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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
On 23rd June 2007, after three years of uncertainty, European Union leaders agreed on relaunching the old idea of a Magna Charta for Europe (now called “the Reform Treaty”), a normative structure based on the old ideas of deference to national identities, sovereignty and equality. To many authors, the first time that juridical equality between states was solemnly stated was in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), in the Westphalia Peace Treaties, representing the beginning of modern international society established in a system of states, and at the same time, “the plain affirmation of the statement of absolute independence of the different state orders.” In fact, under an Eurocentric conception of political ideas (which envisages England as an isolated island and Iberia as Maghreb, north of Africa), the modern state emerges with the Westphalia Peace Treaties. However, under a broader conception, the modern nation-state (under the form of absolute monarchy) emerged long before the Westphalia Peace Treaties, in Iberia and England. Nevertheless, it is in these documents which lies the “birth certificate” of the modern sovereignty nation-state, base of the present democratic state, and “founding moment” of the international political system. Far beyond this merely formal aspect, the importance of the Westphalia Peace Treaties is so great to the understanding of the notion of state that Roland Mousnier, in describing the 16th and 17th centuries in the General History of the Civilizations, organized by Maurice Crouzet, asserts that those treaties symbolized a real “constitution of the new Europe,” a multifarious Europe, plural and very distant from the religious unit of Christianity, from the political unit of the Holy Roman Empire, and from the economical unit of the feudal system. Constitutions are especially important because they establish the rules for the political authority, they determine who governs and how they govern: “[I]n codifying and legitimating the principle of sovereign statehood, the Westphalian constitution gave birth to the modern states-system.”
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