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Judges Guarding Judges: Investigating Regional Harbours for Judicial Independence in Africa
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2023
Abstract
A body of jurisprudence is emerging in Africa's most active regional courts on the independence of national judiciaries. This article reveals that while regional case law relevantly echoes efforts by municipal courts to safeguard themselves, circumstances demonstrate that such case law requires greater contextualization across systems. In this regard, the traditional paradigm of linking independence to executive appointments does not empirically stand the test of the multiplicity of independence factors, executive-free regimes have not proved effective in safeguarding independence, and legal traditions or judicial systems have increasingly become irrelevant to the effectiveness of any independence regime. Factors that transcend the traditional determinants of executive control include the nature and functions of the court involved, and the history and background of the judicial structure of the country or region. Notably, the discussion also reveals the need to strike a critical balance between individual rights to a fair trial and inter-state directive policy towards judicial independence as set out in the African Charter.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London
Footnotes
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Extraordinary Lecturer, Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria; Faculty Member, Constitution Building in Africa Course, Central European University.
References
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37 Communication 423/12, adopted on 18 February 2016, 19th Extraordinary Session, 16–25 February 2016.
38 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe Communication 294/04 (2009) AHRLR 268 (ACHPR 2009), para 122; Wetsh'okonda Koso and Others v DRC Communication 281/03 (2008) AHRLR 93 (ACHPR 2008), para 79.
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41 Id, para 79.
42 Id, para 80.
43 Id, para 83.
44 Pursuant to art 26 of the Charter, “State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.”
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50 Id, paras 306–308.
51 Id, paras 319–20.
52 Id, para 322.
53 Id, para 323.
54 Id, para 48.
55 As opposed to civil law jurisdictions, JSCs in common law seldom include the president of the republic or head of the executive as an active member or chair. In instances where the executive is represented, it does not outnumber members from the judiciary, and its decision-making prerogatives are limited in respect of appointment processes and disciplinary procedures. See generally T Masengu “The vulnerability of judges in contemporary Africa: Alarming trends” (Summer 2017) 63/4 Africa Today 3; H Adjolohoun “‘Made in courts’ democracies’: Constitutional adjudication and politics in African constitutionalism” in Fombad (ed) Constitutional Adjudication, above at note 7 at 247; C Rickard “Judicial independence infringed when Uganda's Chief Justice has to ‘plead’ for funds – Constitutional Court”, available at: <https://africanlii.org/article/20200318/judicial-independence-infringed-when-ugandas-chief-justice-has-plead-funds> (last accessed 14 September 2022).
56 See generally Hourquebie, F “L'indépendance de la justice dans les pays francophones” (2012) 2/2 Les Cahiers de la justice 41Google Scholar; Adjolohoun and Fombad “Separation of powers”, above at note 2 at 371–72.
57 The Kenya JSC is composed of the Chief Justice, who is its chairperson, one Supreme Court judge, one Court of Appeal judge, one High Court judge and one magistrate, elected by their peers; the Attorney General, two advocates elected by the Law Society, one person nominated by the Public Service Commission and, lastly, two members of the public, appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly.
58 The Malawi JSC is composed of the Chief Justice, who is also the chair; the chairman of the Civil Service Commission or his / her designate; a justice of appeal or a judge designated by the president in consultation with the Chief Justice; a legal practitioner; and a magistrate designated by the president in consultation with the Chief Justice.
59 Communication 408/11, 40th Activity Report, 2016.
60 Id, paras 1–8.
61 Id, para 8.
62 Id, paras 81–82.
63 Id, paras 84–85.
64 Id, para 86.
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68 Pursuant to art 152(2) of the 2006 Constitution of the DRC, the CSM is headed by the president of the Constitutional Court and is composed of 18 members, all judicial officers, representing the heads of upper and lower ordinary and military courts and state prosecution.
69 The 19 members of the CSM include only the president of the republic and the Minister of Justice, who are, however, the chair and vice-chair of the Commission. See arts 1, 2 and 3 of Loi organique n° 2017-11 du 17 janvier 2017 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Conseil supérieur de la Magistrature.
70 The Ivorian CSM is headed by a senior judicial officer appointed by the president of the republic, and is largely composed of judicial officers. See art 145 of the 2016 Constitution.
71 Ajavon, above at note 49, paras 267–69.
72 Id, paras 270–73.
73 Id, paras 276–80.
74 Id, paras 281–82.
75 Id, para 283.
76 Id, para 284.
77 Id, para 286.
78 Id, paras 285–87.
79 Id, para 287.
80 Id, para 288.
81 Id, para 289.
82 Id, para 299.
83 Id, para 295.
84 Id, para 297.
85 Alfred Agbesi Woyome v Ghana (merits and reparations) [2019] 3 AfCLR 235.
86 Id, paras 124–32.
87 Id, para 131.
88 Id, para 129.
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105 ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/18, judgment of 19 February 2018.
106 Id, 4–6.
107 ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/20, judgment of 24 June 2020.
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109 ECW/CCJ/JUD/28/20, judgment of 10 November 2020.
110 Id, paras 130 and 137.
111 James Katabazi and 21 Others v The Secretary General of the East African Community and the Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference no 01/2007, EALS Law Digest 29.
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