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Political Shirking – Proposition 13 vs. Proposition 8

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

SEIJI FUJII
SEIJI FUJII*
Affiliation:
Chuo University, Tokyosfujii@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp
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Abstract

This paper considers the efficiency of the political market in the California State legislature. I analyzed the property tax limitation voter initiative, Proposition 13. I found that districts which supported Proposition 13 more strongly were more likely to oppose the incumbents regardless of whether the incumbents had the different preferences for property taxes from their districts. I also studied how legislators voted on the bills adopted after the passage of Proposition 13 to finance local governments. I found that legislators tended to follow the constituents’ will after they received the voters’ tax-cutting message expressed by the passage of Proposition 13.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 213 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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