEU. Further details can be found in P. Watson, EU Social and Employment Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 16; S. Van Raepenbusch and D. Hanf, ‘Flexibility in Social Policy’, in B. De Witte et al. (eds.), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia 2001) p. 65.
46 TSN, supra n. 6, para. 53.
47 F.J. Mena Parras, ‘From Strasbourg to Luxembourg? Transposing the Margin of Appreciation Concept into EU Law’, Working Paper N°2015/7 p. 16.
48 B. Pirker, ‘Mapping the Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights: A Typology’, 3(1) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration (2018) p. 145; Mena Parras, ibid., p. 16.
49 As Daniel Thym noted, the ‘high level of abstraction of common rules for VAT’ implies that the ‘member states retain (very) wide discretion how to fight tax evasion within the framework of national procedural autonomy’: D. Thym, ‘Separation versus Fusion - or: How to Accommodate National Autonomy and the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’, 9 EuConst (2013) p. 394-395.
50 Åkerberg Fransson, supra n. 2, paras. 24-28.
51 Ibid., para. 29.
52 Sarmiento, supra n. 3, p. 1302.
53 ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 60; ECJ 5 December 2017, Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., paras. 44-45. V. Franssen, ‘Melloni as a Wake-up Call - Setting Limits to Higher National Standards of Fundamental Rights’ Protection’, European Law Blog, 10 March 2014, ⟨europeanlawblog.eu/2014/03/10/melloni-as-a-wake-up-call-setting-limits-to-higher-national-standards-of-fundamental-rights-protection/⟩, visited 20 October 2020; D. Sarmiento, ‘To Bow at the Rhythm of an Italian Tune’, Despite our Differences Blog, 5 December 2017, ⟨despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2017/12/05/to-bow-at-the-rhythm-of-an-italian-tune/⟩, visited 20 October 2020; S. Perez Fernandes, ‘Fundamental Rights at the Crossroads of EU Constitutionalism. Decoding the Member States’ Key(s) to the Charter’, 60 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (2018) p. 691.
54 Spaventa, supra n. 32, p. 1021.
55 L.F.M. Besselink, ‘The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’, 10 European Current Law (2014) p. 1183; Sarmiento, supra n. 3, p. 1295.
56 Torres Pérez, supra n. 3, p. 1089; Perez Fernandes, supra n. 53, p. 681-686; Thym, supra n. 49, p. 408.
57 Bartl and Leone (2015), supra n. 34, p. 146 ff.
58 Spaventa, supra n. 32, p. 1018; Bartl and Leone (2015), supra n. 34, p. 149.
59 D. Sarmiento, ‘Charter Applicability under More Favourable Provisions of National Law. The TSN Judgment and the Future of Article 51.1 of the Charter’, EU Law Live Blog, 20 November 2019, ⟨eulawlive.com/blog/2019/11/20/charter-applicability-under-more-favourable-provisions-of-national-law-the-tsn-judgment-and-the-future-of-article-51-1-of-the-charter/⟩, accessed 20 October 2020.
60 Spaventa, supra n. 32, p. 1008. See also Weatherill, supra n. 25, p. 204 ff.
61 C. Barnard, ‘EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: The Past, the Present and the Future’, 67 Current Legal Problems (2014) p. 213-215.
62 E. Muir, ‘Drawing Positive Lessons From the Presence of “the Social” Outside of EU Social Policy Stricto Sensu’, 14 EuConst (2018) p. 86.
63 See also ECJ 19 September 2013, Case C-140/12, Brey; ECJ 15 September 2015, Case C-67/14, Alimanovic.
64 ECJ 11 November 2014, Case C-333/13, Dano.
65 It is notable that the Court did not elaborate on the relationship between the Treaty principle of non-discrimination laid down in Arts. 18 and 21 TFEU and the legislative provisions adopted to give effect to this principle. According to the Court, the right of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality is given ‘specific expression’ in Art. 24 of Directive 2004/38 and Art. 4 of Regulation 2004/883, which seems to imply that its interpretation of these provisions is in line with the Treaty prohibition of discrimination (paras. 59-61). See H. Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of the Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano ?’, 52 CML Rev (2015) p. 381-383; N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘What I Tell You Three Times is True: Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’, 23(6) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2016) p. 926.
66 Dano, supra n. 64, para. 89.
67 Ibid., para. 90.
68 Verschueren, supra n. 65, p. 387.
69 S. Garben, ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between “the Market” and “the Social” in the European Union’, 13(1) EuConst (2017) p. 41-43.
70 Sacha Garben observes, in that regard, that ‘the internal market case law of the Court of the past decade [has] been considered responsible for the “social displacement” in the EU’. See S. Garben, ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights: An Assessment of its Meaning and Significance’, 21 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2019) p. 124; S. Giubonni, ‘Freedom to Conduct a Business and EU Labour Law’, 14(1) EuConst (2018) p. 178.
71 Garben, supra n. 69, p. 37; Spaventa, supra n. 32, p. 1105-1006. See also F.W. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or Why the EU cannot be a “Social Market Economy”’, 8 Socio-Economic Review (2010) p. 211.
72 On the distinction between constitutional and legislative minimum harmonisation, see M. Klamert, ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Harmonisation’, 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2015) p. 373-375; R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 265 ff.
73 Art. 82(2) TFEU.
74 Art. 193 TFEU.
75 Art. 169(4) TFEU.
76 See e.g. Directive (EU) 2019/2161 on the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules. See also P. Rott, ‘Minimum Harmonization for the Completion of the Internal Market? The Example of Consumer Sales Law’, 40 CML Rev (2003) p. 1107.
77 S. Weatherill, ‘Maximum versus Minimum Harmonization: Choosing between Unity and Diversity in the Search for the Soul of the Internal Market’, in N. Nic Shuibhne and L.W. Gormley (eds.), From Single Market to Economic Union - Essays in Memory of John A Usher (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 182-183; Boeger, supra n. 34, p. 66-67.
78 This conclusion applies without prejudice to the application of Charter rights in accordance with the ERT doctrine. The internal market dimension of EU legislations adopted on the basis of Art. 114 TFEU is indeed more likely to give rise to an independent breach of the Treaty freedoms and, hence, trigger the rights featured in the Charter on the basis of that doctrine. Further details on that issue can be found in Spaventa, supra n. 32, p. 1018-1019; Boeger, supra n. 34, p. 69 ff.
79 M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice – Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation, (Hart Publishing 2004) p. 131; Torres Pérez, supra n. 3, p. 1082-1084.
80 TSN, supra n. 6, para. 50.
81 F. Fontanelli, ‘Implementation of EU law through Domestic Measures after Fransson: the Court of Justice Buys Time and ‘Non-preclusion’ Troubles Loom Large’, 39(5) E.L. Review (2014) p. 692-693.
82 On the different types of national discretion that may result from the adoption of EU secondary legislations, see T. van den Brink, ‘Refining the Division of Competences in the EU: National Discretion in EU Legislation’, in Garben and Govaere, supra n. 25, p. 251; T. van den Brink, ‘Towards an Ever Clearer Division of Authority between the European Union and the Member States’, in T. van den Brink et al. (eds.), Sovereignty in the Shared Legal Order of the EU. Core Values of Regulation and Enforcement (Intersentia 2015) p. 217; T. van den Brink, ‘The Impact of EU Legislation on National Legal Systems: Towards a New Approach to EU-Member States Relations’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017) p. 211.
83 As specified in Art. 288 TFEU. See also Van den Brink, ‘Refining the Division of Competences in the EU: National Discretion in EU Legislation’, ibid., p. 259.
84 Bartl and Leone (2015), supra n. 34, p. 148-149.
85 Ibid.
86 See also Art. 169(4) (consumer protection) and Art. 193 TFEU (environment).
87 In Case C-467/19PPU, the Court decided that the discretionary powers bestowed on the member states by an optional clause contained in a minimum harmonisation directive adopted in the field of criminal procedure (Directive 2016/343) were not subject to the Charter’s fundamental rights in the absence of a specific obligation imposed upon them in that regard. See ECJ 24 September 2019, Case C-467/19 PPU, Spetsializirana prokuratura (Présomption d’innocence), paras. 34-42.
88 Dougan, supra n. 3, p. 1219.
89 J. Masing, ‘Unity and Diversity of European Fundamental Rights Protection’, 41(4) E.L. Review (2016) p. 508.
90 Van den Brink (2017), supra n. 83, p. 263.