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Half-Hearted Inception, Miserable Existence, and the Untimely Death of the Bloggers' Register in Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 February 2019

Oleg Soldatov
Oleg Soldatov*
Affiliation:
PhD researcher, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan (Italy); oleg.soldatov@phd.unibocconi.it
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Abstract

The Russian Federation joins a list of countries where violence and terrorism often have a religious and an ethnic basis, and where the authorities seek ways to deal with the issue of online hate speech. In this context, in May 2014 the Russian Parliament enacted Federal Law No 97-FZ (the Bloggers’ Law). This legislation required the compulsory registration of all popular bloggers with the country's internet regulatory agency, Roskomnadzor, thereby forcing the disclosure of their real identities. The Bloggers’ Law has been widely criticised, however, and although the internet community is still engaged in a heated discussion over whether there exists a legal right to online anonymity, the law made anonymous blogging in Russia a daunting undertaking. The Bloggers’ Law was repealed in the second half of 2017, and updating of the ‘Bloggers’ Register’ ceased. This article attempts to (i) analyse the context and the reasoning behind the introduction of the Bloggers’ Register; (ii) disentangle the relevant legal provisions; and (iii) assess its effectiveness, drawing conclusions based on events in the Russian blogosphere during the period 2014–17.

Keywords

freedom of expressionhuman rightscyber lawblogging
Type
Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 61 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2019 

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References

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9 With the notable exception of Brazil, where anonymous speech enjoys no legal protection whatsoever: Samantha S Moura Ribeiro, Democracy after the Internet (Springer 2016) 190. Among less democratic countries, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Ecuador provide examples of legislation that actively battles against anonymity online and offline: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression – David Kaye (22 May 2015), UN Doc A/HRC/29/32.

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24 See, generally, Umland, Andreas, Post-Soviet ‘Uncivil Society’ and the Rise of Aleksanr Dugin (Trinity College Cambridge 2007)Google Scholar.

25 Presidential Decree ‘On National Security Strategy’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 2016, No 1, Pt 2, Item 212 (in Russian)

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31 It is worth noting that the Russian authorities do not admit to annexation; they always refer to it as ‘reunification of Crimea with Russia’: Leonaitė, Erika and Žalimas, Dainius, ‘The Annexation of Crimea and Attempts to Justify It in the Context of International Law’ (2015) 14(1) Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 11, 36Google Scholar.

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35 Presidential Decree ‘On National Information Security Strategy’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 5 December 2016, No 50, Item 7074 (in Russian).

36 Ewen MacAskill, ‘Putin Calls Internet a “CIA Project” Renewing Fears of Web Breakup’, The Guardian, 24 April 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/vladimir-putin-web-breakup-internet-cia.

37 Pollicino, Oreste and Soldatov, Oleg, ‘Striking the Balance between Human Rights Online and State Security Concerns: The Russian Way in a Comparative Context’ (2018) 19(1) German Law Journal 85, 98Google Scholar.

38 Shaun Walker, ‘Russian Data Law Fuels Web Surveillance Fears’, The Guardian, 1 September 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/01/russia-internet-privacy-laws-control-web.

39 Julia Gerlach, Color Revolutions in Eurasia (Springer 2014) 2.

40 See, among other sources, Kudlenko, Anastasiia, ‘From Colour Revolutions to the Arab Spring: The Role of Civil Society in Democracy Building and Transition Processes’ (2015) 23(2–3) Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 167CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ieva Bērziņa, ‘Color Revolutions: Democratization, Hidden Influence, or Warfare?’, Center for Security and Strategic Research, 1 December 2014, http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/WP2014%20Color%20revolutions.ashx.

41 Denisova, Anastasia, ‘Democracy, Protest and Public Sphere in Russia after the 2011–2012 Anti-government Protests: Digital Media at Stake’ (2017) 39(7) Media, Culture & Society 976CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Freedom House, ‘Russia: Country Profile’, Freedom on the Net, 1 June 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2017/russia.

43 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Federal Law “On Information, Information Security and Data Protection”’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 28 December 2013, No 52, Item 6963 (in Russian).

44 Roskomnadzor is the Russian Federal Surveillance Service for Mass Media and Communications, an executive structure within the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media (formerly Ministry of Communications and Mass Media), and the federal body responsible for supervision and surveillance of the media in Russia, including electronic media: Cappello, Maja, Regulation of Online Content in the Russian Federation (European Audiovisual Observatory 2015) 6–8Google Scholar. Roskomnadzor is not the only Russian authority dealing with control of the internet. Internet policy is in fact crafted by a multitude of government ministries and services as well as within the Presidential administration and the Security Council. For a general discussion, see Soldatov and Borogan (n 28).

45 Federal Law ‘On Combating Extremist Activity’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 25 July 2002, No 30, Item 3031 (in Russian).

46 Peter Roudik, ‘Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia’, Library of Congress, 30 November 2015, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php.

47 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity’, 20 June 2012, Opinion No 660/2011, para 74, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e.

48 UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federation (28 April 2015), UN Doc CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7.

49 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Comments on the Draft Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Counteractive Measures against Extremist Activities” and “On Amendments to Several Legislative Acts with regard to Counteractive Measures against Extremist Activities”’, 11 February 2005, https://www.osce.org/odihr/19178?download=true.

50 Soldatov and Borogan (n 28) 313.

51 For general discussion see Nate Anderson, The Internet Police (WW Norton & Company 2013).

52 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Federal Law “On Information, Information Security and Data Protection” and Certain Legislation of the Russian Federation Concerning the Exchange of Information Using Telecommunication Networks’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 5 May 2014, No 19, Item 2302 (in Russian).

53 ‘Komitet Gosdumy Rekomendoval Priravnyat Blogerov-Tysyachnikov k SMI’ [Parliamentary Committee Recommended to Equal Bloggers with More than a Thousand Subscribers to Mass Media], Interfax, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/371723,%2015%20April%202014 (in Russian).

54 As opposed to the post factum de-anonymisation that happens after the alleged infringement has taken place. This, in the author's view, is a more proportionate arrangement. In addition to the Russian example, the pre-emptive de-anonymisation of bloggers also seems to have been introduced in China in 2017: David Meyer, ‘China Tightens the Noose on Free Online Speech, Again’, Fortune, 28 August 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/08/28/china-real-names-online-anonymity-censorship. Nonetheless, even post factum measures can be disproportionate; for instance, in the wake of a failed military coup in Turkey, the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) used as evidence a list of 53,000 people who downloaded the encrypted messaging app in an attempt to prosecute terrorists: Oleg Soldatov and Gülden Tokmak, ‘Köksal v. Turkey: Excessive Formalism or Strict Adherence to Admissibility Criteria?’, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, 11 January 2018, https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Tools/Legal-Resources/Koeksal-v.-Turkey-Excessive-Formalism-or-Strict-Adherence-to-Admissibility-Criteria.

55 In other words, investigative authorities would have to approach the internet service provider (ISP), and hope to track the alleged perpetrator by his or her IP address, an undertaking possible only if the latter were not using anonymising software.

56 Maggs, Peter B, Schwartz, Olga and Burnham, William, Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation (Juris Publishing 2015) 372Google Scholar.

57 UN Human Rights Committee (n 48).

58 From 2015 to 2017, German Klimenko was the chair of the Internet Development Institute, the organisation behind the Draft Paper referenced above (see Internet Development Institute (n 2)) and calling for tightening internet regulation. The initiatives of this Institute might have been designed to attract the attention of the authorities. Eventually, in 2016 German Klimenko was appointed Presidential Adviser: Daniil Turovsky, ‘Putin's Internet Guy’, Meduza, 26 February 2016, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/02/26/putin-s-internet-guy.

59 ‘Legislative Restrictions on Popular Bloggers Come into Force in Russia’, Russia Today, 1 August 2014, https://www.rt.com/politics/177248-russia-bloggers-law-restrictions.

60 Limiting their freedom of expression is, in itself, a major violation: Strossen, Nadine, ‘Freedom of Speech and Equality: Do We Have to Choose?’ (2016) 25 Journal of Law and Policy 185, 210Google Scholar.

61 Drezner, Daniel W, ‘So You Want to Blog …’ in APSA Guide to Publications (American Political Science Association 2008) 181, 190Google Scholar.

62 Jason Burby, Angie Brown and WAA Standards Committee, ‘Web Analytics Definitions’, Web Analytics Association, 16 August 2007, https://www.digitalanalyticsassociation.org/Files/pdf_standards/webanalyticsdefinitionsvol1.pdf.

63 Larisa Zimina, ‘Blogi – eto malenkie SMI’ [Blogs Are Little Mass Media], Habrahabr, 22 April 2014, habrahabr.ru/company/hola/blog/220351 (in Russian).

64 ‘“Zhyvoy zhurnal” skryl kolichestvo podpischikov u populyarnyh blogerov’ [LiveJournal Hid the Number of Popular Bloggers’ Subscribers], RIA Novosti, 23 April 2014, https://ria.ru/technology/20140423/1005178095.html (in Russian).

65 ‘“Yandex” zakryl reyting blogerov’ [Yandex Closed the Blogger's Ranking], Interfax, 18 April 2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/372547 (in Russian).

66 Vsevolod Sazonov, ‘Zakon o priravnivanii blogov k SMI’ [The Law on Giving Mass Media Status to Bloggers], Radio Ekho Moskvy, 7 May 2014, https://echo.msk.ru/blog/advokat_sazonov/1315532-echo (in Russian).

67 Yunna Kotzar, ‘Blogerov Zanesut v Reyestr’ [Bloggers Will be Registered], Gazeta, 1 August 2014, https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2014/08/01_a_6153001.shtml (in Russian).

68 Roskomsvoboda, ‘Godovshhina raboty reestrov blogerov i organizatorov rasprostranenija informacii’ [The First Anniversary of the Bloggers’ Register], Rublacklist, 7 August 2015, https://roskomsvoboda.org/12193 (in Russian).

69 Russian Search Marketing, ‘With 84 Million Users, Russia's Internet Penetration Rate Has Nearly Doubled in Five Years’, East-West Digital News, 8 February 2016, http://www.ewdn.com/2016/02/08/with-84-million-users-russias-internet-penetration-rate-has-nearly-doubled-in-five-years.

70 Roskomsvoboda, ‘Vehi reestra blogerov: rodilsja, muchilsja, umer’ [Bloggers’ Register Milestone: Birth, Misery, Death], Rublacklist, 8 August 2017, https://roskomsvoboda.org/30929 (in Russian).

71 ibid.

72 Three very different viewpoints on self-censorship in Russia can be found in Schimpfossl, Elizabeth and Yablokov, Ilya, ‘Coercion or Conformism? Censorship and Self-Censorship among Russian Media Personalities and Reporters in the 2010s’ (2014) 22(2) Demokratizatsiya 295Google Scholar; Charles Crabtree, Christopher Fariss and Holger L Kern, ‘Truth Replaced by Silence: Private Censorship in Russia’, NYU CESS 8th Annual Experimental Political Science Conference, 27 February 2015, https://wp.nyu.edu/cesspolicon2015/wp-content/uploads/sites/1008/2015/02/Fariss-Russia_I1.pdf; Belin, Laura, ‘Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media’ in Brown, Archie (ed), Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford University Press 2001) 323Google Scholar.

73 Hayes, Andrew F, Glynn, Carroll J and Shanahan, James, ‘Willingness to Self-Censor: A Construct and Measurement Tool for Public Opinion Research’ (2005) 17(3) International Journal of Public Opinion Research 298, 300CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 Wyatt, Robert O and others, ‘The Dimensions of Expression Inhibition: Perception of Obstacles to Free Speech in Three Cultures’ (1996) 8 International Journal of Public Opinion Research 229, 243–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 Rima S Tanash and others, ‘The Decline of Social Media Censorship and the Rise of Self-Censorship after the 2016 Failed Turkish Coup’, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci17/foci17-paper-tanash.pdf.

76 Natalia Raybman, ‘Roskomnadzor prekratil vesti reyestr bloggerov’ [Roskomnadzor Stopped Updating the Bloggers’ Register], Vedomosti, 1 August 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/08/01/727388-roskomnadzor-reestr-blogerov (in Russian).

77 Igor Korolev, ‘Roskomnadzor poprosil politsiyu nakazyvat’ blogerov za ispolzovaie mata’ [Roskomnadzor Asked Police to Fine Bloggers for Profanity], CNews, 21 April 2015, http://www.cnews.ru/news/top/roskomnadzor_poprosil_politsiyu_nakazyvat (in Russian).

78 ‘Zakon o Blogerah – Eto Popytka Sdelat Internet Civilizovannym’ [Bloggers Law is an Attempt to Make the Internet Civilised], Pravda, 1 July 2015, https://www.pravda.ru/news/expert/01-07-2015/1265362-Konstantin_Dobrinin-0 (in Russian).

79 According to Galina Arapova, Director of the Mass Media Defence Centre, ‘[t]his law will cut the number of critical voices and opposition voices on the Internet. The whole package seems quite restrictive and might affect harshly those who disseminate critical information about the state, about authorities, about public figures’: see Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Russia Quietly Tightens Reins on Web with “Bloggers Law”’, The New York Times, 6 May 2014, para 11, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/europe/russia-quietly-tightens-reins-on-web-with-bloggers-law.html.

80 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation concerning Personal Data Processing in Telecommunication Networks’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 21 July 2014, No 30, Pt 1, Item 4243 (in Russian).

81 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning Further Measures to Combat Terrorism and Protect Public Security’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 6 July 2016, No 28, Item 4558 (in Russian); Federal Law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation concerning Further Measures to Combat Terrorism and Protect Public Security’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 6 June 2016, No 28, Item 4559 (in Russian).

82 Pollicino and Soldatov (n 37).

83 ‘Roskomnadzor zakryl reyestr populyarnykh blogerov’ [Roskomnadzor Shut Down the Bloggers’ Register], NTV, 1 August 2017, https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1880680 (in Russian).

84 One should not disregard the possibility of the Bloggers Register returning in a different guise. In 2016, the Head of Roskomnadzor spoke about ‘modernising’ the Bloggers’ Law rather than repealing it: ‘Internet-Ombudsmen: Reyestr Blogerov – Absolutno Bessmyslennaya Avantyura’, NSN, 19 June 2017, http://nsn.fm/society/internet-ombudsmen-reestr-blogerov-absolyutno-bessmyslennaya-avantyura.html (in Russian).

85 eg, navanly.com, the website of a member of the Russian opposition, Alexey Navalny: Agence France-Presse, ‘Russia Censors Media by Blocking Websites and Popular Blog’, The Guardian, 14 March 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/russia-bans-alexei-navalny-blog-opposition-news-websites.

86 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Federal Law “On Information, Information Security and Data Protection”’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 29 July 2017, No 31, Part 1, Item 4825 (in Russian).

87 A brief explanation of the technical side of this piece of legislation would be appropriate. To grossly oversimplify, every internet node – be it a user's computer or a server hosting a website or internet service – has a numeric Internet Protocol address, which contains a precise identifier of the networking equipment operating this internet node (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IP address’). When a user wants to access a certain website or internet service, the user's Internet Service Provider (ISP) (eg, Vodafone) receives a request from the user's IP address to exchange information with the IT equipment (eg, web-hosting servers) that has an IP address of the website or service the user wants to access. The easiest way to block an internet service or website in a certain territory is to instruct all the ISPs located there to stop relaying the information from the IP addresses that correspond with the blocked services. The blocked addresses are included in the blacklist that local ISPs are legally obliged to respect. Any attempts to access websites or services that correspond with blacklisted addresses would be unsuccessful from Russian territory: Oleg Soldatov, ‘The Russian VPN Ban: Another Round in the Battle for a Free Internet’, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, 20 September 2017, https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Tools/Legal-Resources/The-Russian-VPN-ban-another-round-in-the-battle-for-a-free-Internet.

88 Federal Law ‘On Amendments to Articles 10-1 and 15-4 of Federal Law “On Information, Information Security and Data Protection”’, Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, 29 July 2017, No 31, Pt 1, Item 4790 (in Russian).

89 Oleg Soldatov, ‘Telegram Block in Russia: The Wider Context’, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, 29 May 2018, https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Tools/Legal-Resources/Telegram-Block-in-Russia-the-Wider-Context.

90 Satellite Providers, ‘Internet Providers in Russia’, http://www.satproviders.com/en/list-of-all-services/russian-federation; ISP Quick List, ‘List of Internet Service Providers in Russia’, http://www.ispquicklist.com/Internet-Service-Providers-List-in-Russia.aspx.

91 Alexa, ‘Top Sites by Category: Russian’, https://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/World/Russian.

92 On 17 November 2016, following a first-instance court decision and an unsuccessful appeal, Roskomnadzor began to enforce a Russia-wide block of LinkedIn. The LinkedIn application is also no longer available for download to mobile devices via Apple App Store and Google Play: Pollicino and Soldatov (n 37) 104.

93 As a side note, the author's view is that the idea of regulating the internet at the user level will not be forgotten. This concept will be revisited when the level of technology allows for a more practicable implementation of the ideas conceived in the law under scrutiny. For further discussion of Russia's struggles with internet regulation see Pollicino and Soldatov (n 37) 85.