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The Malayan Union and the Historians

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

M. R. Stenson
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Extract

J. de V. Allen's recently published monograph on the Malayan Union will have served its purpose if it redirects the attention of historians to ‘an event whose importance was only possibly exceeded by the things which seem to crowd it out of the historical books — the Japanese occupation of 1943–1945, the emergency which began in 1948, and the declaration of independence from Britain in 1957’.1 In his often fascinating elaboration of what is essentially the accepted, almost traditional, account of the Malayan Union's demise, Allen argues that the scheme (which provided for the amalgamation of the pre-war Federated and Unfederated Malay States and the crown colonies of Periang and Malacca into a unitary colony which would provide the basis for eventual independence by granting citizenship to the great majority of the existing population) represented a recognition by British planners of the advantages of administrative centralisation, of the permanence of settlement of many Chinese and Indian inhabitants and of the loyal support of the Chinese during the Japanese occupation. The scheme failed because it was deliberately foisted upon the Malay Sultans (who were required to cede their sovereignty) in great haste, because it took inadequate consideration of Malay attitudes and political forms, thus arousing united Malay and ex-Malayan Civil Servant opposition, and because it aroused no interest among the Chinese and Indians. Therefore the Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya, which safeguarded the traditional leadership role of the Sultans, which allayed Malay fears of ‘alien’ domination and which yet offered ‘generous’ citizenship rights to the non-Malays. In this manner, so the account goes, a gross error of judgement was rectified and the groundwork laid for progress towards independence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian History , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , May 1969 , pp. 344 - 354
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1969

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References

1. Allen, J. de V., The Malayan Union, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1967.Google Scholar

2. Allen, , pp. 47, 48, 52.Google Scholar

3. Allen, , p. 47Google Scholar, suggests that the Malay Sultans were concerned about sovereignty not citizenship yet no apparent attempt was made by the British to offer a federal constitution while retaining liberal citizenship provisions.

4. Allen, , p. 23Google Scholar, Other historians have concluded that the non-Malays were apathetic with regard to the Malayan Union but none have put the case as positively as Allen, , c.f. Kennedy, J., A History of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 1965, p. 267Google Scholar; Milne, R. S., Government and Politics in Malaysia, Boston, 1967.Google Scholar

5. Purcell, V., ‘A Malayan Union: The Proposed New Constitution’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XIX no. 1, 03 1964, p. 38.Google Scholar

6. M. V. del Tufo concluded that the statistics constituted ‘positive evidence and no mere suggestion of a general intention amongst the Chinese community to settle in Malaya’ although the same could not be said so categorically of the Indians. Report on the 1947 Census of Population, pp. 85–61.Google Scholar

7. It must be remembered that Sir Edward Gent and Malcom MacDonald were almost completely dependent upon the advice of former BMA officials for their assessment of the situation in mid–1946.

8. Many such reports would state that the ‘leftists’ were, ‘of course’, critical but would then refer to Chinese apathy. As the ‘leftists’ monopolised Chinese political organisation, the old, conservative towkays being thoroughly discredited, such estimates were, to say the least, hardly objective assessments of the attitudes of the whole Chinese community. The Indians were regarded as unimportant.

9. Purcell, V., The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London 1965, p. 321.Google Scholar

10. See e.g., Allen, p. 19Google Scholar; Ratnam, K. J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, pp. 54–57.Google Scholar

11. Gullick, J. M., Malaya, London, 1964, p. 94Google Scholar, Ratnam, , pp. 144 and 151.Google Scholar

12. Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs, no, 14, October 1947, p. 12.

13. The left-wing press continued to criticise the Malayan Union and to call for democratic representation throughout 1946. All Malayan Democratic Union and General Labour Union rallies, and there were many, passed resolutions in such terms.

14. See e.g. Lock, Tan Cheng, Malayan Problems from a Chinese Point of View, ed Lee, C. Q., Singapore 1947, Appendix I, p. 164.Google Scholar

15. There can be little or no doubt about the primacy of the MCP in organising the AMCJA.

16. Gullick, , p. 94.Google Scholar

17. The People's Constitutional Proposals for Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.Google Scholar

18. See e.g. reports of speeches by MacDonald, in Indian Daily Mail 6, 21 10 1947.Google Scholar

19. Not one non-Malay political party was represented,. The trade union members represented but a very small, mainly English speaking section of the work-force. The business and professional members represented small, if powerful, minority interests which were divided over the constitutional issue.