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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
INTER-PARTY RIVALRY BASED LARGELY ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINES took institutional shape in Ceylon, for the first time, with the approach of general elections in August–September 1947, under the newly inaugurated Soulbury Constitution. The issues at the general election of 1947 were simple and straightforward. It was accepted that the United National Party (UNP) would form the government with its leader, D. S. Senanayake, as the man who would lead the country to independence. The party had the backing of almost the entire press. It enjoyed ample financial resources and commanded the support of the ‘big families’, the landed interests, the mudalalis (shop-owners), and government officials, particularly the village headmean. The choice posed to the electors was between a policy of progressive social reforms and stable government advocated by the UNP as against the revolutionary changes that the three left wing parties envisaged – the Trotskyist Lank Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and its splinter, the Bolshevik Leninist Party which later changed its name to the Bolshevik Samasamaja Party (BSP), and the Moscoworiented Communist Party (CP). These left-wing groups were ideologically in conflict with each other.
1 The Soulbury Constitution came into operation in October 1947 and lasted till 4 February 1948 when Ceylon obtained independence. It provided for a large measure of internal self-government and for a cabinet of ministers who would be collectively responsible to parliament. It derived its name from the Chairman of the Commission on Constitutional Reform which visited Ceylon on 22 December 1944, Viscount Soulbury.
2 The latest census figures (1963) give the distribution of population as follows: Low Country Sinhalese, 4,473,000 (42.2 per cent), Kandyan Sinhalese, 3,047,000 (28–8 per cent), Ceylon Tamils, 1,170,000 (11 per cent), Indian Tamils, 1,121,000 (10–6 per cent), Ceylon Moors, 662,000 (6.3 per cent), Indian Moors, 27,000 (0.3 per cent), Burghers and Eurasians, 46,000 (0.4 per cent) and others 20,000 (0.2 per cent). Of the Indian Tamils, 121,135 have obtained citizenship under the Ceylon citizenship legislation of 1948 and 1949, thus leaving approximately one million Indians in the category of ‘stateless’.
3 The UNP secured 42 seats, the LSSP 10, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress 7, the Ceylon Indian Congress 6, the Bolshevik Leninist Party 5, the CP 3 and Independents accounted for the remaining 21.
4 See Ceylon Daily News, 6 November 1947.
5 See Ceylon Daily New, 4 October 1947, Ceylon Observer, 7 October 1947 and Times of Ceylon, 11 October 1947.
6 See Ceylon Daily News, 13 October 1947.
7 See Ceylon Daily News, 22 June 1950.
8 See Ceylon Daily News, 12 June 1950.
9 See Ceylon Daily News, 12 January 1949.
10 See Ceylon Daily News, 5 June 1950.
11 This means the Revolutionary Ceylon Equal Society Party.
12 See Ceylon Daily News, 28 May 1951.
13 See Ceylon Daily News, 8 February 1951.
14 Swabasha means ‘one’s own language’.
15 Bandaranaike wanted (a) emphasis to be given to Buddhism, the religion of the majority of the people, while at the same time the state should also provide assistance to other religions, (b) a switchover in the administration from English to Sinhalese and Tamil and (c) more rapid economic development.
16 See Ceylon Daily News, 16 July 1951.
17 See Ceylon Daily News, August 1951.
18 See official statement issued by Leslie Goonewardene, secretary of the LSSP in Ceylon Daily News, 3 January 1952.
19 The Indian Tamil workers dwell mostly in the Kandyan Sinhalese areas. The UNP leaders accused the Left of caring more for the Indian Tamils than for their own countrymen, the Sinhalese. Earlier, in August 1948, the UNP Minister of Finance had characterized all three left-wing parties at the time (CP, BSP, LSSP) as ‘Indian parties, financed by Indian money’ and ‘subject to the directives, control and the decisions of their party heads in India’. Cf. H. R. Deb., 19 August 1948, 1731.
20 The CP-VLSSP united front contested 19 constituencies and won 4. It clashed with the LSSP in 7 of these constituencies. The LSSP put forward 39 candidates of whom 9 won.
21 See Leslie Goonewardene, op. cit., p. 42.
22 See Ceylon Daily News, Independence Supplement, 4 February 1953.
23 The function of the Opposition… is to point out… their own views, in the national interest, on the proposals of the Government and how far, in their opinion, those proposals are likely to achieve even objects which the Government has in view. In a sense, the Opposition serves a purpose which the Government cannot serve, namely, that of forming as well as reflecting public opinion to a degree that is not possible for the Government. (H. R. Deb., 30 July 1952, 1756–70.
24 See the statement of the secretary of the LSSP in Ceylon Daily News, 13 June 1953.
25 The excuse, which was not convincing, given by the LSSP leader was that the SLFP could not participate as they had not been given sufficient time to prepare for the event. See H. R. Deb, 1 September 1953, 2482–83.
26 See ibid., 27 November 1953, 996.
27 Ibid., 5 March 1954, 3267, note, Bandaranaike was wary about this request. It was his view that he held ‘a certain crucial position’ but it was the government’s duty to solve the Indian question satisfactorily. If they could not, they should get out and let him solve it. The prime minister was evidently endeavouring to get Bandaranaike to commit himself to a solution acceptable to the opposition so that he might not turn round later and criticize the government for having blundered in the negotiations. Bandaranaike was, however, astute enough not to let himself be roped in like this. See ibid., 1136.
28 Ibid., 4 August 1954, 525.
29 H. R. Deb., 19 October 1955, 684.
30 See Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, The Betrayal of Buddhism, in English, abridged, Balangoda, 1956.
31 In English the United Front of Buddhist monks.
32 The MEP won 51 of the 60 seats contested and polled 1,046,362 votes, the UNP won 8 of 76 seats contested, polling 738,551 votes, the LSSP won 14 of the 21 seats contested, polling 274,204 votes while the FP won 10 of the 14 seats contested and polled 142,036 votes. It was believed that a number of independent Tamil-speaking MPs could be persuaded to support the FP as against the LSSP.
33 H. R. Deb., 4 May 1956, 416; for the LSSP amendment, see ibid., 290–1.
34 For the details of this incident, see ibid., 12 February 1959, 819–48.
35 See for details the debate on the no confidence motion moved against Dahanayake’s government by N. M. Perera in H. R. Deb, 30 October 1959, 950–1126 and the debate on the vote of censure moved by the opposition against Dahanayake’s Minister of Justice jn ibid., 27 November 1959, 1599–1764. Dahanayake held the premiership from 26 September 1959 to 20 March 1960.
36 See Ceylon Faces Crisis, Federal Party Pamphlet, Colombo, 1957 for details of this pact.
37 There were two ministers, with Trotskyist antecedents in the cabinet but they could no longer be described as Marxists.
38 (i) under legislation enacted in late 1960 and early 1961 for the take-over of schools by the state, the Roman Catholic Church was one of those adversely affected; (ii) the Language of the Courts Act passed by Parliament in late 1960 providing for the use of Sinhalese in all courts throughout the island to the detriment of the Tamil language, and Mrs Bandaranaike’s government’s decision to enforce Sinhalese as the one official language throughout the island from 1 January 1961 alienated the Tamils.
39 See statement on the abortive coup d’état of 27 January 1962 by Dias Bandaranaike, F. R. in H. R. Deb., 13 February 1962, 1120–1143.Google Scholar
40 See ibid., 3 September 1962, 1380–92. There was yet another alleged coup d’état by high ranking Sinhalese Buddhist army officers, this time against Dudley Senanayakc’s ‘national government’ in February 1966. See statement by Jayawardene, J. R. in ibid., 9 03 1966, 221–24.Google Scholar
