¹ By convention, Japanese family names precede given names.

² Japan News, 5 June 1954, p. 1.

³ New York Times, 3 June 1956, p. 19.

⁴ The Yomiuri, 20 May 1960, p. 1.

⁵ Seizaburô Satô and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, Jimintô Seiken [The LDP's Rule], Tokyo, Chûô Kôron, 1986, p. 129.

⁶ Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

⁷ Deliberate disorder includes ‘speaking in debates without the directing authority's permission, refusing to discontinue a speech or come to order, disregarding the authority of the Chair, irrelevance or tedious repetition in speech, the use of language or conduct designed to prejudice the dignity of the House, the use of violence or the threat of violence against Parliament, its members or its officers, and so on. The distinguishing characteristic of all these actions is that they are specifically outlawed by the rules of procedure’. Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium, New York, De Gruyter, 1976, p. 389.

⁸ Hattie Kawahara Colton, ‘The Working of the Japanese Diet’, Pacific Affairs, 28: 4 (December 1955), p. 369.

⁹ The formal rules of the Athenian Assembly provided only for one-way communication: from speaker to audience. In practice, the audience frequently interrupted speakers. It was the repeated and persistent interruptions by a group of about 300 people (a quorum for the Assembly was 6,000) that evidently prompted the law. Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demothenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology, trans. J. A. Cook, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 137–47.

¹⁰ Assemblies without explicit sanctions tend to be those which can only delay legislation, such as the British House of Lords, (West) German Bundesrat, and the Swiss Council of States, or in which order is ensured by extra-parliamentary means, as in the communist regimes of Vietnam, the Soviet Union and East Germany. Parliaments of the World: A Reference Compendium, op. cit., p. 391.

¹¹ The National Diet of Japan, printed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives by Yajima Printing Co., March 1992, p. 6.

¹² In response to the attack on Sumner, a Republican, the Senate set up an investigative committee without Republican members. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction in the matter (the attack occurred after the Senate had adjourned). The House could not find the two-thirds majority needed to expel Brooks. ‘Brooks went unpunished except for a $300 fine for assault in a District of Columbia court.’ Eric M. Uslaner, The Decline of Comity in Congress, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1993, p. 41.

¹³ Jellinek, Georg, ‘Parliamentary Obstruction’, Political Science Quarterly, 19: 4 (1904), p. 581.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 585.

¹⁵ To the extent that it is hard to predict what legislative minorities will see as fair, the notion that a given institutional setting is ‘right’ borders on tautology: we know the institutions are right because the minority plays by the rules, and the minority plays by the rules because the institutions are fair. Yet even if the minority feels democratic institutions are unfair, it may be deterred from breaking the rules by the fear, for example, that the majority would take advantage of a democratic breakdown to gaol members of the minority.

¹⁶ Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay in Democratic Transitions, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, pp. 54–5.

¹⁷ Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 19.

¹⁸ Rustow, Dankwart A., ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, 2: 3 (1970), p. 358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taishô Japan, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 18–19.

²⁰ Polsby, Nelson W., ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives’, American Political Science Review, 62: 1 (1968), p. 168 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Kikuo Nakamura, Nihon No Senkyo Kôzô [Japan's Electoral Structure], Tokyo, Hara-shobo, 1968, pp. 25–9.

²² Hayama, Akira, ‘Incumbency Advantages in Japanese Elections’, Electoral Studies, 11: 1 (1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Polsby points (p. 168) to ‘substantial decay’ in the indicators of institutionalization around the time of the Civil War. However, changes in the level of institutionalization do not account for the rapid descent into disorder by the Austrian parliament in the late nineteenth century. Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrews: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997, p. 240. Nor do they explain the recent decline in legislative comity in the House, occurring at a time of high incumbent security. E. M. Uslaner, The Decline of Comity in Congress, op. cit.

²⁴ Gerald L. Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 101.

²⁵ The October 1996 general election was the first under new rules that replaced the multi-member district system with a combination of single-member districts and proportional representation. Despite this change, 75 per cent of the 500 candidates elected were either incumbents (339) or former incumbents (36). Yomiuri, 21 October 1996, p. 1.

²⁶ E. M. Uslaner, The Decline of Comity in Congress, op. cit., p. vii. He later (p. 52) undermines this claim about the link between social norms and legislative behaviour by conceding that ‘Elites have become polarized along partisan lines, while voters have not’. Elsewhere he states, ‘Even as the political parties in Congress become more polarized, the electorate seems to be drifting in the opposite direction’. Uslaner, Eric M., ‘Comity in Context: Confrontation in Historical Perspective’, British Journal of Political Science, 21: 1 (1991), p. 74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁷ William S. Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, New York, Norton, 1946, p. 458.

²⁸ John W. Dower, ‘Peace and Democracy in Two Systems’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.), Post-war Japan as History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, pp. 20–2.

²⁹ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. Barbara and Robert North, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1965 [1951], pp. 224–6.

³⁰ New York Times, 10 June 1956, p. 3.

³¹ The socialists won 28 seats from local constituencies and 21 in the nationwide electoral district. Ronald J. Hrebenar, The Japanese Party System, 2nd edn, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1992, p. 298.

³² The LDP had hoped to win 80 seats. Yomiuri Japan News, 5 June 1956, p. 1.

³³ Asahi Nenkan 1961, Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1961, p. 416. Cited in Frank Landon, Politics in Japan, Little, Brown, Boston, 1967, p. 91.

³⁴ Douglas Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrews: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics, op. cit., p. 35.

³⁵ The Communist Party also benefited from voter defections from the JSP. While the former was not ‘moderate’ in terms of policies, it was much less implicated in the tactics of parliamentary disorder than the latter.

³⁶ J. J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, op. cit.

³⁷ Loewenberg, Gerhard, ‘The Influence of Parliamentary Behavior on Regime Stability’, Comparative Politics, 3: 2 (1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁸ Occupation authorities banned Hatoyama (and nearly 35,000 others suspected of ties to the pre-war regime) from political office on the eve of his assumption of the premiership in 1946. He was one of the few politicians to return to prominence after the ban was lifted. Kishi, who had held high bureaucratic office in the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria and, as a cabinet minister, signed the declaration of war against the US in 1941, was arrested (but never tried) as a Class A war criminal.

³⁹ Charles G. Gillespie, ‘Models of Democratic Transition in South America: Negotiated Reform Versus Democratic Rupture’, in Diane Ethier (ed.), Democratic Transitions and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, London, Macmillan, 1990; Hagopian, Frances, ‘ “Democracy by Undemocratic Means”?: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil’, Comparative Political Studies, 23: 2 (1990);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Guillermo O’ Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Share, Donald, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction’, Comparative Political Studies, 19: 4 (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ G. Jellinek, ‘Parliamentary Obstruction’, p. 579.

⁴¹ Sarah A. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997; D. Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrews: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics, op. cit.

⁴² D. Dion, Turning the Legislative Thumbscrews: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 238–42.

⁴⁴ Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984.

⁴⁵ Lijphart concedes as much by arguing that India appears majoritarian when only its formal institutions are considered but seems consociational when informal practices are taken into account. Lijphart, Arend, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation’, American Political Science Review, 90: 2 (1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ Ellis S. Krauss, ‘Conflict in the Diet: Toward Conflict Management in Parliamentary Politics’, in Ellis S. Krauss, Thomas P. Tohlen and Patricia G. Steinhoff (eds), Conflict in Japan, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1984, p. 247.

⁴⁷ Masaru Kohno, Japan's Post-war Party Politics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 43.

⁴⁸ Bradley Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 129.

⁴⁹ E. S. Krauss, ‘Conflict in the Diet: Toward Conflict Management in Parliamentary Politics’, op. cit., p. 249.

⁵⁰ B. Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, op. cit., p. 134.

⁵¹ Bingham Powell, G. and Stiefbold, Rodney P., ‘Anger, Bargaining, and Mobilization as Middle-Range Theories of Elite Conflict Behavior’, Comparative Politics, 9: 4 (1977).Google Scholar

⁵² Ray Christensen, Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, 2000, p. 80.

⁵³ E. S. Krauss, ‘Conflict in the Diet: Toward Conflict Management in Parliamentary Politics’, op. cit., p. 260.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 255.

⁵⁶ The Yomiuri, 16 June 1960, p. 1.

⁵⁷ The Yomiuri, 18 June 1960, p. 1.

⁵⁸ E. S. Krauss, ‘Conflict in the Diet: Toward Conflict Management in Parliamentary Politics’, op. cit., p. 250.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 278.

⁶⁰ G. L. Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, op. cit., pp. 117–19.

⁶¹ The number of boycott days was estimated from a chart in S. Satô and T. Matsuzaki, Jiminto Seiken [The LDP's Rule], op. cit. As a result, the true correlation may be slightly different.

⁶² B. Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, op. cit., pp. 130, 145.

⁶³ Ellis S. Krauss and Jon Pierre, ‘The Decline of Dominant Parties: Parliamentary Politics in Sweden and Japan in the 1970s’, in T. J. Pempel (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 237.

⁶⁴ S. Satô and T. Matsuzaki, Jiminto Seiken [The LDP's Rule], op. cit., p. 130.

⁶⁵ Yomiuri, 28 November 1991, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Yomiuri, 16 and 19 June 1993, p. 1.

⁶⁷ G. L. Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics, op. cit., p. 121.

⁶⁸ Yomiuri, 10 November 1994, p. 1.

⁶⁹ The Nikkei Weekly, 4 December 1995, p. 4.

⁷⁰ Yomiuri, 4 March 1996, p. 1.

⁷¹ Yomiuri, 10 September 1999, pp. 1–2.

⁷² Yomiuri, 15 December 1999, p. 1.

⁷³ Japan Times, 5 February 2000.

⁷⁴ Washington Post, 26 July 2003, p. A18.

⁷⁵ B. Richardson, Japanese Democracy: Power, Coordination, and Performance, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁶ New York Times, 25 June 1953, p. 11.

⁷⁷ Larry Diamond, Toward Consolidation, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 241.

⁷⁸ Economist, ‘Survey of the Koreas’, 10 July 1999, p. 10.

⁷⁹ Ivor Jennings, Parliament, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957 [1939], p. 61.

⁸⁰ David Judge, ‘Disorder in the House of Commons’, Public Law, Autumn 1985, p. 370.

⁸¹ G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 222.