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The Canning Mission to Burma of 1809/10
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2011
Extract
The Canning mission of 1809/10 lacks a clearly defined central theme. John Canning was sent to Burma by the British Indian Government to secure Burmese acquiescence in the British blockade of the French Isles of Mauritius and Bourbon, the centres of French privateer activity in the Indian Ocean. While in Burma, however, Canning entered, without authority from his government, into an understanding with the Ein-gyi Paya, or Heir Apparent to the throne of Burma, by which the latter could appeal to the British upon the death of the King for military help against rivals who were expected to contend for the throne themselves. Two further issues arose: King Bodawpaya, Canning discovered, claimed the eastern portion of Bengal on the ground that in the past the area had been subject to Arakan, which still had a right over it that the Burmese had inherited after their conquest of that state in 1785. He also wanted direct relations with the King of England, on the ground that the Governor-General, having only delegated and not sovereign authority, was his inferior in rank. The King was also by this time very capricious and impulsive at times; he was capable of issuing rash, imperious orders, which would have serious consequences if as sometimes happened they were actually carried out. Traces of rashness and imperiousness seem to be present in his behaviour in 1810 even though his viewpoint on eastern Bengal and on sovereignty had nothing to do with peculiarities of temperament.
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References
1 Bengal Political Consultations (BPC), 20 July 1809, no. 24.
2 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 12 (1974), p. 835.Google Scholar
3 Bannerjee, A.C., The Eastern Frontier of British India (Calcutta, 1965), p. 180.Google Scholar
4 BPC, 20 July 1809, no. 24.
5 Burmese maritime trade was mostly with British dependencies. In 1798, Captain Hiram Cox reported that Burmese exports by sea were 700,000 ticals annually and imports, 1.2 million ticals. Burma was a very important trading partner for the British in the east and the shipbuilding industry in Bengal was wholly dependent on teak imports from Burma for its supply of wood. Reliable trade figures for later years are not available to the writer at the present moment but it is possible that trade declined because of the attacks of French privateers who were waging a campaign against British shipping in the Indian Ocean. However, Burma was still the only source of wood for Bengal shipbuilders.
6 BPC, 20 July 1809, no. 24.
7 Duties of 5% on exports and 10% on imports were payable to the King while the King and officials of the provincial government collected certain other duties. Franklin, W., Tracts etc. on the Dominions of Ava and the Northwestern parts of Hindustaun (London, 1811), pp. 116–17Google Scholar. Besides this, there were individuals at Rangoon engaged in trade and shipbuilding. As stated earlier, the volume of trade may have declined since the 1790s, because of the French privateers, and in such a case, the revenue would have declined also. However, Canning reported that the trade yielded the King a lucrative revenue. Also, the Ein-gyi Paya had thought the Rangoon trade worth preserving. (BPC. 29 May 1810, no. 1, 18 Feb. and 8 May). It may be assumed therefore that even if the trade had declined it was still valuable to the Burmese and this meant that good relations with the British were important. By contrast, there was no trade with the French.
8 Canning provided the Rangoon Government with a written explanation on the blockade and also had discussions with them. His written explanation was as follows: the French had declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade; the British, in order to avoid harming their allies, had waited three years before retaliating but had at last declared the French possessions of Mauritius and Bourbon to be in a state of blockade too. Perhaps with a view to bringing out Britain's naval superiority, Canning explained the difference between the British and French systems of blockading: the British actually had ships at the French Isles, while the French merely forbade trade with the British Isles. He continued by observing that neutrals in Europe did not regard the seizure of their vessels on account of a blockade as an act of hostility but that Asian nations, who had not heard of this practice, might do so. Besides, there were mischiefmakers in Burma who would attribute the blockade to motives of hostility. The Burmese were being informed of the existence of the blockade “to prevent any vessel sailing under the flag of His Burmah Majesty from exposing itself to the danger attending an attempt to hold communication with these Isles”. (BPC, 26 Dec. 1809, no. 57, enclosure 1.) Canning concluded by pointing out (as instructed by Calcutta) that the matter was really outside the hands of the Government of India; they could not modify the decisions of the Government in Britain which had sent the orders concerning the blockade to the squadron of the Royal Navy at the Cape of Good Hope, without previous communication with India. The Burmese were assured that the blockade would be lifted as soon as the French Isles were occupied, or the war with France concluded.
9 BPC, 14 Nov. 1809, no 24; BPC, 26 Dec. 1809, no. 57; and BPC, 9 Jan. 1810, no. 72.
10 BPC, 9 Jan. 1810, no. 72.
11 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, entry for 18 Feb.
12 Although the King was absolute, it was possible that a good many of the actual decisions were taken by others. However, according to Canning this was not the case in 1810; the King's authority was needed for almost everything.
13 Hall, D.G.E., Michael Symes, Journal of his Second Embassy to the Court of Ava in 1802 (London, 1955), p. 140Google Scholar. Writing in 1802, he stated that the change began four years previously, i.e., in 1798. The cause or causes of this change cannot be identified with certainty. In 1802, Symes and Luigi de Grondona, the Italian Roman Catholic bishop at the capital, thought that the change was due to advancing age. Canning in 1812 (as will be seen) thought that the King's excesses were mainly due to his having possessed absolute authority for a long time. It seems likely also that the repeated disasters his armies suffered in Siam from 1798 onwards had psychological repercussions. Incessant worry over the fate of his son in a succession struggle and, after 1808, of his grandson of whom he was very fond would have been normal in a parent and may have had psychological repercussions too.
14 Ibid., p. 165, 162. See also, Ibid., p. 240. “The King, as he advances in years grows daily more violent and ungovernable; and it is with great difficulty that the old ministers prevent his issuing the most destructive orders.” (Communication from Grondona to Lt. Canning) Grondona also considered that the King lacked “prudence and delicacy” in his proceedings. (Ibid., p. 236.)
15 Ibid., pp. 198–99.
16 Bengal Secret Consultations (BSC), 20 June 1805, no. 440, entry for 7 June.
17 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, 18 Feb.
18 Ibid., 3–5 Mar. 1810.
19 Ibid., 24 Feb. 1810.
20 BSC, 12 June 1812, no. 24, par. 16. Don Luigi de Grondona, who was still at the capital, warned Canning that the King was “proud to excess”, was “often of a bilious humour incapable of reason”, and might be capable of playing some trick (Ibid., enclosure 18).
21 BSC, 25 Sept. 1812, no. II, par. 31.
22 Ibid., par. 31.
23 Loc. cit.
24 Ibid., par. 45.
25 Ibid., pars. 22–23.
26 BSC, 19 Feb. 1813, no. 6. The King also wished to have the Myowun executed at least partly for having allowed Canning to leave, but changed his mind apparently because he realized that he had actually averted a serious and unnecessary crisis.
27 BSC, 25 Sept. 1812, no. 11, par. 46.
28 BSC, 25 July 1817, no. 29; BPC, 19 Sept. 1817, no. 8.
29 BSC, 1 May 1818, no. 104; and Wilson, H.H., Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War no. 6 (Calcutta, 1827).Google Scholar
30 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, entry for 18 Feb.
31 Some scanty and contradictory information is available in Phayre, A., A History of Burma (London, 1967), p. 232Google Scholar, and Harvey, G.E., History of Burma (New York, 1967), p. 295Google Scholar. Judson, E., The Life of Adoniram Judson (New York, 1883)Google Scholar, is a little more useful. Adoniram Judson was a missionary who lived at Rangoon during the succession crisis of mid-1819. Excerpts from his diary were published, by his son in the book mentioned above. To judge from these, the crisis of 1819 was resolved extremely rapidly, within two weeks at most, possibly much sooner. Several appeals were sent to the current Myowun of Pegu (the same official who had suggested to Canning in 1809 that the British help the Ein-gyi Paya) to hasten to the capital with all his troops, presumably to help his friend the Ein-gyi Paya, but the crisis was apparently resolved before he could set out, or at most within two days of his departure. In the circumstances British aid was not necessary. Had a protracted war of succession ensued, it is possible that the Ein-gyi Paya would have appealed to the British.
The Burmese Chronicle, the Konbaungiet Mahayazawin, should contain more details on the succession crisis of mid-1819.
32 Hall, op. citv p. 199.
33 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, entry for 19 Feb.
34 The statement was misleading in the first place because the King of England (or the Government of Britain) did not have the feelings towards Burma imputed to him by Canning, and in the second place because Canning had been sent to Burma not as a mark of particular regard for the Burmese King but for quite other reasons — because the Burmese were expected to be badly affected by the blockade, to prevent victimization of British traders, and so forth.
35 See Harvey, op. cit., p. 140–47, Phayre, op. cit, pp. 78–80, pp. 177–80. Details concerning Arakanese overlordship of Bengal in the middle ages can be found in the following article (which the present writer has not been able to consult): Hosten, “The Twelve Buiyas or Landlords of Bengal”, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1913. The Arakanese chronicle ought to contain information on this subject too.
36 This was explicitly stated in a letter from the Hlutdaw to the Vietnamese Council of Ministers. See Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, II June 1824, Governor of Prince of Wales Island to Lord Amherst, enclosing Hlutdaw's letter.
37 Wilson, op. cit., no. 21 (c).
38 Cox, H., Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Empire (Westmead, England, 1971), p. 302–3Google Scholar and Wilson, op. cit., no. 6.
39 This cannot be demonstrated in full here, for lack of space, but see BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, entries for 17 Feb., 18 Feb., 20 Feb., 22 Feb., 26 Feb., and App. 8. The King was constantly talking to people about the claim and possessed maps of the region in his rooms. Canning claimed that the instigators of the claim were a colony of Brahmins from northern India who were living at the capital and the Myowun of Ramree who was also at the capital then. These persons could not have been the first to suggest the idea to the King, as Canning believed, since it is clear from Cox's journal that the claim was known to the King in 1797. The possibility that they had some role in reviving his interest in it cannot be ruled out, but cannot be proved either. In view of the wealth of the region, and the fact that the Burmese could make a valid claim to it according to their own rights, their presence was not necessary. The Myowun of Ramree told Baba Sheen that he had asked the King his opinion of it several times but denied having incited him (Ibid., 21 Feb.). Also, Canning's interpreter, Rowland, saw some Brahmins and Muslims talking about the ease with which the region could be conquered from the British (Ibid., 20 Mar.). This suggests that the Brahmins might also have discussed the claim with the King (assuming that they enjoyed access to him). Canning also reported that the Brahmins had asserted that the claim could be proved from Sanskrit records and that some of them had gone to India to make maps of Chittagong, Dacca, and the island of Sandwip (Ibid., 12 Feb.).
40 Ibid., 18 Feb.
41 Ibid., 18 Feb.
42 Ibid., 18 Feb. This remark is further evidence that the King had a tendency towards rash action. Also, Baba Sheen had warned Canning (Ibid., 12 Feb.) that the members of the mission might be held by the King as hostages for the surrender of the region. This did not happen; but the fact that such a warning was given was significant.,
43 BSC, 1 May 1818, no. 104.
44 Wilson, op. cit., no. 31, for Hlutdaw's letter; and Crawfurd, J., Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava (London, 1829), App. 10, p. 95Google Scholar, testimony of Adoniram Judson for views of Burmese officials. However, the belief that the Burmese invaded Bengal in May/June 1824 in order to enforce their claim is mistaken. See the present writer's paper, “The Outbreak of the First Anglo-Burmese War”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Dec. 1978. The Burmese incursions of May/June 1824 had the limited objective of securing rebel leaders living in British territory, and the surrender of the former ruler of Cachar whom the Burmese intended to restore to his throne as a tributary ruler.
45 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, entry for 21 Feb.
46 Ibid., 28 Feb.
47 Ibid., 11 Mar. Lord Minto's letter to the King gave a long list of his titles (BPC, 20 July 1809, Governor-General to King of Ava, 15 July).
48 Ibid., App. 8. The King had not claimed eastern Bengal in this letter; he had suggested only that the “exact limits” of the two countries be defined. For reasons that are not clear, he seems to have intended to bring the claim up at a later stage; probably after, the King of England had sent officials to determine the “exact limits” of the two countries. It is certain that the King was not thinking of a delineation of the frontier between Arakan and British Chittagong; there is no evidence whatever to suggest that he was interested in such a thing, in contrast to the wealth of evidence showing his interest in eastern Bengal. Also, nothing very important was involved in such a delineation, and it would not have been worth sending Canning back without a reply on the blockade for such a reason.
49 Ibid., 17 Mar,, and Canning's observations on mission, 8 May.
50 BPC, 28 Jan. 1814, Carey to Canning, no. 52; and BPC, 7 Oct. 1815, Hlutdaw to Governor-General, no. 87. Also, in 1812, the King was willing to receive Canning, the Governor-General's agent; and he actually gave Canning's sub-interpreter an audience in that year. He also instructed the Myowun of Pegu to write to the Governor-General to ask for the surrender of refugee leaders. (BSC, 19 Feb. 1813, no. 6) in 1812, and subsequently addressed the Governor-General often through provincial viceroys.
51 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, App. 9.
52 Ibid., 17 Mar.
53 Desai, W.S., “Events at the Court and Capital of Ava during the First Anglo-Burmese War”, Journal of the Burma Research Society 27 (1937): 2–3.Google Scholar
54 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, App. 9.
55 Ibid., 20 Mar.
56 Ibid., 20 Mar.
57 Ibid., App. 10.
58 Marshal Daendels in Java, who headed a regime allied to the French, had sent an agent to Burma for the purpose of “establishing an alliance with the Burmese Government for the subversion of the British Empire in India”. (Bengal Secret and Separate Consultations, 30 Oct. 1809, Instructions to Captain Canning, 30 Oct. 1809.) The agent, Lt.-Col. de la Houssaye fell into British hands before he could reach Burma. The Calcutta Government wrote to Canning, informing him of this development and asking him to defeat any French intrigues which were already afoot. Canning, who received this letter on his return to Rangoon, had of course no intrigues to report. He also arranged for someone at Rangoon to send copies of all letters from the French and the Dutch to the Calcutta Government. It was presumably from this person that Canning obtained a copy of the Myowun's letter.
59 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, App. 14. The Myowun was presumably not aware that the King had not wanted to give an answer on the blockade; otherwise, he would surely not have given one.
60 Ibid., App. 14.
61 Ibid., Canning's observations, 8 May.
62 Burma was at war with Siam and its existing armed strength was already committed. It seems impossible that an attack on the British could be carried out at this stage. A large army could not have been raised. The male inhabitants of the Irrawaddy Valley who had not been conscripted had mostly either withdrawn into the interior to escape conscription or the heavy taxes charged in lieu of conscription, or had formed rebel bands which were very active. One was led by a pretender to the throne. The Government seemed to lack the troops to suppress even these bands. It may be noted in passing that opposition to the King had reached such a stage that attempts were made to burn down towns. Both Rangoon and Amarapura were burnt down during Canning's short stay. (Ibid., 21 Dec, 9 Feb., 8 Mar., 8 May).
63 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 2.
64 Ibid., no. 2.
65 The following biographical details are available: John Canning (1775–1824); Major, 53rd Bengal Native Infantry; baptized Ilmington, Worcestershire, 11 Dec. 1775; Cadet, 1799; arrived in India 7 Jan. 1801; Ensign, 12 Aug. 1800; Lieutenant, 8 Oct. 1800; Captain, 16 Dec. 1814 [sic]; Major, 1 Mar. 1824; died Calcutta, 2 Sept. 1824; 3rd and youngest son of Francis Canning, of Foxcote, Warwick; married, 11 Sept. 1807, Mary Anne, daughter of Sir John Randall Meredyth, Baronet, and widow of Sir John Fitzgerald Anster; Services: Commander, Murshidabad Provincial Battalion, 30 Oct. 1807, till 1819; Embassy to Ava, 1812–13 [sic]; A.D.C. to Governor-General, 1821–23 and 1824; First Burma War: accompanied Brig. Gen. Sir Archibald Campbell to Rangoon in May 1824, in a political capacity; returned to Calcutta owing to ill-health, 1 Sept. 1824, and died within eighteen hours of landing. (Source: Hodson, , List of the officers of the Bengal Army, London, 1947.)Google Scholar
66 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, 28 Feb., 8 Mar., 22 Mar., and 8 May.
67 Ibid., 21 Feb.
68 See n. 62 above.
69 BPC, 29 May 1810, no. 1, 9 Mar.