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THE EFTA COURT 15 YEARS ON

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 August 2010

Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen
Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen
Affiliation:
Cand jur, M jur, Dr jur, Research fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen (Norway). Email: Halvard.Fredriksen@jur.uib.no.
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Abstract

For over 15 years, the reports of the EEA Agreement's imminent demise have proven to be greatly exaggerated. In this article it is argued that a great deal of the credit for this accomplishment is due to the EFTA Court. Through a distinctly dynamic approach to the Agreement, the EFTA Court has been able to convince an initially sceptical ECJ that the goal of extending the internal market to include the EFTA States is actually achievable. For the EFTA States, the consequence is a more ‘supranational’ EEA Agreement than originally conceived. Further, it is shown that the EFTA Court appears, in hard cases, to lean even further towards teleological (ie integrationist) interpretation than the ECJ. It is suggested that this may be due to to structural imbalances between the two EEA courts, the EFTA Court's desire to prove its independence from the EFTA States and its quest for recognition from the ECJ.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , July 2010 , pp. 731 - 760
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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References

1 OJ [1994] L 1, 3. For a general, up-to-date introduction to the EEA Agreement in English, see eg, ME Méndez-Pinedo EC and EEA Law (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2009); A Lazowski ‘Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration without Membership in the European Union’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1433–1458; R Petrov ‘Exporting the Aquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of Third Countries’ (2008) 13 EFARev 33–52; C Tobler et al, Internal Market beyond the EU: EEA and Switzerland (Briefing paper commissioned by the European Parliament's Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, PE 429.993, Brussels 2010).

2 cf, eg, H Schermers' prognosis in (1992) 29 CMLR 991, 1005: ‘It is unlikely that the compromises found will lead to a system which remains workable in the long term’.

3 See eg, H-P Graver ‘Mission Impossible: Supranationality and National Legal Autonomy in the EEA Agreement’ (2002) 7 EFARev 73, 90; F Sejersted et al EØS-rett (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2004) 107–108.

4 Graver (n 3).

5 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.

6 Joined cases E-9/07 and E-10/07 L'Oréal [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 258, para 28.

7 OJ [1994] L 344, 3.

8 Cases 270/80 Polydor [1982] ECR 329 and 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641.

9 Jf. H Bull Det indre marked for tjenester og kapital (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2002) 81.

10 Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para 43.

11 Sejersted et al (n 3) 85.

12 See L Sevón and M Johansson, ‘The Protection of the Rights of Individuals under the EEA Agreement’ (1999) 24 ELRev 373, 385; S Norberg, ‘Perspectives on the Future Development of the EEA’ in DT Björgvinsson et al (eds), Festschrift Tor Vilhjálmsson (Bókaútgáfa Orator, Reykjavik, 2000) 367, 374; C Baudenbacher, ‘The EFTA Court Ten Years On’ in C Baudenbacher et al (eds), The EFTA Court Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005) 13, 30.

13 L Sevón ‘The ECJ, the EFTA Court and the national courts of the EFTA countries’ in P Lødrup et al (eds), Festschrift Carsten Smith (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2000) 721, 731.

14 See eg, T Hartley ‘The European Court and the EEA’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 841, 847.

15 Sejersted et al (n 3) 105–106.

16 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821.

17 Case E-1/95 Restamark [1994–1995] EFTA Ct Rep 35, Report for the Hearing, para 96.

18 Restamark (n 17), paras 77–81. Emphasis added.

19 See eg, Baudenbacher (n 12) 26.

20 Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 1, paras 47 ff.

21 In Norway through section 2 of the EEA Act of 27.11.1992 No 109. The Icelandic implementation of Protocol 35 is less clear, but the Icelandic Supreme Court appears to have remedied this, see T Örlygsson, ‘Iceland and the EFTA Court. Twelve years of experience’ in M Monti et al (eds), Festschrift Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 225, 235–238.

22 Baudenbacher (n 12) 26.

23 Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 95.

24 ibid paras 47–62.

25 In the editorial ‘European Economic Area and European Community: Homogeneity of legal orders?’ (1999) 36 CMLR 1999, 697, 691, the opinion is described as ‘fairly daring’.

26 This understanding of the homogeneity objective is controversial and hard to reconcile with the preconditions of the dualistic EFTA States upon signing and ratification of the Agreement, see further Bull (n 8) 78.

27 cf joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 31 and joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029, para 22.

28 This was clarified in the later case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 248, para 29.

29 See, most recently, C Baudenbacher,‘If Not EEA State Liability, Then What? Reflections Ten Years after the EFTA Court's Sveinbjörnsdóttir Ruling’ (2009) 10 Chicago JIL 333, 358.

30 Karlsson (n 28) para 28.

31 C Baudenbacher ‘Institutionen, Entscheidungsprozesse und allgemeine Rechtsprinzipien im EWR-Abkommen’ in C Baudenbacher (ed) Internationales und Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht (Norderstedt, St. Gallen 2004) 207, 219.

32 Case E-1/07 Criminal proceedings against A [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 245, para 39.

33 See only the cases 14/83 von Colson [1984] ECR 1891, para 26 and C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8.

34 See eg, Baudenbacher (n 31) 219; Norberg (n 12) 374; Sevón and Johansson (n 12) 385; Sevón (n 13) 731.

35 Karlsson (n 28) para 28. Arguably, the EFTA Court suggested this position already in Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23), para 63.

36 Criminal proceedings against A (n 32) para 37–42.

37 Restamark (n 17), Report for the Hearing, para 59.

38 Restamark (n 17) paras 46, 52, 64 and 80.

39 Case E-2/97 Maglite [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 129, paras 25 ff.

40 Case C-355/96 Silhouette [1998] ECR I-4799.

41 L'Oréal (n 6) para 27. The presumption originates from case E-3/98 Rainford-Towning [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 205.

42 L'Oreal (n 6) paras 37, cf 23.

43 See T van Stiphout ‘The L'Oréal Cases—Some Thoughts in the Role of the EFTA Court in the EEA Legal Framework: Because it is worth it!’ (2009) Jus & News 7–18.

44 Silhouette (n 40) paras 30–31.

45 For a different assessment, see van Stiphout (n 43) 11–15.

46 Rainford-Towning (n 41), para 21, cf. Report for the Hearing, paras 31–32.

47 Case E-6/98 Norway v ESA [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 74, paras 34, cf 26.

48 Einarsson (n 20), Report for the Hearing, para 68.

49 Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank [2004] EFTA Ct Rep 11, Report for the Hearing, para 34.

50 Case E-10/04 Piazza [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76, Report for the Hearing, para 35.

51 Piazza (n 50) paras 33 ff.

52 Case E-2/06 ESA v Norway [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 164, paras 61, cf 58.

53 ibid, Report for the Hearing, para 49.

54 ESA v Norway (n 52) paras 61 ff, cf 59. In particular, the EFTA Court held that Icelandic and Norwegian preconditions as to the interpretation of art 125 EEA constituted no such specific circumstances, cf further s IV.C.

55 Restamark (n 6) Report for the Hearing, para 58.

56 ESA v Norway (n 51) para 59, cf 49.

57 Case E-5/06 ESA v Liechtenstein [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 296, para 47.

58 cf the references to ECJ case-law in para 61.

59 ibid para 47. cf further Report for the Hearing, para 70, where reference is made to art 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

60 ESA v Liechtenstein (n 57) para 63.

61 Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23), Report for the Hearing, para 52 ff.

62 Karlsson (n 28), Report for the Hearing, para 57.

63 C Baudenbacher ‘Zur Auslegung des EWR-Rechts durch den EFTA-Gerichtshof’ in G Müller et al (eds), Festschrift für Günter Hirsch (CH Beck, Munich, 2008) 27, 49.

64 Case E-1/02 ESA v Norway (‘Postdoc’) [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 1, para 25.

65 ibid para 45.

66 See in detail Baudenbacher (n 63) 29.

67 Einarsson (n 20), paras 40 ff.

68 Case E-5/96 Nille [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 30, para 18.

69 ibid paras 30–34.

70 Joined cases C-34-36/95 de Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843, paras 46, cf 42.

71 Fokus Bank (n 49) para 31.

72 ibid para 31.

73 Cases C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation [2006] I-11673 and C-170/05 Denkavit [2006] I-11949.

74 Opinion in ACT Group Litigation, para 71, cf fn 83, and Denkavit, paras 36 ff, cf fn 28. The EFTA Court has later fallen into line, see case E-7/07 Seabrokers [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 171, paras 48–49.

75 Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] 2445, para 19.

76 Case E-3/00 ESA v Norway (‘Kellogg's’) [2000–2001] EFTA Ct Rep 73, para 28.

77 ibid para 30.

78 Case C-192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693.

79 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751.

80 Report for the Hearing in case E-8/00 LO [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 114, paras 209 ff, 212 ff and 218 ff. respectively.

81 LO (n 80) para 35.

82 Opinion in Albany (n 79) paras 186 ff.

83 LO (n 80) paras 52 ff, cf paras 72 ff. The position of the EFTA Court was explicitly endorsed by AG Maduro in case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779, para 27.

84 Baudenbacher (n 62) 32.

85 Joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb [1996] ECR I-3457.

86 Case E-3/02 Paranova [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 101, para 45.

87 Baudenbacher (n 63) 38.

88 Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim II [2007] ECR I-3391.

89 See the submissions referred by GA Sharpston in her opinion, para 53.

90 Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88) para 38.

91 Joined cases E-8/94 and E-9/94 Mattel/Lego [1994–1995] EFTA Ct Rep 115; E-1/99 Finanger [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 119; E-4/97 Norwegian Bankers' Association [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 1; E-1/05 ESA v Norway [2005] EFTA Ct Rep 234 and E-3/06 Ladbrokes [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 86. Space does not allow further elaboration of these cases. As far as Finanger, E-1/05 ESA v Norway and Ladbrokes is concerned, suffice to note that the president of the EFTA Court, who himself participated in these cases, heralds them as examples of dynamic interpretation, see Baudenbacher (n 63) 33, 42.

92 Case C-537/03 Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745.

93 de Agostini (n 70); C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067; C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa, judgment 8.9.2008 (nyr).

94 Something which the EFTA Court itself noted, cf Maglite (n 39) para 19.

95 Opinion 1/91 (n 5) paras 20–21.

96 T Bruha ‘Is the EEA an Internal Market?’ in P-C Müller-Graff and E Selvig (eds), EEA-EU Relations (Berlin Verlag, Berlin, 1999) 97, 123.

97 An account of the preamble of the original draft agreement is to be found in the ECJ's Opinion 1/91 (n 5).

98 Karlsson (n 27), para 25, with reference to case C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499, para 39.

99 Baudenbacher (n 12) 49.

100 Opinion in case C-110/95 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical [1997] ECR I-3251, paras 30–32.

101 Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] I-5909.

102 Opinion in Silhouette (n 40) paras 43–44.

103 Cases C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259, para 10 and de Agostini (n 70) para 37.

104 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria [1997] ECR II-39.

105 ibid para 62 ff.

106 ibid para 102.

107 ibid paras 107 and 109, respectively.

108 ibid para 108 i.f.

109 Cases C-321/97 Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paras 28–31; Rechberger (n 98) para 38.

110 Opinion in Andersson (n 109), paras 37–54.

111 Rechberger (n 98) para 39.

112 Andersson was decided by what at the time was called the big plenum, which consisted of eleven judges, whereas Rechberger was heard by the small plenum consisting of nine judges.

113 See eg, the Editorial comments of the CMLR (n 25) 700, Baudenbacher (n 31) 216 and Bruha (n 96) 119 (in fn. 79). For a different view, see SM Stefánsson ‘State Liability in Community Law and EEA Law’ in C Baudenbacher et al (eds), The EFTA Court Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005) 145, 154.

114 Case C-172/99 Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-745, para 21.

115 Cases C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura [2003] ECR I-8105, para 106 and C-192/01 Commisson v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, paras 47–53.

116 Case C-452/01 Ospelt [2003] ECR I-9743, para 29.

117 See the summary of the submissions from the Austrian government in AG Geelhoed's opinion, para 65.

118 Opinion in Ospelt (n 116) para 73 (cf fn 32).

119 Ospelt (n 116) para 32. See also cases C-521/07 Commisson v the Netherlands, judgment of 11.6.2009 (nyr), para 33; C-526/07 Commission v Spain, judgment of 6.10.2009 (nyr), para 67 and C-540/07 Commission v Italy, judgment of 19.11.2009 (nyr), paras 65–67.

120 Case C-286/02 Bellio F.lli [2004] ECR I-3465, para 34.

121 Cases C-471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I-2107, paras 48–49; C-345/05 Commisson v Portugal [2006] ECR I-10633, paras 40–41; C-104/06 Commisson v Sweden [2007] ECR I-671, paras 32–33.

122 Case C-522/04 Commisson v Belgium [2007] ECR I-5701, paras 44–45. Similarly case C-153/08 Commission v Spain, judgment of 6.10.2009 (nyr), paras 48–49.

123 Case C-143/06 Ludwigs-Apotheke [2007] ECR I-9623, para 43. See further case C-265/06 Commisson v Portugal [2008] ECR I-2245, paras 29–30.

124 However, in some cases, homogeneity may be hindered by the unfortunate fact that not all Community law provisions of relevance for the proportionality assessment of national restrictions on the fundamental freedoms are part of EEA law, see the recent judgment Commission v Italy (n 119) paras 68–76.

125 Case C-41/02 Commisson v the Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, para 62.

126 Case C-434/04 Ahokainen [2006] ECR I-9171, para 20.

127 Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, para 34.

128 Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88) para 38.

129 See in detail C Baudenbacher ‘The EFTA Court, the ECJ, and the Latter's Advocates General—a Tale of Judicial Dialogue’ in A Arnull et al (eds) Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 90–122.

130 Case C-222/94 Commisson v UK [1996] ECR I-4025, para 3 (in fn 4). The number of references appears if searching for ‘EFTA Court’ in the category ‘Advocate General's opinion’ in the EUR-Lex database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

131 Case C-13/94 P v S [1996] ECR I-2143, para 16.

132 See, in general, M Bronckers ‘The relationship of the EC courts with other international tribunals: Non-committal, respectful or submissive?’ (2007) 44 CMLR 601–627.

133 Cases Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88); C-379/05 Amurta [2007] I-9569 and C-284/06 Burda [2008] ECR I-4571, see further Baudenbacher (n 63) 109–111.

134 V Skouris ‘The ECJ and the EFTA Court under the EEA Agreement: A Paradigm for International Cooperation between Judicial Institutions’, in C Baudenbacher et al (eds) The EFTA Court Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005) 123–129.

135 C Timmermans, ‘Creative Homogeniety’ in M Johansson et al (eds) Festschrift Sven Norberg (Bruylant, Brussels, 2006) 471–484.

136 Similarly Tobler et al (n 1) 8, where the success of the EEA model is ‘in particular’ ascribed to ‘the integrationist approach applied by the EFTA Court’.

137 cf the somewhat troubling prospects offered by the ECJ's interpretation of EEA law in the recent judgment Commission v Italy (n 119) as well as AG Jääskinen in the pending case C-72/09 Rimbaud, opinion of 29.4.2010.

138 See eg, Candolin (n 92) paras 25 ff.

139 Tellingly, the Norwegian government, which in Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23) and Karlsson (n 28) argued passionately before the EFTA Court against the existence of a principle of State liability in EEA law, gave up its resistance when the question was raised before Norwegian courts in the case Finanger II, cf [2005] Report of the Norwegian Supreme Court 1365.

140 Council doc. 1665/1/08 Rev I (5.12.2008), paras 29 and 32.

141 Lazowski (n 1) 1443–1444.

142 From the perspective of reciprocity, it is certainly tempting to see the ECJ's recent judgment in case C-351/08 Grimme, judgment of 12.11.2009 (nyr) as a response to the apparent reluctance of the Swiss' courts to interpret the bilateral agreements with the same dynamism as does the EFTA Court interpret EEA law. Referring to Polydor (n 8), the ECJ held that the interpretation given to provisions of EU law cannot be automatically applied by analogy to the interpretation of the bilateral Agreement between the EU and Switzerland on the free movement of persons.