Author's note: Hanna Batatu, Richard M. Douglas, Andrea Gordon, Roger Owen, Jean-Paul Pascual, André Raymond. Yasser Tabbaa, and Mary C. Wilson offered helpful criticisms and suggestions as I drafted this article. Alka Badshah of M.I.T. produced the map of Damascus. William L. Porter. Director of The Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at M.I.T., and Richard M. Douglas, trustee of the I. Austin Kelly. III Fund at M.I.T., provided the funds for this project. I wish to thank all these individuals and institutions for their counsel and generous support.Google Scholar

¹ Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, 1978), pp. 19–22.Google Scholar Scholars are not in agreement on the question of how much should be attributed to “insecurity” as a factor in the creation of the walled quarter in the Arab or Islamic city. See Greenshields, T. H., “'Quarters' and Ethnicity,” in Blake, G. H. and Lawless, R. I., eds., The Changing Middle Eastern City (London, 1980), p. 124.Google Scholar Pre-modern quarters were often, but not always, separated by fortified walls and gates. They were characterized by a maze of narrow crooked streets. Off of an irregular series of dead-end streets and alleys were houses hidden behind high walls, and turned away from the street around internal courtyards. This achieved maximum privacy for the family. The traditional Arab courtyard house was designed to seclude family from family and to segregate women [in the harāmlik] from men, though only the affluent were able to uphold this ideal. It appears that these patterns reflected the quarter's desire for internal privacy and seclusion as much as it did its desire for protection from external forces. Recent scholarship by André Raymond, among others, suggests that pre-modern quarters were not irrationally (and hence inferiorly) organized, as an earlier generation argued, but conformed logically to the ideals and values of Islamic society regarding family and economic organization. These enforced a strict differentiation between residential areas and commercial areas. In contrast to residential quarters, commercial areas were more “regular,” open, and accessible to the public, something that would be expected of a business district. See Raymond, André, “Remarques sur Ia voirie des grandes villes arabes,” in Hillenbrand, R., ed., Proceedings du loéme Congrès de l'UEAI (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 72–85.Google Scholar Eugen Wirth goes a step further by suggesting that many of the physical structures in the Arab and/or Islamic city, such as the courtyard home, existed previous to the appearance of Islam in the Middle East. Arab Muslim society adapted and reinforced these ancient patterns and structures but did not invent them. [“The Middle Eastern City: Islamic City? Oriental City? Arabian City? The specific characteristics of the cities of North Africa and Southwest Asia from the point of view of Geography,” lecture by Wirth, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1982.] On this subject also see Berardi, Roberto, “Espace et ville en pays d'Islam,” in Chevallier, Dominique, ed., L'Espace social de la ville Arabe (Paris, 1979), pp. 99–123.Google Scholar

² Scholars are far from agreement on a precise definition of the term “quarter” in the Arab, Middle Eastern, or Islamic city. To start with, the Arabic equivalent of “quarter” differs from city to city and region to region: hāra in Cairo and Damascus; mahalla in Aleppo and in Baghdad; and hawma in much of North Africa [Raymond, “Remarques,” p. 74]Google Scholar including Algiers and Fez, but also darb in some parts of Morocco [see Eickelman, Dale F., ‘Is There an Islamic City? The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan Town,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 5 (1974), 278].Google Scholar I agree with Greenshields that the “term has been used rather loosely … as though a quarter is a readily identifiable unit, representative of a certain pattern of social organisation, and possessing a certain structure and set of distinguishing characteristics which it shares with other quarters.” Greenshields, “‘Quarters’,” p. 124.Google Scholar

³ For a penetrating analysis of the Ottoman Empire's (including Egypt's) commercial and financial encounter with Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Owen, Roger, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800–1914 (London, 1981);Google Scholar also see Batatu, Hanna, “The Arab Countries from Crisis to Crisis: Some Basic Trends and Tentative Interpretations,” in American University of Beirut, The Liberal Arts and the Future of Higher Education in the Middle East (Beirut, 1979), pp. 3–7;Google Scholar and Khoury, Philip S., “The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars,” Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (04 1982), 180–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ See Khoury, Philip S., “Reinterpreting the Character and Objectives of Political Movement's in the Interwar Arab East: The Great Syrian Revolt of 1925,” in Lapidus, Ira M. and Burke, Edmund, eds., Islam and Social Movements (forthcoming).Google Scholar

⁵ On the structure of Damascus in different historical periods see the following: Abdulac, Samir, “Damas: les années Ecochard (1932–1982)”, Les cahiers de Ia recherche architecturale, no. 10/11 (04 1982), 32–43;Google ScholarBarbir, Karl K., Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758 (Princeton, 1980);CrossRefGoogle ScholarBesnard, G., “Damas, son oasis, ses habitants,” LA sie française, 31 (1931), no. 292, 239–250;Google ScholarBianquis, Anne-Marie, “Damas et la Ghouta,” in Raymond, André, ed., La Syrie d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1980), pp. 359–384;Google ScholarChevallier, Dominique, “À Damas. Production et société à la fin du 19^e siècle,” Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 11 (1964), 966–972;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDanger, René, “L'urbanisme en Syrie: la ville de Damas,” Urbanisme (Revue mensuelle) (1937), 123–164;Google ScholarDettmann, K., Damaskus. Eine orientalische Stadt zwischen Tradition und Moderne (Nürnberg, 1967);Google ScholarElisséeff, N., “Damas ´ la lumière des theories de Jean Sauvaget,” in Hourani, A. H. and Stern, S. M., eds., The Islamic City: A Colloquium (Oxford, 1970)Google Scholar and “Dimashq,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition); Khayr, Safūh, Madīnat Diniashq. Dirāsai jughrāfiyya al-mudun (Damascus, 1969);Google ScholarKhoury, Philip S., Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism. The Politics of Damascus 1860–1920 (Cambridge, 1983);CrossRefGoogle Scholarvon Kremer, A., Mittelsyrien und Damaskus (Wien, 1853);Google ScholarRoumi, Irène Labeyrie et Muhammad, “La grande traversée de Damas,” Les cahiers de la recherche architecturale, no. 10/11 (04 1982), 44–51;Google ScholarLapidus, Ira M., Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1967);Google ScholarMassignon, Louis, “La structure du travail a Damas en 1927,” Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie, 15 (1953), 34–52;Google ScholarProust-Tournier, J. M., “La population de Damas,” Hanon. Revue Libanaise de Géographie, 5 (1970), 129–145;Google Scholaral-Qāsimi, Muhammad Sa'īd, Qāmūs al-sinā'at al-shāmiyya, ed. by al-Qāasimī, hāfir, 2 vols. (Paris, 1960);Google ScholarRafeq, Abdul-Karim, The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783 (Beirut, 1966);Google Scholar 'Abd al-Qādir Rihāwi, Madinat Dimashq (Damascus, 1969);Google ScholarSauvaget, Jean, “Esquisse d'une histoire de la villa de Damas,” Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 8 (1934), 421–bis–480;Google ScholarSauvaget, J. and Weulersse, J., Damas et la Syrie sud (Paris, 1936);Google ScholarThoumin, R., “Damas. Note sur Ia répartition de la population par origine et par religion,” Revue de Géographie Alpine, 25 (1937), 633–697;CrossRefGoogle ScholarThoumin, , “Notes sur l'aménagement et la distribution des eaux à Damas et dans sa Ghouta,” Bulletin G'études orientales, 4 (1934), 1–26;Google ScholarThoumin, , “Deux quartiers de Damas: Le quartier chrétien de Bab Musalla et le quartier kurde,” Bulletin d'études orientales, 1 (1931), 99–135;Google ScholarWeulersse, Jacques, “Damas. Etude de développement urbain,” Bulletin de l'Association de Géographes français, no. 107 (06–10 1937), 102–105;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWulzinger, K. and Watzinger, C., Damaskus, 2 vols., (Berlin, 1921–1924).Google Scholar

⁶ Thoumin, “Deux quartiers de Damas,” p. 99.Google Scholar

⁷ Referred to as 'Amāra Jawāniyya [inner] and 'Amāra Barrāniyya [outer], and Shāghūr Jawāniyya and Shāghūr Barrāniyya. See René Danger, PaulDanger, and M. Ecochard, Damas: Rapport d'enquête monographique sur la ville 1936, (unpublished), Table 13. 1 wish to thank Jean-Paul Pascual of the Institut Français d'Études Arabes in Damascus for making the Danger report available to me. It is an extremely important document for the study of interwar Damascus in nearly all its facets.Google Scholar

⁸ Scholars seem to agree that in the pre-modern cities, quarters varied widely in size, both in terms of space and population, and that the religious minorities (Christians and Jews in the Arab cities) inhabited their own separate quarters both because the state wanted to contain (and keep an eye on) them and because minorities naturally sought protection through clustering. Otherwise, scholars are still divided over the degree of social and economic homogeneity in the quarters. Their research suggests a wide variety of forms, depending on city and quarter. For example: (1) Although most quarters were not ethnically homogeneous, there were important exceptions, such as the Kurdish quarter of Damascus. (2) The distribution of inhabitants in most pre-modern quarters seems to have been along a rich-poor axis, in the sense that the vast majority of quarters were inhabited by the poor and there were a small number of quarters in which the wealthier classes and strata resided. Yet, at the same time, there were quarters which contained different economic classes and strata. The poorest quarters were frequently on the city periphery and developed with the influx of migrants from the countryside and refugee populations from other regions or countries; where land prices and housing rents were cheapest: and where much of the city's noxious industries (furnaces, tanneries, slaughterhouses) were located. (3) An earlier generation of scholars has argued that quarters were homogeneous in the sense that their inhabitants belonged to the same or a related economic activity or profession. They even suggested a direct link between the guilds and certain residential quarters. Recent research by André Raymond on Cairo and Algiers and Jean-Claude David on Aleppo suggests quite the opposite: residential quarters were not grouped or unified by occupation or trade as previously thought, and their inhabitants worked in separate commercial areas, outside the quarters but often nearby them. Although all residential quarters had their nonspecialized shops (suwaj'qa), hawkers, peddlars, and small artisans, they did not constitute economic units as such; in other words, quarters were not organized along economic lines. See Raymond, André, Artisans et commerçanis au Caire au XVIIIe siècle (Damascus, 1973, 1974);Google Scholar “Remarques,” pp. 73–77; “The Residential Districts of Cairo During the Ottoman Period” in The Arab City. Its Character and Islamic Heritage (n. p1., 1980), pp. 100–110.Google Scholar“Le Centre d'Alger en 1830,” Revue de l'Occideni Musulman et de la Méditerranée. 31 (1981), 73–84;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and David, J. C., “Alep,” in Raymond, André, ed., La Syrie d'aujourd'hui (Paris. 1980), pp. 385–406,Google Scholar and David, , “Alep, dégradation et tentatives actuelles de réadaptation des structures urbaines traditionnelles,” Bulletin d'études orieniales, 28 (1975). In the case of D'smascus, some of the quarters of the old city seem to have been economically and socially homogeneous, while others, including the Christian and Jewish quarters, were not. The more recently established quarters (between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries), which encircled the old city, were more easily identifiable by their major class component.Google Scholar

⁹ Information on the labor movement in Syria during the French Mandate can be found in Hannā, 'Abdullah, al-haraka al'ummaliyya fī sūriyya wa lubnān 1900–1945 (Damascus, 1973)Google Scholar and Longuenesse, Elisabeth, “La classe ouvrière en Sync. Une classe en formation,” 3ème cycle Dissertation. Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris, 1977).Google Scholar

¹⁰ On the foundation of these quarters and their density during the Mandate see Danger, René. “L'urbanisme en Syrie: la yule de Damas,” Urbanisme (Revue niensuelle), (1937), 129, 136;Google ScholarAbdulac, “Damas,” pp. 32–33.Google Scholar

¹¹ Danger, “L'urbanisme,” p. 143. Jean-Paul Pascual has pointed out to me that wealthy residents of Sūq Sāarūja even constructed houses with facades which purposely resembled those found in Istanbul.Google Scholar

¹² Greenshields writes that in Middle Eastern cities “ … the partial or complete departure of an ethnic group [he includes religious communities in his definition of ethnic groups] from its original quarter … leaves a vacuum which in many cities is filled by the invasion of new population elements, often of a different group, and results in an intermixing of populations … “‘Quarters’ and Ethnicity,” p. 131. This process had begun to take place during the Mandate era in the hayy al-Yahūd as Jews began to emigrate to Palestine or to the West. See Danger, “L'urbanisme,” pp. 123–164.Google Scholar

¹³ Bianquis, “Damas,” p. 362.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Danger, “L'urbanisme,” pp. 136, 143.Google Scholar On the origins and adaptation of the hawāsil and khāns (caravansérails) in Damascus see Saba, George, Salzwedel, Klaus, “Typologie des caravansérails dans la vieille ville de Damas,” Les cahiers de la recherche archireciurale, 10/11 (04 1982), 52–59.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See ibid., pp. 129, 136. Al-Sālhiyya dates from the twelfth century.

¹⁶ See Sauvaget, “Esquisse,” pp. 473–474;Google ScholarGreenshields, “‘Quarters’,” p. 122;Google ScholarBianquis, “Damas,” p. 374.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Thoumin, “Deux quartiers,” pp. 116–20, 131;Google Scholar Also see Khoury, Urban Notables, chapter 2.Google Scholar

¹⁸ al-'Allāf, Ahmad Hilmi, Dimashq fī matila al-qarn al-'ashrīn, ed. by Nu'aysa, 'Alī jamīl (Damascus, 1976), pp. 41–43.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Grellet, J., “La Fiscalité municipale en Syrie,” Centre de Hautes Etudes Administratives sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes[CHEAM] (Paris) no. 331, n.d., pp. 31–32.Google Scholar

²⁰ Conversation with the late Farīd Zayn al-Dīn (Damascus, 14 April 1976). According to Zayn al-Din, a radical nationalist leader during the Mandate, there was another informal council which met in the quarters. It was called majlis al-shiyūkh (Council of Shaykhs), composed of leading intellectuals who met in different homes to discuss political strategy. Occasionally, quarter notables would attend in order to learn how to explain to the common people what was going on at the summit of nationalist politics.Google Scholar

²¹ Kassemy, Zafer [Zāfir al-Qāsimī], “La participation des classes populaires aux mouvements nationaux d'ińdependance aux XIX^e et XXC^e siècles: Syrie,” in Commission Internationale d'histoire des mouvements sociaux et des structures sociales, ed., Mouvements nalionaux d'indépendance er classes populaires aux XIX^e et XX^e siècles en Occident er en Orient (Paris, 1971), p. 348.Google Scholar

²² I have been deeply influenced by the theoretical and empirical studies on patron-client relations of James Scott and, in particular, his “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review, LXVI, no. I, 91–113.Google Scholar More of Scott's work and that of a number of prominent social scientists can be found in the excellent collection: Gellner, Ernest and Waterbury, John, eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London, 1977).Google Scholar On the political and social behavior of urban notables in the Middle East see Hourani, Albert, “The Islamic City in the Light of Recent Research,” in Hourani, A. H. and Stern, S. M., eds., The Islamic City (Oxford, 1970), pp. 9–24;Google ScholarHourani, , “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in Polk, W. R. and Chambers, R. L., eds., Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1968), pp. 41–68;Google Scholar and Khoury, Urban Notables, pp. 1–55.Google Scholar

²³ The population of Damascus in 1922 (beginning of Mandate) was estimated at 169,000 [169,367]. In 1943 (end of the Mandate), it was estimated at 286,000 [286,310], meaning that the population increased 1.7 times in two decades. The increase in the 1930s was more rapid than it was in the 1920s. Similarly, the population of Aleppo doubled (2.05 times) in the same period. For statistical information and sources on the population of the cities (and countryside) in Syria during the French Mandate see Khoury, Philip S., “The Politics of Nationalism; Syria and the French Mandate, 1920–1936,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1980, vol. 3, pp. 1160–1168.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Elisséef, N., “Dimashk,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), p. 290.Google Scholar

²⁵ On the changing architectural style and social functions of houses in Syrian cities, see Thoumin, R., La Maison syrienne dons Ia plaine hauranaise. le bassin du Barada et sur les plateaux du Qalamoun (Paris, 1932);Google ScholarAbdel-Nour, A., Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle) (Beirut, 1982);Google ScholarDepaule, Jean-Charles, “Espaces lieux et mots,” Les cahiers de Ia recherche architecrurale, 10/11 (04 1982), 94–101;Google Scholar and David, Jean-Claude, Hubert, Dominique, “Maisons et immeubles du début du XX^e siècles ´ Alep,” Les cahiers de la recherche architecturale, 10/11 (04 1982), 102–111.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Khoury, Urban Notables, chapters 2 and 3.Google Scholar

²⁷ Ibid., chapter 2.

²⁸ This information and analysis is based on conversations with Wajīha al-Yūsuf (Beirut, 15 and 29 August 1975), and with 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm al-Dandashī, Mahmūd al-Bayrūtī, Fu'āad Sidawi, and George Sibā' (Damascus, 13 and 14 February 1976 and 9 and 10 March 1976). One of the most prized of the creature comforts found in the new homes constructed in the bourgeois suburbs of towns like Damascus or Aleppo was the modern (private) bathroom. Unlike the new suburban quarters for the poor (often filled with recently arrived in-migrants from the countryside) where public baths (hammāmāt) had to be constructed, the wealthy suburban quarters did not require public baths; indeed, their inhabitants did not want them. Another such creature comfort was the modern kitchen. See David and Hubert, “Maisons,” pp. 64–65Google Scholar and Roumi, Muhammad, “Le hammam domestique: nouvelles pratiques et transformations de l'espace,” Le cahiers de la recherche architecturale, 10/11 (04 1982), 74–79.Google Scholar

²⁹ Fakhrī al-Bārūdī, Personal Papers, “Al-Bārādī File 1922–47,” in Markaz al-Wathā'iq alTārīkhiyya [Damascus], al-Qism al-Khāss.Google Scholar

³⁰ The first President of the Syrian Republic, Muhammad 'Alī al'Ābid saw to it during his tenure in office (1932–1936) that a tramway line connected the center of Damascus with the bourgeois suburb of al-Muhājirīn where the 'Ābid family had moved during the Mandate, after leaving Sūq Sārūja. This enabled the 'ābids one of the most prominent notable families and possibly the wealthiest family in Damascus, to service their original clientele in Sūq Sārūja in addition to the poorer residents of their new district, especially during the holy month of Ramadan, when they fed hundreds of people nightly at their al-Muhājirīn palace. Conversation with Nasūh [Abū Muhammad] al-Mahayrī. (Damascus, 12 March 1976.)Google Scholar

³¹ See Khoury, Philip S., “Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists During the French Mandate,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 13 (11 1981), 462–469; and Khoury, “Reinterpreting the Character and Objectives of Nationalist Movements in the Interwar Arab East.” (forthcoming)Google Scholar

³² The National Bloc was the preeminent nationalist organization of the Mandate era, Its influence on political life in Syria can be compared to that of the Wafd Party in Egypt in the interwar period. For information on its organization, headquarters in Damascus and branches in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Latakia, rivalries with the French, with other nationalist organizations and within the Bloc itself, ties to the rest of the Arab world, and its ascent to government, see Khoury, “The Politics of Nationalism,” vols. 2 (especially chapter 8) and 3.Google Scholar

³³ Naturally, not all merchants were anti-French. Numerous merchants engaged in the import- export trade with Europe (many of whom belonged to the religious minorities) collaborated rather freely with the French. Furthermore, the structural constraints of colonial rule necessitated some degree of collaboration with the Mandatory authorities by nearly everyone engaged in commerce and industry. The question is: to what degree did merchants and industrialists collaborate? The answer is to be found in the character and orientation of the enterprises they ran. Similarly, there were, at times, serious disputes between merchants and industrialists over which commercial or financial policy they wished the French to pursue in Syria. The best example of such a split occurred in the early 1930s when Syrian merchants wanted easy access to cheap Japanese cloth' as it sold so well locally, whereas industrialists wanted the French to put an end to what they claimed was “dumping” by raising import duties on foreign cloth. Roger Owen has kindly reminded me of this example. Specific information on Japanese competition, which reached its height in 1934 (protective measures began to be introduced at the end of that year), can be found in PRO: FO 371/4188, vol. 19023.Google Scholar

³⁴ Conversations with 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm al-Dandashī and Mahmūd al-Bayrūtī (Damascus, 9 and 10 March 1976).Google Scholar

³⁵ See Khoury, Urban Notables, chapter 3 and Conclusion.Google Scholar

³⁶ Conversation with al-Qāsimī, Zāfir (Beirut, 24 and 26 July 1975).Google Scholar Al-Qāsimī's father was the leading religious figure of Bāb al-Jābiyya. Also see Khoury, Philip S., “Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab World: an Historical Appraisal,” in Ibrahim, I., ed., Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 213–236.Google Scholar

³⁷ See al-'Allāf, Dimashq, pp. 244–247. According to the author, who wrote during the early Mandate, al-zgririyya is a Turkish word referring to the “courageous of the quarter.”Google Scholar

³⁸ These characteristics have been isolated in an inspiring article on the power structure in Beirut's Muslim quarters in the early 1970s, and in particular the role of qabadāyāt in these quarters. See Johnson, Michael, “Political bosses and their gangs: Zu'ama and qabadayat in the Sunni Muslim quarters of Beirut,” in Gellner, Ernest and Waterbury, John, eds., Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London, 1977), pp. 207–224.Google Scholar Conversation with al-Sidawi, Fu'ad, qabaday of the Christian quarter of Bab Tūma during the Mandate (Damascus, 13 02 1976).Google Scholar A list of some nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century qabadāyāt of Damascus is provided by al-'Allāf, Dimashq, pp. 247–251.Google Scholar

³⁹ Zu'rāan featured prominently in the medieval Muslim city [see Lapidus, Muslim Cities]; in Damascus during the Mandate [al-' Allāf, Diniashq, p. 244]; and in Beirut during the Lebanese civil war of the 1970s [based on my personal observations]. Also see Johnson, “Political Bosses,” p. 212.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Conversations with Abū 'Alī al-Kilāwī, 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm al-Dandashī, and Mahmūd al-Bayrūtī (Damascus, 3,9, 10 March 1976).Google Scholar

⁴¹ The following information on the personal life and career of Abū 'Alī al-Kilāwī is based on several days of conversations with him and with several other qabadāyāt of the Mandate and early independence eras whom I met at his home in Bāb al-Jābiyya (Damascus, 14 February, 3 and 15 March 1976).Google Scholar

⁴² On the Al-Sha'lān, see Khoury, “Tribal Shaykh,” pp. 183–185.Google Scholar

⁴³ For the rise on the Bakrī family see Khoury, Urban Notables, pp. 34–35.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See al-'Allāf, Dimashq, pp. 242–243.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 240–243.

⁴⁶ Al-Kilāwī was also an accomplished Arabic musician who played a three-stringed guitar and sang popular beduin ballads. His dialect reflected his long years of association with tribes south of Damascus.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ As late as 1976. Abū 'Alīl was still riding and showing his horses in national parades in Damascus, despite his antipathy toward the current Syrian regime.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ al-'Allaf, Dimashq, pp. 259–262.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ On the transformation of 'arāda into political manifestations in the twentieth century, see Lecerf, J. and Tresse, R., “Les 'arāda de Damas,” Bulletin détudes orienrales, 7/8 (1937–1938), pp. 237–264;Google Scholar and al-Qāsimī, Zāfir, Warhā'iq jadīda min al-thawra al-sūriyya al-kubrā (Damascus, 1965). pp. 63–74;Google ScholarFrance, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Syrie-Liban 1930–40, de Martel to MAE, 5 July 1935, vol. 491, pp. 31–33.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ On al-Kharrät and other hero/martyrs of the Revolt, see al-Jundī, Adham, Tāarīkh al-ihawrāt al-sūriyya fi 'ahd al-intidāb al-faransī (Damascus, 1960).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Besides the Kilāwīs, other noted qahadāyāt of the Mandate era were Abū Ghāssim 'Abd al-Salām al-Tawīl (al-Qaymariyya quarter); Abū Rashīd Khūja (al-Kharāb); Abū'I haydar al-Mardīnā (Bāb al-Srīja), Mahūd Khaddām al-Srīja (Shāghūr); and Abū 'Abdū Dīb al-Shaykh ('Amāra).Google Scholar

⁵² Information on the Great Revolt and Abū 'Alī's role in it comes from his personal memoir which his eldest son, 'Alī, had recorded, and which Abū 'Alī kindly made available to me. The memoir is entitled: Thawra 'amma 1925. al-Faransiyyīn fi sūriyya (n.pl., n.d.).Google Scholar

⁵³ The jam'iyyāt were the prototype for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (founded in the 1940s). See Reissner's, Johannes groundbreaking study Ideologie und Politik der Muslimbrüder Syriens (Freiburg, 1980).Google Scholar In Damascus, their leaders included shaykhs, teachers, lawyers, and doctors. Their principal goals were the spread of Muslim education based on modernist and salafiyya ideas; the spread of Muslim ethics and morals and nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments. They were especially involved in the affairs of Palestine at the time of the Arab revolt of 1936–1939. The earliest of the societies was the jam'iyyat al-Gharrā' (founded in 1924). Others included jam'iyyat algamaddun al-Islāmā (1932), jam'iyyat al-hidāmiyya al-Islāmiyya (1936), and jam'iyyat al-'ulamā' (1938). By the mid-1930s, they were leading violent campaigns against the influx of foreign goods and culture into Syria; the proliferation of cabarets serving alcohol, permitting gambling, and featuring female dancers; the increasingly liberal dress code adopted by bourgeois women (including the wives of National Bloc leaders); women frequenting public places, in particular cinemas; and the holding of lotteries. See Markaz al-Wathā'iq al-Tārīkhiyya [Damascus], Dākhiliyya, File 33/5431–3098. Shaykh Hamdā al-Safarjalānī to Minister of Interior (Damascus): nizam nādī, 5 May 1932; Pāshā, Jamīl lbrāhīm, Mudhakkirāt Jamīl Ibrāhīm Pāshā (Aleppo, 1959), pp. 78–79;Google ScholarOriente Moderno, 14 (1934), p. 438;Google Scholaribid., 15 (1935), p. 636; ibid., 18 (1938), pp. 532–533; 'Ādil al'Ahma Papers [Syria: Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut], File 16/398, 7 February 1939 and File 16/398a, 9 February 1939.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Johnson, “Political Bosses,” pp. 214–220.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 218–220.

⁵⁶ Conversation with Abū 'Alī al-Kilāwī (Damascus, 3 March 1976).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ On the General Strike of 1936, which lasted nearly fifty days, and which led the French to open up direct negotiations in Paris with National Bloc leaders on the subject of a Franco-Syrian treaty, and which ultimately allowed the Bloc to get control of the Syrian government by the end of the year, see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 3, Epilogue-Conclusion.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Information on al-Srīja and his gang was found in Markaz al-Wathā'iq al-Tārīkhiyya [Damascus], Registre correctionnel, 5 October 1932–8 February 1934, pp. 216–218.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ On the formation, composition, and operation of individual political machines in Damascus during the Mandate, and in particular those of Shukrī al-Quwwatlī and Jamīl Mardam, see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 3, chapters 12, 13, and Epilogue-Conclusion.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ On the origins of the Kurdish notable families of Damascus in the nineteenth century see Khoury, Urban Notables, chapters 3 and 4. This information has been supplemented by conversations with Wajīha al-Yūsuf [Ibish], daughter of 'Abd al-Rahmān Pāashā al-Yūsuf (the leading Kurdish notable of Damascus in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and wife of Husayn Ibish (the leading Kurdish notable of the Mandate era, and the biggest landowner in the province of Damascus) (Beirut, 15 and 29 August 1975). Another political force to draw support from the Kurdish quarter by the late 1930s was the Syrian Communist Party. The Party rank and file in Damascus included a number of Arabized Kurds owing to the fact that its leader, Khālid Bakdāsh, was a Kurd from the quarter. See Batatu, The Old Social Classes, chapter 24.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Khoury, “Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists,” pp. 460–465.Google Scholar

⁶² This same phenomenon seems to have appeared in Palestine during the British mandate. The major difference, however, was that Jewish capital and the British administration were able to provide a framework and opportunities for in-migrants which the French administration in Syria could only provide on a much less developed scale. Therefore, in Damascus, those in-migrants who remained on the periphery of the city had to await the appearance of new forces: in the case of political integration, the Ba'th and Communist parties; in the case of economic integration, the development of industrialization on a significant scale which only occurred at the end of World War II. On developments in Palestine, see Migdal, Joel S., “Urbanization and Political Change: The Impact of Foreign Rule,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 19 (07 1979), 328–349. On French involvement in the Syrian economy, see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. I, chapter IV.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶³ On the contribution of this class to the independence movement, see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 3, chapters 12 and 13.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ 1.7 times. See Ministère des Affaires ÉEtrangères, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban 1924, Appendix 4, p. 95; PRO: FO 371/625, vol. 19022, MacKereth to F.O., 7 January' 1935.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Conversation with Qustantin Zurayq (Beirut, 10 January 1976).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ On al-Bārūdī's upbringing and career see al-Bārūdī, Fakhrī, Mudhakkirāt al-Bāarūdī, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1951–1952);Google ScholarSidqī, Nahāal Bahjat, Fakhrī al-Bārūdī (Beirut, 1974);Google ScholarQudāma, Ahmad, Ma'ālim wa a'lām fi bilād al-'Arab (Damascus, 1965), vol. I, p. 10;Google ScholarFāris, George, Man huwa fi sūriyya 1949 (Damascus, 1950), p. 54;Google ScholarVacca, Virginia, “Notizie Biografische su Uomini Politici Ministri e Deputati Siriani,” Oriente Moderno, 17 (10 1937), p. 478;Google Scholar and Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 2, pp. 664–667. More information comes from conversations with 'Alī 'Abd alKarīm al-Dandashī and Mahmūd al-Bayrūutī (Damascus, 9 and 10 March 1976).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ On the contribution of the tajhīz of Damascus to the independence movement see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 3, chapter 12.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Information on Bayrūutī's upbringing and career comes from a long conversation with him in Damascus on 10 March 1976; and conversations with other youth leaders of the Mandate era, including 'Alī 'Abd al-Karīm al-Dandashī. I have also depended on al-Mudhik al-mubkī, [Damascus weekly satirical magazine] no. 18 (1929), p. 12;Google Scholar and Fāris, George, Man huwa, pp. 70–71.Google Scholar On Mamlūk's career, see ibid., p. 429.

⁶⁹ Conversation with Mahmūd al-Bayrūtū (Damascus, 10 March 1976);Google ScholarFāais, Man huwa, pp. 70–71;Google Scholaral-Mudhik al-mubkī, no. 103 (21 November 1931). p. 14.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Conversation with Munīr al'Ajlānī (Beirut, 2 September 1975). On the development of the new “nationalist youth” leadership, see Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 3, chapters 13 and Epilogue-Conclusion.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Conversations with Abū 'Alī al-Kilāawī and Mahmūd al-Bayrūutī (Damascus, 15 February and 10 March 1976).Google Scholar

⁷² See Khoury, “Politics of Nationalism,” vol. 2, chapter 6.Google Scholar

⁷³ The Franco-Belgian owned Société des Tramways et d'Électricité was the most visible foreign concession visited by nationalist demonstrations during the Mandate. The cinemas, located in the modern districts, were another focal point. On the one hand, political organizations that wished to start a demonstration could find a ready-made crowd afternoons and evenings coming out of films. The Roxy cinema was used most frequently. On the other hand, some Muslim benevolent societies ted demonstrations against cinemas which permitted the attendance of women. Most cinemas were Christian-owned. 'Ādil al-'Ahma Papers [Syria]. File 16, no. 398, 7 February 1939 and File 16, no. 398a, 9 February 1939.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Tresse, R., “Manifestations féminines à Damas au X1X^e et XX^e siècles,” in Entretiens sun lévolution des pays de civilisation arabe, 111 (Paris, 1939), pp. 115–125.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ The Nationalist Youth was transformed into a paramilitary organization in 1936, called the Steel Shirts (a1-Qumsān al-Hadīdiyya), with nearly 5,000 members by the end of the year. Khoury, “Politics,” vol. 3, Epilogue-Conclusion. It was around this time that the French-controlled Syrian army (Troupes Spéciales) began to attract young “talented” nationalists and the civilian nationalist elite finally saw the importance of encouraging their sons and young men from the rising middle classes to enter the military academy at Horns. Since the early nineteenth century, the notable families of Damascus and other Syrian towns had actively discouraged their sons from pursuing military careers which they felt were beneath their dignity and standing in society. This traditional bias and the fact the military was under French sway helped to preserve this attitude, until the possibility of Syrian independence grew in the thirties and nationalists began to think seriously about the institutional future of Syria. However, the military academy and the army itself, unlike the high schools and law faculty, were not important politicizing forces for Syrian youth before independence. For one thing, the French made concerted efforts to keep the military apolitical and most political agitation within the military seemed to focus on issues of promotion and pay scale and not on entering the political arena as such. Furthermore, it is likely that many of the young men who entered the military academy from the mid-thirties till the French left Syria in 1946 were already politicized in high school. In any case, the academy only graduated approximately 150 men between 1935 and 1946, a third of whom came from Damascus. The Syrian Army on independence was, itself, only 12.000 strong. Van Dusen, Michael H., “Intra- and Inter-Generational Conflict in the Syrian Army” (Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1971), pp. 45–46, 165–66, 382–89.Google Scholar