We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2015
Since the founding of the Journal of Law and Religion, burgeoning numbers of distinctively interdisciplinary approaches have appeared in the study of law including feminist jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, critical and postmodern legal studies, and law and religion. These approaches enrich the theoretical and practical dimensions of law. Nevertheless, in response to such conversations, the legal academy has been buffeted by disciplinary impulses toward marginalization, tribalism, and balkanization. These impulses can attenuate the prospects for interdisciplinary conversations by simplifying plural realities and multifarious foci into dichotomies (“us” and “them”) or totalities (“us”).
They reflect the conceptual challenges of the complexity of culture, which, according to theologian David Tracy, includes “a diminishment of belief in the possibility of authentic civic discussion in the community.” This diminishment of belief in discussion on a broader civic level has also contributed to facile assumptions about the unlikelihood of interdisciplinary conversations between law and religion.
1. Tracy, David, The Analogical Imagination; Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 11 (Crossroad 1981)Google Scholar.
2. The literature on these issues is extensive. See Greenawalt, Kent, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness vol. 1 (Princeton U. Press 2006)Google Scholar and Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and Fairness vol. 2 (Princeton U. Press 2008)Google Scholar; Witte, John Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential Rights and Liberties (Westview Press 2000)Google Scholar; Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton U. Press 2005)Google Scholar; Nussbaum, Martha, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (Basic Books 2008)Google Scholar; Eisgruber, Christopher and Sager, Lawrence, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Harv. U. Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Perry, Michael J., Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (Oxford U. Press 1997)Google Scholar.
3. Among the relevant works, see Bourdieu, Pierre, In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology (Adamson, Matthew trans., Stanford U. Press 1990)Google Scholar, especially Fieldwork in Philosophy 3-33, From Rules to Strategies 59-75, and Social Space and Symbolic Power 122-139. As will be discussed below, Bourdieu influences Kathryn Tanner's theological method; for her critical appreciation for Bourdieu, see Tanner, Kathryn, Economy of Grace 10–22 (Fortress Press 2005)Google Scholar. The influence of Bourdieu on Luhmann is less than Parsons and Weber in part because Luhmann finds Bourdieu's discourse too self-insulating (“In others words, Bourdieu's analyses make it possible to converse about Bourdieu and his analyses.” Luhmann, Niklas, Art as a Social System 323, n. 36 (Stanford U. Press 2000))Google Scholar. There have been some attempts to identify more explicit connections between Bourdieu and Luhmann. See e.g. Bruun, Hans Henrik, Objectivity, Value Spheres, and ‘Inherent Laws: On Some Suggestive Isomorphisms between Weber, Bourdieu, and Luhmann, 38 Phil. Soc. Sci. 97–120 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4. These criteria resemble, in some ways, Joseph Raz's four problems (of existence, identity, structure, and content) as the criteria for a complete theory of legal system. See Raz, Joseph, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5. See e.g. Posner, Richard, Frontiers of Legal Theory (Harv. U. Press 2001)Google Scholar and The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Harv. U. Press 2002)Google Scholar.
6. I follow here Lisa Sowie Cahill and her discussion of theology's contribution to pubic bioethics debates. She insists 1) that secular bioethics has “thick” assumptions (in its privileging of the market or science) and 2) that theological bioethics must retrieve its “thick” symbols and stories in order to enhance public debate and transform unjust models of health care. See Cahill, Lisa Sowie, Theological Bioethics: Participation, Justice, and Change 13–43 (Georgetown U. Press 2005)Google Scholar. In her Economy of Grace, Tanner develops a similar framework for theology and economics. Differing from her method from other theological accounts that view economic questions merely in theological terms, Tanner considers theology and economics “under the rubric of ‘economy’ in a very broad sense, and that is what allows them to be considered together so directly…. Theology and economics enter the same universe of discourse—discourse on economy—and can be directly compared on that basis.” Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at x. Her method therefore mandates that she critically juxtapose theology and economics point-by-point and engage the complex workings of contemporary capitalism (id. at 88). In thinking more generally about the contributions of theology to public debate, Tanner insists that religious persons do not seek to persuade others of the religious premises underpinning their argument; nonetheless, she declares the necessity of articulating these premises: “If Christians are to make a distinctive contribution [to public debates], they should be able to interject into public debate both religious premises and conclusions about collective life drawn from those premises.” Tanner, Kathryn, Public Theology and the Character of Public Debate in The Annual of the Socy. of Christian Ethics 79, 95 (1996)Google Scholar. She later adds that the goal of such debate should not be measured in terms of weak consensus but by the depths of exchange: “A fruitful debate also depends of the character of the proposals entertained, enriched by the distinctive perspectives that the various interlocutors bring to the debate.” Id. at 98.
7. Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at 10.
8. Luhmann, Niklas, Soziale System 290 (Suhrkamp 1984)Google Scholar, as cited in Habermas, Jürgen, Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation of the Philosophy of the Subject through Systems Theory, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, in Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought 383 (Lawrence, Frederick trans., MIT Press 1991)Google Scholar.
9. For an analysis of Luhmann's reception by Anglo-American scholars (and rejoinders to frequent criticisms), see King, Michael, The Construction and Demolition of the Luhmann Heresy, in Law's New Boundaries: The Legal Consequences of Autopoiesis 123–156 (Přibaň, Jiří & Nelken, David eds., Ashgate 2001)Google Scholar.
10. Postliberal theology itself resists monolithic characterization. For an account of the general features and varieties of postliberal theology, see Hunsinger, George, Postliberal Theology, in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology 42–57 (Vanhoozer, Kevin ed., Cambridge U. Press 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11. For example, in her study of the incarnation, Tanner draws upon the early Greek Fathers, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, the Reformers, Karl Rahner, Karl Barth, and contemporary figures in Eastern Orthodoxy. See Tanner, Kathryn, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Fortress Press 2001)Google Scholar.
12. Lindbeck, George, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 16 (Westminster Press 1984)Google Scholar.
13. Id. at 16.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 39.
18. Id. at 120.
19. Id. at 114.
20. Tanner, Kathryn, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology 76 (Fortress Press 1997)Google Scholar.
21. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, supra n. 12, at 131.
22. See for example Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 147. In her systematic reflection on the incarnation, Tanner abjures the lack of consensus at efforts of Christian witness as causes for contestation and despair. Rather, this history and her interpretation of it are meant to be empowering for theologians; she thus develops an account “without suggesting that any of this is forced on theologians hoping to address current needs and challenges to the faith in particular contexts.” Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at xvii.
23. This is not to say that the system of Aquinas does not envision and critique other positions within Christian theology. The scholastic method of Aquinas is predicated upon an examination of the state of the question (disputatio) that identifies and adjudicates different perspectives. However, the synthetic character of Aquinas' method—one that integrates Scripture, seminal theologians (notably Augustine but also thinkers such as Dionysius the Areopagite, Peter Lombard), and “the Philosopher” (Aristotle), “the Interpreter” (Averroes) and “the Rabbi” (Moses Maimonides)—as well as his sanguine construal of theological anthropology, rationality, epistemology, the mediation of reason and revelation, and the import of natural law affirm harmony over conflict.
24. Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at xv.
25. Tanner submits that in undertaking the constructive dialogue and intellectual contest with other theologians “one should make figuring out what Christianity is all about one's personal responsibility.” Id. at xvi.
26. This is Tanner's overarching objective in The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Fortress Press 1992)Google Scholar.
27. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 142.
28. For example, Tanner writes: “But for Lindbeck the diversity of theological judgment seems to have its roots solely in external influences; without them, properly socialized Christians would, it seems, form the same judgments.” Id. at 158.
29. Id. at 158.
30. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 6.
31. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 148.
32. In a footnote, Lindbeck notes: “The type of theology I have in mind could also be called ‘postmodern,’ ‘postrevisionist,’ or ‘post-neo-orthodox,’ but ‘postliberal’ seems best because what I have in mind postdates the experiential-expressive approach which is the mark of liberal method.” Lindbeck The Nature of Doctrine, supra n. 12, at 135, n. 1.
33. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 38.
34. Id. at 39-40.
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 90.
38. Id. at 158.
39. Many thinkers identify the postliberal/correlationist-revisionist paradigms as the fault lines for modern/postmodern theology. For analysis and constructive proposals to mediate them, see Lints, Richard, The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy or Lindbeck?, 61 J. Am. Academy Religion 655–677 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reynolds, Terrence, Walking Apart, Together: Lindbeck and McFague on Theological Method, 77 J. Religion 44–67 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Heyer, Kristin, How Does Theology Go Public? Rethinking the Debate between David Tracy and George Lindbeck, 5 Political Theology 307–327 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
40. Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation, Being and God vol. 1, 3 (U. Chi. Press 1951)Google Scholar.
41. Id. at 8.
42. See e.g. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 9 and Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 63. Compare with Paul Tillich's comments on the relationship between religion and culture in Theology of Culture 42 (Kimball, Robert ed., Oxford U. Press 1959)Google Scholar; Systematic Theology: Life and the Spirit, History of the Kingdom of God 158 (vol. 3, U. Chi. Press 1963)Google Scholar; and On the Idea of a Theology of Culture, in What is Religion? 160 (Adams, James Luther ed., Harper & Row, Publishers 1969)Google Scholar.
43. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 66.
44. Tracy, David, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology 32 (U. Chi. Press 1996)Google Scholar.
45. Id. at 46.
46. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 256.
47. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 116.
48. Id. at 98. In similar regard, she mentions the transformation of pagan moral virtues into a Christian moral code. Though she does not identify it, an exemplary example would be Augustine's reinterpreting the four cardinal virtues as grounded in reason into expressions of love. Among his works, see his City of God and On the Morals of the Catholic Church. In On Christian Doctrine, Augustine also discusses Christian appropriation of the “spoils of Egypt.” Augustine, , On Christian Doctrine II, XL, 60 (Robertson, D.W. Jr. trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1958)Google Scholar.
49. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 113.
50. Id. at 123 (emphasis in original). See also Tanner, Kathryn, Postmodern Challenges to ‘Tradition’, 28 Louvain Stud. 175, 192 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
51. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 136.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Tanner, Postmodern Challenges to ‘Tradition’, supra n. 50, at 183.
55. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 134.
56. Tanner notes that the “text is somehow still in control of its reception” and that “a text's capacity to function as a classic is … something internal to the text.” Tanner, Kathryn, Scripture as Popular Text, 14 Modern Theology 279, 284–285 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57. Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method 290 (2d, rev. ed., Weisheimer, Joel & Marshall, Donald trans., & rev. Continuum 2004)Google Scholar.
58. Id. at 304.
59. Tanner, Scripture as Popular Text, supra n. 56, at 295-296.
60. Id. at 296. The creation of this motion is not limited exclusively to a hermeneutically open Biblical exegesis. In mining the history of Christian thought on the incarnation, Tanner envisages her theological task as one focused on “expanding the range of imaginative possibilities.” Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at xviii.
61. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at viii.
62. In his study of doctrine and politics, Hugh Nicholson draws upon Tanner and Talal Asad's criticisms of Clifford Geertz to abrogate Lindbeck's flawed conception of the political. See Nicholson, Hugh, The Political Nature of Doctrine: A Critique of Lindbeck in Light of Recent Scholarship, 48 Heythrop J. 858–877 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
63. Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at 29.
64. Id. at 32.
65. Tanner, Kathryn, Creation, Environmental Crisis, and Ecological Justice, in Reconstructing Christian Theology 99, 102–103, 103–113, 118 (Chopp, Rebecca S. & Taylor, Mark Lewis eds., Fortress Press 1994)Google Scholar.
66. This is Tanner's general strategy in numerous of her writings. This applies equally to her explicit consideration of case-studies as well as to her systematic theology. With respect to the latter, Tanner writes: “Action is the proper response to take with respect to a world that is not the way it should be, because, although human action does not bring about life in God (that is God's unconditional gift to us), human action of a certain sort is what life in God requires of us.” Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at 120. For further analysis, see Helmer, Christine, A Systematic Theological Theory of Truth in Kathryn Tanner's Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology, 57 Scottish J. Theology 203, 218 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
67. For example, in contrast to Parson's theory of a general system of action, Luhmann views functional differentiation as the product of evolution. Luhmann, Niklas, Law as a Social System 490 (Kastner, Fatima, Nobles, Richard, Schiff, David & Ziegert, Rosamund eds., Ziegert, Klaus trans., Oxford U. Press 2004 (1993)Google Scholar.
68. For Luhmann's criticisms of Durkheim and Weber, see e.g. Luhmann, Niklas, A Sociological Theory of Law 14–19 (Albrow, Martin ed., King, Elizabeth & Albrow, Martin trans., Routledge 1985Google Scholar (originally published as Rechtssoziologe in 1972)). Luhmann's theory of system is influenced by innovative conceptions of system, notably Brown, George Spencer, Laws of Form (Allen & Unwin 1969)Google Scholar.
69. Luhmann, Niklas, Durkheim on Morality and the Division of Labor, in The Differentiation of Society 18 (Holmes, Stephen & Larmore, Charles trans., Colum. U. Press 1982)Google Scholar.
70. Luhmann, Talcott Parsons: The Future of a Theory, in id. at 53.
71. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 78.
72. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 78. As he puts it later, “the basic problem of law: the congruent generalization of normative behavior expectations.” Id. at 115.
73. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 126.
74. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law 94 (emphasis in original) (2d ed. Oxford U. Press 1994)Google Scholar. For Hart's full analysis of primary and secondary rules, see id. at 79-99.
75. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 125.
76. Id. at 130.
77. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 45.
78. Raz, supra n. 4, at 183.
79. Id. at 189.
80. Id. at 210.
81. Id. at 212.
82. King, Michael & Thornhill, Chris, Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Politics and Law 37 (Palgrave MacMillan 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
83. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 273.
84. See Wagner, Gerhard, The End of Luhmann's Social Systems Theory, 27 Phil. Soc. Sci. 387, 390–391 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wagner contends that Luhmann's aspirations fail in that his systems-theoretic sociology presupposes (modern) Hegelian foundationalist claims about unity underlying dialectics.
85. See e.g. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 181& 212, and Luhmann, Art as a Social System, supra n. 3, at 41-44.
86. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 113 (emphasis in original).
87. Luhmann, Interaction, Organization, and Society, in The Differentiation of Society, supra n. 69, at 70.
88. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 133.
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id. at 281 (emphasis in original). For a similar point, see Luhmann, Niklas, The Unity of the Legal System, in Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society 14 (Teubner, Gunther ed., deGruyter 1988)Google Scholar.
91. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 85.
92. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 284.
93. Luhmann, Art as a Social System, supra n. 3, at 11.
94. See Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J., Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living (D. Reidel Publg. Co. 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Supporters of Luhmann caution that his appropriation of autopoiesis from biology is not simple borrowing; rather, “[i]t derives from a cognitivist broadening of the whole of the problematics of reflexivity.” Jean Clam, The Specific Autopoiesis of Law: Between Derivative Autonomy and Generalized Paradox, in Law's New Boundaries, supra n. 9, at 47.
95. Luhmann, Niklas, Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing, 24 New Literary Hist. 763, 767 (1993)Google Scholar.
96. Id. at 774.
97. Gunther Teubner is another leading exponent of law as autopoiesis. See for example Gunther Teubner, Alienating Justice: On the Surplus Value of the Twelfth Camel, in Law's New Boundaries, supra n. 9, at 21-44.
98. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 81.
99. Id. at 83.
100. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 283; id. at 283.
101. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 107.
102. Id. at 112.
103. Id. at 101.
104. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 288.
105. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 118-119.
106. Id. at 233.
107. Id. at 243.
108. Id. at 297.
109. Id. at 307.
110. Id. at 455.
111. Id. at 467.
112. Habermas, The Normative Content of Modernity, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, supra n. 8, at 343.
113. Id. at 353. Similar points are noted by Roger Cotterrell, The Representation of Law's Autonomy in Autopoiesis Theory, in Law's New Boundaries, supra n. 9, at 97, and Milbank, John, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason 130 (Blackwell 1990)Google Scholar.
114. Habermas, Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation of the Philosophy of the Subject Through Systems Theory, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, supra n. 8, at 369.
115. Id. at 372. As Habermas explains, metaphysics attempts to ask what lies behind the “for us” of physical appearances; metabiological similarly begins with the “for itself of organic life and goes beyond it. Id. at 372.
116. Id. at 385.
117. See e.g. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 42-57.
118. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 353.
119. Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 70.
120. Luhmann, Interaction, Organization, and Society, in The Differentiation of Society, supra n. 69, at 73 (emphasis in original).
121. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, supra n. 113, at 97, 104.
122. Luhmann, Niklas, Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies (Beyer, Peter trans., Edwin Mellen Press 1984)Google Scholar.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 28. For example, Luhmann extrapolates theological convictions (e.g., justification by faith alone) to be an “unequivocal function of differentiation.” Id. at 59.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
127. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 60.
128. Luhmann, Religious Dogmatics and the Evolution of Societies, supra n. 122, at 94-95.
129. Id. at 99.
130. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 59-60.
131. Tanner submits that Milbank's radical orthodoxy overstates the Christian call for conversion: “Despite the use in Christianity of this sort of language as a rhetorical trope making clear the weighty significance of conversion, the idea that Christian life is led in a new society is difficult to sustain empirically.” Tanner, Theories of Culture, supra n. 20, at 97.
132. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 39.
133. Id. at 69.
134. Tanner, Public Theology and the Character of Public Debate, supra n. 6, at 96.
135. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 114.
136. Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at 75. In more general terms, Tanner describes the connections between humans as creatures of God and humans as responsive agents: “Action is the proper response to take with respect to a world that is not the way it should be, because, although human action does not bring about life in God (that is God's unconditional gift to us), human action of a certain sort is what life in God requires of us.” Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at 120.
137. Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at 90. See also Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at 95.
138. Tanner, Economy of Grace, supra n. 3, at 121.
139. See Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, and the Trinity, supra n. 11, at 71-72, and The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 231. Tanner therefore opposes Luther's proposals for the orders of creation (id. at 81-85), Catholic and Protestant models of natural law (id. at 85-90), and other aspects of theological systems that seemingly promote preservation of the order of the status quo. Though, as noted, she is generally in agreement with Barth's theological method, on this point Tanner censures Barth's distorted hierarchical account of male-female relations (id. at 132, n. 3 & 141, n. 15).
140. Id. at x.
141. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 71.
142. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, supra n. 68, at 98.
143. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 115.
144. Id. at 119.
145. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
146. Tanner, The Politics of God, supra n. 26, at 61.
147. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 158.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Farley, Margaret A., Ethics, Ecclesiology, and the Grace of Self-Doubt, in A Call to Fidelity: On the Moral Theology of Charles E. Curran 55–75 (Walter, James, O'Connell, Timothy & Shannon, Thomas eds., Georgetown U. Press 2002)Google Scholar.
150. Witte, John Jr., God's Joust, God's Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition 461 (William B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 2006)Google Scholar.
151. Levinson, Sanford, Our Papalist Supreme Court: Is Reformation Thinkable (Or Possible)?, in Law and the Sacred 117 (Sarat, Austin, Douglas, Lawrence & Umphrey, Martha Merrill eds., Stan. U. Press 2007)Google Scholar.
152. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, supra n. 67, at 213.
