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9 On this Hegelian idea, see Fukayama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (1993). For a critique, see Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 EJIL 449 (1997).Google Scholar

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32 Id.Google Scholar

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42 Koskenniemi, , supra note 1, at 607. However, it is also worth noting the presence (and apparent stabilising force) of “structural bias”; Koskenniemi continues the quotation above, “the former are always taken as the starting-point while the latter have to struggle for limited realisation”. On structural bias, see infra.Google Scholar

43 Id. at 585–8.Google Scholar

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81 This internalises – and temporarily suspends – disputes over which features are relevant to the construction of like cases, and over which standards these cases are to be subjected to.Google Scholar

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104 Id. at 495–6 and on Friedman in particular, Id. at 498. The impossibility of reaching a determinate understanding of the demands of contemporary Public International Law by reference to classic Kelsenian methods is highlighted and persuasively demonstrated by the most consistent neo-Kelsenian currently writing on the subject of Public International Law, Jörg Kammerhofer, The Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EJIL 523 (2004).Google Scholar

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117 Koskenniemi, , supra note 7, at 500. Perhaps it is closer still to Nietzsche's “endless return”, or at least Deleuze's interpretation thereof, see Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari 31 (1989).Google Scholar

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150 Perhaps a more telling analogy would be with the claim that immigrant communities in the England must be speaking a form of English, because they reside, interact, and communicate in England.Google Scholar

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194 Koskenniemi, , What Is International Law For?, supra note 8, at 59, especially footnote 4.Google Scholar

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