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Vaassen, Bram
2023.
Absence and Abnormality.
Analysis,
Vol. 83,
Issue. 1,
p.
98.
Article contents
Absence Causation for Causal Dispositionalists
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2018
Abstract
Several theories of causation rule out causation of or by lacks, omissions, or absences of things. They thereby conflict with much of what we think and say about what causes what. This article proposes a modification of one kind of theory, causal dispositionalism, so that it accepts absence causation while retaining a fundamental commitment of dispositionalism.
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Footnotes
Thanks to Rani Lill Anjum, Sara Bernstein, Stephen Kearns, Sam Murray, and Nat Stein for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks as well to an editor and a referee for this journal, and to an audience at the 2018 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.
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