Britain, Russia, and the Revival of “Entente Diplomacy”: 1934

1. Scott, William E., Alliance against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact (Durham, N.C., 1962), chs. viii-ix. Scott gives a careful, balanced account of Barthou's activities and refers to the earlier literature.

2. Ibid., pp. 56-73.

3. Ibid., pp. 74-152. Russia's entry into the League was apparently desired solely because without it Soviet aid could not be extended across the territory of member states.

4. New York Times, Dec. 26, 1933.

5. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 147–48.

6. Ibid., pp. 105, 150-52, 167-68. Barthou had recently (Mar. 1933) spoken against the Franco-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in the Senate. Earlier he had helped construct the cordon sanitaire, had attacked the Soviet delegation at Genoa (1922), and had prosecuted French Communists vigorously while serving as Minister of Justice.

7. Lammers, D. N., “The Engineers' Trial (Moscow, 1933) and Anglo-Soviet Relations,” South Atlantic Quarterly, LXII (1963), 256–67.

8. Cmd. 4513, Parliamentary Papers, 1933-34, XXVII, 759. Between 1929 and 1933 the British market absorbed an average of 25 per cent (by value) of annual Soviet exports.

9. See, for example, Cooper, A. Duff, “Shall We Recognize Russia?” Fortnightly Review, CXXXII (new series, CXXVI) (1929), 433–38; Boothby, Robert, I Fight to Live (London, 1947), pp. 70–87.

10. For circumstantial details see Maisky, Ivan M., Vospominaniia sovetskogo posla, II, Mir ili voina? (Moscow, 1964), 37-38, 72-74, 268–72. Portions of this memoir first appeared as Kto pomogal Gitleru? (Moscow, 1962) [Eng. trans., London, 1964]. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood was among the prominent Englishmen sought out by Maisky during this period. When they met at Harold Laski's, Maisky ventilated his doubts about Britain's attitudes toward Germany and, especially, Japan. In reply Cecil said that “the controversy with Russia over India had created a considerable element of distrust between us, and that the controversies were still going on. I reminded him of the language used in Russia with regard to stirring up rebellions in foreign countries, etc., and pointed out that that was not calculated to increase good relations.” Cecil also suggested that matters generally “would be very much easier if Russia were actually a member of the League,” to which Maisky answered that his government might want to join “in the relatively near future.” Though Cecil admitted the persistence of strong anti-Russian feeling in England, he insisted that any large anti-Soviet combination with Germany and Japan “was completely out of the question.” BM, Add. MSS, 51101, Record of Conversation with the Russian Ambassador, Feb. 5, 1934, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Toward the end of March Cecil saw Maisky again and was told that the Soviets would welcome from the British or French foreign office a private expression of interest in their joining the League — though Maisky's own view was “that so long as Simon remained Foreign Minister there was no prospect of better relations between England and Russia.” BM, Add. MSS, 51101, Record of Conversation with Maisky, Mar. 28, 1934, ibid.

11. Vansittart, Lord Robert, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), pp. 455–62.

12. Colvin, Ian, Vansittart in Office (London, 1965), pp. 23–28.

13. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, second series, VII, ed. Woodward, E. L. and Butler, Rohan (London, 1958), Nos. 546, 566 (hereafter cited as D.B.F.P., VII).

14. Ibid., VII, No. 548. See also New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 6, 1934; Spectator, Jan. 19, 1934.

15. The speeches were reported in Pravda (Moscow), Jan. 17 and Feb. 5, 1934; see also D.B.F.P., VII, No. 566.

16. Ibid., VII, Nos. 570, 585, 590, 597, 602, 606.

17. Ibid., VII, Nos. 577, 579.

18. Ibid., VII, Nos. 576, 582.

19. See, e.g., Muggeridge, Malcolm, “To Friends of the Soviet Union,” English Review, LVIII (1934), 44–51; Muggeridge, Malcolm, “Germany, Russia, and Japan,” Nineteenth Century and After, CXV (1934), 281–90; Soloveytchik, G., “The International Position of Soviet Russia,” Contemporary Review, CXLV (1934), 167–76.

20. New Statesman, Jan. 6 and 20, 1934; Spectator, Jan. 5 and Mar. 23, 1934; Henderson, Arthur, “The Pursuit of Peace,” Nineteenth Century, CXV (1934), 1–14. Some Labourites had urged that Russia join the League in 1924; during the second Labour Government, however, nothing along those lines was attempted.

21. For the views of Sir Stafford Cripps see Times, Jan. 12, 1934; see also Brailsford, H. N., “Labour's Foreign Policy,” New Statesman, Sep. 29, 1934; Taylor, A. J. P., The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939 (London, 1957), p. 187; Brockway, A. Fenner, Inside the Left (London, 1942), pp. 255–58, and his letter in New Statesman, Sep. 14, 1935; New Leader, July 27 and Sep. 21, 1934.

22. See, e.g., the remarks of Cocks, S., 286 H. C. Deb. 1536 (Mar. 5. 1934); Grenfell, D., 288 H. C. Deb. 150 (Apr. 10, 1934); and McEntee, R., 289 H. C. Deb. 19 (Apr. 30, 1934).

23. Times, May 16, 1934; SirSimon, J., 286 H. C. Deb. 1536 (Mar. 5, 1934), and 288 H. C. Deb. 150 (Apr. 10, 1934); see also the messages from the British delegation at Geneva, D.B.F.P., VII, Nos. 588-89.

24. On the Anglo-French relationship see Wolfers, Arnold, Britain and France between Two Wars (New York, 1940); Jordan, W. M., Britain, France and the German Problem (London, 1943); Furnia, A. S.'s idiosyncratic The Diplomacy of Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II (Washington, 1960).

25. D.B.F.P., second series, VI, No. 206 (hereafter cited as D.B.F.P., VI). The intricate disarmament negotiations of this period may be followed in: France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Négociations relatives à la réduction et à la limitation des armements, 14 octobre 1933 — 17 avril 1934 (Paris, 1934); Foreign Relations of the United States 1933, I (Washington, 1950) (hereafter cited as F.R.U.S.); Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, series C, II (Washington, 1959) (hereafter cited as D.G.F.P., II); Wheeler-Bennett, John W., The Pipe Dream of Peace (New York, 1935), pp. 184–238.

26. For reports of French dissatisfaction, which British moderates now appeared to share, see Economist, Feb. 10, 1934.

27. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 355.

28. According to Herriot, Êdouard, Jadis (Paris, 1952), II, 396, Barthou told the cabinet on March 8 that “La presse britannique évolue vers la France.”

29. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 385. This British action shows the effects of the Foreign Office “Memorandum on Germany's Illegal Rearmament and Its Effects on British Policy” of Mar. 21. Ibid., VI, No. 363. Its author(s) concluded: “the old question of French security must now be viewed, not merely as hitherto in its generalised form as part of an international Convention on Armaments, but in its more concrete form as an ingredient in the future organisation of British security against the impending menace created by Germany's uncontrolled rearmaments.” See also ibid., VI, Nos. 368, 379; Colvin, , Vansittart, pp. 34–35.

30. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 160–61; Herriot, , Jadis, II, 406–18; D.B.F.P., VI, No. 393.

31. Scott, , Alliance, p. 167. Slightly variant accounts are in Géraud, André (Pertinax), “France, Russia and the Pact of Mutual Security,” Foreign Affairs, XIII (1935), 229; and D.B.F.P., VII, No. 580.

32. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 195–97, shows that the French expected no substantial military assistance from Russia but prized her capacity to divide Germany's attention and deny Hitler the resources of the Ukraine.

33. D.B.F.P., VII, No. 613. On Soviet policy generally see Roberts, Henry, “Maxim Litvinov,” in The Diplomats, ed. Craig, G. and Gilbert, F. (Princeton, 1953), pp. 344–77; Slusser, R. M., “The Role of the Foreign Ministry,” in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. Lederer, I. J. (New Haven, 1962), pp. 215-17, 226–28; Tucker, R. C.'s Introduction, in The Great Purge Trial, ed. Tucker, R. C. and Cohen, S. (New York, 1965).

34. Milton Loventhal has kindly given me prepublication access to a set of documents which he means to identify as foreign policy resolutions of the Politburo during 1933-35. Consistent in style with other Soviet material and credible in content, these copies were reportedly conveyed to Nazi purchasers in Vienna, from whence they were sent to Berlin. Those I have examined amply confirm Soviet misgivings about Western policy and permit the accurate dating of certain decisions (or at least their formal presentment) known or inferred from other sources. May 24, for instance, is the crucial date for the developments referred to in the text. On German efforts to keep alive the “Rapallo policy,” see D.B.F.P., VII, No. 605; and D.G.F.P., II, Nos. 171, 210, 425.

35. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 168–69. Géraud, , “France, Russia and the Pact,” Foreign Affairs, XIII, 226, admitted freely that the French goal was “to organize a defensive league that will be able to deal with Germany, or better yet, a preponderant force that will overawe Germany and so compel her to observe the treaties she has made.” For a Soviet account which minimizes the anti-German character of Russian policy, see Andreyeva, M. and Vidyasova, L., “The Struggle of the U.S.S.R. for Collective Security in Europe during 1933-1935,” International Affairs (Moscow), I (1963), 107–16.

36. According to the Politburo resolution of May 23, 1934 (above n. 34).

37. Vansittart, , Mist Procession, p. 487.

38. Wolfers, , Britain and France, pp. 365–79; Windrich, E., British Labour's Foreign Policy (Stanford, 1952), pp. 110–12; Tucker, R. W., The Attitude of the British Labour Party towards European and Collective Security Problems 1920-1939 (Geneva, 1950), pp. 70-76, 166–70.

39. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 428.

40. Times, May 23, 1934; Economist, May 26, 1934; New Statesman, May 26 and June 9, 1934; Spectator, June 1 and 8, 1934; Hutton, D. G., “The European Kaleidoscope,” Nineteenth Century, CXVI (1934), 49–50; SirSmithers, W., 291 H. C. Deb. 1546-48 (July 2, 1934).

41. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 429.

42. “The Disarmament Conference: The Latest Compromise,” Bulletin of International News, X (1934), 803–12; F.R.U.S. 1934, I, 71-73, where Barthou's feelings toward Simon are described.

43. Young, G. M., Stanley Baldwin (London, 1952), pp. 179–81.

44. Times, June 30, 1934; Tucker, , Attitude of the British Labour Party, p. 168; Dalton, Hugh, Memoirs, II, The Fateful Years 1931-1945 (London, 1957), 44-45, 53–55.

45. D.G.F.P., II, Nos. 486, 491, 504.

46. Ibid., II, No. 502; D.B.F.P., VI, No. 450.

47. Ibid., VI, Nos. 454-55, 465.

48. Cameron, E. R., “Alexis Saint-Léger Léger,” in The Diplomats, pp. 383–84.

49. Having thus prepared the way, the French transmitted their version of the Eastern Pact on June 27. D.B.F.P., VI, No. 472.

50. The exchanges cited in n. 16, above, had failed to give satisfaction.

51. Maisky, , Vospominaniia, II, 259–60. The timing of Vansittart's initiative is worth remark; it came on the same day as the Clerk-Léger conversation (above, n. 47), and only two days after Simon had sent Clerk the rather discouraging instruction to volunteer no observations on the Eastern Pact, “particularly as it may never reach maturity.” D.B.F.P., VI, No. 461.

52. Ibid., VI, No. 510. Beloff, Max, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941 (London, 1947–1949), I, 112, following Bilainkin, G., Maisky: Ten Years Ambassador (London, 1944), pp. 123–24, dates the first conversation July 18, which deprives it of its point as a preliminary to Barthou's London visit. Maisky and Vansittart had a second friendly talk on August 9. D.B.F.P., VII, No. 611.

53. Maisky, , Vospominaniia, II, 261. Andreyeya and Vidyasova quote an undated dispatch in which Maisky reported that Britain would oppose the Eastern Pact because it would give the Soviets security in the West (hence freedom in the East) and would enlarge French power to an unwanted degree. Andreyeva, and Vidyasova, , “Struggle of the U.S.S.R.,” International Affairs, I, 114. The Politburo resolved on June 25, 1934, that the British were carrying on covert activities with the aim of either disrupting the Pact, or at least rendering it harmless (to po men'shei mere ‘obezvrezhenie’ proekta).

54. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 487-89. According to van Zuylen, P. (les Mains libres [Brussels, 1950], p. 308), Barthou had been willing late in May to accept disarmament, “moyennant la conclusion d'un Locarno d'Est et l'absence de tout désarmement français avant cinq ans.”

55. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 499-501, 503.

56. Scott, , Alliance, p. 182.

57. Andreyeva, and Vidyasova, , “Struggle of the U.S.S.R.,” International Affairs, I, 115. The same contention is argued in Andreyeva, M. and Dmitriyeva, K., “Na putyax ko vtoroi mirovoi voine,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (Moscow), No. 5 (1961), pp. 96–99. The evidence for the Soviet version is not exactly abundant.

58. Scott, , Alliance, p. 182.

59. 292 H. C. Deb. 675–758 (July 13, 1934).

60. On July 15 Barthou insisted upon his own understanding that arms negotiations were conditional upon German behavior. Scott, , Alliance, p. 182.

61. F.R.U.S. 1935, I, 254.

62. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 512, 515.

63. 292 H. C. Deb. 2339 (July 30, 1934). The Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug. 3, 1934, surveyed the French press and reported that only “Pertinax” read the speech pessimistically, as a disavowal of British interest in the region east of the Rhine.

64. D.B.F.P., VI, Nos. 537, 544, 551. After the Dollfuss murder Barthou resolved to keep Germany out of the Franco-Russian agreement. Scott, , Alliance, pp. 182–89.

65. D.B.F.P., VII, Nos. 609, 613, 558.

66. Ibid., VII, No. 609, n. 1.

67. Ibid., VII, Nos. 610, 616, 617. The American Ambassador in Moscow, William Bullitt, told Chilston that there was “general and genuine astonishment” at the British Government's forthright support for the Pact and that “the change of attitude of the Soviet government towards Great Britain and its undoubtedly better feeling were very marked.” Ibid., VII, No. 613.

68. Ibid., VII, Nos. 618-31. Robert Dell has left accounts in New Statesman, Sep. 22, 1934, and The Geneva Racket 1920-1939 (London, 1941), pp. 211–16, where Simon's role is harshly treated. The account in Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs 1934 (London, 1935), pp. 389–404, is full and fair.

69. Gottschalk, Louis, Understanding History (New York, 1950), p. 242.

70. D.G.F.P., series C, IV, Nos. 189, 201, 221, 234, 243, 253, 262, 462, 562.

71. This argument is implicit in such works as Furnia, Diplomacy of Appeasement; Gilbert, M. and Gott, R., The Appeasers (London, 1963); Rowse, A. L., All Souls and Appeasement (London, 1962). It becomes explicit in Soviet studies such as Trukhanovski, V. G., Vneshniaia politika Anglii na petvom etape obshchego krizisa kapitalizma (1918-1939 gg.) (Moscow, 1962), and Volkov, F. D., SSSR-Anglia, 1929-1945 gg.: Anglo-Sovetskie otnosheniia nakanune i v periode vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 1964).

72. See, for example, Colvin, , Vansittart, pp. 40–41; and Watt, D.C., “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” J.M.H., XXVIII (1956), 161 ff. Watt, D. C., Personalities and Policies (London, 1965), pp. 117, 130, 163–67, has reformulated the phasing of “appeasement” in a way which brings his position close to the one taken here.

73. Amery, Leopold, My Political Life, III, The Unforgiving Years 1929-1940 (London, 1957).

74. Maisky, , Vospominaniia, II, 279–84.

75. Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), pp. 255–56.

76. Eden, Anthony (Earl of Avon), Memoirs, II, Facing the Dictators (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 119.