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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2009
Recent explanations of the crisis in Uruguay have tended to focus either on the inadequacies of economic policy in the 1950s, or on the financial and moral implications of the social legislation of Uruguay. This article puts forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, finding the fundamental causes of it in the manner in which modernizing forces were reconciled to traditional structures in the early decades of this century. The first section discusses the nature of the economic crisis, its immediate causes and some of its political repercussions. The second analyses Uruguay's reputation for political and social modernity. The third suggests the origins of the crisis in the policies of José Batlle y Ordóñez and the consequences they have had. The sections, therefore, broadly correspond to three different perspectives on the crisis–the first economic, the second political, the third historical.
1 See Daly, Herman E., ‘The Uruguayan Economy: Its Basic Nature and Current Problems’, Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7, 3 (1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daly, Herman E., ‘An Historical Question and Three Hypotheses Concerning the Uruguayan Economy’, Inter-American Economic Affairs, 20, 1 (Summer 1966)Google Scholar; Redding, David C., ‘The Economic Decline of Uruguay’, Inter-American Economic Affairs, 20, 4 (Spring 1967).Google Scholar
2 Asociación de Bancos del Uruguay, Resumen de los Principales Aspectos de la Actividad Económica del Uruguay en el Año 1968 (Montevideo, 1969), Table 2/3.Google Scholar
3 Per capita income data from Resumen de los Principales Aspectos, op. cit., various years.
4 Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico (CIDE), Estudio Económico del Uruguay: Evolución y Perspectivas (Montevideo, 1963), vol. 2, Anexo Estadístico, Table 33, and 1, ch. 1, 22.Google Scholar
5 Ibid., 1, ch. 11, 152.
6 Ibid., 1, ch. 1, 19.
7 Ibid., ch. 11, 48.
8 Robinson, E. A. G. (ed.), Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (London, Macmillan, 1960), esp. ch. II and pt. vi.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Agricultural census data on the stock of sheep and cattle are as follows (in millions):
1900 1908 1916 1924 1930 1937 1943 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966
Cattle 6.8 8.2 7.8 8.4 7.1 8.3 6.3 6.8 8.2 7.4 8.8 8.2
Sheep 18.6 26.3 11.5 14.4 20.5 17.9 20.3 19.6 23.4 23.3 21.7 23.1
Source: Solari, Aldo E., Néstor Campiglia, Germán Wettstein, Uruguay en Cifras (Montevideo, Universidad de la República, 1966), p. 161.Google Scholar
10 According to the Censo Agropecuario 1956, 81.7% of the territory of Uruguay consisted of natural grassland. Barely 4 5% of the utilizable grassland was reported to be sown to artificial pasture or fodder crops at the beginning of the 1960s. UN ECLA/FAO, Livestock in Latin America; Status, Problems and Prospects (E/CN. 12/620; New York, 1962), 1, 58.Google Scholar
11 Ibid., pp. 57–8.
12 CIDE, op. cit., 1, ch. 11, 19.
13 Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Departamento de Investigaciones Económicas, Producción Agropecuaria (Montevideo, 05 1966), pp. 45–6.Google Scholar
14 The report made by Enrique V. Iglesias on the policy of the Central Bank at the time of his resignation in 1968 as its first President concluded: ‘The lack of understanding on the part of large sectors of the community of the magnitude of the whole crisis shaking the country makes the work of the Government difficult and at times misconstrued; and gives rise to unjustified reactions from social groups. Much of this incomprehension is due to a great lack of clear and undistorted information … I consider that the Government should be frank in making its ideas explicit. Obviously it can offer nothing but sacrifices to all sectors. But these will be better received if it is clearly seen that the Government is striving for justice and proposing solutions.’ The report was published in La Mañana (Montevideo, 28 August 1968).
15 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938.)
16 Coleman, James S., ‘Conclusion: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas’, in Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S. (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 534.Google Scholar The other two countries were Israel and Chile.
17 See, for example, Lindahl, Göran G., ‘Uruguay: Government by Institutions’, in Needler, Martin C. (ed.), Political Systems of Latin America (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1964)Google Scholar: ‘Today Uruguay is noted for its political stability and its democratic ways and has a reputation as a country of advanced social legislation’ (p. 447).
18 In 1933 the collegiate executive was overthrown by Gabriel Terra; the 1934 Constitution restored the one-man presidency. The coup of 1942 instigated by Baldomir produced only minor constitutional changes. See Taylor, Philip B. Jr, Government and Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans, Tulane University, Tulane Studies in Political Science, vol. 7, 1960), ch. 11.Google Scholar
19 Indeed, it is argued by Lindahl, Göran G., Uruguay's New Path: A Study in Politics During the First Colegiado 1919–33 (Stockholm, Library and Institute of Ibero-American Studies, 1962)Google Scholar, that ‘In reality, a multi-party system has now been in existence in Uruguay for four decades’ (p. 273).
20 Literally meaning motto, the word lema denotes the name of a political party or group of parties. By registering the lema with the Electoral Court, the party or group obtains the right to the exclusive use of the lema. The Lema Law is discussed by Lindahl, , Uruguay's New Path, pp. 38–40.Google Scholar See also Taylor, , op. cit., ch. 111.Google Scholar
21 Surveys were conducted among specialists from the U.S. on Latin America in 1945, 1950, 1955 and 1960, to ascertain the degree of democracy in each country. On each occasion Uruguay emerged as the most democratic of the Latin American countries in the opinion of the specialists. See Fitzgibbon, Russell H. and Johnson, Kenneth F., ‘Measurement of Latin American Political Change’, American Political Science Review, vol. 55, no. 3 (09 1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Solari, Aldo, El Desarrollo Social del Uruguay en la Postguerra (Montevideo, Editorial Alfa, 1967). pp 151–60.Google Scholar
23 ‘… the filling of elective offices leads him [the politician] to an income level normally much higher than he had in his previous occupation, and the loss of office would signify unemployment or a considerable drop in his financial situation. Evidently there are only two solutions, not mutually exclusive, to this problem: corruption, or the creation of a special ordinance of protection for the politician … Since the system of corruption has not been institutionalized, only the other route has remained open, and Uruguay has travelled it with growing enthusiasm in recent years. Its best-known mechanism, provoking the greatest scandal, is the special retirement system for the politician.’ Solari, , op. cit., pp. 152–3.Google Scholar
24 Taylor, , op. cit., pp. 53–5.Google Scholar
25 Solari, , op. cit., pp. 155–9Google Scholar; Finch, Elizabeth A., ‘The Politics of Regional Integration: A Case-Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA’. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Liverpool University, 1970, pp. 201–3, 253–63.Google Scholar
26 Johnson, John J., Political Change in Latin America (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 45.Google Scholar
27 This reversal is the central theme of de Azúa, Carlos Real, El Impulso y Su Freno (Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1964).Google Scholar
28 Detailed recent estimates of net migration for the years after 1910 suggest that figures for earlier periods may be exaggerated. See Pereira, Juan José and Trajtenberg, Raúl, Evolución de la Población Total y Activa en el Uruguay 1905–1957 (Montevideo, Instituto de Economía, 1966).Google Scholar Tables 52–3, and cf. Oddone, Juan Antonio, La Formación del Uruguay Moderno: La Inmigración y el Desarrollo Económico-Social (Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1966), p. 57.Google Scholar The estimates employed by Oddone were made in 1939.
29 Rama, Carlos M., ‘Batlle y el Movimiento Obrero y Social’, Batlle: Su Obra y Su Vida (Montevideo, Editorial ‘Acción’, 1956), p. 40.Google Scholar
30 Vanger, Milton I., José Batlle y Ordóñez of Uruguay: The Creator of His Times, 1902–1907 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 166–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
31 The pacto del chinchulín between the majority factions of the Blanco and Colorado parties determined that the boards of directors of public corporations should be appointed in the proportion that the lemas were represented in the collegiate executive.
32 El Día (Montevideo, 3 April 1908), quoted in Hanson, , op. cit., p. 23.Google Scholar
33 Hanson, , op, cit., p. 126.Google Scholar
