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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
The paper consists of six parts. The first part discusses the major reasons for the presence of a conventional sociopolitical Baloch culture in Iran. The second part presents a profile of the Iranian Baloch elites, dividing them into four major groups: the Sunni clerics or molavis, tribal chiefs, the educated, and the wealthy. The third discusses the challenging relationship which exists among the Baloch elites. The fourth describes the elites' attitudes towards the Baloch society's norms. The fifth determines the elites' orientation towards state and politics. And finally the paper ends with conclusions.
1 There are two different spellings of the word: “Baloch” and “Baluch.” Both are used interchangeably in the literature.
2 According to official estimations of Pakistan and Afghan governments, close to 7 million Baloch live in Pakistan, and around 600,000 live in Afghanistan. Besides, many Baloch live in the Gulf States, in some parts of Africa like Kenya and Tanzania, and several communities of Baloch also live in India, Europe, and North America.
3 All major government sources believe that Balochestan is the most undeveloped part of Iran. The following Persian references of the Sazman-e Modiriat va Barnamehrizi (Management and Planning Organization) are only a few instances to be noted: Barasi-ye Siasatha va Barnameha-ye Toswse'eh-ye Sistan va Balochestan (no. 78, 1988–97); Barnameha-ye Bolandmodat-e Towse'eh-ye Sistan va Balochestan (no. 64, 1997); Bank-e-Etelaati-ye Sistan va Balochestan (2004); Arzyabi-ye Barnameh-ye Sevom-e Towse'eh-ye Sistan va Balochestan (no. 120, 2004).
4 The culture of the Baloch society is dominated by the teachings of Sunni clerics (molavis or mullahs). They favor a situation that would return the society to a former value system that long ago existed at the time of Prophet Mohammad. They reject claims to human equality and notions of sociopolitical progress in the contexts defined in modern or contemporary liberal philosophy.
5 A recent study, Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism (Karachi, 2000)Google Scholar by Mohammad Hassan Hoseinbor, discusses that the Iranian Baloch population could be between 3 and 4 million.
6 Unfair treatment in public employment or discrimination between “Sunni Baloch” and “non-Baloch Shia” is acknowledged even by many government officials. But some high ranking government authorities (names withheld for security reasons) whom I interviewed (August 2011, Ministry of Science & Technology, Tehran) believe that the issue of “Baloch's unfair treatment in public employment” has nothing to do with central government's policies, rather “the narrow minded local provincial authorities themselves are behind the discriminations.”
7 Williams, Charles Reynolds, The Defence of Kahun (London, 1886), 77.Google Scholar
8 Mir Mitta Khan Marri, “Rahm All Marri” (Quetta, 1978), 25–44.
9 To cite few instances, Chakar Khan Rind ruled Balochestan in the fifteenth century, Bahram Khan Barakzahi gained control of Balochestan in the twentieth century, and Doost Mohammad Khan Barakzahi succeeded his uncle Bahram Khan in 1920, proclaiming himself King of Balochestan. He was toppled by Reza Shah's forces in 1928.
10 A few of the main differences are highlighted here. (1) The succession after Prophet Mohammad: the Shia believe that it had been his cousin and son-in-law Ali's right to succeed Mohammad directly and that the three caliphs preceding Ali had been usurpers, while the Sunni reject this idea. (2) Ashura (an annual mourning service that falls on the traditional date of Imam Hossain's martyrdom, the tenth day of the Islamic month of moharram, the most important of the many religious occasions for the Shia. Both the Sunni and the Shia condemn the massacre in Karbala, in which Imam Hossain was killed. However, the event is particularly mourned by the Shia on Ashura. In this ceremony, the Shia sometimes express their grief by cutting their own bodies with razors or whip themselves to emulate Hossain's bloody wounds. The Baloch Sunni do not mourn the way the Shia do. (3) The pro-Imam banners and billboards, displayed at public places such as educational institutions and shopping malls in Iran, including Balochestan, are unacceptable to the Sunni Baloch. The Sunni faith gives priority to Allah and then to Prophet Mohammad, rather than to Imams.
11 In Iran, discussing and promoting Shia Islam is a compulsory practice in the universities. This practice has caused arguments, quarrels, and, at times, exchange of insults between Shia and Sunni students or professors in Balochestan. It has remained a major problem, especially for the Sunni Baloch social science professors.
12 In Islamic literature the term molavi or maulavi has multiple usages. For example, it can refer to noted Muslim poets, jurists, theologians, and Sufis. However, in Balochestan the term commonly refers to any Baloch Sunni cleric, irrespective of his religious educational rank.
13 Mahmood, Zand Moghadam, “Balochestan of Iran,” in Iran: Hoviyaat, Meliyat, Qomiyat, ed. Hamid, Ahmadi (Tehran, 2004), 319.Google Scholar
14 The majority of the traditional Baloch hold conventional attitudes towards the society. The following are just few examples which are clearly noticeable within the Baloch society of Iran: (1) lack of criticism—generally, Baloch do not tolerate any kind of criticism of the Sunni principles; (2) no religious conversion—converts can be threatened with death; (3) Compulsory prayers—the molavis, the ruling elite of Baloch society, emphasize the strict regard for namaz, the Muslim prayers five times a day; (4) strict hijab—in principle, the molavis prefer that women fully cover themselves with burka, as is the case with women under the rule of the Taliban or in Saudi Arabia; although such fatwa is resisted in today's Balochestan, some sections of the society abide by these norms.
15 Of course, the law of the state has never interfered with the local customs and traditions of the Baloch unless such traditions were to have political repercussions. This has been a characteristic of both the Pahlavi and the Islamic establishments.
16 Siasar, Ghasem, Monasebat-e Sardaran, Olama va Tahsilkardegan-e Baloch ba Dolat-e Modern: 1285-1357, (Zahedan, 2005), pp.16–19.Google Scholar
17 Mohammad Reza Taheri, “Khaterat-e Ejetema'i va Siasi-ye Man” (unpublished ms, Zahedan, 2007).
18 Interview (by the author) with Gholam Mohammad Khanzai, an Iranian Baloch political expert, who represented Chabahar city in parliament in Tehran for few months during the last year of Pahlavi's rule in 1979 (Karachi, January 9, 2003).
19 Many Baloch regard Dadshah as a hero, while others consider him a bandit. Dadshah's story has also entered the Persian and Balochi literatures; poems, articles, books, films, have been made in his name. The first work on Dadshah was published by Shahbakhsh, Azim, Maajera-ye Dadshah: Pazhoheshi dar Tarikh-e Moaser-e Balochestan (Shiraz, 1994).Google Scholar
20 Ghasem Siasar, no. 16, 76–8.
21 The cities which are located in Makoran, the southern part of Iranian Balochestan, include Saravan, Iranshahar, Sarbaz, Nikshahr, and Chabahar. In the Sarhad region, several tribal chiefs are still organized, such as Rigi, Narooie, and Shahbakhsh chiefs. These tribal masters whenever required play a part in supporting the government agencies with local security.
22 Jahantigh, Ghulam Hossain, Barrasi-ye Mazaheb va Makateb-e Ostan-e Sistan va Balochestan: Maktab-e Deoband (Zahedan, 2000), 297–8.Google Scholar
23 In the parliamentary elections, whoever enjoys support from the influential molavis may win the elections. Examples can be given of Baloch parliamentarians elected in 2004, 2008, and 2012 who enjoyed full support of the molavis. In the presidential elections of 1997, Khatami enjoyed full support from the Baloch. The molavis had asked the Baloch to cast their votes for Khatami because of his reformist views. In 2005, presidential candidate Mostafa Moein who did not win the elections had total support from the Baloch. The votes collected for him from Balochestan were remarkable.
24 Interview (by the author) with Pir Mohammad Mollazai, an Iranian Baloch political expert at Iran's state television (Tehran, April 9, 2010).
25 The Islamic Republic of Iran officially does not regard the leadership of the Makki institution as representing Baloch society. By contrast, the institution's leadership does enjoy tremendous Baloch mass support. This support increased further in the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary Guard attack on the Makki mosque in Zahedan in the second decade of the Islamic Republic. Since then molavi Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi has turned into a hero for the overwhelming majority of Baloch. The Makki establishment has been expanding its activities: it helps the poor talibs and students financially; provides almost free accommodation to over 1,000 talibs; organizes annual seminars inviting thousands of students and scholars; and systematically broadcasts its activities and news on the Internet and in print in several languages—English, Persian, Arabic, and Urdu.
26 The Baloch Student Union at the University of Sistan va Balochestan which operates informally arranges annual Baloch graduation parties for the Baloch students. The Union updates itself about the number of the educated Iranian Baloch. In this regard, interviews were conducted by the author with union members and members of the faculty or academicians at different universities in Balochestan (Zahedan, January and February 2011).
27 “Fa'aliayat-ha-ye Mazhabi,” Ruznameh-ye Zahedan (no. 1948, February 2011), 2.
28 About the Baloch-Qajar wars in 1873, 1888, 1889, 1891, and 1896, see Sykes, Percy M., Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran (London, 1902)Google Scholar; Hoseinbor, M.H., Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism (Karachi, 2000).Google Scholar
29 Interview (by the author) with a leading member (identity withheld for security reasons) of Gamshadzahi tribe in Saravan (June 2007). However, this view was first disclosed openly by Jundollah's head Abdol Malek Rigi in 2009 immediately after the deadly suicide attack on an official gathering (October 18, 2009) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGCs) and some Baloch tribal chiefs at Pishin of Balochestan where close to forty-five people, including several notable IRGC figures and tribal chiefs, were killed. According to Jundollah, the “IRGC has been planning to divide the Baloch and rule over them by undermining the influence of the leading molavis in Balochestan by supporting and empowering some tribal chiefs. The meeting at Pishin was a major step which was nullified by our attack.” (jonbesh-mardom.blogspot.com/jondollah.blogspot.com).
30 In one of these meetings (the author was also present) held in March 2002, Mohammad Reza Taheri, a Baloch professor, representing a group of the educated Baloch, discussed the question with the representatives (Ahmad Narooie and M. Ghasemi) of Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi, the religious leader of Baloch in Balochestan of Iran. The meeting, attended by a group of Baloch, including postgraduate students, molavis, and academicians, was held at the home of a former Baloch professor at Sistan va Balochestan University, Azim Shirani, at the Teachers' Residence, Zahedan.
31 In 2008, molavi Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi addressed a large group of Iranian Sunnis including teachers, academicians, and religious and university students, at the Fourth Annual Seminar of the Iranian Sunni Students “Chaharomin Hamayesh-e Salaneh-ye Daneshjuyan-e Ahl-e Sunat-e Iran” (Zahedan: Makki mosque, May 13, 2008).
32 Interview (by the author) with Mohammad Reza Taheri, an Iranian Baloch Professor at Sistan va Balochestan University (Zahedan, June 8, 2007).
33 Atta Mohammad Taheri, “Khaterat-e Roozaneh-ye Man” (unpublished ms, Saravan, 1993).
34 Eissa Poor Yazdan, “Barresi-ye Padideh-ye Chand Hamsari va Sabt Nashodan-e Ezdevaj-ha-ye Zojeyn dar Ostan-e Sistan va Balochestan,” Nashr-e Aftab (Zahedan, no. 71, August 2, 2008): 5.
35 Ala Maududi, Sayyid Abul, The Meaning of the Qur'an (Lahor, 1972), 1:305.Google Scholar
36 From 2000 on, Iranian Baloch youth began their activities on the Internet. Today, Baloch hold close to 700 blogs/sites, publishing online notes and articles related to sociopolitical affairs.
37 Curzon, G.N., Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1966), 2: 259.Google Scholar
38 Hoseinbor, Mohammad Hassan, Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism (Karachi, 2000), 68.Google Scholar
39 Khan Baloch, Mohammad Sardar, History of the Baloch Race and Balochestan (Karachi, 1958), 169.Google Scholar
40 The number of universities in Iran increased under the Islamic Republic. There are more than twenty-four higher educational institutions and universities in Balochestan of Iran (2012). There are at least six universities in Zahedan, four in Iranshahr, four in Chabahar, three in Saravan, three in Khash, two in Nikshahr, one in Sarbaz, and one in Sooran. Besides, in present-day Iran, the university entrance test is a “formality” and has become easier for both graduate and postgraduate education.
41 The terms (parochial, subject, and participant political cultures) initially discussed by Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney in The Civic Culture (Boston, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar are still applicable in some underdeveloped and developing societies as a way of understanding the political culture of the people. This formula can be applied to Baloch society as well. In 1996, for example, a study entitled “Impact of Political Culture on Political Development of Balochestan in Pakistan” (PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Karachi) was carried out by Rahmat Ibad Khan, applying the theories of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba.
42 M. Hassan Hoseinbor, no. 38, 165–6.
43 In the first few years (1980–84) of the Islamic Republic, mostly molavis represented the Baloch at the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament). For example, molavi Hamed Dameni represented the people of Khash; molavi Nazar Ahmad Didgah represented the people of Iranshahr; and molavi Mohammad Is-haaq Madani represented the people of Saravan.
44 A number of leading molavis have repeatedly asked the central government to allow them to build mosques for Friday prayers in Tehran. But the indifference of the government towards the issue raised a tumult of protest among the Baloch elites. The government's concern seems to be that because Friday prayers are institutionalized weekly public prayers at which religious leaders follow communal prayers often with political speech, this may encourage the Sunnis of Iran to gather en masse in Tehran. This ultimately may result in the creation of a powerful Sunni bloc in the capital. Such a bloc would have the potential of political manipulation against the ruling Shia. The regime has already experienced such a threat in Balochestan. Today, the Makki mosque of Zahedan, for example, acts like a powerful bloc within Balochestan.
45 In the early months of Ahmadinejad's (first) administration, several Baloch professors of Sistan va Balochestan university (Zahedan) received telephone calls from the intelligence units, requesting them not to attend any sociopolitical meeting with the molavis at the Makki mosque in Zahedan. In fact, the Baloch's sociopolitical meetings were routine during the administration of President Khatami.
46 The issue was revealed (during a discussion with the author) by Mahmood Berahooynejad, a Baloch journalist who was threatened by the security agents not to accept any further interview from the Iranian foreign-based media (Zahedan, March 2009).
47 The policy is known as “Tarh-e Samandehi-ye Madares-e Dini-ye Ahl-e Sonnat-e Iran” (Plan to organize the religious schools of the Sunni sect in Iran).
48 The major target of the government has been the Makki institution in Zahedan where talibs from Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have been receiving Sunni education.
49 In this case, several letters were sent to Ayatollah Khamenei, requesting him to stop this policy. The following are just two examples: “Nameh-ye Nemayandegan-e Ahl-e Sonnat-e Majles (Dowreh-ye Hashstom) beh Rahbar-e Enqhelab,” Dabirkhaneh-ye Daftar-e Nemayandegan-e Majles-e Shora-ye Easlami (no. 12495, December 19, 2011); “Nemayandeh-ye Mohtaram-e Maqam-e Mo'azzam-e Rahbari dar Omur-e Ahl-e Sonnat-e Sistan va Balochestan,” Nameh-ye Modiran-e Madares-e Dini dar Sistan va Balochestan (December 17, 2011).
50 Referring to Article 12 of the Constitution where it says that, “The official religion of Iran shall be Islam and faith Jafari Ithna Ashari, and this article shall be eternal and immutable. But, other Islamic faiths such as the Hanafi, Shafei, Maleki, Hanbali, and Zaidi, shall enjoy full respect. The followers of these faiths are free to carry out their religious rites according to their own religious jurisprudence. Their religious education and training, personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and will) and lawsuits related thereto shall be officially recognized by courts of law.”
51 The issue was discussed several times in different meetings among the Baloch elites. It was also presented to the thousands of Baloch during prayer times in Makki mosque, by Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi, the leading molavi of the Iranian Baloch. At times, he strongly criticized the central government on the issue of Sunnis' religious freedom, asserting that “we will defend our rights at any cost.” These developments are also available at the official website of the Makki Sunni School (News archive, 2009–11), http://www.sunnionline.net.
52 For more information about Jundollah, see its blog, jonbeshmardomiran.blogspot.com. The Iranian Baloch insurgent group with fundamentalist Sunni beliefs emerged in 2004 in Iranian Balochestan. A number of Western scholars believe that the members of Jundollah are basically from Pakistan. This view, however, is wrong. The main members or majority of them hail from Iranian Balochestan.
53 The statement has been aired by Abdol Malek Rigi in most of his interviews, which are now available on YouTube and at jonbeshmardomiran.blogspot.com.
54 The disclosure was first made in 2008 by ABC News Analysis in the US. It was immediately republished by others, including The Times of India, April 5, 2007, 16. See also Bill Beeman, “Will the U.S. Support Terrorists to Destabilize Iran?,” Online: New America Media, News Analysis, July 7, 2008, at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=0a3f42cca536140506e6a708b367b98.
