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Limitations of Fundamental Rights in EU Law: Are Human Rights Absolute?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2023
Abstract
The importance of fundamental rights has been seen especially during the Covid-19 crisis. Although fundamental rights are usually perceived as abstract by individuals, they concretely and directly influence our everyday lives. With this article I want to confirm the thesis that, despite the fact that rights are generally not absolute, their limitation is possible only in exceptional cases. This article will discuss fundamental rights in the EU. It will present the regulation and possibilities of limiting fundamental rights in EU law, in particular in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter). The article will also present the role of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the field of fundamental rights. Moreover, it will depict the jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding health care rights. This is particularly important due to the problems of restricting several fundamental rights during the Covid-19 crisis, where health-related rights were at the forefront and accompanied by the search for a fair balance and assessment of proportionality. The article will also present the CJEU case law on the limitation of fundamental rights in the digital society, in the context of which we are also often faced with the search for a fair balance between several rights, especially concerning the protection of personal data on the one hand and other rights on the other hand (e.g. the freedom to conduct a business).
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- © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Academia Europaea Ltd
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