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Constitution-making and institutional design. The transformations of presidentialism in Argentina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Gabriel L. Negretto
Gabriel L. Negretto
Affiliation:
Columbia University(New York).
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Abstract

This paper presents an analytical framework for the study of constitutional design from the point of view of the structure of interaction and mechanisms of institutional selection that affect the behavior and choices of the actors involved in a constitution-making process. This framework is used to explain the various limitations introduced to the powers of the President in the Argentine constitution of 1994. I argue that two levels of causation determined this reform. At the macro level, the limitation of presidential powers was the outcome of a distribution of political resources and a configuration of preferences among the actors that made possible the resolution of conflicts by means of compromise. At the micro level, the new set of institutions derived from the limited influence of the incumbent executive over constitutional design, the pluralism of the constituent assembly that approved the constitution, and the prevalence of bargaining as a mechanism of collective decision-making. Both levels of action facilitated a consensual constitution-making process from which emerged a powersharing structure that has the potential to lower the stakes of political competition for presidential office and create new rules of mutual trust between government and opposition.

L'article propose un cadre d'anaiyse pour l'étude du processus consriturionnel à partir de la structure des interactions et des mécanismes de choix institutionnel. Le cadre théorique permet de rendre compte des limitations imposées au pouvoir du Président dans la Constitution argentine de 1994. Au niveau macro, la distribution des ressources politiques et la configuration des préférences des acteurs faisaient de ces limitations un compromis acceptable. Au niveau micro, on trouve principalement la prévalence du marchandage comme mécanisme de décision collective. De la combinaison des deux, résulte une structure de partage du pouvoir qui mod`re les enjeux de la compétition pour la présidence et qui crée des règles nouvelles pour susciter con fiance mutuelle entre gouvernement et opposition.

Der hier vorgestelle Interpretationsansatz dient der Analyse der Verfassungsgebung, wobei zwei Aspekte berücksichtigt werden: erstens die Struktur der Zwischenhandlungen und zweitens die institutionellen Auswahlkriterien, die Verhalten und Entscheidungen der in den verfassunggebenden Prozeß eingebundenen Personen beeinflußt haben. Die zahlreichen Einschränkugen des Präsidentschaftsmandats in der argentinischen Verfassung von 1994 werden hierdurch verstandlich. Ich behaupte, daß zwei Überlegungen diese Reform beeinflußt haben. Die politischen Kräfte und der Wille der Verhandlungsführer, eine Konfliktlösung durch Kompromißsuche herbeizuführen, waren auf der Makroebene für die Machtbegrenzung verantwortlich. Auf der Mikroebene rührte die Neudefinierung der Institutionen von dem begrenzten Einfluß der Exekutive auf die Verfassungsgebung her, aber auch vom Pluralismus der verfassunggebenden Versammlung und dem Wunsch, der Verhandlung bei der Entscheidungsfindung den Vortritt zu geben. Beide Ebenen haben zu einem konsensuellen verfassunggebenden Prozeß und einer Gewaltenteilung geführt, die die Kämpfe um den Präsidentenposten gemindert und neue Regeln für ein gemeinsames Vertrauen zwischen Regierung und Opposition geschaffen haben.

Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , November 1999 , pp. 193 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1999

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