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Co-decision and Inter-Committee Conflict in the European Parliament Post-Amsterdam1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Charlotte Burns
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Abstract

This article makes a two-fold contribution to the European Parliament (EP) literature. First, it challenges the dominant assumption that post-Amsterdam the EP has experienced an increase in its powers. Through analysis of the Socrates case the article shows that the EP is now potentially weaker under the post-Amsterdam co-decision procedure (co-decision II), than it was under the earlier variant, co-decision I. Second, the article uncovers a hitherto overlooked aspect of internal divisions within the parliament, by revealing that there is scope for inter-committee conflict in the EP over budgetary allocations for multi-annual programmes. It is argued that such conflict can weaken the parliament in co-decision negotiations with the council, and that the negotiation of the EU's new multi-annual budgetary framework provides the perfect conditions for such internecine conflict to occur once more.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , 2006 , pp. 230 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2006

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Footnotes

1

This article draws upon research funded by ESRC Grants R00429843318 and T026271246. The author would like to thank the commission, council and EP officials and MEPs who gave so freely of their time in order to answer questions, and allowed access to archives and files and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.

References

2 For example, on committees see, inter alia, Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. M., ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination’, British Journal of Political Science, 25: 2 (1995), pp.219–43;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Whitaker, R., ‘Party Control in a Committee Based Legislature? The Case of the European Parliament’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 7: 4 (2001), pp. 63–88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mamadouh, V. and Raunio, T., ‘The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41: 2 (2003), pp. 333–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On parties and voting behaviour see, inter alia, Hix, S., ‘Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the EP’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 4 (2001), pp. 663–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kreppel, A., The European Parliament and Supranational Party System, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 Google Scholar; Scully, R., ‘MEPs and the Building of a Parliamentary Europe’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 4: 3 (1998), pp. 92–108Google Scholar; G. Tsebelis, C. Jensen, A. Kalandrakis and A. Kreppel, ‘Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis’, British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), pp. 573–99.

3 See, inter alia, Crombez, C., Steunenberg, B. and Corbett, R., ‘Understanding the EU Legislative Process – Political Scientists’ and Practitioners’ Perspectives’, European Union Politics, 1: 3 (2000), pp.363–81;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6 S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 94–8; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘Legislative Politics in the European Union’; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union’.Google Scholar

7 Farrell and Héritier, ‘Formal and Informal Institutions Under Co-decision’, p. 595.Google Scholar

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10 Bowler and Farrell, ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament’; Whitaker, ‘Party Control in a Committee Based Legislature?’; Mamadouh and Raunio, ‘The Committee System’.Google Scholar

11 See, for example, Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘Agenda-Setting, Vetoes and the European Union's Co-decision Procedure’, p. 80; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘Legislative Politics in the European Union’, pp. 13–15; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union’, p. 375.Google Scholar

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13 Scully, ‘The European Parliament and the Co-decision Procedure’; Scully, ‘The European Parliament and Co-decision: A Rejoinder’.Google Scholar

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19 Hix, The Political System of the European Union, p. 94.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., pp. 94–8; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘Legislative Politics in the European Union’, p. 15; Tsebelis and Garrett, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union’, pp. 375–6.Google Scholar

21 Farrell and Héritier, ‘Formal and Informal Institutions Under Co-decision’.Google Scholar

22 For details of representation on committees under co-decision II see Shackleton and Raunio, ‘Codecision Since Amsterdam’.Google Scholar

23 Bowler and Farrell, ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament’; Whitaker, ‘Party Control in a Committee Based Legislature?’; Mamadouh and Raunio, ‘The Committee System’.Google Scholar

24 R. Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, The European Parliament, 4th edn, London, John Harper Publishing, 2000, p. 216.Google Scholar

25 Ibid., pp. 216–32.Google Scholar

26 European Parliament, Activity Report, 1 November 1993–30 April 1999, from Entry into Force of the Treaty of Maastricht to Entry into Force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, of the Delegations to the Conciliation Committee, 1999, p. 26.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., pp. 24 and 38; PE Debates, 28 January 1998, no. 4–513, pp. 37–41.Google Scholar

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29 Material for this case study was collected between September 1999 and March 2000 and is drawn from official documentary sources and research interviews with MEPs and parliament, commission and council officials.Google Scholar

30 Interview, EP Socialist Group official, 10 February 2000; Shackleton and Raunio, ‘Codecision Since Amsterdam’, p. 184.Google Scholar

31 Interview, Finnish COREPER official, 20 March 2000.Google Scholar

32 Ibid.Google Scholar

33 Interview, MEP, 7 March 2000.Google Scholar

34 Interviews, MEPs, 7 March 2000; 29 February 2000.Google Scholar

35 Interview, EP official, 25 November 1999.Google Scholar

36 Interview, commission official, 23 March 2000.Google Scholar

37 European Parliament, Report on the Joint Text Approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European Parliament and Council Decision Establishing the Second Phase of the Community Action Programme in the Field of Education, SOCRATES, European Parliament Delegation to the Conciliation Committee, 1999.Google Scholar

38 Interview, MEP, 7 March 2000.Google Scholar

39 Iivari, PE Debates, 13 December 1999.Google Scholar

40 Interview, council official, 19 November 1999.Google Scholar

41 Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. and Shackleton, M., ‘The European Parliament at Fifty: A View From the Inside’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41: 2 (2003), pp.353–73; p. 365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 Ibid., p. 365.Google Scholar

43 For example, see R. Fenno, The Power of Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966.Google Scholar

44 Shackleton and Raunio, ‘Codecision Since Amsterdam’, pp. 179–80.Google Scholar

45 Hix, ‘Constitutional Agenda-Setting through Discretion Rule Interpretation’, pp. 275–6.Google Scholar