This article underscores the impact of the Qing dynasty’s war making capacity and organization on non-military areas. Following a brief account of the Qing military establishment and its major operations in the first half of the dynasty, i.e., 1640–1800, it explores several important examples of how Qing military institutions interacted with the civil bureaucracy and society at large. First, through the practice of appointing officials across the divide between the civil and military bureaucracies, military personnel penetrated into the domain of the civil state apparatus, quietly transforming the Qing government’s makeup. Second, Qing military costs deeply influenced the distribution of dynastic financial resources and general administration at all levels. Finally, the Qing’s wartime logistical system engaged both the civil bureaucracy and society, opening many opportunities for both civil bureaucracy personnel and the private sector, which in turn re-shaped the local socio-economic landscape.
1 Rawski, Evelyn S., The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Crossley, Pamela Kyle, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999); Elliott, Mark C., The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
2 Fang, Chaoying, “A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 13.1 (June 1950), 192–215 .
3 On the Banner garrisons, see Soon, Im Kaye (Ren Guichun 任桂淳), Qingchao Baqi zhufang xingshuai shi 清朝八旗駐防興衰史 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1993), Elliott, The Manchu Way, 89–132, and Yizhuang, Ding 定宜莊, Qingdai Baqi zhufang yanjiu 清代八旗駐防研究 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2003).
4 Ergang, Luo 羅爾綱, Lüying bingzhi 綠營兵制 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 7–9 .
5 For Wu Sangui and his rebellion, see Yishan, Xiao 蕭一山, Qingdai tongshi 清代通史 (Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1972), vol. 1, 449–83; Wakeman, Frederic Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 1099–1105 .
6 This occurred in early 1675 when Shaanxi's provincial military commander, Wang Fuchen 王輔臣, rebelled against the Qing, killing the commander-in-chief of the Qing forces, Moluo 莫洛, throwing Shaanxi province into chaos. Arguably, this was the war's most critical moment.
7 Perdue, Peter, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, 1600–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 193–208 .
8 For Kangxi's decision and the Qing expeditions to Tibet in 1718–20, see Dai, Yingcong, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (Seattle and London: University of Washington, 2009), 76–83 .
9 Perdue, China Marches West, 270–89.
10 Eertai zoushu 鄂爾泰奏疏 (reprint: Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1991), 6a, 8a, 23b, 32a, 32b, 46b, 50a, 57a, 74a, 114a.
11 The first Jinchuan war was launched by the Qing in response to a feud among the local chieftains in the Jinchuan area in northwestern Sichuan. It lasted for more than two years, 1747–49. Although the chieftain who initiated hostilities surrendered to the Qing, this campaign was inconclusive, leaving the area unstable for the following two decades. The second Jinchuan campaign was fought 1771–76, as Qing forces again attempted to subdue the local chieftains. The war was protracted and extremely costly, about 61 million taels being spent. At the end of the war, the Qing dynasty supplanted the tribal chieftains' rule with the administrative system found in much of the rest of the empire and set up military colonies in the Jinchuan area.
12 A case in point is the Myanmar campaign, which was a disaster. See Dai, Yingcong, “A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty,” Modern Asian Studies 38.1 (January 2004), 145–88.
13 The portrait was painted by Giuseppe Gastiglione and is housed in Beijing's Palace Museum. It appears on the cover of Crossley's A Translucent Mirror, and in Perdue, China Marches West, 258.
14 On the Qing empire's northwestward expansion, see Perdue's China Marches West; Millward, James, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). In Chinese literature, the most prominent recent work includes Ruheng, Ma 馬汝珩 and Dazheng, Ma 馬大正, Qingdai de bianjiang zhengce 清代的邊疆政策 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994) and Senpo, Yuan 袁森坡, Kang Yong Qian jingying yu kaifa beijiang 康雍乾經營與開發北疆 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1991). Studies on the southwest frontier during the Qing include Hostetler, Laura, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Giersch, C. Patterson, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Sutton, Donald, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century,” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China, edited by Sutton, Donald, Crossley, Pamela K., and Siu, Helen F. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 469–508 ; “Ethnic Revolt in the Qing Empire: The Miao Uprising of 1795–1796 Reexamined,” Asia Major, third series, 16.2 (2003), 105–52; Herman, John E., Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200–1700 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet. For the Taiwan frontier, see Shepherd, John Robert, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Teng, Emma Jinhua, Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1896 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). The most comprehensive work on the Qing wars in the second half of the eighteenth century is Jifa, Zhuang 莊吉發, Qing Gaozong shiquan wugong yanjiu 清高宗十全武功研究 (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1983).
15 The most important work in this regard is Waley-Cohen, Joanne, The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), and her chapter “Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China,” in Di Cosmo, Nicola, editor, Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 278–95 and 378–80.
16 On Qing military organizations, see Elliott, The Manchu Way; Luo Ergang, Lüying bingzhi. Studies on the Qing military station in Taiwan include Xueji, Xu 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lüying 清代臺灣的綠營 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1987). On the Qing military financial system, see Feng, Chen 陳鋒, Qingdai junfei yanjiu 清代軍費研究 (Wuchang: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1992). The only systematic study of the Qing logistical system in the Qianlong period is Fushun, Lai 賴福順’s Qianlong zhongyao zhanzheng zhi junxu yanjiu 乾隆重要戰爭之軍需研究 (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1984). Yingcong Dai also published several articles on the topic, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns,” Late Imperial China 22.2 (December, 2001), 35–90 , “ Yingyun Shengxi: Military Entrepreneurship in the High Qing Period: 1700–1800,” Late Imperial China 26.2 (December, 2005), 1–67 , and “Military Finance of the High Qing Period: An Overview,” in Nicola Di Cosmo, editor, Military Culture in Imperial China, 296–316 and 380–82. On war finances of the second Jinchuan campaign, see Theobald, Ulrich, War Finance and Logistics in Late Imperial China: A Study of the Second Jinchuan Campaign (1771–1776) (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Paul Lococo Jr. has a chapter on Qing weaponry in his dissertation, “The Military Campaign to Suppress the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion, 1787–1788” (University of Hawaii, 1998). Also see Cosmo, Nicola Di, “Did Guns Matter? Firearms and the Qing Formation,” in The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time, edited by Struve, Lynn A. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).
17 Huang, Ray, Broadening the Horizons of Chinese History (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1999), 14 .
18 For the origins and evolution of the Grand Council, see Bartlett, Beatrice S., Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
19 Guy, R. Kent, Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2010), 127–45, and 356–57.
20 On how Qing military operations contributed to the building of communication networks, see Pasquet, Sylvie, L’évolution du système postal: la province chinoise du Yunnan a l’époque Qing (1644–1911) (Paris: Collège de France, Institut des hautes études chinoises, 1986), especially 179–236. In Qing Colonial Enterprise, Laura Hostetler explores the acquisition of ethnographical and cartographical knowledge in the southwest which was stimulated by Qing expansion in the area.
21 As Elliott (Manchu Way, 200–207) has demonstrated, Qing rulers tried to keep the Manchu and Mongol bannermen employed; if there were not sufficient slots in the military bureaucracy, they would be sent to other areas.
22 The phrase first appeared in the Tang dynasty. When Wang Gui 王珪 (570–639) praised Li Jing 李靖 (571–649) for his being capable of serving in both military and civil positions, Wang used the phrase chujiang ruxiang. Jing, Wu 吳兢, Zhenguan zhengyao 貞觀政要 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1978), juan 2.
23 As R. Kent Guy (Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 15) notes, fewer than half of the provincial governors (xunfu 巡撫) up to the end of the eighteenth century held the jinshi degree; the rate was only 26% during the Qianlong reign.
24 Kangxi had asked his advisors about how long a mourning period Manchu officials should observe when their parents passed away. Mingju's reply was meant to say that all Manchu officials could not serve the three-year mourning period, because they could all have military duty even when they were in the positions of civil bureaucracy. Kangxi qijuzhu 康熙起居注 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 121 .
25 Fiyanggū (1645–1701) was one of the commanders of the Qing expeditions against the Zungar Mongols in the 1690s. Furdan (d. 1752) participated in the Zungar campaigns in the 1690s, and led the war on the Zunghars in the Yongzheng period. Hailancha (d. 1793) was a Solon from Heilongjiang. Rising to prominence from the rank-and-file, Hailancha was a constant presence in the wars of the Qianlong period. Mingliyang (1735–1822) was another leading general of the Qianlong era, and one of the commanders of the campaign to suppress the White Lotus rebellion, though he experienced ups-and-downs repeatedly in his long career. Eldemboo (1748–1805) distinguished himself in the wars in the late Qianlong period, and was taken under Fuk'anggan's wing. In 1800–1803, he was the commander-in-chief of the White Lotus war.
26 Ts'ereng (d. 1756) was the grandson of Ebilun 額必隆, a general of the founding generation and one of Kangxi's regents. One of the leading generals of the Qianlong period, Ts'ereng participated in several frontier wars (he was the commander-in-chief of the Qing expedition to Tibet in 1750). But he also served as governor and governor-general on several occasions. Mingšui (d. 1768) was a general of the Qianlong period, but he served in the posts of the civil bureaucracy such as Vice Minister of Revenue. In his capacity as the Minister of War, Mingšui was named the commander-in-chief of the Qing expedition to Myanmar in 1767. Having suffered a defeat, he committed suicide in a Myanmar jungle. Agūi (1717–97)’s career exemplifies the ideal of “chujiang ruxiang.” He participated in and commanded numerous wars in the Qianlong era, and then served as one of the leading grand councilors in the last two decades of his life. Fuk'anggan (d. 1796) was the most illustrious general in the late Qianlong era, although he was also considered to have “corrupted” the military with his overspending in war. Fuk'anggan was also appointed as governor and governor-general several times and headed ministries in the central government from time to time. Cangling (1758–1838) was a Mongol bannerman. In his long career spanning the Qianlong, Jiaqing, and Daoguang reigns, Cangling shuttled between the civil and military bureaucracies, and served both in the central government and the frontiers. He was one of the most important banner generals in the early nineteenth century.
27 Necin (d. 1749) had been the chief grand councilor before he was sent by Qianlong to oversee the first Jinchuan war. Necin was executed in 1749 for mishandling of the war. Fuheng (d. 1770), who was the younger brother of Qianlong's first empress, succeeded Necin to head the Grand Council. In 1768, he was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Qing expedition to Myanmar. After the invasion's failure, Fuheng died of an illness contracted in Myanmar. Wenfu (d. 1773) served mainly in the civil bureaucracy. He was the Minister of Lifanyuan 理藩院 (Court of Colonial Affairs) when he was named co-commander of the second Jinchuan war. In 1773, Wenfu was killed when the Jinchuan forces raided and routed the Qing armies at Muguomu 木果木. Having been appointed to many important positions in the central government in the wake of the purge of Hešen 和珅 in 1799, Nayancheng (1764–1833), who was Agūi's grandson, was sent by the Jiaqing emperor to help lead the campaign against the White Lotus rebels. But Nayancheng failed to fulfill the emperor's expectations, thus losing almost all his positions. On Nayancheng's meteoric rise and disgraceful fall, see Dai, Yingcong, “Broken Passage to the Summit: Nayancheng's Botched Mission in the White Lotus War,” in Duindam, Jeroen and Dabringhaus, Sabine, editors, The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces: Agents and Interactions (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 49–73 .
28 Fuge 福格, Tingyu congtan 聽雨叢談 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 26 ; Elliott, The Manchu Way, 152–55.
29 For the situation of Chinese bannermen and their significance to the Qing during the conquest period, see Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 89–128.
30 Fuge, Tingyu congtan, 27–28.
31 On the Chinese bannermen's removal from the Banner system, see Ding, Qingdai Baqi zhufang yanjiu, 224–35; Elliott, The Manchu Way, 340–42.
32 One of them was Qingcheng 慶成, the great grandson of Sun Sike 孫思克, an outstanding Chinese bannerman in the early Qing period. Qingcheng was a leading general in the White Lotus campaign and was promoted to the position of provincial military commander first in Shaanxi and then in Hubei. Zhao, Qingshigao, juan 346.
33 Nian Gengyao (d. 1726) was Yongzheng's confidant but offended the latter by not showing the due respect after the latter became the emperor. Nian was dismissed and disgraced shortly after the Qinghai campaign and then ordered by Yongzheng to commit suicide. On the Qinghai campaign, see Perdue, China Marches West, 243–48; Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, 93–95. For a detailed account of Nian's fall, see Erkang, Feng 馮爾康, Yongzheng zhuan 雍正傳 (Shangahi: Sanlian shudian, 1999), 96–120 .
34 Nian said this in 1720 after he was appointed to be the commander of the upcoming expedition to Tibet (but he ended up staying in Sichuan). Kangxichao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian 康熙朝漢文硃批奏摺彙編, vol. 8 (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1984), 661 .
35 Dai, Yingcong, “To Nourish a Strong Military: Kangxi's Preferential Treatment of His Military Officials,” War and Society 18.2 (October, 2000), 71–91 .
36 In some TV series on the Qing dynasty in China, Nian Gengyao is depicted as a rough and bandit-like military man, who is referred to by others as “Generalissimo Nian” (Nian da jiangjun 年大將軍).
37 Fuge, Tingyu congtan, 26. Fuge was the great grandson of Yinglian 英廉 (1707–83), a grand secretary of the Qianlong period. Fuge was a magistrate in the 1850s–1860s. Tingyu congtan, 1.
38 Fuge, Tingyu congtan, 21.
39 Fuge listed only a handful of such exceptions. Tingyu congtan, 21.
40 On literary inquisition in Qing times, see Durand, Pierre-Henri, Lettrés et pourvoirs: Un procès littéraire dan le Chine impériale (Paris: École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1992), Spence, Jonathan D., Treason by the Book (New York: Viking, 2001), and Guy, R. Kent, The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987).
41 For example, in the spring of 1799 when Shaanxi dealt with the White Lotus rebels in the province, Hengrui 恆瑞, a Manchu and the Xi'an general, commented on his Chinese colleague, Qin Cheng'en 秦承恩, who was Shaanxi's governor: “Qin Cheng'en is a Chinese, not conversant with military affairs, so that his arrangements [of Shaanxi's defense] cannot be perfect.” Qinding jiaoping sansheng xiefei fanglüe 欽定剿平三省邪匪方略 (reprint: Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1970), 94, 2b.
42 DaQing lichao shilu 大清歷朝實錄 (Tokyo: Okura shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937–38), Shunzhi period, 6, 9a–11a. 112, 7a–b.
43 Military colonies were set up in some areas throughout the Qing dynasty, especially Xinjiang in the wake of the elimination of the Zunghar empire. See Perdue, China Marches West, 324–57. However, the method was never the major or universal means to support the armies.
44 DaQing lichao shilu, Shunzhi period, 137, 9a-9b.
45 DaQing lichao shilu, Shunzhi period, 136, 22a.
46 Numerous memorials in this regard can be found in Weiren, Zhang 張偉仁 ed., Ming Qing dang'an 明清檔案 (Taipei: The Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica, 1986–95), A1–A9.
47 Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian 清代檔案史料叢編, vol. 4 (Beijing, Gugong bowuyuan, 1979), 1–2 .
48 Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, vol. 4, 34–37 and 40; DaQing lichao shilu, Kangxi period, 4, 9b; 5, 8b–19a; 5, 19b–20a.
49 In 1661, the Qing state severely punished the participants of a tax protest in Jiangnan. See Kessler, Lawrence D., Kangxi and the Consolidation of Qing Rule: 1661–1684 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 33–34 ; Dennerline, Jerry, “Fiscal Reform and Local Control: The Gentry-Bureaucratic Alliance Survives the Conquest,” in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, edited by Wakeman, Frederic Jr. and Grant, Carolyn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 86–120 .
50 For a case study on the Qing's exactions in Shaanxi during the Shunzhi period, see Xue, Chen 陳雪, “Chuanyun yu Hanyun: Shunzhi nianjian Shaanxi de junliang choucuo” 川運與漢運：順治年間陝西的軍糧籌措, Qingshi yanjiu 1 (2016), 83–93 .
51 DaQing lichao shilu, Kangxi period, 32, 22a.
52 DaQing lichao shilu, Kangxi period, 183, 8b.
53 For detailed discussion of Kangxi's lenient attitude toward his military officials, see Dai, “To Nourish.”
54 Kangxichao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 8, 836.
55 Dai, “To Nourish.”
56 Chen Feng, Qingdai junfei yanjiu, 8–9.
57 Provinces where military expenditures were over 80% of their total expenditures included Guangdong (86.90%), Fujian (86.01%) and Sichuan (83.28%). See Dunstan, Helen, “The Finance of Imperial Munificence: How Simple Quantitative Work Can Help Us Rethink High-Qing History,” T'oung-Pao 100 (2014), 188–89.
58 I have presented this argument in The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet by exploring the changing strategic significance of Sichuan for the Qing state.
59 There are also different estimates on the percentage of the taxes retained in the provinces. According to Shi Zhihong 史志宏, 25%–33% of the total tax income was delivered to Beijing each year. See Zhihong, Shi, Qingdai Hubu yinku shouzhi he kucun tongji 清代戶部銀庫收支和庫存統計 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2009), 1 .
60 Dunstan, “The Finance of Imperial Munificence.”
61 To help the two armies acquire extra income, Qing state pushed them into entrepreneurship by issuing capital funds to the army units, letting them make profits from setting up businesses themselves or investing their capital with merchants. See Yingcong Dai, “Military Entrepreneurship in the High Qing Period.”
62 For example, during the second Jinchuan war, about 40% of the total war funds were from a number of provinces. Theobald, War Finance and Logistics, 121–37.
63 After 1800, the central treasury no longer disbursed funds to the war; war funds basically came from provincial treasuries, merchant donations, and other sources. Overall, more than 14 million taels of silver were extracted from the provinces in this protracted war. For a detailed account of this situation, see Yingcong Dai, The White Lotus War in Late Imperial China (unpublished manuscript).
64 Shi, Qingdai Hubu yinku shouzhi he kucun tongji, 45, 109–11; Feng, Chen, “ Qingdai caizheng zhichu zhengce yu zhichu jiegou de biandong 清代財政支出政策與支出結構的變動,” in Chen Feng, Qingdai caizhengshi lungao 清代財政史論稿 (Beijing: shangwu yinshuguan, 2010), 139–43, 145–47.
65 Perdue, Peter, “Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia” Modern Asian Studies 30.4 (1996), 757–93.
66 For the origins of the logistical bureaus, see Chen, Qingdai junfei yanjiu, 265. For their role during the two Jinchuan wars, see Yingcong Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns,” 45–48; Theobald, War Finance and Logistics, 34–36.
67 It was usually the case that expectant personnel were awarded offices when a war was concluded. In 1721, in the wake of the Tibetan expedition, Nian Gengyao requested to appoint them to vacant positions in Shaanxi and Sichuan, which was endorsed by Kangxi. See Kangxichao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian, vol. 8, 838. It also occurred in the wake of the Zunghar campaigns in the 1690s, the two Jinchuan campaigns, the Gurkha campaigns, and the White Lotus war.
68 Wang Chang (1725–1806) participated in the Myanmar campaign and the second Jinchuan campaign on the staff of the campaigns' commanders. He penned Zheng Mian jilüe 征緬紀聞 and Shujiao jiwen 蜀徼紀聞 on the two campaigns. Zhao Yi (1727–1814) was on Fuheng's staff during the Myanmar campaign and was on Li Shiyao's (the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang) staff during the campaign against Lin Shuangwen's rebellion in Taiwan. He wrote Huangchao wugong jisheng 皇朝武功紀盛, which records seven Qing military campaigns.
69 Qianlongdi 乾隆帝, Yuzhi shiji 御製詩集 (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), juan 23.
70 Qianlongdi, Yuzhi shiji, juan 20.
71 Yi, Dai 戴逸, “Qianlongdi he Beijing de chengshi jianshe” 乾隆帝和北京的城市建設, Qingshi yanjiu ji 清史研究集, 6 (1988), 37 .
72 Erxun, Zhao 趙爾巽, Qingshigao 清史稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), juan 268, Mishan's biography.
73 This occurred in the second Jinchuan campaign. The families of the laborers who died in action or of illness were entitled to compensation of 2–4 taels of silver. See Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force,” 52. However, laborers' death compensation was not stipulated in Junxu zeli.
74 Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force,” 75.
75 Dai, The White Lotus War.
76 Qinding Hubu zeli 欽定戶部則例, 1865 edition (reprint: Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), 73, 41a, and 79, 26a–b.
77 Qinding Hubu junxu zeli 欽定戶部軍需則例 (reprint: Haikou, Hainan chubanshe, 2000), juan 1.
78 An early case of issuing shanghao to the troops occurred in the first Qing invasion of Tibet in 1718–20, when Nian Gengyao used his own salary to buy silks to award his soldiers. See Nian Gengyao Man Han zouzhe yibian, 210–11. In the first Jinchuan campaign, Fuheng, the special commissioner sent by the Qianlong emperor to supervise the war, did the same thing. But it was Fuheng's son, Fuk'anggan, who greatly abused this practice, spending large amounts of the war funds to buy gifts for his troops in all the wars he led in the late Qianlong era, which was repeatedly criticized by the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820). In 1802, the Ministry of Revenue officially renounced this practice. Qinding jiaoping sansheng xiefei fanglüe, 344, 14a–15b.
79 Yuan, Wei 魏源, Sheng wu ji 聖武紀 (reprint: Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), juan 11.
80 Qinzheng pingding shuomo fanglüe 親征平定朔漠方略 (reprint: Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 1987), 13 , 24a; 14, 8a–b; 18, 29b–30a.
81 For instance, the “commercial streets” occurred in the second Jinchuan war. See Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force,” 64–88.
82 DaQing lichao shilu, Jiaqing period, 39, 17b–18a; Qinding jiaoping sansheng xiefei fanglüe, 90, 18b–19a. See also Dai, The White Lotus War.
83 Lai Fushun, Qianlong zhongyao zhanzheng zhi junxu yanjiu, 100, and map 3 in appendix; DaQing lichao shilu, Qianlong period, 1219, 25–26; Pasquet, L’évolution du système postal, 179–229.
84 For example, Peter C. Perdue presents a convincing case in China Marches West that the Qing expansion to the northwest facilitated the development of commerce between China proper and Xinjiang by building infrastructure, providing security and unifying currency, among other things. Perdue, China Marches West, especially 378–406. On commerce in Xinjiang after the fall of the Zunghar empire, see Millward, Beyond the Pass, 113–93.
85 Giersch, C. Patterson, “‘A Motley Throng’: Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700–1880,” Journal of Asian Studies 60.1 (February 2001), 67–94 .
86 Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force,” 78–80.
87 Dai, The White Lotus War.
88 Perdue, Peter C., Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500–1850 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), 75–76 .
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