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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2009
During the mandatory period following World War I Britain's attempts to implement the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and establish a ‘National Home’ for the Jews in Palestine encountered stubborn resistance from the local Arab population. As dissatisfaction mounted in the late 1930s, militant nationalists were able to mobilize popular support for the Arab cause and foster the growth of an opposition movement directed against the British. The most visible and significantleader of this movement was the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini.
Author's Note: I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Hans Adolf Jacobsen and Teddy J. Ularicks for their interest in the topic and their willingness to share their views and opinions on the subject, as well as to the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst whose generous support made it possible to complete the research on this project.
1 For a discussion of the Mufti's rise to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine seeLukasz, Hirszowicz,The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, 1966), pp.20–26.Google Scholar See also Maurice, Pearlman, Mufti of Jerusalem:The Story of Haj Amin el Husseini (London), pp.10–24.Google Scholar
2 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 30 and 34–39.Google Scholar
3 Documents of the German Foreign Office,Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter cited as A.A.) Bonn, Politische Abteilung VII, Politisches Bezeihungen Palästinas zu Deutschland(1936–1938), 3496/Eo1991–Eo19914. The following excerpt from a circular, which was distributed throughout the German Foreign Office and which included a quotation from a speech of Alfred Rosenberg delivered on 15 January 1939, demonstrates the exact extent to which members of the Nazi hierarchy remained violently opposed to the notion of an independent Jewish state. The excerpt reads as follows: ‘It is to be wished that the friends of the Jews in the world, above all the western democracies, who dispose of so much space in all parts of the world, assign to the Jews a territory outside Palestine, not to establish a Jewish state, but to establish a Jewish reservation.’ See A.A., Judenfragen(1936–1943) 1520/373216.
4 A. A., P.A. VII, Politisches Beziehungen Paläistinas zu Deutschland (1936–1938), 1542/27550–375532.
5 Ibid., and 375506–375512.
6 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, p. 43.Google Scholar
7 For a discussion of the Mufti's journey and the reasons why French authorities the Levant assisted him in obtaining transit from Lebanon to Iraq see Jacob, C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York, 1968), pp. 147–149.Google Scholar
8 A.A., P.A. VII, Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’1642/304315–304316.
9 For a discussion of Grobba's activities in Iraq and his ‘blandishment’ and courting of Iraqi officials seeGeorge, Kirk, ‘Iraqi Bid for Independence,1940–1941,’ The Middle East in the War: Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946 (London, 1952), pp.57–59.Google Scholar For a discussion of why German officials felt that it was necessary to restrain the zealous Dr. Grobba from pursuing extensive economic penetration in Iraq, since the Arab Middle Eastern market was not of such critical importance to Germany as to warrant unnecessarily antagonizing the British, see Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp.18–19.Google Scholar
10 For a discussion of the complex and confusing situation in Iraq which produced the unexpected aberration in Nuri es-Said's political behavior see Majd, Khadduri, ‘General Nuri's Flirtation with the Axis Powers,’ Middle East Journal,16 (1962), 328–336.Google Scholar
11 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 86–92.Google Scholar
12 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. V ‘Grossmufti, 1942–1943,’ 1473/367915.
13 Ibid., 1473/367879–367883.
14 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 79–94.Google Scholar
15 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. V‘Grossmufti, 1942–1943,’1473/367884–367885.
16 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 166–172;Google Scholar see also Kirk, , ‘The Middle East in the War,’ pp. 65–78.Google Scholar For a recent discussion of whythe 1941 conflict in Iraq should be regarded as a war rather than ‘a revolution’ or ‘a revolt’ see Ayad, Al-Qassaz,‘The Iraqi-British War of 1941: A Review Article,’International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4 (1976),591–596.Google Scholar
17 For a discussion of the Mufti's and Raschid Au's flight to Europe see Pearlman, , Mufti of Jerusalem, pp. 39–41;Google ScholarHurewitz, , The Struggle for Plaestine, p.152;Google Scholar and Kirk, , ‘The Middle East in the War,’pp. 132, 138, and p. 158, n. 5.Google Scholar
18 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’992/30432–1304328.
19 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 218–221.Google Scholar
20 A.A., P.A. VII Handahten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’ 1642/390831.
21 Ibid., 1473/304328. See also A.A.Inland II(g) Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage im und über den Nahen Osten, 53130 dated 20 10 1942, pp. 1–5.
22 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. V‘Grossmufti, 1942–1943,’ 1473/367966–367973and 367889–367891.
23 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, p. 227.Google Scholar
24 Ibid. pp. 227–228. Of course, the Mufti was in the words of one German official too much of a ‘Realpolitiker’ not to be aware of the fact that Italian ambitions in the Middle East jeopardized his dreams of Arab independence. See A.A. Inland II(g) Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage imund über den Nahen Osten, 53130 dated 20 October 1942. But as Hirszowicz has carefully pointed out, although the Mufti was acutely aware of Italy's ‘double-faced’ attitude on Arab independence, he had beentied to Italy for too long a period of time to sevet his connection with Rome. What resulted was a political paradox in which ‘the extremist advocate of Pan-Arabism, the Mufti, did not scorn close collaboration with a country, Italy, which was deeply suspicious of all pan-Arabist plans.’ See Hirszowicz, ,The Third Reich and the Arab East, p. 258.Google Scholar
25 Ibid. pp. 223–225.
26 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’ 1642/390883–390892 and992/304374–304378. For a portrait of Ettel as ‘a fanatical Nazi’ who ‘was not distinguished by his ability for independent political analysis’ see Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, p. 264.Google Scholar
27 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’1642/390834–390842.
28 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ritter, Briefwechseldes RAM und des Duce mit den Grossmufti und Gailani (1940–1943),826/28029.
29 A.A., PA. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943’, 992/304431–304436. For a further analysis of why Grobba felt the Mufti could not be considered ‘the leading personality’ and ‘the only national leader’ in Arab affairs see Fritz, Grobba, Männer und Mächte im Orient: 25Jahre diploma tischer Tatigkeit im Orient (Göttingen,1967), pp. 253–254.Google Scholar
30 A.A., P.A. VII Han/edakten Ritter, Briefwechsel des RAM und des Duce mit den Grossmufti und Gailani (1940–1943),826/280189–280195.
31 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’ 1642/390819–390823.From all the evidence available in the German archives it is impossible to conclude whether or not such an organization did in fact exist.
32 A.A.., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. IV‘Grossmufti, 1942,’ 1642H/390707–390715.
33 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ritter, Briefwechsel des RAM und des Duce mit den Grossmufti und Gailani (1940–1943),826/280198–280201.
34 Ibid. 826/280197. For a further discussion of the differences between the Mufti and Gailani as regards the make up, command, and deployment of the DAL see Grobba, , Männer und Mächte im Orient, pp. 285–291.Google Scholar
35 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. III‘Grossmufti, 1941–1943,’ 992/304422–304430.
36 Ibid., 992/304374–304378. See also A.A., P.A. VII Handakien Ettel Bd. IV ‘Grossmufti,1942,’ 1574/4385.
37 Ibid., 1642H/390769. See also A.A., P.A.VII Handakten Ettel Bd. V ‘Grossmufti, 1942–1943,’1473/367966–367973.
38 Hirszowicz, , The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 262–268.Google Scholar For Grobba's account of the Mufti's campaign to have him ousted from Arab affairs see Grobba, , Männer und Mächte im Orient, pp.302–303.Google Scholar
39 For excerpts of this propaganda see A.A., InlandIIA/B Palästina Frage (1944), pp. 54–55; andA.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. VI ‘Grossmufti,1942–1944,’ 930/298042–298050.Google Scholar
40 Ibid., 930/297941–297945.
41 See address of the Mufti to the Bosnian Waffen SS Division A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. VI ‘Grossrnufti,1942–1944,’ 930/298018–298023. For a further discussion of the Mufti's activities in the area of recruitment see Pearlman, ,Multi of Jerusalem, pp. 57–66.Google Scholar
42 See telegram 1526 from Kasche (Agram) to RAM(Berlin) dated 12 April 1943 in A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. VI‘Grossmufti, 1942–1944.’
43 A.A., Judenfragen (1936–1943),4742H/E233245. For an expansion of the indictment against the Mufti for his complicity in the extermination of the Jews see Pearlman, , Mufti of Jerusalem, pp. 66–74,Google Scholar and Hurewitz, , The Struggle forPalestine, pp. 154–155.Google Scholar For additional information on the exact nature and extent of the Mufti's collaboration with the Axis see also The Nation Associates, The Arab Higher Committee: Its Origins, Personnel, and Purpose (New York, 1948),Google Scholar and idem, Record of Collaboration of King Farouk of Egypt with the Nazis and Their Ally, the Mufti(New York, 1948).Google Scholar
44 See Hurewitz, , The Struggle for Palestine, pp. 251–253,Google Scholar and Pearlman, , Mufti of Jerusalem, p. 82.Google Scholar
45 A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. VI‘Grossmufti, 1942–1944,’ 930/298018–298023.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. See also A.A., P.A. VII Handakten Ettel Bd. VI ‘Grossmufti, 1942–1944,’930/298015–298107.
