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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 April 2020
Cuban emigration in the post-Soviet period has largely been attributed to economic motivations, but without significant racial analysis. Moreover, little is known about how black Cubans on the island think about emigration. It is therefore imperative to re-examine how blacks, once cited as the Cuban Revolution's loyalists, make decisions today about remaining in Cuba and/or pursuing economic security outside of its borders. Using original survey data of black Cubans on the island, I find that economic motivations are prominent among black Cubans, but that these motivations can be multifaceted. In a study of black Cubans and emigration, the issue of increasing racial inequality and racial exclusion has significant influence on economic opportunity, which in turn influences the desire to leave Cuba to achieve economic and professional success. The results have implications for the ways in which we analyse migration throughout the Latin American region, where race has not been factored into why people migrate.
La emigración cubana del periodo post-soviético ha sido en buena medida atribuida a motivaciones económicas, pero no ha contado con un análisis racial significativo. Aún más, se sabe poco sobre lo que los cubanos negros en la isla piensan acerca de la emigración. Resulta imperativo reexaminar cómo los negros, en un tiempo citados como leales a la revolución cubana, toman decisiones hoy sobre permanecer en Cuba y/o buscar una seguridad económica fuera de sus fronteras. Utilizando datos de una encuesta original a negros cubanos en la isla, encuentro que las motivaciones económicas son prominentes en estos cubanos, pero que estas pueden ser multifacéticas. En un estudio sobre negros cubanos y emigración, la creciente desigualdad y exclusión racial tiene una influencia significativa sobre las oportunidades económicas, la que a su vez influye en los deseos de dejar Cuba para lograr éxito económico y profesional. Los resultados tienen implicaciones importantes para el análisis de la migración a lo largo de Latinoamérica, donde la raza no ha sido tomada en cuenta en por qué la gente migra.
A emigração cubana após o período soviético foi em grande parte atribuída à motivações econômicas, mas sem nenhuma análise racial significativa. Além disso, pouco se sabe sobre a opinião dos cubanos negros da ilha no que diz respeito à emigração. E isso é fundamental na reavaliação de como os negros de Cuba - antes citados como a demografia mais leal da revolução - decidem hoje entre permanecer em Cuba e/ou uma segurança econômica fora do país. Com base em dados originais de pesquisa feita com negros cubanos, determinei que motivações econômicas são proeminente entre os mesmos, mas tais motivações podem ser multifacetadas. Em um estudo sobre negros cubanos e emigração, a crescente desigualdade e exclusão racial tem grande influência em oportunidades econômicas, que por sua vez influencia o desejo de deixar Cuba em busca de sucesso profissional e econômico. Os resultados têm implicações na maneira como analisamos migração dentro de todas as regiões da América Latina, onde raça não foi um fator considerado entre os motivos pelos quais as pessoas migram.
1 For example, historian María Cristina García argues that because racial equality and racial segregation were immediately identified as one of the goals of the Revolution, blacks were optimistic about their future if they remained in Cuba. They were also among the economically marginalised in Cuba and served to gain access that they did not possess prior. See María Cristina García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006). Nonetheless, the Revolution also publicised much of the racism and brutality of the Jim Crow period in Cuba, which also affected some black Cubans’ decisions to stay.
2 The majority of Cubans living abroad are in the United States and according to the 2010 US Census, 85 per cent of Cubans self-identify as white.
3 Clealand, Danielle Pilar, The Power of Race in Cuba: Racial Ideology and Black Consciousness during the Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sawyer, Mark, Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.
4 For an analysis of racial differences among recently arrived immigrants in the United States, see Aguirre, Benigno and Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, ‘Does Race Matter among Cuban Immigrants? An Analysis of the Racial Characteristics of Recent Cuban Immigrants’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 34: 2 (2002), pp. 311–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 For literature on Cubans who have emigrated, see Ackerman, Holly, ‘The Balsero Phenomenon, 1991–1994’, Cuban Studies, 26 (1997), pp. 169–200Google Scholar; Aja, Alan A., Miami's Forgotten Cubans: Race, Racialization, and the Miami Afro-Cuban Experience (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Newby, Alison C. and Dowling, Julie A., ‘Black and Hispanic: The Racial Identification of Afro-Cuban Immigrants in the Southwest’, Sociological Perspectives, 50: 3 (2007), pp. 343–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Berg, Mette Louise, Diasporic Generations: Memory, Politics and Nation among Cubans in Spain (Oxford: Berghahn, 2011)Google Scholar; Krull, Catherine and Stubbs, Jean, ‘“Not Miami”: The Cuban Diasporas in Toronto and Montreal, Canada’, in Tabío, Luis René Fernández, Wright, Cynthia and Wylie, Lana (eds.), Other Diplomacies, Other Ties: Cuba and Canada in the Shadow of the US (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), pp. 267–303CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Although blacks have been included in survey and interview data, the ways in which race directly affects immigrants’ decisions and experiences are not directly examined within emigration scholarship.
8 Aguirre and Bonilla-Silva, ‘Does Race Matter among Cuban Immigrants?’
9 Blue, Sarah, ‘The Erosion of Racial Equality in the Context of Cuba's Dual Economy’, Latin American Politics and Society, 49: 3 (2007), pp. 35–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Sawyer, Racial Politics.
10 Prieto, Mayra Espina and González, Viviana Togores, ‘Structural Change and Routes of Social Mobility in Today's Cuba: Patterns, Profiles and Subjectivities’, in Domínguez, Jorge, Pérez, Omar Everleny, Prieto, Mayra Espina and Barberia, Lorena (eds.), Cuban Economic and Social Development: Policy Reforms and Challenges in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 261–90Google Scholar; Mesa-Lago, Carmelo and Pérez-López, Jorge, Cuba under Raúl Castro: Assessing the Reforms (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013)Google Scholar.
11 In 2004, US dollars were taken out of circulation and replaced with CUC.
12 Eckstein, Susan, ‘Immigration, Remittances, and Transnational Social Capital Formation: A Cuban Case Study’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33: 9 (2010), pp. 1648–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 These numbers are likely under-reported, as those with or without state jobs may be self-employed on the side with unregistered jobs or without licenses (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, Cuba).
14 Much of the microcredit is in fact for homeowners to make repairs on their homes. See Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, Institutional Changes of Cuba's Economic Social Reforms: State and Market Roles, Progress, Hurdles, Comparisons, Monitoring and Effects (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014)Google Scholar.
15 While there is no record of families who send money to Cuba, the self-reported racial make-up of Cuban Americans in the US Census (4.6 per cent identified as black) suggests that the majority of those who receive remittances in Cuba are white (2010 US Census; Clealand, The Power of Race in Cuba).
16 Housing patterns, still racially segregated in many areas of Havana, do not allow for Afro-Cubans to benefit from the option of renting rooms to tourists or opening up private restaurants, as do many white Cubans living in more attractive, central neighbourhoods.
17 Clealand, The Power of Race in Cuba.
18 The literature has identified the emergent sector as the dollarised sector that includes tourism, other joint ventures and employment in foreign companies. See Prieto, Rodrigo Espina and Ruiz, Pablo Rodríguez, ‘Raza y desigualdad en la Cuba actual’, Temas, 45 (Jan.–March 2006), pp. 44–54Google Scholar.
19 Others who have occupations that allow for travel abroad, such as musicians, academics, etc., can also earn hard currency at much higher rates.
20 See López, Gustavo, Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States, 2013 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015)Google Scholar.
21 Spadoni, Paolo, Cuba's Socialist Economy Today: Navigating Challenges and Change (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014)Google Scholar.
22 Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, Cuba under Raúl Castro.
23 Ritter, Archibald and Henken, Ted A., Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015)Google Scholar.
24 President Bill Clinton implemented the Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy in 1995 to limit the number of Cuban immigrants who were eligible for political asylum. Prior to this policy, the US Coast Guard brought Cubans found at sea to the United States.
25 Eckstein, Susan, The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland (New York: Routledge, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Aja, Antonio, ‘La emigración de Cuba en los años noventa’, Cuban Studies, 30 (winter 2000), pp. 1–25Google Scholar; Duany, Jorge, ‘Revisiting the Cuban Exception: A Comparative Perspective on Transnational Migration from the Hispanic Caribbean to the United States’, in Fernández, Damián (ed.), Cuba Transnational (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005), pp. 1–23Google Scholar; Eckstein, The Immigrant Divide; Grenier, Guillermo and Pérez, Lisandro, The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2003)Google Scholar.
27 Antonio Aja, ‘La emigración de Cuba’.
28 Blue, Sarah, ‘Internationalism's Remittances: The Impact of Temporary Migration on Cuban Society’, International Journal of Cuban Studies, 5: 1 (2013), pp. 41–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 Portes, Alejandro and Puhrmann, Aaron, ‘A Bifurcated Enclave: The Economic Evolution of the Cuban and Cuban American Population of Metropolitan Miami’, Cuban Studies, 43 (winter 2015), pp. 40–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Eckstein, ‘Immigration, Remittances, and Transnational Social Capital Formation’.
30 Grenier, Guillermo and Gladwin, Hugh, FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 2016)Google Scholar.
31 Aja, ‘La emigración de Cuba’.
32 The vast majority of émigrés of the early wave held deep hostility toward the Castro government and Cubans of this wave wielded (and continue to wield) enough power in the US political realm to push the continuance of the US embargo against Cuba as long as the government remained communist.
33 The FIU Cuba Poll accounts for race, but the sample of non-whites is too small to draw conclusions about race and political attitudes.
34 Gosin, Monika, ‘“A Bitter Diversion”: Afro-Cuban Immigrants, Race, and Everyday-Life Resistance’, Latino Studies, 15: 4 (2017), pp. 4–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
35 Clealand, The Power of Race in Cuba.
36 Ibid.; Blue, The Erosion of Racial Equality.
37 de la Fuente, Alejandro, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001)Google Scholar; Benson, Devyn Spence, ‘Owning the Revolution: Race, Revolution, and Politics form Havana to Miami, 1959–1963’, Transnational American Studies, 4: 2 (2012)Google Scholar, available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5sb9d392#main (last access 27 Nov 2019).
38 Casal, Lourdes, ‘Revolution and Race: Blacks in Contemporary Cuba (Washington, DC: Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, 1979)Google Scholar.
39 Overall, blacks suffered more from illiteracy, lack of educational access, lack of political access, and economic exclusion when compared to whites, coupled with informal segregation that kept whites in power. For data on racial inequality during the Republican period, see Casal, Revolution and Race; de la Fuente, Alejandro and Glasco, Laurence, ‘Are Blacks “Getting out of Control”? Racial Attitudes, Revolution and Political Transition in Cuba’, in Centeno, Miguel Angel and Font, Mauricio (eds.), Toward a New Cuba? Legacies of a Revolution (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997)Google Scholar; Robaina, Tomás Fernández, El negro en Cuba, 1902–1958: Apuntes para la historia de la lucha contra la discriminación racial (Havana: Editorial de ciencias sociales, 1990)Google Scholar; de la Fuente, A Nation for All.
40 Casal, Revolution and Race.
41 Zeitlin, Maurice, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.
42 Casal, Revolution and Race.
43 Sawyer, Racial Politics.
44 There is evidence that there was private acknowledgement of racism among black Cubans during the first decades of the Revolution, but this conversation was prohibited at a more public level. Sarduy, Pedro Pérez and Stubbs, Jean (eds.), AfroCuba: An Anthology of Cuban Writing on Race, Politics and Culture (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Afro-Cuban Voices: On Race and Identity in Contemporary Cuba (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000)Google Scholar; Clealand, The Power of Race in Cuba.
45 De la Fuente and Glasco, ‘Are Blacks “Getting out of Control”?’
46 Aguirre and Bonilla-Silva, ‘Does Race Matter among Cuban Immigrants?’
47 One of the survey collection sites was a symposium where most of the respondents lived in other provinces and the survey does not represent only those residing in Havana.
48 Nonetheless, I am Afro-Caribbean and am read as a mulata in Cuba, rather than a US national.
49 The respondents were all black Cubans identified by a dual process. First, they were identified by my colleague and me by phenotype and according to the Cuban racial schema and then, after we approached them, they self-identified. My colleague and I discussed each respondent before approaching him or her to ensure that we were in agreement about whether the person would be considered black by Cuban racial standards. These racial standards consider those of mixed race, or mulatos, in a separate racial category from blacks. Research in other Latin American countries has found that often racial self-identification does not match with interviewer identification, primarily due to non-whites identifying as lighter than they may be identified by others (see Telles, Edward E., Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar). My finding in Cuba is that there is a high level of agreement between self-identification and interviewer identification in that those considered black in Cuba self-identify as such. In my implementation of the survey we only received four denials to complete the survey because someone who we identified as black identified as mulato. Moreover, Mark Sawyer found in his study of racial identification in Cuba (see Sawyer, Racial Politics) that there was significant agreement between both interviewer and self-identification among not only blacks, but all races.
50 It should be noted that the main focus of this survey was racial identity and attitudes regarding racism, and the question on emigration was in this context. Although it is difficult to assess how honest respondents were about such sensitive topics, I received many detailed responses regarding discrimination, personal experiences and attitudes about emigration that would not lead me to believe that there was a fear to candidly respond to these questions. On the contrary, many respondents talked with me at length about the survey after its completion.
51 This final category was included because many respondents expressed the desire to see other countries.
52 Pedraza, Silvia, Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press), p. 209Google Scholar
53 Eckstein, Susan and Krull, Catherine, ‘From Building Barriers to Bridges: Cuban Ties Across Straits’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 20: 2 (2009), pp. 322–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
54 Bobes, Velia Cecilia, ‘Reformas en Cuba: ¿Actualización del socialismo o reconfiguración social?’, Cuban Studies, 44: 1 (2016), pp. 165–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
55 In 2008 there were also three hurricanes, Gustav, Ike and Paloma, which hit Cuba. Although none passed directly over Havana where the surveys were taken, the storms affected the economy significantly.
56 Oscar Reinaldo Figueredo and Dianet Doimeadios Guerrero, ‘En la Mesa Redonda: Cuba apuesta por una migración legal, ordenada y segura hacia los Estados Unidos’, Cubadebate, 13 Jan. 2017, available at www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2017/01/13/en-la-mesa-redonda-cuba-apuesta-por-una-migracion-legal-ordenada-y-segura-hacia-los-estados-unidos-video/#.XdWhsy2ZNBw (last access 27 Nov. 2019).
57 Krull and Stubbs, ‘“Not Miami”’.
58 Berg, Diasporic Generations.
59 Blue, ‘Internationalism's Remittances’.
60 All quotes in this section on economics and living standards are anonymous survey responses from written surveys conducted by Danielle Clealand and Cuban colleagues, Havana, 2008–10.
61 All quotes in this section on race, economy and migration are anonymous survey responses from written surveys conducted by Danielle Clealand and Cuban colleagues, Havana, 2008–10.
62 All quotes in this section on motivations to stay are anonymous survey responses from written surveys conducted by Danielle Clealand and Cuban colleagues, Havana, 2008–10.
63 Clealand, The Power of Race in Cuba.
