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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 May 2008
This paper outlines recent developments in regional cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea region leading to the recent establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The huge interest generated among the major oil-producing multinational corporations, the newer independent producers and the participating States in the Gulf of Guinea necessitates a critical assessment of the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission. This paper adopts a comparative analysis with pre-existing regional and institutional bodies having similar aims and objectives. The aim is to ascertain whether and to what extent the emergent regime can facilitate a sustainable and responsive regime for the anticipated explosion of exploitative activities in this resource-rich and strategic littoral zone. This paper, thus, places the existing regime in the context of international best practices for multinationals and governments involved in oil and gas exploration and production. The author identifies certain imperatives for the consideration of both the corporate and sovereign interests in the world's newest resource Eldorado.
1 Werner Puschra Head, Africa Department in his preface to R Traub-Merz and D Yates (eds), Security & Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 2004).
2 Hereinafter called the Commission.
3 Hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. A Bill for an Act to Enable Effect to be given in the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission has been placed before the National Assembly of Nigeria. The Bill is sponsored by the Executive and has had its first reading on Tuesday, 1 Feb 2005. See further <http://www.nassnig.org/bills/BILLS%20PAGE%202004.htm> (visited 6 Mar 2006).
4 A Ifesi, ‘Offshore delimitation of resource deposits situated across national boundaries: The International Court of Justice decision in Cameroon v. Nigeria lending clarity or compromise?’ (February 2004) 1 Transnational Dispute Management, fn 3.
5 West Africa is generally viewed by the oil industry as one of the world's leading deepwater offshore oil zones, with 633 fixed platforms, 13 floaters and 20 storage and offloading vessels. By 2008, a further 159 fixed platforms will be installed, drilling more than 700 wells. Overall oil production is expected to rise from 3.8 million barrels per day in 2001 to 6.8 million by the year 2008. This dwarfs the total projected production levels of oil production in competing zones such as the Caspian region where estimations do not exceed 3.8–5 million barrels per day by 2010. See DA Yates, ‘Changing Patterns of Foreign Direct Investment in the Oil-Economies of the Gulf of Guinea’ in R Traub-Merz and D Yates (eds), Oil Policy In The Gulf Of Guinea: Security & Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 2004); See also Mahmood Khaghani (Director General for Caspian Sea Oil & Gas Affairs at the Deputy Petroleum Minister for Caspian Affairs Sector of the Iranian Republic Iran, Ministry of Petroleum) Roundtable on Caspian Oil & Gas Scenarios available at <www.iea.org/Textbase/work/2003/caspian/Khagtext.pdf> (visited 24 July 2007).
6 Rudolf Traub-Merz's introduction to Traub-Merz and Yates (n 5), available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02115-inf.htm>.
7 The Caspian Sea is a 700-mile-long body of water in central Asia, landlocked between Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Deciding upon pipeline routes that have a reasonable assurance of security and are politically acceptable to parties with influence in the region are serious hurdles in the development of Caspian Sea region energy resources. The longer the pipeline route, the less attractive it is to producers. Transit fees are a source of revenue to governments and politics as well as economics come into play in pipeline route selection. BA Gelb, ‘Caspian Oil and Gas: Production & Prospects’ CRS Report for Congress (9 April 2002) 1, 5 available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9652.pdf visited 23 July 2007>.
8 J Oloka-Onyango, ‘Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for People's Rights in Africa’ (2002–3) 18 American Univ Intl L Rev 874, 874–5; See also J Lamont & M Peel, ‘Human Rights Issue in Focus as US Move in a Region Known for Corruption and Poor Governance’ Financial Times (29 Oct 2002) 13.
9 See Puschra (n 1) 8.
10 See Presidential Research & Communications Unit, ‘Oil and the Gulf of Guinea’ Official Website of Office of Public Communications, available at <http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article_230.shtml> (visited 3 Feb 2007).
11 J Dieterich, ‘The Gulf of Guinea and the Global Oil Market: Supply and Demand’ in Traub-Merz and Yates (n 5) 28.
12 Militants in the Niger Delta quite regularly blow up pipelines belonging to oil companies operating in the area. A recent event in March 2006 witnessed destruction of the Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) pipelines cutting off 65,000 barrels per day of crude oil production and raising to 621,000 barrels per day the total amount of Nigeria's output currently ‘shut in’. See H Igbikiowubo and S Oyadongha, ‘Oil spill as militants blow up pipeline’ The Vanguard (Nigeria) (Monday 20 March 2006).
13 Ed Royce, the Republican Chairman of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, quoted in Dieterich (n 11) 33. The general trend as noted by the OAPEC is that international oil companies are trying to increase their reserves and their share of world oil and gas production by exploring offshore, in particular in the Gulf of Mexico, West Africa, and East Brazil. Over 2.7 million b/d are as at 2004 estimated to come from offshore areas with a depth of over 1,600 feet. See OAPEC, The Secretary General's 31st Annual Report 2004, p 93. The Secretary General's Annual Reports of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) are available at <http://www.oapecorg.org/Publications.htm>.
14 See Presidential Research & Communications Unit (n 10).
15 The present State Parties to the treaty are Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Gabon, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Prícipe.
16 The Executive Secretary shall, upon receipt of such notification, transmit copies thereof to all Member States. The vote of each Member State shall be received by Executive Secretary. Upon receipt of the required number of votes, the Executive Secretary would then transmit the decision of admission to the concerned Member State.
17 Done at Lagos, 27 January 1987. The association embraces 12 countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Libya, and Nigeria [1987] ILM 1493.
18 Agreement for the Establishment of an Arab Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries, signed at Beirut, on 9 January 1968, entered into force on 1 September 1968 [1968] 681 UNTS 235 [hereinafter OAPEC Agreement]. Members of the OAPEC are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and UAE.
19 A Maachou, OAPEC: An International Organisation for Economic Cooperation for Economic Cooperation and an Economic Cooperation and an Instrument for Regional Integration (Antony Melville (trans), Frances Pinter Publishers, London, 1982).
20 Article 2 of the OPEC Statute states the principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. The Organization aims to devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. OPEC concerns itself at all times with the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries. OPEC also aims at providing an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.
21 The Member States are Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Tunisia and Oman are the two notable Arab States that are outside this body. The headquarters of the organisation remains in Kuwait. R El Mallakh, ‘The Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries: Objectives and Potential’ (1977) 2 Annual Review of Energy 399.
22 The Statute in Article 7 further distinguishes between three categories of membership: Founder Member, Full Member and Associate Member. Founder (Members with year of accession 1960): Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Full Members: Qatar, 1961; Indonesia, 1962; Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1962; United Arab Emirates, 1967; Algeria, 1969; Nigeria, 1971.
23 R Kupchinsky, ‘Vision of Global Gas Cartel Gains Clarity’ (Tuesday 27 March 2007) 7 Russia Report No 6. The reports are available at <http://www.rferl.org/reports/> (visited 26 July 2007).
24 cf the structures established for the OPEC: the Conference (the supreme authority of the Organization, and consists of Heads of Delegation—normally the Ministers of Petroleum, Mines and Energy of Member Countries). At the top of the OAPEC structure is the Ministerial Council.
25 The rules of procedure and other matters pertaining to the Ad Hoc Arbitration Mechanism shall be defined by the Council and approved by the Assembly (Article 18).
26 The Ministers for the Economy and Finance, Hydrocarbons, Fishery Resources, Mines, Environment or all such Ministers as are designated by Member States can also meet as need be. The Council is to meet at least twice a year in regular sessions but it can also meet in extraordinary session at the request of any Member State and subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the Commission (Article 11).
27 The Council may create a Specialized Committees in order to assist itself in the accomplishment of its aims and duties. The Assembly may also establish Specialized Committees to deal with various issues and may create such committees at the request of the Council on specific matters pertaining to the realization of the objectives set forth in the Treaty. The Assembly may, if it deems it necessary, restructure committees or create new ones according to the needs of the Commission (Article 15).
28 The question that suggests itself in relation to this particular provision is whether the formulation ‘present and voting’ would not be a better requirement, considering that few Members States may be present and some may abstain from the vote. In such a case the assent of two thirds of members ‘present’ may be a gross under-representation of the collective will of the parties to the treaty. This would, thus, lead to an abuse of the democratic principle that applies to international organizations.
29 Admittedly, this does not solve the problem of ultra vires arising out of procedural irregularities and the exercise of substantive powers that are not expressly provided for in the constitutive instrument of an organization. Note, however, recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence relating to the region, which supports the notion that involvement of a head of State in a treaty and in official negotiations is a legally significant event that would bind the State, despite its internal laws. There was confusion arising out of the ‘gift’ of land to Cameroon by a Nigerian military leader in appreciation for Cameroon's neutrality during the Biafran civil war. The ICJ eventually accepted Cameroon's contention by validating the Declarations of Yaounde II and the Maroua Agreement, which former leaders of both countries, General Gowon of Nigeria and Ahidjo of Cameroon had signed in 1971 and 1975. Nigeria's argument that the Maroua Declaration was not valid in international law because its constitutional rules on treaty ratification had not been complied with was not supported by the court. Heads of States are regarded as empowered to represent their States, for the purpose of performing al1 acts relating to conclusion of a treaty. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (Judgment, Merits) [2002] ICJ 303 (<www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icnjudgment/>); see particularly a 213–15, paras 3, 210, 211. See also BBC News, ‘UN mediates in Bakassi dispute’ (Friday 15 November 2002) available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2481903.stm> (visited 28 July 2007). See BBC News, ‘UN mediates in Bakassi dispute’ (Friday 15 November 2002) available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2481903.stm> (visited 28 July 2007).
30 Admittedly, involvement of heads of States does not solve the problem of ultra vires arising out of procedural irregularities and the exercise of substantive powers that are not expressly provided for in the constitutive instrument of the organization. For a near-exhaustive account of this problem see E Osieke, ‘The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations’ (1983) 77 AJIL 239, 244, 245; E Osieke, ‘Unconstitutional Acts in International Organisations: The Law and Practice of the ICAO’ (1979) 28 ICLQ 1, 1–3, 25–26 et seq.
31 The OPEC Secretariat is, for instance, charged with the important task of calculating the organization's crucial reference basket. The basket was initiated in 1987. The 11 types of OPEC crude that make up the reference basket are Saharan Blend (Algeria), Minas (Indonesia), Iran Heavy (Islamic Republic of Iran), Basra Light (Iraq), Kuwait Export (Kuwait), Es Sider (Libya), Bonny Light (Nigeria), Qatar Marine (Qatar), Arab Light (Saudi Arabia), Murban (UAE) and BCF 17 (Venezuela). See OAPEC, The Secretary General's 32nd Annual Report 2004, 5–7.
32 The OAPEC General Secretariat carries out its functions in accordance with the outlines drawn up by the Ministerial Council as part of the organization's Program of Work. These include developing a data bank (using information, from member countries and literature on oil, energy and economics), enhancing Arab and international cooperation in energy-related issues, particularly through the Arab Energy Conference, Enhancing OAPEC-sponsored ventures, and encouraging scientific research. See OAPEC, ibid 209–12.
33 ibid 198–99.
34 The official languages of the Commission are English, Spanish, French and Portuguese representing the languages spoken across the regions involved and in accordance with their colonial history. It may be regrettable that the countries did not include at least one widely spoken African language such as Swahili.
35 For instance, the privileges and immunities granted to the Secretariat shall be the same as that enjoyed by diplomats in the country hosting the headquarters of the Commission and in Member States.
36 United Nations Charter (1945) UNTS XVI: UKTS 67 (1946); Cmnd 7015.
37 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (entered into force 13 Sept 1963) 479 UNTS 39.
38 Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, entered into force 26 May 2001.
39 Established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, (1994) 33 ILM 1125 (Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes) 1226–47 [hereinafter DSU].
40 CPR Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle’ (1999) 31 NYU J Intl L & Policy 718; available at <http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/jilp/issues/31/pdf/31r.pdf>.
41 The Appellate Body has more pronounced judicial features in that it is a standing organ. It considers appeals against the findings of ad hoc panels. The Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, three of whom sit on any one case in rotation and can hear only appeals relating to points of law covered in the report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. Romano (n 40) 718–19.
42 Article 33 provides that: ‘the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’.
43 Indeed Article 34 and 35 make provision for any Member of the United Nations to bring any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute or endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
44 Hereinafter referred to as Court of Justice.
45 Hereinafter referred to as the Protocol. The Court was established in consonance with the Constitutive Act of the Court of Justice of the African Union. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union in (2005) 13 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 115–28.
46 The OAPEC judicial Council consists of a President, Vice President, and three members.
47 G Oduntan, Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice a Critique of the Contentious and Advisory Jurisdictions, (Michigan State University Press, Michigan, 1999).
48 G Oduntan, ‘How International Courts Underdeveloped International Law: Economic, Political and Structural Failings of International Adjudication in Relation to Developing States’ (2005) 1 African Journal Of International And Comparative Law 263, 292–7 et seq.
49 Subject to exceptions in Article 20 of the Protocol and Article 59 of the ICJ Statute concerning the exclusion of the application of the principle of stare decisis (or judicial precedence) to international proceedings.
50 This provision reads as follows: ‘(a) The organisation shall enjoy a juridical personality and the legal capacity entitling it to exercise in the territory of each and every member all the powers of juridical persons. In particular, the organisation may acquire and own moveable and immovable property, perform legal transactions, as well as sue and be sued in its own name. (b) The organisations shall enjoy in the territories of its members such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the fulfilment of its objectives and the performance of its activities, and the premises it occupies shall enjoy immunity’.
51 Note the miscellaneous provisions contained in Articles 102–5 of the United Nations Charter. Article 104 provides: ‘The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. Article 105 states: 1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.’
52 cf the opposing theory that ‘an entity should not be recognised as subject to international law for the simple reason that it exists and makes its presence felt through action in the international arena’ See P Pescatore, ‘Les Relations Extérieures des Communautés Européennes’ (1961) 103 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de la Haye 37; cited in Maaschou (n 19) 104.
53 ibid 105.
54 Note also the incremental interpretation of an international organization's power contained in the ICJ opinion in the Certain Expenses Case in 1949. With regards to the capacity of the UN to receive compensation for damages suffered in its service, the Court adopted the thinking that the organization may cover the gaps and the shortcomings of other sections of the charter, regarding the organs and their powers and competence. This was, therefore, a practical way of extending the powers beyond the formal provisions of the texts, and of allowing a wide interpretation which is not usually permitted with the texts of treaties that limit the parties' sovereignty. See also M Virally, L' Organisation Mondiale (Armand Colin, Paris, 1972) 211.
55 Similarly, Article 5 of the OAPEC agreement states: ‘The organisation may conclude agreements with members, or with other countries, or with a federation of states, or with an international organisation and especially agreements for establishing joint projects in various fields of economic activity in the petroleum industry’. cf Maaschou (n 19) 106, 108–9.
56 Certain Expenses of the United Nations Advisory Opinion [1962] ICJ Rep 157. The Court stated that ‘when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization’. Note also that, according to the customary rule of interpretation as expressed in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the terms of a treaty must be interpreted ‘in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’ and there shall be ‘taken into account, together with the context …’
57 See Osieke (1979) (n 30) 5–7. See further RY Jennings, ‘Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law’ in Cambridge Essays in International Law—Essays in Honour of Lord McNair (CUP, Cambridge, 1965); E Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations’ ibid. See further RY Jennings, ‘Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law’ in DW Bowett, G Fitzmaurice, CW Jenks et al, Cambridge Essays in International Law—Essays in Honour of Lord McNair (CUP, Cambridge, 1965); E Lauterpacht, ‘The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Ogranisations’ in DW Bowett, G Fitzmaurice, CW Jenks et al 88–121; F Morgenstern, ‘Legality in International Organisations’ (1976–77) 48 British Ybk Intl L 241–57.
58 Many other leading international organizations enjoy the legal expertise of an institutional judicial body within their system. This is the case, with the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and any other UN organ or specialized agency so authorized by the General Assembly (ICJ Statute Article 65). Advisory opinions also can be requested of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) by the General Assembly or the Council of the International Sea-Bed Authority (Established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded on 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994. See UNCLOS Articles 191 and 287 UN Doc A/CONF.62/121 (1982) [1982] 21 ILM 1261. See also ITLOS Rules art 138.1; and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, (COMESA) Court of Justice by the COMESA Authority and Council. The COMESA Authority and the COMESA Council can ask the COMESA Court of Justice for an opinion under Article 32 of the Treaty 33 ILM 1067, 1072. See also COMESA Rules, at Rules 95–97.
59 cf Article 33 of the Constitutive Act of the AU which stated inter alia: the provisions of this Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
60 REIAs refer to Regional Economic Integration Agreements. Romano (n 40) 742–43.
61 The excitement created by the new opportunities for oil companies is captured in the statements of Texas entrepreneur Van Dyke (a man who holds the exploration rights for 30 million acres in eight African countries from Ivory Coast to Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Namibia and over to Madagascar) who points out: ‘West Africa is now, and will be in future, fantastically important to the global oil economy’. Van Dyke's only regret in anticipation of the new oil boom as he relates to a journalist is that he wasn't so successful when he was younger. Dieterich (n 11) 28.
62 Oil companies that operated in the region since the colonial era, many of which survive to date, include: Nigeria D'Arcy Exploration Company (Nigeria; Shell-D'Arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd), Mobil Exploration Nigeria, Tenneco, Amoseas, Gulf Oil Nigeria, ENI (Italian), the French subsidiary SAFRAP, Shell, ChevronTexaco, Total, ExxonMobil and ENI-Agip, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); French Equatorial Africa: Société des Pétroles d'Afrique Équatoriale Française (SPAEF), Société de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Pétroles du Cameroun (SEREP-CA)ExxonMobil, Chevron, Malaysian state oil company Petronas, Elf-SEREP-CA's, Portuguese Angola: American Sinclair Oil Company, Belgian firm Petrofina, American Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, ChevronTexaco, Total and ExxonMobil; Belgian Congo: American Gulf Oil Company (which changed its name to Gulf Zaïre in 1975,), Chevron, Chevron-Texaco, Unocal, Teikoku Oil of Japan, Cohydro. ChevronTexaco, British Heritage Oil.; Spanish Guinea: MobilExxon, Ocean, Marathon and Amerada Hess, Mobil Oil, instead of Elf See Yates (n 5) 38–42.
63 Yates ibid 45.
64 OAPEC, The Secretary General's 31st Annual Report 2004 (n 13) 28, 93.
66 Yates (n 5) 49.
67 See our discussions on technology transfer (n 80).
68 Yates (n 5) 49.
69 ibid 49–50.
70 Niger Delta violence indeed leads to more than 1,000 deaths a year and significant disruptions of Nigerian oil supplies. Numerous expatriate oil workers have been kidnapped in the last few years and the Niger Delta rebels continue to threaten even more spectacular attacks on foreign oil industry workers. Although the major oil companies deny involvement in ransom payouts there are estimations of ransom payouts to the tone of £450,000 per kidnap victim. E Alike, ‘Chevron Loses 23,000 Barrels Daily to Pipeline Damage’ (Wednesday 2 Aug 2006) 5(152) Business Day 1; M Pflanz, ‘Nigerian Rebels Threaten new Wave of Kidnaps’ The Daily Telegraph (7 Feb 2007) 13.
71 V Crawley, ‘United States Seeks to Help Improve Security in Gulf of Guinea’, available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/> (visited 5 Feb 2007).
72 Crawley ibid. Peoples Daily Online, ‘Nigeria Ponders Regional body to Secure Oil Rich Gulf of Guinea’, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/09/eng20050409_180221.html> (visited 5 Feb 2007).
73 An account relating to the Niger Delta region goes: ‘It has now been firmly established that some of the multinationals are also involved in the importation of arms and ammunition into the Niger Delta for the purpose of “protecting our staff and facilities”’. See O Douglas and D Ola, ‘Defending Nature, Protecting Human Dignity–Conflicts in the Niger Delta’ in M Mekenkamp et al (eds), Searching for Peace in Africa (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation in Cooperation, Utrecht, 1999) 337; I Okonta, ‘The Lingering Crisis In Nigeria's Niger Delta And Suggestions For A Peaceful Resolution’ a report to of the Centre for Democracy & Development March 2000, available at <http://www.cdd.org.uk/resources/workingpapers/niger_delta_eng.htm> (visited 9 February 2007). Note also the tremendous use of gun-boat force by European nations against African rulers in the region GW Neville ‘Nanna Oloma of Benin’ (1915) 14 Journal of the Royal African Society 162–67. See further WI Ofonagoro, ‘Reviewed Work(s): King Jaja of the Niger Delta: His Life and Times, 1821–1891 by S. J. S. Cookey, The Trade Makers by P. N. Davies, Oil Rivers Trader by R. G. Clough’ (1977) 3 ASA Review of Books 135–38; See also HS Wilson, ‘Review: Southern Nigeria in Transition, 1885–1906: Theory and Practice in Colonial Protectorate’ [1967] The American Historical Review 658; C Chamberlin, ‘Bulk Exports, Trade Tiers, Regulation, and Development: An Economic Approach to the Study of West Africa's “Legitimate Trade”’ (1979) 39 The Journal of Economic History 435–36; See also MA Matthews, ‘Chronicle of International Events’ (1928) 22 AJIL 861, 861.
74 While African influence in this area was deliberately stunted by the European powers through many overt and covert devices, international law and diplomacy continued among a privileged few as a tool of facilitation of Western business. This position was typified in various colonial treaties and agreements. Note for instance, Agreement between France and Great Britain relative to the Frontier between French and British Possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to the Niger (Southern Nigeria and Dahomey) (Paris, 19 Oct 1906) 2 Hertslet 849, UNLS 122; note also the German–Spanish exchange of notes granting reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment for importation of German products into the Spanish possessions in Gulf of Guinea and for importation of products of those possessions into Germany [6 Aug 1928] USCR 375. Furthermore, see the agreement between France and Great Britain relative to the frontier between French and British possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to the Niger (Southern Nigeria and Dahomey) (Paris, 19 Oct 1906) 2 Hertslet 849, UNLS 122; the German–Spanish exchange of notes granting reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment for importation of German products into the Spanish possessions in the Gulf of Guinea and for importation of products of those possessions into Germany. See also MA Matthews, ‘Chronicle of International Events’ (1928) 22 AJIL 861, 861.
75 P Manning, ‘An Economic History of Southern Dahomey, 1880–1914’ (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Univ of Winconsin, 1969) 37, citied in Chamberlin (n 73) 435, 436. Indeed it is submitted here that the only real threats to legitimate commerce and international trade in and around the Gulf of Guinea emanated and perhaps still do so as a result of interferences from foreign powers seeking increasing control of the resources of the region through the use of proxy wars, divide and rule tactics, illegitimate regime changes and direct use of force.
76 Note also the tremendous use of gun-boat force by European nations against African rulers in the region particularly in the colonial era. GW Neville, ‘Nanna Oloma of Benin’ (1915) 14 Journal of the Royal African Society 162–67. See further WI Ofonagoro, ‘Reviewed Work(s): King Jaja of the Niger Delta: His Life and Times, 1821–1891 by S. J. S. Cookey The Trade Makers by P. N. Davies Oil Rivers Trader by R. G. Clough’ (1977) 3 ASA Review of Books 135–38; See also HS Wilson, ‘Review: Southern Nigeria in Transition, 1885–1906: Theory and Practice in Colonial Protectorate’ [1967] The American Historical Review 658; Chamberlin (n 73) 435–36.
77 M wa Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa’ (1995) 16 Michigan Journal of International Law 6, 43.
78 CN Okeke, ‘International Law in the Nigerian Legal System’ (1996–97) 27 California Western Intl L J 328, 328.
79 See O Alegimenlen, ‘Petroleum Development Technology Acquisition: a Synopsis of the Nigerian Experience’ (1999) 3 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 526 O Osunbor, ‘Law and Policy on the Registration of Technology transfer in Nigeria’ (1987) 21 JWTL 18; Y Omorogbe, ‘The Legal Framework and policy for Technology Development in Nigeria’ (1991) 3 RADIC 156.
80 See UNCTAD, ‘Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into the Global Economy’, Policies and programmes 2003 UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2003/6 available at <www.unctad.org> (accessed 20 March 2006).
81 See UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (5 June 1985) (TD/CODE TOT/47 20 June 1985). See also PT Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995) 447.
82 In Nigeria, it was the British D'Arcy Exploration Company that began reconnaissance work in search of oil in 1937. Later the Shell-D'Arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd was formed in September 1951 to conduct operations on behalf of the parent organizations (Shell and BP); the Portuguese authorities in charge of Angola invited the American Sinclair Oil Company to conduct exploratory drilling in the possession between 1918 and 1932. In 1953, again they granted a concession to a subsidiary of the Belgian firm Petrofina, which made the first commercial discovery in the colony in mid-1955; in 1952 the Société de Recherches et d'Exploitation des Pétroles du Cameroun (SEREP-CA) received a concession along the coastal area of the French Cameroon.
83 Muchlinski (n 81) 447.
84 Official Website of Office of Public Communications (n 10).
85 See Presidential Research & Communications Unit, ‘Acceptance Speech by His Excellency, President Olusegun Obasanjo GCFR on the Occasion of the Award of an Honorary Degree by the Addis Ababa University 30th January 2007’, official website of Office of Public Communications, available at <http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article_7018.shtml> (visited 3 February 2007).
86 The philosophy underlying this recommendation is found in an Indian Statement on Industrial Policy of 24 July 1991, which noted as follows: ‘In the fast changing world of technology the relationship between suppliers and users of technology must be a continuous one. Such a relationship becomes difficult to achieve when the approval process includes unnecessary governmental interference on a case by case basis involving endemic delays and fostering uncertainty’. See Statement on Industrial Policy of 24 July 1991, in UNTC, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer in India (UN Doc ST/CTC/117, 1992), annex VII.
87 Three other countries apart from Nigeria–Ghana, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic are already implementing this template.
88 Angola Press Agency (Luanda), Posted to the Web 14 May 2004 quoted in JA Schumacher, ‘Introducing Transparency into the Oil Industry—The Quest for EITI’ (2004) 4 Global Jurist Advances, Article 2. Available at <http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol4/iss3/art2>.
89 This accounts for the many interesting phrases that have been coined by commentators to capture the unfortunate phenomenon. These include ‘resource curse’, ‘paradox of plenty’ and the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’. The Dutch Disease involves a massive inflow of oil money which creates inflationary pressure that in turn fosters particular patterns of consumption and investment, and finally affects other industries, eventually damaging or weakening the necessary diversification of the economy. See RM Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. (Routledge, London and New York, 1993); TL Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (University of California Press Ltd, London, 1997); WM Corden, and JP Neary, ‘Booming Sector and De-Industrialization in a Small Open Economy’ (1982) 92 Economic Journal 127, 825–48; Y Kalyuzhnova, AM Jaffe, D Lynch and RC Sickles, Energy in the Caspian Region: Present and Future (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002) 60; see also Schumacher (n 88) 1.
90 Developed countries that are home to the major MNCs have also sought legal solutions to this issue. On 30 March 2004, the EU Parliament became the first parliamentary institution to pass legislation dealing with the issue of revenue transparency in mainstream financial services legislation. An amendment to the ‘Transparency Obligations Directive’ reads, ‘EU states should promote public disclosure of payments to governments by extractive companies listed on European stock exchanges’. EU Transparency Obligations Directive: European Parliament takes historic step on oil and mining transparency; PWYP Newsletter, Edition 2, 13 May 2004, <www.publishwhatyoupay.org>. Note also the Publish What You Pay Campaign which promotes mandatory disclosure of all payments made by MNCs in oil and gas as well as disclosure of all revenues received by governments. See H Parham, ‘Publish What You Pay-Extractive Industries Transparency Is in Everyone's Best Interests’ in Traub-Merz and Yates (n 5) 123. cf the ‘Declaration on Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency’ issued at the G8 Evian summit (2003) available at <http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/home.html> (visited 23 March 2006).
91 Professor Muchlinski correctly notes in his seminal work that ‘international organisations have sought to introduce harmonised disclosure requirements for multinational groups’. Muchlinski (n 81) 447. It needs only be repeated that the Commission cannot afford not to pay due attention to this area of its regulation. Perhaps the greatest progress in this direction has been achieved through the EC regimes especially the Fourth and Seventh Directives on Company Law. Note that many of the major actors expected in the Gulf of Guinea are expected to emanate from the EC area. Thus, the proposed regime ought to be neither unusual nor onerous on the concerned companies.
92 The Secretariat of the organisation could act as a depository of the submissions and carry out further analysis.
93 The proposals contain demands for detailed financial and non financial items for disclosure by transnational corporations.
94 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003).
95 The guidelines state, inter alia, that MNC's should provide to representatives of employees information which is needed for meaningful negotiations on conditions of employment; information which enables them to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity or, where appropriate, the enterprise as a whole. It is also stated that in considering changes in their operations which would have major effects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the case of the closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dismissals, provide reasonable notice of such changes to representatives of their employees, and where appropriate to the relevant governmental authorities and cooperate with the employee representatives and appropriate governmental authorities so as to mitigate to the maximum extent practicable adverse effects.
96 This document insists that governments should supply to the representatives of workers' organizations on request, where law and practice so permit, information on the industries in which the enterprise operates, which would help in laying down objective criteria in the collective bargaining process. In this context, multinational as well as national enterprises should respond constructively to requests by governments for relevant information on their operations; multinational enterprises should provide workers' representatives with information required for meaningful negotiations with the entity involved and, where this accords with local law and practices, should also provide information to enable them to obtain a true and fair view of the performance of the entity or, where appropriate, of the enterprise as a whole; in considering changes in operations (including those resulting from mergers, takeovers or transfers of production) which would have major employment effects, multinational enterprises should provide reasonable notice of such changes to the appropriate government authorities and representatives of the workers in their employment and their organizations so that the implications may be examined jointly in order to mitigate adverse effects to the greatest possible extent.
97 L Wick, ‘Human Rights Violations In Nigeria: Corporate Malpractice And State Acquiescence In The Oil Producing Deltas of Nigeria’ (2003) 12 Michigan State Journal of International Law 83.
98 Note the alternative direction offered in the revised Thirteenth Directive proposed by the European Parliament and Council in early 1996, in the form of a set of framework rules protecting shareholders throughout the Community and establishing minimum conduct requirements for takeover bids.
99 See H Stolowy, ‘Nothing Like the Enron Affair Could Happen in France!’ (New Economics Papers Law and Economics, 29 Jan 2006) <http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:0815&r=law> (visited 10 October 2007).
100 Pub L No 107–204, 116 Stat 745 (also codified in the various sections of 15 USC).
101 See generally PT Muchlinski, ‘Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure Regimes’ (2007) 37 Connecticut Law Review No 3 et seq.
102 Senator Paul S Sarbanes, Workshop on Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption In Latin America and the Caribbean Inter-American Development Bank, 15 March 2005, p 5; available at <http://enet.iadb.org/idbdocswebservices/idbdocsInternet/IADBPublicDoc.aspx?docnum=507117> (visited 10 October 2007).
103 See Traub-Merz (n 1) 18.
104 P Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now’ (2000) 34 The International Lawyer 1033.
105 Global Policy Forum, ‘Oil and Natural Gas in Conflict’ available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oilindex.htm> (accessed 1 March 2006). For further insights into the problem of the hidden curse in oil discovery see E Duruigbo, ‘The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse In Africa’ (2005) 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law.
106 Radio Free Europe, ‘Western Press Review: EU Enlargement And Russia, Dividing The Caspian's Riches, And The Duma's Restrictions On Protest’ <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/04/a483bf50-aaa5-481e-b8eb-6473ad7e576b.html>.
107 R Dufresne, ‘The Opacity Of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, And International Law’ (2003) 36 NYU J Intl L & Policy 332.
108 ibid 332–33.
109 Official Website of Office of Public Communications (n 10).
110 ibid.
111 European politicians and business experts are already squaring up for a lot of catching up. Dieterich wrote: ‘It is worth noting at this stage that the interest in the region is a predominantly, if not exclusively, American affair. Industrial powers like Japan or Germany aren't part of the new scramble at all (To the dismay of some German politicians, who accuse their oil industry of being totally phlegmatic. An influential German politician focusing on Africa told me recently that one could tell a German company that it must drill right here to get oil and they would still not lift a finger.) There are Malaysian and Australian participants in the West African oil rush, but these are smaller companies, which are involved in high-risk exploration. Even France's famous influence—together with Elf-Aquitaine's oil fields in Gabon—is now in danger of drying up. But right up to its merger with TotalFina, Elf-Aquitaine still derived more than half of its global oil production from sources in the Gulf of Guinea’. Dieterich (n 11) 33.
112 The former President of São Tomé and Prícipe, Miguel Trovoada is touted as the father of the nation. Much of that reputation is linked with his efforts to open the country and foster good relations with neighbours, particularly with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, with whom he signed the JDZ Treaty (2001). Trovoada had occasion to state that the reason for the treaty was the realization that his nation is small, with a population of 147,000 citizens. ‘In Africa, we have too many conflicts. I tried to create a landmark boundary with Nigeria to avoid such problems. We succeeded. We would have had problems with Nigeria but we signed the treaty to avoid it. Since we had little resources, the only way forward for my country was to have friendly relations with Nigeria in order to capture more resources. And we did.’ See Madu Onuorah, ‘Controversy threatens Nigeria, São Tomé Treaty’ Abuja Friday, The Guardian (Nigeria, 30 December 2005) <http://www.nigeria.com/Channels/_News_Room/Newspapers/Guardian/guardian.html>. When five years later controversy threatened the trust between the two nations arising from the oil-bloc licensing round by the Joint Development Authority of Nigeria and São Tomé and Prícipe, genuine compromise and negotiations in good faith from all sides eventually produced agreements leading to the sharing of $201 million being the signature bonus for oil licences awarded to local firms and multinationals. The Nigerian Minister of State for Petroleum, Dr Edmund Daukoru, underlined the contributions of the multinationals in the eventual solution of deadlock stating: ‘Negotiation of a PSC is by no means an easy task, as it involves exhaustive and careful discussions to arrive at a consensus which all parties will have to abide for a very long time’. See Y Lawal, ‘JDZ: Nigeria to Share $201m with São Tomé and Prícipe’ Guardian (Nigeria) available at <www.guardiannewsngr.com>(visited 19 March 2006).
113 It is necessary to note that in the African experience, the end of judicial and arbitral proceedings in relation to boundary conflicts do not indicate the end of the danger to the affected population. For instance, the Ethiopia–Eritrea border situation remains volatile and dangerous to the population therein, despite the 2002 award of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. VOA News, UN: Ethiopia–Eritrea Border Remains Potentially Volatile, 29 December 2005 (<www.voanews.com/english/2005-12-29-voa43.cfm>). It must, however, be stated that although there were problems in some sectors, the pre-existing fraternity between Cameroonian and Nigerian communities along the land boundary can be put to good effect and consolidated upon if the demarcation process is successfully handled. Children from the boundary communities attended schools that are based in the neighbouring country without let or hindrance and farmers relied on regular vaccination of their livestock from whichever State was close enough. In 2004, some 17,000 Nigerian refugees were reported to have fled ethnic conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in 2002 and found refuge in Cameroon, where many of them still reside. For more on this theme and on the inconclusive and limited value of international litigation see G Oduntan, ‘Maritime Pyrrhic Victories: Evaluation of the de facto Regime of Common Fishing Rights in the Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v Nigeria)’ (2006) 37 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, available at <http://www.jmlc.org/website/index.php>; G Oduntan, ‘How International Courts Underdeveloped International Law: Economic, Political and Structural Failings of International Adjudication in Relation to Developing States’ (2005) 1.2 African Journal Of International And Comparative Law, <http://www.eup.ed.ac.uk/journals/content.aspx?pageId=1&journalId=12164> See also G Oduntan, ‘The Demarcation of Straddling Villages in Accordance with the International Court of Justice Jurisprudence: The Cameroon–Nigeria Experience’ [2006] Chinese Journal of International Law.
114 Nigeria holds a 60 per cent stake while São Tomé and Prícipe retain 40 per cent. See the Energy Information Administration, Nigerian Country Analysis Brief, January 2002 at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nigeria.html> (visited 12 January 2003).
115 See A Kolo, ‘Managing Political Risks In Transnational Investment Contracts’ available at the website of the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol1/article1-4.html>.
116 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria for instance stated that: ‘Direct social investment in projects, programmes, capacity building activities and advocacy, remain veritable tools to promote local development and meet the demands for social responsibility. This is more pertinent for oil companies given the long-term nature and scale of their investment, potential on ground risk that may ensue from social issues, and the interconnectivity of the world’. See The Shell Petroleum Development Company, ‘Nigeria (SPDC. Should Oil-Companies Directly Finance Development Projects for Local Communities? The Case of Shell-Nigeria’ in Traub-Merz and Yates (n 5) 143.
117 See the preamble to the Treaty.
118 Note the serious diplomatic and litigation consequences of Canada's enthusiastic enforcement of the conservation and management measures adopted by the North West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) which witnessed the arrest in 1995 of a Spanish registered vessel the Estai. Apart from the confrontations with the European Community (EC), Spain instituted proceedings against Canada at the ICJ although Canada successfully invoked its reservations against such disputes in its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) [1995–1998] ICJ Rep. ICJ decisions are available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm>.
119 JC Kunich, ‘Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening the World's Ocean Hotspots,’ [2005] Columbia Journal of Environmental Law. See also JC Kunich, ‘World Heritage in Danger in the Hotspots’ (2003) 78 Indiana Law Journal 619 and fnn 51–52.
120 Wick (n 97) 63.
121 Czarnikow & Co Ld v Roth, Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478. Lord Justice Scrutton, one of the great architects of English commercial law, made the pronouncement in a celebrated judgment in 1922 in the context of a commercial arbitration dispute. He was in fact expressing as a cardinal principle the common law position that that subjects of the law may not agree to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts. In like manner, it is doubtful whether an MNC and a government can collude to lower environmental standards so much as to lead to damage without severe consequences.
122 See the contributions of Tim Little, Executive Director Rose Foundation in Friends of the Earth, ‘Environmental and Social Disclosure and the Securities and Exchange Commission: Meeting the Information Needs of Today's Investors’, Proceedings of the symposium prepared by Friends of the Earth (Washington, DC, 2003) available at <http://www.corporatesunshine.org/sympsumm.pdf>. The issue of environmental standards must be addressed at the earliest stages by the Commission. It will be necessary to consider also the extent and type of allocation of liability that would be borne by the operators and their parent companies and/or other bodies in the network or conglomerate. The determination of group liability for actions and exploratory activities in the Gulf of Guinea is crucial in the light of the sheer scale of exploratory and exploitation activity that would transpire in this vast maritime territory.
123 See Muchlinski (n 81) 325.
124 See Union of India v Union Carbide Corporation (Gas Claim Case No 113 of 1986) Order 17 December 1987, Deo J. The decision was Upheld in part in Union of India v Union Carbide Corporation Civil Revision No 26 of 1988, 4 April 1988.
125 AIR 1987, SC 965, 1086.
126 Muchlinski (n 81) 330–32; G Tebner, ‘The Many-Headed Hydra: Networks as Higher-Order Collective Actors’ in J McCahery, S Picciotto and C Scott (eds), Corporate Control and Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) 41 and 59. Note should also be taken of Judge McGarr's analysis in the celebrated case of the Amoco Cadiz: ‘As an integrated multinational corporation which is engaged through a system of subsidiaries in the exploitation, production, refining, transportation and sale of petroleum products throughout the world, Standard is responsible for the tortuous acts of its wholly owned subsidiaries and instrumentalities AIOC and Transport’ [1984] 2 Lloyds Rep 338.
127 Member States may submit proposals for amendment by communications to the Secretariat which would then be transmitted to Member States within a month. The Assembly would examine the proposals at its next meeting and decide upon the issue with a requirement of two-thirds majority for it to be passed on for ratification by Member States.
128 There are of course numerous other courts and arbitral institutions that may be preferred by one or more of the parties such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration; ICSID (Washington) (established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States; International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, International Court of Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
129 It is suggested that such omission is actually derogatory of the African philosophy of ‘ancestralism’ by which the future, present and past generations are in contractual unity. On the emerging criteria of Intergenerational equity see E Brown Weiss, In Fairness To Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Transnational Publishers Inc, New York, 1989) 220–22, 224–26, 232–46. cf the conclusions of Segger and Khalfanon: ‘the duty of states to ensure sustainable use of natural resources’. M-C Cordonier Segger and A Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 109–10; W Makus, W Gehring and M-C Cordonier Segger (eds), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2005) 84–86.
130 Norway pumps three million barrels of oil from the North Sea daily, and is the world's third largest oil exporter. However, in realization of the certainty that the oil will run out and to ensure the well-being of future generations, the Norwegian State has set up a pension fund based on current oil revenues with what the government considers ‘strict ethical guidelines’. The ethical guidelines were adopted by the Norwegian Parliament in 2004, and are based on two important aspirations. First, the fund aims at ensuring that a reasonable portion of the country's petroleum wealth should be kept for the benefit of future generations. Secondly, the funds and the investments capital it provides is geared towards contributing to unethical acts, such as violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of human rights, gross corruption, or severe environmental degradation. The fund is currently worth more than NOK 1275 billion (€160 billion). At the end of 2006, the fund is expected to be worth NOK 1456 billion (€183 billion). That is approximately NOK 284, 582 (£24,733) per Norwegian citizen. At the current growth rate the Fund will be the world's second largest retirement fund by the end of this year. Income from the petroleum sector accounts for 21 per cent of the Norwegian GDP. A little over half of the fund is invested in bonds and equities in Europe. The rest is spread out through America, Asia, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. See Embassy and Consulate General of Norway in the UK, ‘Saving the Norwegian Oil Wealth for Future Generations’ available at <http://www.norway.org.uk/policy/news/pensionfund.htm> (visited 28 June 2007).
131 cf Kalyuzhnova, M Jaffe et al (n 89) 78–79.
132 The oil weapon is used to refer to manipulation of the price and/or supply of oil by exporting nations with the intention of changing the political behaviour of the consumer nation. Oil power, therefore, arises from the dependence of the consumer nations on oil. This forms the basis of successful application of the oil weapon and includes all factors which allow the producers to influence and control important aspects of the political behaviour of the consumers. As a writer rightly points out: ‘The oil weapon, therefore, is one specific way of using oil power: other ways would be the threat to use the oil weapon, or simply the diplomatic exploitation of consumer dependence.’ H Maull, ‘Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined’ in Gregory Treverton (ed), Energy and Security (Gower Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot, 1980) 3–5, 7.
133 Treverton, ibid 8–9.
134 G Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Dar al-Kutub, Cairo, 1955) 67–69.
135 n 18.
136 Maachou (n 19) 15.
137 Inspired by the heady success of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries in pumping up the price of oil, Zambia, Zaire, Chile and Peru, countries that accounted for 70 per cent of the world's copper adopted some of OPEC's tactics and formed a cartel—the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). Fernandez Maldonado, the then Peruvian Minister of Energy and Mines said: ‘The Arabs have shown us the way’. But because certain ‘… nations are not apt to watch complacently as CIPEC moves from the illusion of cooperation to viable cooperation’ the CIPEC dream has become wholly unrealised. KA Mingst, ‘Cooperation or Illusion: An Examination of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries’ [1976] International Organization 287. Compare the fate of the CIPEC States to that of the OAPEC States of the Persian Gulf, such as United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
