1 Action on Armed Violence, Explosive States: Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2014, 2015, available at: https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/AOAV-Explosive-States-monitoring-explosive-violence-in-2014.pdf (all internet references were accessed in December 2016). For country and thematic reports relating to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, see the International Network on Explosive Weapons website, available at: www.inew.org/learn-more-about-inew#inew-member-material.

2 Tactical directives were used to provide guidance and intent for the employment of force in support of ISAF operations.

3 In 2007, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 629 deaths attributed to pro-government forces; in 2014, that number was 162. See discussion on UNAMA reports at notes 76–77, below.

4 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, report submitted to the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 28 November–1 December 2011 (2011 Challenges Report).

5 Ibid.

6 Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (AP I); Henckaerts, Jean-Marie and Doswald-Beck, Louise (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 AP I, Art. 51.

8 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 71; Laurent Gisel, The Use of Explosive Weapons in Densely Populated Areas and the Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks, paper presented at the International Institute for Humanitarian Law's 37th Roundtable on Current Issues in International Humanitarian Law, “Conduct of Hostilities: The Practice, the Law and the Future”, San Remo, 4–6 September 2014, available at: www.iihl.org/Media/Default/Round%20Tables/XXXVII%20Round%20Table/Speakers%20contributions/Gisel_REV.pdf.

9 2011 Challenges Report, above note 4, p. 41.

10 AP I, Art. 57(2)(a)(iii); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 14.

11 Camilla Wasznik, Protection of Civilians Under International Humanitarian Law: Trends and Challenges,  Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, August 2011.

12 McCormack, Timothy and Mtharu, Paramdeep, Expected Civilian Damage and the Proportionality Equation: International Humanitarian Law and Explosive Remnants of War, Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne Law School, 2006, pp. 12–13 Google Scholar. See also the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Art. 3(10)(a), which requires that the “long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population” be taken into account when taking precautions.

13 “The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied.” International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, para. 48, available at: www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-campaign-against-federal.

14 Janina Dill, Applying the Principle of Proportionality in Combat Operations, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, December 2010, p. 4.

15 See, generally, Corn, Geoffrey S., “War, Law and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure”, Pepperdine Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2015 Google Scholar.

16 See AP I, Arts 57 and 58; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rules 15–24.

17 AP I, Arts 57(1) and (2)(a)(i); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 15.

18 AP I, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 16.

19 AP I, Arts 57(2)(a) and (b); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 17.

20 Schmitt, Michael N., “The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare,” Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 2, 1999, p. 170 Google Scholar; Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Commentary on HPCR Manual on Air and Missile Warfare, 2010, Commentary on Rule 32(b), para. 3.

21 AP I, Art. 57(2)(b); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 19.

22 ICTY, above note 13, para. 29: “A military commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in operations must have some range of discretion to determine which available resources shall be used and how they shall be used.”

23 AP I, Arts. 57–58; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rules 15–24.

24 Quéguiner, Jean-François, “Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 864, 2006, p. 819 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 The ICTY has categorically rejected reciprocity as a justification for violations of IHL, affirming that “[t]he defining characteristic of modern international humanitarian law is instead the obligation to uphold key tenets of this body of law regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants”. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 511.

26 Sandoz, Yves, Swinarski, Christophe and Zimmermann, Bruno (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 2212Google Scholar.

27 J.-F. Quéguiner, above note 24, pp. 800–803.

28 Ibid .

29 ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 6, Rule 20.

30 ICRC, Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas: Humanitarian, Legal, Technical and Military Aspects, report of the ICRC Expert Meeting, 24–25 February 2015, p. 6.

31 The San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement does expressly prohibit the use of unobserved indirect fire, observed indirect fire or all indirect fire in a number of situations, including populated areas. See the section “Policies Relevant to Protecting Civilians beyond ISAF and AMISOM”, below.

32 Weaponeering assessment is the process for determining the quantity of a particular weapon to achieve the specific level of damage desired.

33 The United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in October 2001 after the September 11 attacks. Following the UN-initiated Bonn Conference to develop a roadmap for Afghanistan's reconstruction, the UN Security Council in December 2001 authorized ISAF to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority. ISAF was initially led by six-month rotations of troop-contributing countries. When NATO assumed leadership of ISAF operations in August 2003, the international imperative was to provide reconstruction and training assistance to the Afghan government and the Afghan National Security Forces. OEF maintained a concurrent mission in Afghanistan, with the bulk of kinetic action being carried out by US troops. In October 2003, ISAF began to expand beyond Kabul in order to provide stability and security assistance in the Afghan provinces. The expansion took place in four stages from 2003 to 2006. By the last stage of expansion in 2006, ISAF commanded all international military forces across Afghanistan, although OEF remained in operation concurrently. At the same time, anti-government groups stepped up attacks, dramatically increasing the combat operations tempo. As ISAF and OEF combat operations increased, so too did civilian casualties. Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Civilian Harm Tracking: Analysis of ISAF Efforts in Afghanistan, 2014, p. 3, available at: http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/ISAF_Civilian_Harm_Tracking.pdf.

34 Ibid.; CIVIC interviews with three former ISAF Commanders in 2014; Sarah Sewall and Dr. Larry Lewis, Reducing and Mitigating Civilian Casualties: Afghanistan and Beyond – Joint Civilian Casualty Study, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, US Joint Forces Command, 2010 (redacted version on file with author).

35 FRAGOs are issued as a revision to a directive.

36 Interviews with former ISAF officials cited in CIVIC, above note 33.

37 ISAF, The ISAF Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Framework: Sustaining Best Practice, 31 May 2014 (on file with author), p. 38.

38 CIVIC interview with Major-General Gordon B. Davis, former Chief of the Strategic Advisory Group to COMISAF, March 2014.

39 CIVIC, above note 33, p. 3.

40 2007 Tactical Directive, cited in S. Sewall and L. Lewis, above note 34, p. 23.

41 Ibid. US Central Command (CENTCOM) also issued a civilian casualty-related directive in September 2008 in response to the August 2008 Azizabad incident, calling for rapid reporting and investigation. CENTCOM Tactical Directive, September 2008.

42 Oxford Research Group, The UN and Casualty Recording: Good Practice and the Need for Action, April 2014, available at: http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG-UN-and-CR.pdf.

43 Human Rights Watch, Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, September 2008, available at: www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/08/troops-contact/airstrikes-and-civilian-deaths-afghanistan.

44 CIVIC, above note 33, pp. 2–4.

45 Ibid., p. 3.

46 In 2010, the North Atlantic Council approved amends guidelines for ISAF in Afghanistan that includes acknowledgement and financial assistance for civilian death, injury and property damage. See NATO, “NATO Nations Approve Civilian Casualty Guidelines”, 6 August 2010, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_65114.htm?selectedLocale=en. For further details on amends policies in Afghanistan, see CIVIC, Addressing Civilian Harm in Afghanistan: Policies and Practices of International Forces, 2010, available at: http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Addressing_civilian_harm_white_paper_2010.pdf; CIVIC, Losing the People: The Costs and Consequences of Civilian Suffering, 2009, available at: http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/losing-the-people_2009.pdf.

47 CIVIC, above note 33, p. 5.

48 COMISAF Initial Assessment on Afghanistan, 2009 (unclassified), available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.

49 ISAF Tactical Directive, December 2008, available at: www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090114.pdf.

50 ISAF Tactical Directive, 6 July 2009, available at: www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.

51 The conditions are classified for operational reasons.

52 Author conversation with ISAF CCMT team.

53 Author conversation with Dr. Larry Lewis (see above note 34), noting the ISAF FRAGO, air support request procedures and “troops in contact” terminology, 14 October 2009.

54 Brigadier-General Richard Gross, presenting at the OCHA-Chatham House Meeting on Reducing the Humanitarian Impact of the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, 23–24 September 2013.

55 UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report 2014: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2015, p. 10.

56 Personal interviews with US servicemen, 2013–14.

57 David Zucchino, “As U.S. Deaths in Afghanistan Rise, Military Families Grow Critical”, Los Angeles Times, 2 September 2010.

58 Opening Statement of General David Petraeus, US Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 June 2010; Elizabeth Bemuller, “Petraeus Pledges to Look at Strikes in Afghanistan”, New York Times, 29 June 2010, available at: www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/world/asia/30petraeus.html?_r=0.

59 ISAF Tactical Directive, 4 August 2010, available at: www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/general-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-of-force.html.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 S. Sewall and L. Lewis, above note 34.

65 CIVIC, above note 33, p. 7.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Author conversations with US servicemen and ISAF. See also Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, Tackling Tough Calls: Lessons from Recent Conflicts on Hostile Intent and Civilian Protection, March 2016, available at: www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Tackling-Tough-Choices-Hostile-Intent-HLSIHRC-2016.pdf.

69 Personal interview with Dr. Larry Lewis, Center for Naval Analysis, July 2015.

70 Revision 3 of ISAF Tactical Directive on Defensive Operations, available at: www.isaf.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf.

71 Allen Tactical Directive, November 2011, available at: www.pksoi.org/document_repository/doc_lib/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r%5B1%5D.pdf.

72 CIVIC interviews with USFOR-A and ISAF officials, 2010–12.

73 Ibid.

74 NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, Protection of Civilians: How ISAF Reduced Civilian Casualties, 1 June 2015 (on file with author).

75 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Afghanistan Civilian Casualty Prevention Handbook, June 2012 (CIVIC was a contributing author to this handbook); Center for Army Lessons Learned, Rules of Engagement Vignettes: Observations, Insights and Lessons, May 2011.

76 See UNAMA, above note 55, p. 10.

77 Ibid., pp. 10, 78.

78 The Peace and Security Council is the standing organ of the African Union for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. For more information, see: www.au.int/en/organs/psc.

79 Paul Williams, “The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges”, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, p. 10. CIVIC and UK Major-General Roger Lane conducted an assessment of AMISOM's operations and co-wrote AMISOM's indirect fire weapon policy.

80 CIVIC, Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response, 2011, pp. 18–23; Human Rights Watch, “You Don't Know Who to Blame”: War Crimes in Somalia, 2011.

81 CIVIC, above note 80.

82 Ibid.

83 AMISOM, Commander African Union Mission in Somalia – Indirect Fire Weapon Policy, 2011 (on file with author).

84 Making amends is the practice whereby parties to a conflict acknowledge civilian harm and offer culturally appropriate and dignifying gestures of assistance in accordance with victims’ needs and preferences, despite having no legal obligations to do so. See CIVIC, “Frequently Asked Questions on Amends”, available at: http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/Amends_FAQ_2013.pdf.

85 AMISOM, above note 83.

86 Counter-battery fire is return fire against an enemy IDF position.

87 CIVIC wrote an implementation plan for the CCTARC and helped to set it up. The CCTARC was established under the authority of the African Union Peace and Security Council, pursuant to the mandate set out in various UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSCR 2036 (2012), UNSCR 2093 (2013), UNSCR 2124 (2013), UNSCR 2182 (2014) and UNSCR 2232 (2015). See also AMISOM, Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis Cell, available at: http://amisom-au.org/cctarc/.

88 Walter Lotze and Yvonne Kasumba, “AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia”, Conflict Trends, Vol. 2, 2012 (the authors wrote this article in their capacity as civilian planning and liaison officers in the Peace Support Division of the African Union Commission, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).

89 AMISOM, “AMISOM Investigates Claims of Civilian Deaths in Wardinle, Bay Region”, press release, 19 July 2016, available at: http://amisom-au.org/2016/07/amisom-investigates-claims-of-civilian-deaths-in-wardinle-bay-region/; “AU Mission Apologises for Somali Civilian Deaths,” Al Jazeera, 17 April 2016, available at: www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/amisom-somalia-civilian-deaths-160417132914157.html (AMISOM apologizes for accidentally killing four civilians after soldiers mistook them for Al-Shabaab fighters when they failed to stop at a roadblock).

90 Direct effects are immediate first-order effects, the results of military actions with no intervening effect between act and outcome, and are recognizable – for example, the immediate, physical results of weapons use. Indirect effects are second- and third-order systematic effects that are created though an intermediate effect or mechanism, which may be physical or psychological in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed, may be difficult to recognize, and are often a cumulative or cascading result of combined impacts. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, JP 3-60, 31 January 2013, pp. II-35–II-36, available at: http://cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Joint_Chiefs_of_Staff-Joint_Targeting_31_January_2013.pdf.

91 The Handbook reflects best practice from nations across the globe. It is intended not to state the official position of governments or international organizations, but for practitioners to use it as a guide when drafting rules of engagement.

92 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, San Remo, November 2009, available at: www.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ROE-HANDBOOK-ENGLISH.pdf.

93 Ibid.

94 Use of the term “burst” in this context indicates that indirect fire is about weapons that explode, but the notion of indirect fire focuses on a mode of delivery rather than on blast and fragmentation effects. Ibid., p. 85.

95 Ibid.

96 Australian Defence Force, Targeting, ADDP 3.14, 2009, p. 1-10, available at: www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/disclosures/021_1112_Document_ADDP_3_14_Targeting.pdf.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., at pp. 1–6. Examples of what are considered sensitive targets are not listed.

99 UK Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 2004, p. 86, para. 5.33.4, available at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf.

100 See, generally, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06, 20 November 2013, available at: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/atp3_07x6.pdf.

101 US Department of the Army, Protection of Civilians, ATP 3-07.6, 29 October 2015, section 5-39, available at: http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/atp3_07x6.pdf.

102 Ibid.

103 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, above note 101, p. I-6.

104 Ibid., p. I-6.

105 Ibid., p. I-7.

106 Australian Defense Force, above note 96, pp. 4-7, 4-8. A no-strike policy states that certain “objects or entities [are] characterised as protected from military effects under international law and/or rules of engagement” and cannot be attacked. The manual does not list what targets are designated on no-strike lists, but the likely entities that are included on a US no-strike list are presented in note 109 below.

107 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, No Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, Instruction, 12 October 2012, available at: https://publicintelligence.net/cjcs-collateral-damage/.

108 Ibid., p. B-1.

109 CAT I includes: diplomatic offices, foreign missions; religious, cultural, historical institutions, cemeteries, and structures; intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UN, NATO) and NGO property, equipment and personnel; medical facilities (both civilian and military); public education facilities including non-military schools, colleges, universities, child/day care centres, and institutes; civilian refugee camps and concentrations; prisoner of war camps and concentrations and government detention facilities/prisons; facilities whose engagement may result in pollution that cannot be contained, to include contamination of standing water, streams and rivers; and dams or dykes whose engagement may result in the flooding of civilian areas. CAT II includes: non-military billeting and accommodations, including private civilian housing and family housing on military or government property; civilian meeting places including athletic fields, stadiums, racetracks, parks, civic and convention centres, theatres, amusement parks, markets and recreational facilities; public utilities and facilities including those that generate, distribute or transport electricity, petroleum or water intended for civilian consumption; commercial fuel service stations, civilian mass transit facilities, water supply facilities, waste facilities, urban gas supply, fire stations, postal facilities, police stations, civil defence facilities and financial institutions; agricultural processing and storage facilities that produce, market or distribute foodstuffs for civilian consumption; public utilities, industrial facilities and storage depots that have the potential to release toxic chemicals that may contaminate air, food, soil or water resources; and facilities and/or structures for which the functionality/purpose is unknown.

110 Ibid., p. B-7.

111 Ibid., p. D-1.

112 Ibid., p. D-2.

113 Ibid., pp. D-1–D-2, D-5.

114 Ibid.

115 The goal of CDE Level 3 is to achieve a low collateral damage estimate while limiting the number of tactical weaponeering restrictions. CDE Level 3 determines appropriate delivery systems and warhead and fuse combinations that mitigate the risk of collateral damage while still achieving the desired effect on the target. Ibid.

116 Ibid., pp. D-5–D-6.

117 Ibid., p. D-6.

118 Ibid.

119 ICRC, above note 30, p. 29.

120 Physical damage includes the quantitative extent of physical damage through munitions blast, fragmentation and/or fire damage effects to a target. Functional damage estimates the effect of attacks and other force employment on the target's ability to perform its intended mission. It may also include an estimate of the time required for the enemy to reconstitute or replace the target functions destroyed or degraded. Target system assessment is a broad assessment of the impact and effectiveness of all types of attacks. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, above note 90, Appendix D, pp. D-4–D-6.

121 NATO, “NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians”, 9 July 2016, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en (also reflecting lessons on civilian casualty mitigation from Afghanistan).

122 Author interview with NATO official at Joint Force Command Brunssum, February 2016.

123 CIVIC has provided technical assistance to the Afghan government in developing civilian casualty mitigation tools and provided input on a national civilian casualty mitigation and prevention policy. NATO's Resolute Support “train, assist and advise” mission, which began in 2015 after ISAF, is working with Afghan security forces on such policies, tools and trainings.

124 Notably, President Barack Obama issued an executive order on addressing civilian casualties that reflects lessons learned in Afghanistan: see “United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force,” 1 July 2016, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures.

125 See, e.g., UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq, 1 May–31 October 2015; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/31/68, 11 February 2016.

126 Author conversations with UK, US and Australian military forces involved in the anti-ISIS air campaign. (strict controls in place to limit civilian casualties), available at: www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-16/australian-fighter-jets-first-air-strikes-syria-us-military/6779104.

127 Author conversation with CENTCOM. The US government has also authorized amends (acknowledgement and condolence payments) for incidental civilian harm caused during its operations in Iraq and Syria. Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room, 14 October 2014, available at: www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/606936 (amends for Syria); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, section 1211, available at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114s1356enr/pdf/BILLS-114s1356enr.pdf (authorizing ex gratia payments for incidental damage, personal injury or death).

128 As of 2 February 2017, the United States has admitted to causing 199 civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria since the air campaign began in mid-2014, and is investigating allegations by NGOs and those reported in the media. See CENTCOM, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve Monthly Civilian Casualty Report, 2 February 2017, available at: www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1068742/combined-joint-task-force-operation-inherent-resolve-monthly-civilian-casualty/. As of 30 January 2017, Airwars – a transparency project monitoring the air campaign against ISIS and other groups and recording civilian harm in Iraq, Syria and Libya – had attributed over 2,300 deaths and injuries to the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria, but it “cautions” on the number “given the significant challenges of casualty verification”. Civilian casualties attributed to Russian air strikes in Syria, supporting the Syrian regime from September 2015 to December 2016, number over 8,000. (See, generally, Airwars.com.) In Afghanistan as well, although the ISAF mandate ended in 2014, US forces in Afghanistan who are training Afghan forces, and who since June 2016 have been allowed to conduct air strikes against the Taliban in support of the Afghan security forces, must strictly adhere to guidance and policies to minimize civilian harm and prevent any recurrence of events like the October 2015 attack on the Medécin Sans Frontiéres hospital in Kunduz. A US military investigation found that US forces did not know they were firing at a medical facility, and that “a combination of human errors, compounded by process and technical errors” resulted in the attack. The investigation also found that certain personnel failed to adhere to ROE and violated the law of armed conflict. CENTCOM, “CENTCOM Releases Investigation into Doctors without Borders Trauma Facility”, 29 April 2016, available at: www.centcom.mil/news/press-release/april-29-centcom-releases-kunduz-investigation.

129 The author visited Zummar and several towns and villages in Nineveh governorate, and villages in Kirkuk governorate, in Iraq, and Kobane in Syria, in 2015. In 2016, the author interviewed civilians who fled Ramadi as Iraqi forces retook the city from ISIS. Sahr Muhammedally, “Retaking Mosul: ISIS and Human Shields”, MENASource, 16 March 2016, available at: www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/retaking-mosul-isis-and-human-shields; Tribune Writers, “Iraqi City Ramadi Once Home to 500,000 Now Lies in Ruins”, Chicago Tribune, 17 January 2016, available at: www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-ramadi-iraq-buildings-destroyed-20160117-story.html.

130 Prime Minister David Cameron, “PM Statement Responding to FAC Report on Military Operations in Syria”, 26 November 2015, available at www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-responding-to-fac-report-on-military-operations-in-syria (“We have the Brimstone precision missile system, which enables us to strike accurately with minimal collateral damage”); Colonel Steve Warren, Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson, Department of Defense Press Briefing via Teleconference in Pentagon Briefing Room from Baghdad, Iraq, 28 October 2015, available at: www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/626351/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-colonel-warren-via-teleconference-in-th (“We put a lot of energy into developing targets and we'll continue to develop targets and refine them, and redevelop them and watch them and make sure that those targets meet our standards for minimizing destruction of civilian infrastructure and of course civilian casualties”).

131 Muhammedally, Sahr, “Iraq: Learning Civilian Protection the Hard Way”, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2015 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: www.stabilityjournal.org/article/10.5334/sta.ge/.

132 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, Art. 16.