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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2011
During World War II, Britain and the United States differed over the postwar status of Indochina. Although the United States made several strong statements about restoring the prewar possessions of the French Empire, the Americans, especially President Franklin D. Roosevelt, increasingly came to favour an international trusteeship guiding postwar Indochina to eventual independence. The British were not at first prepared to guarantee the complete restoration of the French Empire. With surprising slowness, the British did gradually sponsor the prompt return of French colonial authority in Indochina. British postwar planning had shown how dangerous a hostile or unfriendly France and French Empire could be to the security of the British Isles and British Empire. The British determination to reestablish the French connection coincided with a refusal by Roosevelt to enter any discussions about the postwar status of Indochina. The presidential silence only served to promote Anglo-French colonial interests. After Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman did not challenge the return of French control in Indochina. Ironically, despite the earnest — but seldom expressed — American intentions to underwrite indigenous dreams of independence, the people of Indochina subsequently associated the United States with Western suppression of those dreams.
1 This paper incorporates research through primary sources, including government documents recently declassified in the United States and the United Kingdom, largely as the result of a Fulbright Scholarship and funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities and The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Another version of this paper was presented in December 1978 to the American Historical Association convention in San Francisco. For different views on the general topic, see Hess, Gary R., “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Indochina”, Journal of American History LIX (Sept. 1972): 353–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; LaFeber, Walter, “Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina”, American Historical Review LXXX (Dec. 1975): 1277–95Google Scholar; Thorne, Christopher, “The Indochina Issue Between Britain and the United States, 1942–1945”, Pacific Historical Review XLV (Feb. 1976): 73–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thorne, C., Allies of A Kind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Herring, George C., “The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina”, Diplomatic History I (Spring, 1977): 97–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 This paper will focus only on the interplay of these two themes, but several other issues, beyond the scope of this paper, influenced Anglo-American policies concerning Indochina. Some of these intertwining influences included territorial trusteeship, decolonization, relations with France, the personality of Charles de Gaulle, military events in Indochina, and the role of China, as well as two overriding general issues: military grand strategy and the politics of coalition diplomacy. Moreover, the subsequent postwar importance of Indochina should not lend undue emphasis to the relatively minor role Indochina played in Anglo-American relations from 1940 to 1945.
3 For a complete account of British policy decisions, memoranda, and events in Southeast Asia from Nov. 1940 to Dec. 1941, see the records of the Far Eastern Committee and its agencies, in CAB 96/1, Public Record Office, London (hereinafter referred to as PRO). See especially the reports of the British Consuls in Haiphong and Saigon, enclosed in FE(40)42, 5 Nov. 1940, CAB 91/1, PRO. See also C. K. Webster memorandum, “French Interests and Policies in the Far East”, 7 Mar. 1941, Webster Collection, Vol. VIII (b) III/i. Imperial War Museum, London. Important documents taken from the files of Georges Catroux (French Governor General in Indochina until 1940) pertaining to the 1940 situation are in R. Bloom's memorandum, 27 Feb. 1945, Record Group 59 Records of the Department of State, 740.0011PW/2–1545, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as SD).
4 See the Noble-Admiralty correspondence and deliberations of the Far Eastern Committee leading up to the Noble-Decoux Agreement of July 1940, in CAB 96/1, PRO. For valuable accounts of Japanese expansion into Indochina, see Morley, James, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia 1939–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)Google Scholar.
5 Noble to Admiralty, 5 Nov. 1940, enclosed in FE(40)42, 5 Nov. 1940, CAB 96/1, PRO.
6 Leith-Ross memorandum, FE(40)7, 7 Nov. 1940, ibid.
7 Noble to Admiralty, 28 Dec. 1940, FE(40)106, 30 Dec. 1940, ibid.
8 FE(40)7, 7 Nov. 1940, ibid. He warned, “Action against the Bank, therefore, raises both political and economic issues of some importance.” Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Economic Warfare argued, “It would, however, be anomalous to forbid British subjects to have dealings with Indo-China and yet not to treat Indo-China as an enemy destination for contraband and enemy export purposes.” See Ministry of Economic Warfare memorandum, FE(40)59, 18 Nov. 1940, ibid.
9 FE(40)106, 30 Dec. 1940, ibid. See also FE(41)1, 2 Jan. 1941, CAB 96/2, PRO; FE(41)6, 4 Jan. 1941, CAB 96/3, PRO; FE(41)46, 19 Feb. 1941, CAB 96/3, PRO; War Cabinet memorandum, “Japanese Intentions in Indo-China”, WP(41) 154, 6 July 1941, CAB 66/17, PRO.
10 Butler to Foreign Office, 25 Dec. 1940, FE(40)103, 28 Dec. 1940, CAB 91/1, PRO; Butler interview with the author, 4 June 1973, London. For Decoux's point of view, see Decoux, Jean, A la barre de l'Indochine (Paris: Plon, 1950), pp. 151–62Google Scholar. The title page bears the legend: “J'ai maintenu.”
11 United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), II, 561.Google Scholar
12 See Eden's report of his visit to the United States, WM(43)53, SSF (Secretary's Standard File — Confidential), 13 Apr. 1943, CAB 65/38, PRO; Cordell Hull memorandum, 27 Mar. 1943, folder “Eden's convs. March '43”, Record Group 59 Harley Notter Files, Box 284, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Notter Files).
13 Atherton to Pleven, as quoted in Eden to Lord Halifax, 29 Dec. 1943, FO 371.35921, F 6056/1422/61, PRO. Hereinafter all British archival records of the Foreign Office (FO 371 series), the PREMIER (or Prime Minister) Papers (PREM), War Cabinet Papers (WP), War Cabinet Minutes (WM), the minutes and memoranda of the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), and all CAB citations refer to the PRO.
14 Roosevelt to Petain, 27 Dec. 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereinafter referred to as PSF), folder “France 1941”, Box 41, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereinafter referred to as FDRL).
15 Rosenman, Samuel I., ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York: Random House, 1938–1950), XI, 455–57Google Scholar. Hereafter referred to as Rosenman, Public Papers and Addresses. For a similar guarantee by General Mark Clark to the French Vice Premier, Admiral Jean Darlan, 22 Nov. 1942, see their correspondence in the Mark Clark Papers, Box 1, Archives-Museum, the Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina (hereinafter referred to as Mark Clark Papers).
16 See the texts of two Murphy letters to Giraud, n.d., enclosed in Eden to Churchill, 4 Feb. 1943, FO 371.36427, L 1487/1266/69. Murphy forwarded copies of these letters carrying dates of 26–27 Oct. 1942 in a letter to Cordell Hull on 22 Mar. 1943 (folder “S France”, Box 78, Notter Files), but warned of discrepancies in the dates because the undated draft copies were shown to Giraud while the General was secretly in France. For more on various American pledges about the French Empire, see Murphy, Robert, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1964), pp. 119–23Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Murphy, Diplomat); Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), II, 1597–1601Google Scholar; see also General Mark Clark's memorandum of his meeting with French military officers (led by General Mast) in North Africa about the forthcoming invasion in Nov. 1942. The two officers and their staffs discussed the draft Murphy letters and made some revisions. (Mark Clark memorandum, 30 Oct. 1942, Mark Clark Papers, Box 2.)
17 Murphy, Diplomat, p. 168. Welles interrupted a meeting Hull was having with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to deliver a message from Roosevelt disavowing the pledges made by Murphy. See Stimson memorandum, 29 Dec. 1942, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Box 171, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (hereinafter referred to as Stimson Papers).
18 See, for example, the comments of Brendan Bracken (Minister of Information) in an interview with William R. Crozier, 1 July 1943, in the William R. Crozier Papers, folder “B. Bracken”, Box 1, Beaverbrook Library, London; also, Murphy, Diplomat, p. 102; Moran, Lord, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival (London: Constable, 1966), p. 224Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as Moran, Churchill). Secretary of State Cordell Hull, too, held a strong dislike for de Gaulle, whom he once described as a “little squirt” built up by the British. Hull's outburst to an astonished Hamilton Fish Armstrong is recorded in Michael Wright (British Embassy in Washington) to Neville Butler (Foreign Office), 19 July 1943, FO 371.35994, Z 8293/2/17 (on 29 July J.G. Tahourdin in the Foreign Office attached his comment: “Frightening!”).
19 Roosevelt frankly described this feeling to the French Ambassador Henri Hoppenot. See text of Hoppenot report, 16 Oct. 1944, as quoted in de Gaulle, Charles, War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944–1946: Documents, translated by Murchie, Joyce and Erskine, Hamish (London: Weidenfeld and Nicoloson, 1960), pp. 48–49Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as de Gaulle, Salvation). For Stimson's efforts to dissuade Roosevelt of this idea, see Stimson Diary, 25 Aug. 1944, Vol. 48, No. 62, Stimson Papers.
20 Roosevelt to Hull, 24 Jan. 1944, as quoted in Roosevelt, Elliott, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 3 vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), III, 1489–90.Google Scholar (Hereinafter referred to as E. Roosevelt, FDR Letters).
21 United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 485Google Scholar. (Hereinafter referred to as FRUS, Cairo and Tehran).
22 White, Theodore H., ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1948), pp. 251–54.Google Scholar
23 Rosenman, , Public Papers and Addresses, XIII, pp. 562–63Google Scholar. See also Roosevelt, Elliott, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 114–16Google Scholar; Roosevelt, Elliott and Brough, James, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), pp. 327–33.Google Scholar
24 Knight Memorandum, “The Economic Relations of Indo-China”, T-283, 23 Mar. 1943, folder “TDocs 280–89”, Notter Files, Box 34. Knight declared, “Back of the problem of who conspicuously has power and income in Indo-China is another question of who less conspicuously has income and power because of Indo-China. Even with the best of intentions distance and unfamiliarity tend to make the right and left hands of empire uncritical, if not incurious, of eash other's doings.” See also Knight memorandum, “France's Economic Relations With Her Empire”, T–251, 23 Feb. 1943, folder “T Docs 251–260”, ibid., Box 33.
25 Bowman memorandum, T–398, 29 Oct. 1943, folder “SEA”, ibid., Box 23.
26 James Masland and Amry Vandenbosch memorandum, “Indo-China: Political and Economic Factors”, T-398a, n.d., folder “T Docs 382–400a”, ibid., Box 36; also Masland memorandum, “The Political Status of Indo-China”, T-60, 3 Sept. 1942, folder “T Docs 37–66”, Box 31; “C.H.O.” memorandum “Imperialism Versus an Enlightened Colonial Policy in the Area of SEAC”, 6 Jan. 1945, “Briefing Book”, Box 2, Record Group 43 Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions: World War II Conferences (hereinafter referred to as RG 43), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
27 This growing consensus, however, did not last throughout the war. As hostilities neared an end (and as political considerations began to receive much more attention), State Department officials differed over the wisdom of decolonization. Officers on the European desks (led by James Dunn) believed that the United States had to cultivate close postwar relations with the European colonial powers and pointed out that anti-colonial policies jeopardized prospects for U.S.-European cooperation. Other officials, such as Abbot Low Moffat, called attention to the emerging force of nationalism among dependent peoples and argued that the United States, in her own best interests, should promote these nationalist movements, especially by blocking any attempts to restore prewar colonial controls. For a discussion of the growing split within the State Department, see Moffat's testimony in United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War, May 9, 10.and 11, 1972 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 161–205Google Scholar. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings … Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War.)
28 See minutes of Territorial Subcommittee Meeting #55, 5 Nov. 1943, and Meeting #56, 12 Nov. 1943, folder “Mins 50–59”, Notter Files, Box 42.
29 Eden to Churchill (in Algiers), 4 Feb. 1943, FO 371.36247, Z 1487/266/69. Eden wanted the American pledges “annuled or wholly recast”.
30 Churchill to Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee (for the War Cabinet), 1 Dec 1943, PREM 3–178/ 2.
31 See Eden to Churchill, 28 Dec. 1943, and Churchill to Eden, 25 Dec. 1943, PREM 3–178/2. For more on the British reluctance to provide guarantees, see Churchill memorandum of conversation with Robert Murphy, 4 Feb. 1943, FO 371.36247, Z 1487/266/69; Hugh Borton memorandum, “Indo-China: Military Government”, T–404, 9 Nov. 1943, folder “T Docs 401–416”, Notter Files, Box 36; C Easton Rothwell memorandum, “British Attitudes Towards the French Empire”, 14 Mar. 1943, folder “S France”, Notter Files, Box 78. It should be noted, however, that London did make an unprecedented offer to France just before the French surrendered in June 1940. The offer involved common Franco-British citizenship. For the text of the proposed Franco-British union, see Eden memorandum, “Sir Ronald Campbell's Final Despatch, June 27, 1940”, WP(41)61, 24 June 1941, CAB 67/9.
32 Halifax to Churchill, 5 Feb. 1943, PREM 4–27/9. In fact, Murphy believed his authority stemmed from a telegram 2 Nov. 1942 sent by Admiral William B. Leahy: “The decision of the President is that… you will do your utmost to secure the understanding and cooperation [for Torch] of the French officials with whom you are now in contact.” Murphy surmised, “This presidential directive clearly left it up to me to deal with our French allies in whatever ways I thought best.” Murphy, Diplomat, pp. 120–21.
33 WM(43)53, SSF, 13 Apr. 1943, CAB 65/38; Eden to Churchill, 29 Mar. 1943, PREM 4–42/9. See also, Harry Hopkins memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, Eden, and Hull, 22 Mar. 1943, Harry Hopkins Papers, Book 7, Box 329, FDRL. Hopkins stated that “from what Eden said it made me think the British are going to be pretty sticky about their former possessions in the Far East”. And from Cairo, Churchill informed the War Cabinet that “the President contemplates change” in the status of Indochina. Churchill to Attlee, 1 Dec 1943, PREM 3–178/2.
34 FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 325.
35 Ibid., pp. 485–86.
36 For extracts of the Roosevelt minute, 29 Feb. 1944 and Hull memorandum, 17 Feb. 1944, see Abbot Low Moffat (Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs) memorandum, “Developments — French Military Participation — Indochina”, 10 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–1044; and K.P. Landon (Special Political Assistant) to Hull, 6 July 1944, SD 740.0011WP/7–644.
37 A.L. Moffat memorandum, 10 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–1044. Moffat summarized the State Department memorandum (7 July), which received no presidential response. Moffat reported that Halifax delivered to the State Department a British aide-memoire on 26 Aug., which was then forwarded to Roosevelt and Leahy (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Roosevelt sent his reply to Hull on 28 Aug. Moffat made the revealing observation: “The Department was first informed of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the British Embassy.” He claimed that in a letter to Hull 29 Aug. Leahy outlined JCS acceptance of the French requests strictly by a military point of view. Actually, the JCS disapproved any French role in political warfare and accepted the British Chiefs' desire to deny French participation in strategic planning. See Sterndale Bennett memorandum, COS (45) 320 (0), 8 May 1945, CAB 80/94. This paper asserted that the JCS never replied officially to the British Chiefs and that the State Department was told by the White House to await the pending Roosevelt-Churchill talks but “no such opportunity ever occurred”. See also Landon to Roosevelt, 7 July 1944, SD 740.0011PW/7–744; State Department memorandum, 12 Jan. 1945, RG 43, folder “Vincent”, Tab “Indochina”, Box 8; Murphy (enclosing copy of French request to British on 24 May) to Hull, 10 June 1944, SD 740.0011PW/3967. In early July 1944, H. Freeman Matthews warned Roosevelt that the British might try to convince the French that the United States was responsible for delaying recognition of the Provisional Government. He urged Roosevelt to extent recognition as “a stepwhich would make difficult, if not impossible, the undermining of our position in France”. Matthews to Roosevelt, n.d., folder “Memoranda for the President 1943–1944”, RG 59 Records of the Department of State: Records of the Office of European Affairs, 1943–1947: Files of H. Freeman Matthews (hereinafter referred to as Matthews Files), Box 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
38 See the summaries and extracts in A.L. Moffat memorandum, 10 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–1044; Sterndale Bennett memorandum, COS (45) 320 (0), 8 May 1945, CAB 80/94; State Department memorandum, 12 Jan. 1945, RG 43, folder “Vincent”, Tab “Indochina”, Box 8. See also the testimony of A.L. Moffat, Hearings … Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War, pp. 161–205.
39 Moffat memorandum, 10 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–1044.
40 See Stettinius to Roosevelt, 2 Nov. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder “Indochina”, Box 55, FDRL; Roosevelt to Stettinius, 3 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–2444. Donovan is quoted in the Moffat memorandum, 10 Nov. 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11–1044; see also Donovan to Roosevelt, 10 July 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder “OSS Reports July 1944”, Box 168, FDRL. The French had been preparing plans to participate in the war against Japan, especially in Indochina, for over a year. See, for example, the detailed French plans, including specific unit assignments, in a 1943 strategic staff study by a French officer (Lt. Col. Herkel), enclosed in Brigadier General A.K. Kingman (U.S. Army, Chief of the French Training Section) to Lieutenant General Mark Clark, 24 Aug. 1943, Mark Clark Papers, Box 2.
41 See Stettinius to Roosevelt, 23 Nov. 1944, and Roosevelt to Stettinius, 24 Nov. 1944, both in SD 740.0011PW/11–2444. For the text of the British aide-memoire, 22 Nov. 1944, see Halifax to Stettinius, 23 Nov. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder “lndo-China”, Box 55, FDRL. The President later told Stettinius, “I still do not want to get mixed up in any lndo-China decision. It is a matter for postwar. By the same token I do not want to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of lndo-China from the Japanese”. Roosevelt to Stettinius, 1 Jan. 1945, SD 740.0011PW/1–145. In hisdiary, Stettinius quoted this message, observing that there was much discussion at the time about French sabateurs entering Indochina. See Vol. III, Sect. V, 2, 21–22, RG 59 Records of the State Department: Stettinius Diaries: 1 Dec 1944–3 July 1945, 8 vols., National Archives, Washington, D.C.
42 Foulds memorandum (and attached minutes), 7 Sept. 1943, FO 371.35921, F 4646/1422/61. Foulds warned, “A France hostile to ourselves might well be able to supplement her own strength by diplomatic connexions of a traditional kind, e.g., a revival of the French-Czechoslovak-Soviet bloc.”
43 “Future Relations With France”, PH P(44)32(Final), 19 May 1944, CAB 81/42; also see COS(44)485(0), 25 May 1944, CAB 80/84; PHP(44)28, 15 May 1944, CAB 81/40; and two Foreign Office Research Department studies: “The Policy and Interests of France in the Far East”, and “The Policy and Interests of the British Empire in the Far East”, enclosed in Geoffrey Hudson to H. Ashley Clarke, 23 Feb. 1943, FO 371.55917, F 1098/877/61.
44 Churchill to General Hastings Ismay, COS(45)237(0), 4 Apr. 1945, CAB 80/93.
45 Text of Churchill speech, 11 Nov. 1944, PREM 4–76/2. On Churchill's love for France, Lord Moran commented, “In Winston's eyes, France is civilization.” (Moran, Churchill, p. 224.)
46 See Eden memorandum, “The Future of Indo-China and Other French Pacific Possessions”, WP(44)111, 16 Feb. 1944, CAB 66/47, approved at WM(44)25, 24 Feb. 1944, CAB 65/41; Eden memorandum, “Indo-China”, WP(44)444, 13 Aug. 1944, CAB 65/33, approved at WM(44)106, 14 Aug. 1944, CAB 65/43; COS(44)890(0), 9 Oct. 1944, CAB 80/88; Churchill to War Cabinet, 1 Dec. 1943, PREM 4–74/2 Pt. 2; PHP(44)21, 25 Apr. 1944, CAB 81/40; T.L. Rowan to Churchill, 13 Mar. 1944, PREM 3–178/2.
47 Peterson to Ismay, 11 Mar. 1944, COS(44)249(0), 13 Mar. 1944, CAB 80/81.
48 Foulds memorandum, 7 Sept. 1943, FO 371.35921, F 4646/1422/61.
49 See Cavendish-Bentick minute, 22 Dec. 1943, attached to Halifax to Eden, 19 Dec. 1943, FO 371.35921, F 6656/1422/61. The anxious Halifax had suggested “putting the brake on” the mounting American anticolonial rhetoric. For other similar comments by Cavendish-Bentick, see his minutes 15 Sept. 1943 (FO 371.35921, F 4871/1422/61) and 30 Oct. 1943 (FO 371.35921, F 5608/1422/61). In the latter minute, he endorsed the French request for membership in the London Pacific War Council, but he said, “we should have to dispense with the ornamental presence of a Filipino as I do not believe that we stock one here”. And in the same minute, he described the projected French Far Eastern force as “a heterogeneous collection of black men”. Cavendish-Bentick had served in the Foreign Office since 1919.
50 PHP(44)2(Final), 22 Jan. 1944, CAB 81/45.
51 “Japanese Intentions in Indo-China”, WP(41)154, 6 July 1941, CAB 66/17, approved by the War Cabinet at WM(41)66,7 July 1941, CAB 65/19; Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, 1945–1955, rev. ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 19–26; Foreign Office memorandum, 12 Mar. 1945, PREM 3–178/2.
52 Marshall to Stilwell, 28 Aug. 1943, Record Group 332 Records of United States Theaters of War: World War II: Stilwell Files, Vol. 2, Box 2, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
53 Mountbatten to Roosevelt, 23 Oct. 1943, PREM 3–90/3.
54 Mountbatten interview with the author, 2 Aug. 1973, London; Mountbatten, , Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, 1943–1945 (London: H.M.S.O., 1951 [written 31 July 1947]Google Scholar), see the text of “Agreement With the Generalissimo” at Appendix D. Minutes, of the Mountbatten-Generalissimo meetings, 16–22 Oct. 1943, may be found in AIR 23/2247, PRO. The original view of the British Chiefs was that Siam (Thailand) and Indochina would be included in the SEAC boundaries. See COS(43)310(0), 16June 1943, CAB 80/70; also Foreign Office memorandum, “South East Asia Command: Boundaries”, COS(43)702(0), 10 Nov. 1943, CAB 80/76.
55 United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 770Google Scholar. Roosevelt subsequently declared that “Stalin would play ball if approached right” about territorial trusteeship. See Charles Taussig memorandum of conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt, 27 Aug. 1945, Charles Taussig Papers, folder “1945 — July to December incl.”, Box 52, FDRL.
56 FRUS, Yalta, 1945, pp. 844–45, 856–59, 935, 944–47, 977, Alger Hiss played a key role in framing the language of the agreement.
57 Taussig memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 15 Mar. 1945, Taussig Papers, Box 52, FDRL; also Taussig to Stettinius, 16 Mar. 1945, Stettinius Diaries, Vol. IV, Sect. VII, 50, National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a good summary of Roosevelt's views on wartime relations with France, see Roosevelt to Edwin C. Wilson (American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation), 5 Jan. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder “France 1944–45”, Box 42, FDRL.
58 Stettinius to Jefferson Caffrey (American Ambassador in France), 10 Apr. 1945, SD 740.0011PW/3–1245; H. Freeman Matthews to Francis Lacoste (Counsellor, French Embassy in Washington), 19 Apr. 1945, SD 740.0011PW/3–1945. For more on Roosevelt's views, see Dulles, Foster Rhea and Ridinger, Gerald E., “The Anti-Colonial Policies on Franklin D. Roosevelt”, Political Science Quarterly LXX (Mar. 1955): 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reynolds, David, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 187Google Scholar; also Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.
59 Grew to Truman, 16 May 1945, SD 740.0011PW/5–1645.
60 See the report of this Truman-Bonnet conversation in Matthews to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 23 May 1945, SD 740.0011PW/5–2345. For more on the attitude of the Truman Administration, see Sterndale Bennett memorandum, COS(45)320(0), 8 May 1945, CAB 80/94; COS(45)352(0), 22 May 1945, CAB 80/94; COS(45)135,24 May 1945, CAB 79/80; Grew memorandum of conversations with Bonnet, 13 June 1945 (SD 740.0011PW/6–1345) and 19 May 1945 (Joseph C. Grew Papers, Vol. 7, folder 16, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts). For a 1945 report on some of the French military activities (Mission 5) in Southeast Asia, see Sainteny, General Jean, Histoire d'une paix manquee Indochine, 1945–1947 (Paris: Fayard, 1967), pp. 253–59.Google Scholar
61 Sino-American Staff Meeting #73 (Chungking), 15 Aug. 1945, Record Group 332 Records of United States Theaters of War, World War II: Files of General Albert Wedemeyer, folder “G-mo's Mins, Vol II”, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. See also Hurley to Truman, 10 Aug. 1945, SD 740.0011PW/8–1045.
62 Mountbatten interview with the author, 2 Aug. 1973, London.
63 Ibid. See also Sbrega, John J., “The Japanese Surrender: Some Unexpected Consequences in Southeast Asia”, Asian Affairs VII (Sept./Oct. 1979): 45–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
64 Seymour to Foreign Office, 4 Oct. 1945, FO 371.46214, F 7861/186/10; Mountbatten to Foreign Office, 7 Jan. 1945, COS(45)64(0), 21 Jan. 1945, CAB 80/91; also COS(45)237, 28 Sept. 1945, extracted in FO 371.46214, F 7927/186/10; Admiral Sir James Somerville to Mountbatten, 27 Mar. 1945, Admiral Somerville Papers, folder 9/2, Churchill College, Cambridge University; Sterndale Bennett memorandum, COS(45)352(0); 22 May 1945, CAB 80/94; Prime Minister Attlee memorandum, COS(45)529(0), 12 Aug. 1945, CAB 80/96.
65 Sterndale Bennett to the British Chiefs of Staff, 25 Sept. 1945, COS(45)598(0), 3 Oct. 1945, CAB 80/97.
66 Slim memorandum, COS(45)607(0), 9 Oct. 1945, CAB 80/97; see also the collection of documents in Great Britain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945–1965 (London: H.M.S.O., 1965)Google Scholar.
67 Churchill to Eden, 18 Oct. 1942, PREM 4–100/7. Roosevelt complained to Charles Taussig, “Churchill shows little interest in postwar problems.” Taussig memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 18 Feb. 1943, Taussig Papers, folder “Miscellaneous 1939–1944”, Box 52, FDRL. See also, Sbrega, John J., “Anglo- American War Aims in World War II”, Virginia Social Science Journal XIV (Nov. 1979): 67–78.Google Scholar
68 Roosevelt to Stettinius, 3 Nov. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder “Indo-China”, Box 55, FDRL.
69 See, for example, the testimony of Abbot Low Moffat before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings … Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War, pp. 161–65. At a meeting of the American delegation during the San Francisco Conference, Nelson Rockefeller inquired if the United States had ever intended to place all dependent areas under trusteeship. Leo R. Pasvolsky replied that there had never been any serious plans to do so, “although there had been some ‘wild’ ideas concerning a complete trusteeship system”. See Minutes of Commission II Meeting, 20 June 1945, folder “Drafting Book — II”, Notter Files, Box 275. For more on the related issue of trusteeship, see folder “United Nations”, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, PSF, Box 188, FDRL; Taussig Papers, folder “Trusteeship — Background Material Before San Francisco”, Box 59, FDRL; also the excellent study by Wm. Louis, Roger, Imperialism at Bay — The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.
