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Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA
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Abstract

Young people play an important role in shaping Iran's politics but have only a marginal role in its economy. Youth (ages 15–29) are more than one-third of the country's population and are better educated than the generation they are replacing, while accounting for more than two-thirds of the unemployed. Demographics have thrown the marriage market out of balance, with a “shortage of men” of about 25 percent, while economic pressures have reduced the ability of youth to get married and form families. The higher education system has expanded to absorb ever greater numbers of youth but because education quality is low this has not helped in reducing unemployment. The demographic pressures have amplified since 2008 when the economy entered a period of stagnation. The economic crisis has hit Iran's youth particularly hard, especially those from lower economic backgrounds because the country's rigid formal labor market preserves jobs for older workers. The record number of youth entering the labor market has to wait longer for a regular job or has to take up part-time and informal jobs. In either case, their difficulties in marriage and family formation are intensified.

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 6 , November 2011 , pp. 789 - 806
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2011

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References

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21 Because survey data excludes institutional residences, this method misses youth living in university dormitories who are neither head or dependent.

22 This is within the range that Banerjee and Duflo use to define middle class status see Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Duflo, Esther, “What is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the World?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 3–28.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed PPP adjustments equalize the purchasing power of a dollar in Iran and the US.

23 Egel and Salehi-Isfahani, “Youth Transitions.”

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26 This is very similar to the division by middle class status in analysis of unemployment. In both cases I use per capita expenditures to classify youth into 2 and 5 income groups.

27 http://www.sabteahval.ir/Upload/Modules/Contents/asset0/AmarHayati/eb-1388-p09.pdf, accessed 16 November 2010.

28 Fogel, “123,000,000,000,000,” 75.

29 Bloom and Williamson, “Demographic Change.” See also Figure 2 above for Korea.

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36 Reported in Sarmayeh, no. 947, 19 Bahman 1387 (7 February 2009), http://sarmayeh.net/ShowNews.php?34266.