1 See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, United States and Allies Target Russia and Belarus with Sanctions and Other Economic Measures, 116 Am. J. Int'l L. 614 (2022).

2 See also Statute of the Council of Europe art. 20(d), May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (two-thirds requirement).

3 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Admission of New Members, Res. (51)30A (May 3, 1951).

4 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Invitation to the Russian Federation to Become a Member of the Council of Europe, Res. (96)2 (Feb. 8, 1996).

5 Russ. Fed'n, Declarations Appended to the Instrument of Ratification Deposited on 5 May 1998 (May 5, 1998), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=declarations-by-treaty&numSte=005&codeNature=1&codePays=RUS (recognizing European Court's jurisdiction).

6 Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Recent Developments in Ukraine: Threats to the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, ¶ 14, Res. 1988 (Apr. 9, 2014).

7 Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Reconsideration on Substantive Grounds of the Previously Ratified Credentials of the Russian Delegation, ¶ 15, Res. 1990 (Apr. 10, 2014); Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Challenge, On Substantive Grounds, of the Still Unratified Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, ¶ 14, Res. 2034 (Jan. 28, 2015) (renewing suspension).

8 John Dalhuisen, What is the Council of Europe For?, Open Democracy (June 27, 2019), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-council-europe/.

9 See Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Strengthening the Decision-Making Process of the Parliamentary Assembly Concerning Credentials and Voting, ¶ 10, Res. 2287 (June 25, 2019); Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Challenge, On Substantive Grounds, of the Still Unratified Credentials of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, ¶¶ 3–5, 13, Res. 2292 (June 26, 2019). See also Dalhuisen, supra note 8 (describing the rule change that ended the standoff as “appeasement” towards Russia).

10 See Council Eur. Newsroom, Russia Ceases to Be Party to the European Convention on Human Rights (Sept. 16, 2022), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/russia-ceases-to-be-party-to-the-european-convention-on-human-rights (noting that Russia has yet to fully implement 2,129 judgments).

11 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Situation in Ukraine, Doc. No. CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426bis/2.3 (Feb. 24, 2022).

12 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Measures to Be Taken, Including Under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, Doc. No. CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426ter/2.3 (Feb. 25, 2022) [Document 1, reproduced infra]. The “no” votes were Russia and Armenia, and the abstention was Turkey. Azerbaijan and Serbia did not vote.

13 Ukr. v. Russ. (X), App. No. 11055/22, Interim Measure, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 1, 2022), discussed in Press Release, Eur. Ct. H.R., The European Court Grants Urgent Interim Measures in Application Concerning Russian Military Operations on Ukrainian Territory, ECHR 068 (Mar. 1, 2022), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-7272764-9905947&filename=The%20Court%20grants%20urgent%20interim%20measures%20in%20application%20concerning%20Russian%20military%20operations%20on%20Ukrainian%20territory.pdf.

14 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Legal and Financial Consequences of the Suspension of the Russian Federation from Its Rights of Representation in the Council of Europe, ¶¶ 7, 10, Res. CM/Res(2022)1 (Mar. 2, 2022).

15 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Consequences of the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine, ¶ 9, Doc. No. CM/Del/Dec(2022)1428bis/2.3 (Mar. 10, 2022).

16 See Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, On Greece, Res. (69)51 (Dec. 12, 1969) (noting that Greece had declared its withdrawal under Article 7 of the CoE Statute and so “there is no need to pursue the procedure for suspension under Article 8” (quotation at ¶ 5)). Greece's withdrawal took effect on December 31, 1970 and it rejoined in 1974. Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Invitation to Greece to Rejoin the Council of Europe, Res. (74)34 (Nov. 28, 1974) (inviting Greece to rejoin because it “now again complies with the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Statute” (quotation at pmbl. ¶ 3)).

17 Jörg Polakiewicz, Council Eur. Legal Adviser, Speaking Points at the 62nd Meeting of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.coe.int/en/web/dlapil/-/62nd-meeting-of-the-committee-of-legal-advisers-on-public-international-law-cahdi-.

18 Russ. Fed'n, Foreign Ministry Statement on Initiating the Process for Withdrawing from the Council of Europe (Mar. 15, 2022) [Document 2, reproduced infra]. The CoE has apparently not made public Russia's letter to the CoE Secretary-General.

19 Council Eur. Parl. Ass., Consequences of the Russian Federation's Aggression Against Ukraine, ¶ 19, Op. No. 300 (Mar. 15, 2022) [Document 3, reproduced infra].

20 Id. ¶ 20.

21 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Cessation of the Membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe, Res. CM/Res(2022)2 (Mar. 16, 2022) [Document 4, reproduced infra].

22 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Donal K. Coffey, Suspension and Expulsion of Members of the Council of Europe: Difficult Decisions in Troubled Times, 68 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 443, 454 (2019).

23 Polakiewicz, supra note 17. See also Nikos Vogiatzis, “No Longer a Member State of the Organisation”: The Expulsion of Russia from the Council of Europe and Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute, ECHR Blog (Mar. 17, 2022) https://www.echrblog.com/2022/03/no-longer-member-state-of-organisation.html (elaborating a rationale for applying Article 8 to immediately expel a member notwithstanding the member's withdrawal under Article 7).

24 Council Eur. Cmte. Ministers, Legal and Financial Consequences of the Cessation of Membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe, ¶ 8, Res. CM/Res(2022)3 (Mar. 23, 2022) [Document 5, reproduced infra]. Russia's departure from the CoE did not automatically remove it from CoE conventions open to accession by any state. Id.

25 Eur. Ct. H.R., Consequences of the Cessation of Membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe in Light of Article 58 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ¶ 1 (Mar. 22, 2022) [Document 6, reproduced infra].

26 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Laurence Helfer, Russia and the European Human Rights System: Doing the Right Thing … But for the Right Legal Reason?, EJIL: Talk! (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-and-the-european-human-rights-system-doing-the-right-thing-but-for-the-right-legal-reason/ (European Court chose from among three possible interpretations of ECHR Article 58).

27 Eur. Ct. H.R., supra note 25, ¶ 2.

28 See, e.g., Russian Parliament Votes to Break with European Court of Human Rights, Reuters (June 7, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-votes-exit-european-court-human-rights-2022-06-07/ (describing new Russian law excluding implementation of rulings issued after March 15, 2022).

29 Press Release, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., The Russian Federation Ceases to Be a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR 286 (Sept. 16, 2022), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-7435446-10180882.

30 G.A. Res. 60/251, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 7–8 (Apr. 3, 2006).

31 G.A. Res. ES-11/1, Aggression Against Ukraine, ¶ 2 (Mar. 2, 2022) [Document 7, reproduced infra]. The vote was 141 to 5, with thirty-five abstentions and twelve states not voting.

32 H.R.C. Res. 49/1, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression, ¶¶ 1, 11 (Mar. 4, 2022) (quotation at ¶ 1) [Document 8, reproduced infra]. The vote was 32 to 2 (Russia and Eritrea), with thirteen abstentions.

33 Id. pmbl. ¶ 11.

34 G.A. Res. ES-11/2, Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression Against Ukraine, pmbl. ¶ 8, ¶¶ 3–7 (Mar. 24, 2022) (quotation at pmbl. ¶ 8). The vote was 140 to 5, with thirty-eight abstentions and ten states not voting.

35 See Interview by Andrea Mitchell, MSNBC, with Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. (Apr. 7, 2022) [hereinafter Thomas-Greenfield], https://usun.usmission.gov/ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-interview-with-andrea-mitchell-of-msnbcs-andrea-mitchell-reports/ (U.S. ambassador asserting that a video of the Bucha atrocities “was something that really influenced the voters today”).

36 G.A. Res. ES-11/3, Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council, ¶ 1 (Apr. 7, 2022) [Document 9, reproduced infra].

37 Id., pmbl. ¶¶ 2–4 (quotation at pmbl. ¶ 2).

38 Resolution 60/251 requires a two-thirds majority of General Assembly members “present and voting” to suspend rights of membership, G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 30, ¶ 8, which means “members casting an affirmative or negative vote,” ignoring abstentions, G.A. Rules Proc., Rule 86, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.20 (2022). Eighteen states cast no ballot.

39 G.A. Res. 65/265, Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council (Mar. 1, 2011) (adopted by consensus).

40 In withdrawing, Russia followed a precedent set by the United States. See Jean Galbraith, United States Withdraws from the UN Human Rights Council, Shortly After Receiving Criticism About Its Border Policy, 112 Am. J. Int'l L. 745 (2018).

41 U.N. GAOR, 11th Emergency Special Sess., 10th plen. mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. No. A/ES-11/PV.10 (Apr. 7, 2022) [Russia G.A. Vote Record]. See also id. (Russia suggesting that prior to the vote it had already decided to withdraw); id. at 24 (U.K. delegate: “that sounds like someone who has just been fired and has tendered their resignation”).

42 Id. at 23.

43 Press Release, U.N., Electing Czech Republic as Member of Human Rights Council, General Assembly Also Adopts Texts on Stockholm+50 Conference, Peacekeeping Operations Review, GA/12418 (May 10, 2022), https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12418.doc.htm.

44 See, e.g., H.R.C., 5th Mtg., 51st Reg. Sess. (Sept. 13, 2022), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k14/k14ops6yiy (Russia accusing Ukraine of atrocities and “torture of opposition members”); H.R.C., 9th Mtg., 50th Reg. Sess. (June 16, 2022), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1c/k1cf7qawv8 (Russia asserting that it freed Mariupol from Nazis); Press Release, O.H.C.H.R., High Commissioner for Human Rights: High Numbers of Civilian Casualties in Ukraine Raise Concerns that Attacks by Russia Are Not Complying with International Humanitarian Law (July 5, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/high-commissioner-human-rights-high-numbers-civilian-casualties-ukraine?sub-site=HRC (Russia at HRC accusing U.N.'s human rights secretariat of “becom[ing] an accomplice of the Kiev regime and its Western sponsors”) (video at https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1g/k1gefe60mm).

45 Press Release, O.H.C.H.R., High Commissioner to Special Session of the Human Rights Council on Ukraine: Many of the Allegations of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Ukraine May Amount to War Crimes (May 12, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/05/high-commissioner-special-session-human-rights-council-ukraine-many?sub-site=HRC.

46 See, e.g., Jannika Jahn, The Council of Europe Excludes Russia: A Setback for Human Rights, EJIL:Talk! (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-council-of-europe-excludes-russia-a-setback-for-human-rights/ (arguing against expulsion as a penalty because “it is at least equally problematic from an individual rights perspective if legal protection is restricted precisely when it is needed most”).

47 See, e.g., Erik Møse, Chair, Comm'n Inquiry Ukr., Update by the Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, at the 51st Session of the Human Rights Council (Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/09/update-chair-independent-international-commission-inquiry-ukraine-51st-session; H.R.C. Res. S-34/1, The Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression (May 12, 2022).

48 See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 51/25, Situation of Human Rights in the Russian Federation (Oct. 7, 2022) (establishing a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights within Russia with a mandate to collect and assess information and report to the HRC in October 2023); Press Release, O.H.C.H.R., Russia: UN Expert Alarmed at Continued Targeting of Human Rights Defenders (Sept. 14, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/russia-un-expert-alarmed-continued-targeting-human-rights-defenders;

49 See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, Org. for Sec. & Coop. Eur. [OSCE] Rapporteur, Report on Russia's Legal and Administrative Practice in Light of Its OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, Doc. No. ODIHR.GAL/58/22/Rev.1 (Sept. 22, 2022), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/5/526720.pdf (making recommendations to Russia, the OSCE, and the international community aimed at protecting human rights and preserving cooperation); Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukr. v. Russ.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, ¶ 86, Gen. List No. 182 (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf (International Court of Justice ordering Russia to “immediately suspend” Ukraine operations); Karim A.A. Khan Q.C., Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Ct., Statement on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-receipt-referrals-39-states.

50 See Rick Lawson, “They Can Destroy Our Houses. But They Cannot Destroy Our Values”: The Response of the Council of Europe to the Russian Invasion in Ukraine, Leiden Law Blog (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.leidenlawblog.nl/articles/they-may-destroy-our-houses-but-they-cannot-destroy-our-values. For its part, the United States participates in proceedings on individual petitions at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but regards the Commission's decisions as nonbinding. See generally OAS: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), 2020 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, ch. 7, § D(3) at 290–318.

51 Similarly, the October 2022 HRC resolution establishing a special rapporteur on Russia garnered more abstentions and “no” votes than “yes” votes. H.R.C. Res. 51/25, supra note 48 (seventeen in favor, six against, twenty-four abstaining). This tally represents a significant drop in affirmative support compared to the two Russia-specific resolutions adopted earlier in 2022. H.R.C. Res. 49/1, supra note 32 (thirty-two in favor, two against, thirteen abstaining); H.R.C. Res. S-34/1, supra note 47 (thirty-three in favor, two against, twelve abstaining).

52 See, e.g., Russia G.A. Vote Record, supra note 41, at 10 (Brazil: “Only [after the commission of inquiry finishes its investigation] would the General Assembly be in a position … to take a responsible and informed decision on the status of Russia in the Human Rights Council.”); accord id. at 16 (Indonesia).

53 See, e.g., id. at 12 (Mexico: calling for “more dialogue” and asserting that “[m]ultilateral structures are strengthened through inclusion, not exclusion”); id. at 9 (South Africa) (similar); id. at 15 (Qatar) (similar). But see Interview by Margaret Besheer, Voice of America, with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield (Apr. 7, 2022), https://usun.usmission.gov/ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfields-interview-with-margaret-besheer-of-voice-of-america/ (U.S. ambassador to U.N.: “[D]o we have to sit and continue to watch … the horror of Bucha happen over and over again, while Russia is sitting on the Human Rights Council?”).

54 See, e.g., Russia G.A. Vote Record, supra note 41, at 8 (Cuba, opposing: “dangerous additional precedent”); id. at 11 (China, opposing for same reason); id. at 21 (Saudi Arabia, abstaining: “serious precedent that threatens multilateral work”); id. at 10 (Egypt, abstaining, “warn[ing] of [resolution's] consequences”); id. at 20 (Algeria, opposing: “Any attempt to suspend any State … from any United Nations body is not conducive to promoting the virtues of multilateralism.”).

55 Sarah Joseph & Eleanor Jenkin, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Is the United States Right to Leave this Club?, 35 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 75, 99–112 (2019) (examining some reasons for HRC dysfunction, including poor membership, politicization, and bloc behavior). See also Russia G.A. Vote Record, supra note 41, at 14 (India: “If India has chosen any side, it is the side of peace and an immediate end to violence.”).

56 See Colum Lynch, Russia to U.N. Members: You're with Us or Against Us, Foreign Policy (Apr. 6, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/russia-un-human-rights-council/ (describing Russian letter intended to strongarm African, Asian, and Latin American states into opposing its HRC suspension); accord Thomas-Greenfield, supra note 35 (explaining how Russia threatened other states). See also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Russian Invasion of Ukraine Draws Widespread—But Not Universal—Condemnation, 116 Am. J. Int'l L. 605 (2022) (discussing why some countries have refrained from condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine).

57 U.N. World Tourism Org. Gen. Ass., Consideration of the Suspension of Membership of the Russian Federation in Accordance with Article 34 of the Statutes, Doc. No. A/RES/EXT-1/5 (Apr. 27, 2022).

58 Org. Am. States Perm. Council, Suspension of the Status of the Russian Federation as a Permanent Observer to the Organization of American States, Doc. No. CP/RES/1195 (2374/22) (Apr. 21, 2022).

59 Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD] Secretary-General, Statement on Further Measures in Response to Russia's Large-Scale Aggression Against Ukraine (Mar. 8, 2022), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/statement-from-the-oecd-council-on-further-measures-in-response-to-russia-s-large-scale-aggression-against-ukraine.htm.

60 See, e.g., Eur. Org. for Nuclear Rsch. [CERN] Council, Decision-Making in Respect of Renewal of the International Cooperation Agreement Between CERN and the Russian Federation, Res. CERN/3669 (June 16, 2022) (declaring intent to terminate cooperation agreement with Russia upon its expiration); Danube Comm'n, Decision of the 12th Extraordinary Session of the Danube Commission Concerning the Military Aggression by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine, Violating the Basic Principles of the Belgrade Convention, Doc. No. DC/SES-XII Extr./3 (Mar. 17, 2022), (excluding Russia from meetings until restoration of peace with Ukraine); Press Release, Int'l Council for the Exploration of the Sea [ICES], ICES Council Places a Temporary Suspension of Russian Participation in ICES Activities (Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.ices.dk/news-and-events/news-archive/news/Pages/TemporarySuspension.aspx.

61 See, e.g., Press Trust of India, Russia Loses All 4 Elections to UN Committees; Global Isolation for Moscow, Business Standard (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/russia-loses-all-4-elections-to-un-committees-global-isolation-for-moscow-122041400159_1.html (reporting on losses in U.N. NGO Committee, U.N. Women Executive Board, UNICEF Executive Board, and Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues).

62 Press Release, Int'l Telecommc'n Union [ITU], Member States Elect Doreen Bogdan-Martin as ITU Secretary-General (Sept. 29, 2022), https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2022-09-29-ITU-SG-elected-Doreen-Bogdan-Martin.aspx (of 172 votes cast, U.S. candidate received 139 votes to Russian candidate's twenty-five votes).

63 See, e.g., Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Bd. of Governors, The Safety, Security and Safeguards Implications of the Situation in Ukraine, ¶¶ 2–3, Doc. No. GOV/2022/55 (Sept. 15, 2022) (deploring Russia's “persistent violent actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine” and calling on it to stop) (quotation at ¶ 2); Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO] Council, 226th Sess., 14th Mtg., Summary of Decisions, ¶¶ 9–10, Doc. No. C-DEC 226/14 (June 28, 2022) (calling on Russia “to immediately cease its infractions of the Chicago Convention” stemming from dual registration of aircraft) (quotation at ¶ 10(b)); U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Org. [UNESCO] Exec. Bd., Impact and Consequences of the Current Situation in Ukraine in All Aspects of UNESCO's Mandate, Doc. No. 7 X/EX/DR.2.1 Corr. (Mar. 30, 2022); Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO] Council, 35th Extraordinary Sess. (C/ES.35), Decision on Impacts on Shipping and Seafarers of the Situation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, ¶ 6 (Mar. 11, 2022) (demanding that Russia “cease its unlawful activities to ensure the safety and welfare of seafarers and the security of international shipping”).

64 See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 56, at 609–10, 613 (discussing “more neutral position” of some U.N. Security Council members and how Russia's veto has stymied real action) (quotation at 609); Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity 123–24 (6th ed. 2018) (listing the “limited number” of organizations' constitutions with an expulsion provision (quotation at 123)).