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Diplomatic Security Failure in Benghazi, Libya, September 11, 2012

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2023

BRIAN J. CONSTANTINE Open the ORCID record for BRIAN J. CONSTANTINE [Opens in a new window]  and
ADAM M. MCMAHON Open the ORCID record for ADAM M. MCMAHON [Opens in a new window]
BRIAN J. CONSTANTINE
Affiliation:
Rider University
ADAM M. MCMAHON
Affiliation:
Rider University
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Abstract

Terrorists attacked the United States diplomatic compound and adjoining CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012. Despite repeated warnings from officials about the security risks in Tripoli and Benghazi, we argue that intelligence, security, and organizational deficiencies within the Department of State created vulnerabilities contributing to the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stephens. Scholarly assessment of these failures has been precluded as a consequence of the incident’s use in partisan attacks. Republicans in Congress used investigations into the incident to damage presumed 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton, who was then President Obama’s secretary of state. Setting aside political considerations and examining the failures that led to the attack is important to protect diplomatic personnel abroad in the future.

Keywords

terrorismdiplomatic securityState DepartmentBenghaziLibya
Type
Article
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , July 2023 , pp. 414 - 434
Copyright
© Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press, 2023

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References

NOTES

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